IR 05000395/1998006
| ML20239A370 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20239A369 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-98-06, 50-395-98-6, NUDOCS 9809090104 | |
| Download: ML20239A370 (22) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II'
Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Report No.: 50-395/98-06 Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)-
Facility: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
. Location: P.- 0. Box 88 Jenkinsville. SC 29065-Dates: June 28 - July 25, 1998 Inspectors: B. Bonser. Senior Resident Inspector M. King. Resident Inspector (In-Training)
E. Girard Reactor Inspector RII (Section E8.1)
D. Jones. Reactor Inspector. RII (Sections R1.2. R1.3, and R1.4)
W. Kleinsorge. Reactor Inspector. RII (Sections M (partial). M1.2 (partial). M8.1. M8.2. M8.3.'and E8.2)
Approved by: R. C. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects I
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9809090104 990924 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G PDR
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- _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ . 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V. C. Summer Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/98-06 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operation maintenance.. engineering and plant support. The report covers a four-week period of resident: ins)ection: in addition. it includes the results of announced inspections )y three regional inspector Ooerations
. Operato'rs acted promptly in response to a circulating water pump tri and prevented a.more-significant challenge to plant operation (Section 01.2).
. Following the discovery of voiding-in the A train Residual Heat Removal
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System, the licensee's initial corrective action to vent the gas and restore the system was incomplete in that the RHR pump was not ru When the A train RHR pump was run two days later additional gas problems were observe The licensee initiated a root cause evaluation to determine the cause of the voiding (Section 01.3).
. The inspectors found-the Auxiliary Building Lower Operator to be knowledgeable and familiar with his assigned duties and responsibilities during his rounds. Good self-checking and proper communication with the control room was noted (Section 04.1).
Maintenance' ,
e Observed maintenance activities on a component cooling water system pump breaker a service water system temporary leak repair and fabrication and welding of main steam system piping were conducted using the appropriate procedures, tools, and techniques. The maintenance technicians were knowledgeable and demonstrated good work practices (Section M1.1).
e' Observation of a-service water to emergency feedwater cross connect valve _ function test and a reactor building exhaust filtration system test revealed good communications. proper calibration of the test equipment and procedural adherence (Section M1.2).
Enaineerina i e An unresolved item was identified concerning the lack of a safety-evaluation. the use of risk analysis, and the administrative controls for blocking _ open steam propagation barriers (Section E1.1).
.~ The' licensee's root'cause evaluation of service water building fan failures was thorough and appeared to identify a common mode failur The pro)osed corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence of the pro)lem-(Section E1.2).
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- A' review'of various radiological control practices found the electronic dosimeter calibration. the C charging pump room I,urvey results, and.th control of locked high radiation-areas and associated records to be o appropriately performed and controlled (Section R1.1).
.... There was an overall decreasing trend in the collective personnel ;
exposures and the licensee was generally successful in neeting
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established goals for "As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA).
Maximum individual radiation exposures were controlled to levels which
.were well within the licensee's administrative limits and the regulatory limits for occupational dose specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(a)
-(Section R1.2).
Trainin! was provideddelineated with'th descriptions to Radiationin Protection the licensee's personnel in accordance Radiation Protection ;
-Manual and Nuclear Training Manual (Section R1.3).
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-* The licensee had conducted a comprehensive audit of the program for I packaging and transportation of radioactive material as required by i 10 CFR 71.137 (Section R1.4). i
- The licensee had aroperly prepared radioactive waste for shipment in !
accordance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirements for transport and disposal of radioactive materials (Section R1.5).
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e- Security. compensatory actions during plant work activities ensured that j the appropriate level of security was maintained (Section S1.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 9 power was reduced to 95 percent for feedwater booster pump repairs. On July 12 power
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was returned to 100 percent. On the evening of July 25 power was reduced to 78 percent following the failure of the B circulating water pump moto Doerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operation In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious: specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo .2 Circulating Water Pumo Trio Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a trip of B circulating water pum ,0 observations and Findinos At 10:26 p.m. on July 25 one of the three operating Circulating Water l (CW) pumps tripped while the unit was operating at 100 percent powe '
Operators promptly reduced power at a rate of one percent per minute to maintain appropriate condenser vacuum and circulating water temperatur Power was reduced to 77 percent. All primary systems responded as expected. Operators encountered balance of plant problems during and after this event with the turbine closed cycle cooling system and vacuum pumps. These problems were resolved to minimize the effects on plant operation. Operators followed the annunciator response procedure and operating procedures during the plant transient and responded promptly to prevent further challenges to plant operation. Subsequent investigations by the licensee discovered an electrical ground on the CW pump moto c. Conclusions Operators acted promptly in response to a CW pump trip, and prevented a more significant challenge to plant operatio .3 Response to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Void Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors reviewed and observed the licensee's response to unexpected voiding in the A train RHR syste _ _ - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ - _ _ __
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2 Observations and Findinas On July 21. during the 3erformance of surveillance test STP-205.00 " Residual Heat Removal ) ump and Valve Operability Test " Revision voiding was discovered in the A train RHR system. During the initial portion of the test when opening valve MVG-8706A (cross connect between A train RHR to A centrifugal charging pump) operators observed a three to four percent drop in Volume Control Tank (VCT) level. This level drop was unex)ected and operators immediately closed MVG-8706A as directed by t1e procedure. The VCT level drop was equivalent to about 60 gallons. The surveillance test was stopped and the A train RHR system was declared inoperable at 3:30 a.m. on July 2 The licensee initiated venting of the A train RHR system. When vent valves were opened significant amounts of gas were released. Most of the vented gas was located near the RHR heat exchanger at a high point in the RHR system. The licensee was unable to obtain a sam gas during the venting to determine the source of the gas.The ple of the inspectors observed portions of the venting. Following completion of the venting at 5:20 p.m. on July 21 the A train RHR system was declared operable. Similar venting of the B train RHR released no ga Surveillance test, STP-205.004. was started again and completed at 1:15 a.m. on July 23. During the test the A train RHR pump mini-flow switch (IFS 0602A) and associated mini-flow recirculation valve (FCV602A)
operated erratically. This flow switch controls RHR pump recirculation flow at low pump flow rates (valve opens at less than 710 gpm flow and closes at greater than 1326 gpm flow). After consulting with Operations management the operating shift declared the A train RHR system inoperable at 6:00 a.m. on July 23. The inspectors observed venting of flow switch (IFS 0602A) and noted some gas release, including a steady stream of small gas bubbles. The A train RHR system was declared operable at 7:00 p.m. on July 23 following the flow switch venting, additional system venting, and a functional check of the flow switc The inspectors * observations and review of the licensee actions in response to the A train RHR system voiding and flow switch problems concluded that the licensee had restored the A train RHR system to operability. Operator response was prompt to ensure that the charging system was not affected. The ins)ectors questioned the licensee's decision to declare the A train RiR system operable after system venting on July 21 without running the PHR pump. The inspectors were concerned that venting without running the A train pump may not have swept all the gas out of.the system. As a result of not running the A train RHR pump l when the system was initially vented, other gas related problems were not discovered for two additional days. During the time period that A train RHR system was inoperable B train RHR system was operabl In )
response to this concern, the licensee indicated they would review the RHR venting procedures and determine if pump runs should be included when significant amounts of gas are found during venting.
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The suspected cause for the A train RHR system voiding was leaking i valves in the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) allowing hydrogen '
intrusion into the RHR system from the pressurizer steam space. The licensee has taken actions to prevent further gas intrusion by tagging out that. portion of the PASS system and has increased RHR system venting ;
frequency from monthly to bi-weekly. In addition, the licensee is performing a formal root cause analysis of the RHR system voidin Conclusions Following the discovery of voiding in the A train RHR system, the licensee's initial corrective action to vent the gas and restore the system was incomplete in that the RHR pump was not' run. When the A train RHR pump was run two days later additional gas problems were - i observe The licensee initiated a root cause evaluation to determine the cause of the voidin Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Auxiliary Buildina Lower Ooerator Rounds j Insoection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors accompanied the Auxiliary Building -(AB) lower level operator during the performance of a routine tour and Technical Specification (TS) required log Observations and Findinas On June 29 the ins)ectors observed routine activities of the AB lower level operator whic1 included a complete tour of the assigned spaces and the. recording of the evening shift logs. The logs were performed in accordance with 0AP-106.1. Attachment V. " Auxiliary Building Lower Tech
. Spec Logsheet." Revision 6. Aren toured in the AB included the Hydrogen Recombiners, Waste Gas System. Charging / Safety Injection Pump rooms. Batteries and Battery Chargers, Component Cooling Water (CCW)
System. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps, and Chiller rooms. During the AB lower level operator rounds, the inspectors noted that the operator informed the control room properly prior to alarm checks (which would cause a control room alarm). While transferring waste gas tanks, the operator performed the valve line up carefully with good self-checking and with the system operating procedure in hand. The operator demonstrated a good level of knowledge and familiarity with his assigned duties and responsibilitie Conclusions L The inspectors found the AB lower level operator to be knowledgeable and familiar with his assigned duties and responsibilities during his rcunds. Good self-checking and proper communication with the control
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l I Maintenance j M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1.0bservation of Work Activities Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities.
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b, Observations and Findinas On July 1. the inspectors observed replacement and maintenance' of. .. -
breaker XSW1DB13 (B CCW pump breaker). The ins Request (WR) 9807773 and associated procedures.pectors The activities reviewed Work observed were performed properly and the inspectors noted oversight by a Quality Control (OC) inspector, t
On July 22. the inspectors observed WR 9811991.'" Remove Temporary Patch So System Engineer Can Evaluate Leakage. Reinstall Patch As Required After Inspection." On the morning of July 22. the licensee identified that the Service Water (SW) System patch, a tem)orary non-code repair initially-installed in accordance with Generic _etter (GL) 90-05 (see NRC Inspection Report 50-395/98-04 Section El.1) was found to be leaking during a weekly qualitative assessment. The inspectors observed all activities associatec with the removal, cleaning, and reinstallation
'of the tem)orary non-code repair clamp and gasket. The inspectors reviewed t1e GL-90-05' relief request dated May 13. 1998. Nonconformance Control Notice 98-0369. and the calculation su) porting the flaw evaluation using the Through-Wall Flaw approac1. Observations were compared with GL 90-05. Memorandum 815.14 CGSS-93-0940. " GUIDANCE ON GENERIC LETTER 90-05." dated March 12, 1993, and the Final Safety Analysis Report-(FSAR). All observed activities were accomplished in accordance with procedural and regulatory requirement On July 23. the inspectors observed welding activities associated with WR 9801507 " Fabrication of Piping for Refueling Outage 11-." The inspectors observed welding and inspection associated with the main steam system piping. The inspectors examined the following quality records: Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) 18F-300: supporting Procedure Qualification Record (POR) B5-5L: welder performance test records: records attesting to the maintenance of welder qualification:
T welding filler material requisitions; receiving inspection reports: and t certified material test reports. Observations were compared with
. procedures. the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler L
and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Section IX, and the FSAR. The inspectors determined that welding was being accomplished by qualified '
and certified welders, in accordance with WPSs that were supported by PORs. and conducted in accordance with ASME Section IX.
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5 Conclusions Observed maintenance activities on a CCW pump breaker, a SW system temporary leak repair, and fabrication and welding of main steam system piping were conducted using the appropriate procedures, tools, and
-. techniques .' The maintenance technicians were knowledgeable and demonstrated good work practice M1.2 Surveillance Observation Insoection Scooe (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed surveillance testing activitie Observations and Findinas On ' July 21. the inspectors observed a portion of surveillance test'STP-503.003. "A Train Service Water To Emergency Feedwater Cross Connect i Function Test." The inspectors observed activities at-the motor control '
center. The technicians performing the test followed the procedure and were knowledgeable of the tas On July 20 and 21 the inspectors observed performance of STP-455.00 Reactor Building Exhaust HEPA and HECA Filter Test." Revision 2. The test demonstrated the ability of the reactor building purge exhaust HEPA and adsorption filters to remove particulate and gaseous contaminatio The inspectors also observed _the iisual-inspection of the reactor purge exhaust filter plenum, and noted proper confined space entry controls, proper. calibration of the test equipment, proper use of safety belts and i good Health Physics (HP) oversight of the-job progres .l Conclusions Observation of a service water to emergency feedwater cross connect valve function test and a reactor building exhaust filtration system-test revealed good communications, proper calibration of the test
. equipment, and procedural adherenc M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92700, 92902)
M (Closed)'VIO 50-395/97013-07: Failure to conduct Technical Specification required snubber inspections. This item addressed the
. licensee's failure to test potentially damaged snubbers after an-unexpected potentially damaging plant transient. The licensee attributed the. violation to a lack of programmatic guidance on actions following a significant plant transient. The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER) 97-04. Revision 1. dated November 11, 1997.
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-and noted that-the licensee had made an adequate survey to determine the
, extent of the problem and took appropriate corrective action The i
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inspectors reviewed the revised. procedure which should )reclude i recurrence of the problem. The inspectors noted that tie appropriate 1 testing had been conducted at the next refueling outage (RF 10) to i I
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assure compliance with the TS. Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions were adequat M8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-395/97014-01: Two examples: 1) failure to initial and date the Prerequisites Complete and Limits and Precautions Reviewed steps when performed as required by maintenance control procedures, and l 2) failure to meet the specified criteria for the storage of a portable air monitoring cabinet in the vicinity of safety-related service water system. The licensee attributed the violation to personnel errors. The inspectq,rs noted that the licensee had made an adequate survey to :
determine the extent of the problems with equipment storage and took appropriate corrective actions, and noted that appropriate training had been conducted. Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee'; corrective actions were adequate. While reviewing this item the in0 ctors questioned whether Maintenance Rule components should also be protected from stored equipment. The licensee indicated that they would look further into this matter and take appropriate action M8.3 (Closed) LER 50-395/97004-00 and -01: Technical Specification noncompliance and piping analysis exceeds code allowables due to snubber failures. This item addressed the licensee's failure to test
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I potentially damaged snubbers after an unexpected potentially damaging plant transient and was the subject of Violation 50-395/97013-07. In addition, the LER addressed snubbers that the licensee believed failed due to lubrication degradation. The licensee's survey to determine the extent of the problems, both those to address Violation 50-395/97013-07, and the snubbers they believed failed due to lubrication degradation, were appropriate. The licensee's corrective actions including walkdowns, ultrasonic examination of welds or pipe and weld replacement, additional snubber testing, and ASME code fatigue qualification completed by Westinghouse, was ap3ropriate to the circumstances. The revision to procedure SAP-1122. siould prevent recurrence of similar circumstances. Based on this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions were adequat II Enoineerina El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Control of Steam Procacation Barriers (SPBs) Insoection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative controls of SPBs and the risk analysis performed to support the controls over these barriers.
! Observations and Findinas As a result of maintenance observations the inspectors questioned the i licensee's administrative controls over fire doors that also serve as ;
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SPB The licensee routinely disables SPB doors for administratively controlled periods to perform maintenance. In the case observed, the door to the B train vital AC switchgear room was disabled for several hours to change-out a circuit breaker. The inspectors were concerned whether the licensee's administrative practices, which have established allowed outage times for these SPBs, had introduced the potential for an unreviewed safety questio The licensee has defined SPBs as design features which minimize the flow paths available for steam propagation in the event of a postulated steam line break. The SPBs protect areas containing safety related equipment designed to operate in a mild environment from the effects of steam exposure resulting from certain design basis accidents. SPBs include various fire rated assemblies, control room pressure boundary barriers, and associated Penetrations seals. The licensee controls fire barriers that include SP3s under fire protection procedure. FPP-025, " Fire Containment." Revision 2. The procedure identifies the fire doors that also serve as SPB The licensee designates SPBs as either risk significant or less risk signi ficant. Risk significant SPBs protect the risk significant areas identified in FPP-025. Risk significant areas are those areas within the plant that contain equipment whose failure during an event such as a steam line break would significantly degrade plant safety. The risk significant areas defined in FPP-025 inc'ude the control room. the relay room, and areas containing vital AC and vital DC powe In FPP-025 the licensee has established guidelines for the control of SPBs. The less risk significant SPB doors are limited to being blocked open for seven days. Risk significant SPB doors are limited to twelve hours (one shift). In Modes 1 through 4 the risk significant SPBs other than doors cannot be degraded without approval by engineering service The number of SPBs out of service is also limited to one barrier at a time. System engineering also maintains a running total of hours that the SPBs are ope The licensee established a basis for the controls over the SPBs by performing a probabilistic risk analysi The licensee's approach limited the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) associated with secondary side breaks occurring outside the reactor building to 1.0E-06/yr. A large steamline break accident was used as the representative event for the analysis since it presented a greater challenge to the plant than other high energy line breaks. The risk analysis concluded that a total allowed outage time of 1632 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20976e-4 months <br /> in a rolling 18 month window for the less risk significant SPBs would limit the increase in CDF to less than 1.0E-06/yr. The risk analysis assumed that only one steam pressure barrier would be breached at a time and i recommended that the allowed outage time be limited to seven days.
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Risk significant dreas were not included in the probabilistic risk analysis based on the licensee's recognition that disabling SPBs for f these areas would exceed the CDF goal of 1.0E-06/y The licensee's
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risk analysis stated that penetrations through SPBs that protect equipment in certain risk significant areas was either not allowed or required further analysis. The inspectors were concerned that the licensee's administrative controls appeared to contradict the assumptions of the risk analysis for risk significant areas and potentially increase the risk of unanalyzed conditions following a steam line brea The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records that tracked the outage time on all SPBs and found that the SPB outages were being controlled within the established administrative limits. The licensee stated that
.they considered blocking open the SPB doors, including the risk significant doors, for a controlled period of time to perform work activities was within the definition of normal use and was not considered to be a change to the facility as described in the FSA Pending further review of the licensee's risk analysis used to support their administrative controls for SPBs the administrative controls, and the preparation of the controlling procedure without performing a safety evaluation is identified as Unresolved Item (URI) 50-395/98006-0 c. Conclusions Unresolved item 50-395/98006-01 was identified concerning the lack of a safety evaluation, the use of risk analysis, and the administrative controls for blocking open steam propagation barrier E1.2 Review of Root Cause Evaluation For SW Buildino Fans Failure Insoection Scone (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause evaluation for the failure of both SW building fan Observations and Findinas On June 10. the licensee identified that both SW building fans had trip)ed. The licensee's initial investigation identified that on both
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i fan 3reakers the left line phase from the breaker stab assembly was I damaged (see NRC Inspection Report 50-395/98-05). The initial investigation identified that the left line phase supplies, in part, the
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control power for the fan's indicating lights and its associated fan )
. trip alarm. When control power was lost the fan tripped alarm was j disabled on the ventilation panel in the control room and no alarm was ,
t received. The licensee's review of equipment history for the SW building fans and their associated breakers identified that two previous breaker failures had occurred in 1993 and in 199 The licensee's root cause evaluation concluded that the most probable cause for the leads overheating was due to loose termination lugs. Two factors appeared to contribute to the lugs becoming loose over tim One factor involved not sleeving the fine stranded wire at the breaker
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termination lugs. In 1987. Square D. the breaker manufacturer, issued a bulletin concerning the use of fine stranded wire with mechanical lug The. bulletin suggested that not sleeving finely stranded wire could lead to false torque indications which could result in wire overheating and easy wire pullout. Although the bulletin did 'not specifically require sleeves for the wire size used in the SW building fan breakers. the breaker manufacturer indicated.that it was wise to sleeve all fine wound wire The second contributing factor identified by the licensee was the properties of dissimilar metals in contact with each other could result in uneven expansion and contraction. In this case, an aluminum alloy lug fastened a cop)er wire on to the breaker With alternating monthly runs of the fans t1ese wires and lugs were subject to rapid heat-up and cooldown cycle The inspectors concluded that the licensee had identified the apparent root cause for the breaker failures and had recommended appropriate corrective action. The inspectors also discussed with the licensee why this vendor bulletin had not been reviewed sooner. The licensee's investigation of their operating experience program found that the breaker vendor had never sent the bulletin to the licensee. The licensee's review concluded that this event could have been avoided had the vendor bulletin been receive ,
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' Conclusions The licensee's root cause evaluation of SW building fan failures was thorough and appeared to identify a common mode failure. The pro)osed corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence of the pro)le E8 Miscellaneous Engineering. Issues (92700, 92903)
E (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50-395/97001-02: Actions to address weaknesses in valve factors. This followup item was opened pending the licensee's completion of Regulatory Tracking System (RTS)
items LIC-MSP970008 and LIC-MSP97000 In the current inspection, the inspectors reviewed related documentation and confirmed that the RTS items had been satisfactorily completed, as described below:
RTS Item LIC-MSP970008 This RTS item specified the following actions for the licensee's Group 13 motor-operated gate valves:
- Evaluate industry data to verify that a sufficiently high valve factor.was assumed in calculating the thrust requirements applied to these valve _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ ____-____-__a
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. Bypass the close torque switches of the valves to increase their available valve factors and thereby provide'added assurance that they will close under design basis condition The inspectors confirmed completion of the above actions through a review of the following documentation: -
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Work Requests 9716047 and 9716048. which bypassed the close torque l switches of the Group 13 valve *
Engineers Technical Work Record Book MOV7, Serial R015239. " Group 13 IFI Eval.." dated August 27, 1997, which reviewed test data obtained from several industry sources and showed that it supported the valve factor which had been assumed for the Group 13 gate valve .
The inspectors concluded that RTS Item LIC-MSP970008 was complet RTS Item LIC-MSP970009 I
This RTS item indicated that industry data would be evaluated to verify that sufficiently high valve factors had been assumed in calculating thrust requirements for Group 10. 11, 12. and 22 motor-operated gate valves. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee had completed the evaluations by reviewing the following supporting documentation: ;
- Engineers Technical Work Record Book MOV7 Serial R01523 " Comanche Peak MOVs vs. VCSNS MOVs." dated July 23, 1997 (evaluation of industry test data applicable to Groups 10,1 and 12)
. Engineers Technical Work Record Book MOV7. Serial R01523 "Clinton Power Station MOVs vs. VCSNS MOVs." dated August 26, 1997 (evaluation of industry test data applicable to Group 22)
The documented evaluations listed above determined that some of the valve factors previously selected were acceptable, while others were too low. New higher valve factors were proposed to replace those considered too low. Valve capabilities at the current settings were evaluated and the valves were determined to be capable of performing their design functions. The inspectors found that the data provided in the evaluations supported the licensee's determinations. The inspectors reviewed the following licensee calculations and confirmed that the new valve factors had been incorporated into the calculations:
. Calculation DC01520-059. " Minimum Required Thrust for Rising Stem MOVs in the Safety Injection System." Revision 6 (Groups 10. 1 and 12)
. Calculation DC01520-056. "Minimua. Required Thrust for Rising Stem MOVs in the MS System." Revision 6 (Group 13)
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. Calculation DC01520-064. " Minimum Required Thrust for Rising Stem MOVs in the FS System." Revision 4 (Group 22)
The inspectors concluded that RTS Item LIC-MSP970009 was complet E8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-395/97007-02: Inadequate procedure for snubber replacemen This item addressed the licensee's failure to provide a procedure with appropriate instructions for the installation of a Grinnel pipe restraint. The licensee attributed the violation to procedural deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the response letter:
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noted that the. licensee had made an adequate survey to determine the extent of the problem and took. appropriate corrective actions: reviewed the revised procedure which should preclude recurrence of the problem:
.and noted that appropriate training had been conducted. This issue is considered close E8.3 (Closed) LER 50-395/98007-00: Potential failure of Westinghouse fuel rod design criteria discovered by Westinghouse while updating PAD cod On July 7 the licensee reported that Westinghouse performed a site specific fuel analysis which showed that at a Cycle 11 burnup of 10.670 Megawatt Days per Metric Ton of Uranium (MWD /MTU) the gap between the fuel pellet and the cladding may reopen due to a conservatively calculated fuel rod internal pressure. This fuel burnup occurred on July 17. The licensee reported this event based on a potential violation of the fuel rod design bases specified in FSAR Section 4.2.1.1 1. The FSAR states that the internal pressure of the lead rod'
in the reactor will be limited to a value.below that which would cause the diametric gap to increase due to outward cladding creep during steady state operation. Westinghouse performed a bounding safety assessment and concluded that the Cycle 11 Reload Safety Evaluation for Summer remained valid and plant operation could continue through the
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full fuel cycle.- As corrective action the LER stated that Westinghouse has developed a comprehensive plan to resolve the fuel rod internal 3ressure issue and that the licensee will continue to monitor the Westinghouse long term corrective actions for this issue. Based on this review.-the inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions
.were-adequate IV. Plant Supoort R1 - Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Radiological Controls Insoection Scooe (71750)
The-inspectors reviewed several radiological control practices and discussed these practices with a HP technician. Areas of review L . included electronic dosimeter alarm checks and calibration, walkdown l verification of an HP survey and verification of HP control of access for locked high radiation and very high radiation area ___ _ - - _ __-_ _ -_ _ __ - - _ ___ - _ - _ - _ - __ _ _ ---__
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12 Observations-and'Findinas On July 2. the inspectors selected at random three electronic dosimeters (two standard issue and one emergency issue dosimeter). The inspectors had HP' personnel perform actual dose rate alarm and dose margin alarm checks on these electronic dosimeters using a Cesium-137 source. All of the dosimeters operated properly and both the rate and dose alarms occurred at the expected alarm settings. .The inspectors confirmed the calibration due date for all.the electronic dosimeters available on the racks.(both standard and emergency issue) and no discrepancies were
_: foun The inspectors performed a walkdown with radiological personnel of the C Charging Pump Room verifying the results of an HP survey (Survey # W-67)
performed the day before. Radiation levels posted were confirmed to be in agreement with the survey posting for the C Charging Pump Roo ' The' ins)ectors also performed a walkdown of a random sampling of the Locked ligh Radiation Areas'to verify the areas posting and barricades including locks were in place to restrict access in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 " Standards for Protection Against Radiation" and Regulatory Guide 8.38 " Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas in Nuclear Plants." All seven. areas selected were appropriately posted, barricaded and locked as required. The inspectors also reviewed licensee surveillance paper work associated with weekly verifications of all. locked high radiation area and very high radiation area requirements and there were no discrepancies identified with the licensee progra Conclusions A review of various radiological control practices found the electronic dosimeter calibration. the C Charging Pump room survey results and the control-of locked high radiation areas and associated records to be appropriately performed and controlle R1.2 Occupational Radiation Exoosure Control Proaram Insoection Scoce (83750)
The inspectors reviewed implementation of selected elements of the
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licensee's radiation protection program pertaining to control of occupational radiation exposure. The review included examination of licensee records'and reports for annual and outage collective dose, and comparison of the collective doses to the licensee's estabhshed goals for "As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA). The inspectors also reviewed records and reports of individual personnel exposure', and compared those ex)osures to the occupational dose limits specified in Subpart C to 10 C:R 20 and the licensee's procedurally established administrative limits for personnel exposure.
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i Observations and Findinas The licensee provided the inspectors with records of annual and outage collective dose for calender year 1997 and year-to-date 1998. The inspectors verified that the data was consistent with the licensee's Computerized Ex[;osure Nuclear Tracking System (CENTS) data base, which is used by the licensee to record and monitor personnel radiation exposure, and with outage ALARA re) ort The inspectors compiled the data in the table below, along wit 1 the data for the years 1994 through 1996, which were taken from similar tables contained in previous inspection reports.
, Collective Dose (man-rem)
Annual Dose Outage Dose Year Actual Goal 3 Year Outage Actual Goal Days Mean Type
1994 348 376 218 RF0-8.SGRP 336 360 97 1995 10 10 212 1996 107 117 155 RFO-9 89 110-Satisfactory 39 95-Good 80-Exceptional 1997 187 90 101 RF0-10 170 95-Satisfactory 33 80-Good 60-Exceptional
1998 As of 6/29/98 Steam Generator Replacement Project As indicated in the table. there was an overall decreasing trend in the collective personnel ex)osures and the licensee was successful in meeting established ALARA goals during the years 1994 through 199 However, the ALARA goals for calender year 1997 and Refueling Outage Number 10 (RF0-10) were exceeded due to elevated dose rates from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) piping and components. Those elevated dose rates were caused by the release of higher than antici3ated amounts of
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radioactive materials, from the internal surfaces of t1e RCS into the primary reactor coolant as the reactor was being shutdown for the RF The licensee also provided the inspectors with CENTS reports for maximum individual radiation exposures incurred during calender year 1997 and year-to-date 1998. The data is tabulated below, along with the data for the years 1994 through 1996. which were taken from similar tables l
contained in previous inspection reports.
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Maximum Individual Radiation Doses (Rem)
Year TEDE Skin Extremity Eye Lens 1994 1.370 1.370 1.355 1.370 1995 0.292 0.292 0.292 0.292 1996 -0.760 0.761- 0.761 0.760 1997 0.988 1.271 1.335 1.021
1998 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 Regulatory and Administrative Limits j 10 CFR 20 5.000 50.000 50.000 15.000 Admi .000- 40.000 40.000 12.000
2 As of 6/29/98 Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE)
As indicated in the table. the maximum individual radiation exposures were well within the regulatory limits for occupational dose specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(a) and the licensee's administrative limits established in procedure SAP-500 " Health Physics Manual."
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records for Personnel i Contamination Events (PCEs) which occurred during 1997 and year-to-date -l 1998. 'The procedurally established threshold for initiating followup actions for-PCEs was skin or clothing contamination in excess of 100 net-counts per minute-(ncpm) as measured by a hand held frisker. The licensee's records indicated that there had been a total of 337 PCEs I du. ring 1997. 71 before the RF0-10, 254 during the outage, and 12 afte i
~ Five of those events. all of which occurred before the outage, resulted i in assignments of skin dose. Each of the assigned skin doses were less than 300 millirem (mrem). As of June 29, 1998, there had been 20 PCEs and no skin dose assignments. -There were 72 uptakes of radioactive material during 1997, all during the outage. Three of those uptakes resulted _in assignment of internal dose, each of which were less than 100 mre No uptakes had occurred year-to-date 1998.
( ~ The licensee's records for contaminated floor space within the
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Radiological Control Area (RCA) were also reviewed by the inspector iThe licensee maintained records of the areas within the RCA, excluding ;
the Containment Building, which had smearable contamination levels in '
excess'of 1000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters
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(dpm/100 cm') from beta and gamma radioactivity. The threshold for
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alpha radioactivity was 100 dpm/100 cm . The contaminated square footage was tracked on a daily basis and the status as of the end of l
'each month was reported for trending purposes. The inspectors noted l that the contaminated floor space had decreased from approximately nine l
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percent of the RCA floor space, following the October 1997 RFO. to approximately three percent by the end of May 1998. The licensee's established goal for contaminated floor space during non-outage periods was 1.6 percent of the RCA floor spac c.. Conclusions Based on the above reviews and observations, the inspectors concluded that there was an overall decreasing trend in the collective personnel exposures and the licensee was generally successful in meeting established goals for "As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA).
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were well within the licensee's administrative limits and the regulatory limits for occupational ' dose specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(a).
R1.3 Radiological Protection Trainina and Qualification Insoection Scooe (83750)
The inspectors reviewed im) lamentation of the licensee's training and qualification program for Radiation Protection personnel. The. review-included an evaluation of the training provided to selected individuals for consistency with the training program description in the licensee's Radiation Protection Manua Observations and Findinas As described in Section 6.3 of the licensee's Radiation Protection Manual, the training and qualification 3rogram for Health Physics Technicians (HPTs) included basic healta physics training. on-the-job training, continuing training, and speciality training. The program was administered by the Nuclear Training department and implemented through the Nuclear Training Manual. Training and qualification records were maintained in the licensee's Taskmaster computer software. The inspectors reviewed the training records for two randomly selected HPT a Field Operations Technician and a Count Room Technicia The records included listings of the fundamental health physics courses com)leted for basic training prescribed tasks performed during on-the-jo)
training for qualification to perform specific functions and courses attended for continuing training. The inspectors determined that training had been provided for the selected individuals in accordance-with the licensee's established training program requirement Conclusions Training was provided to Radiation Protection personnel in accordance with the descriptions delineated in the licensee's Radiation Protection L Manual and Nuclear Training Manual.
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R1.4 Audits Insoection Scooe (86750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records for the most recent audit of their program for packaging and transportation of radioactive material. Those records were evaluated for consistency with the requirements' for audits specified in 10 CFR 71.13 Observations and Findinas
.The inspectors reviewed the report for Audit No. 0A-AUD-97003 Radioactive-Waste which was conducted on February 19 through March 12, 1997.. The audit report consisted of a description of the audit scope, a summary of the audit result. and follow-up on previously identified items. The inspectors also reviewed the Audit Checklist and Auditors Notes in order to evaluate the scope and death of the audit. The inspectors noted that the audit addressed t1e applicable elements of the quality assurance program for packaging and transportation of radioactive material as outlined in 10 CFR 71 Subpart H. The inspectors determined that the audit was of sufficient scope and depth to identify potential problems and that corrective actions for identified findings were monitored for completion through the Quality Action Item tracking system. The audit results were well documented and reported to facility management in a timely manner, Conclusions The licensee had conducted a comprehensive audit of the program for packaging and transportation 'of radioactive material as required by 10 CFR'71.13 R1.5 Transportation of Radioactive Material
] Insoection Scooe (86750)
The inspectors observed the preparation of a shipment of contaminated filters for disposal. The licensee's shipment pre)arations were !
evaluated for conformance with applicable NRC and Jepartment of Transportation (DOT) requirements for transport and disposal of radioactive material Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed closure of the transport cask containing the filters and noted that the applicable procedure for that o)eration was being followed. The inspectors also noted that good Healta Physics support was provided for that operation through frequent radiation and contamination surveys and good contamination control practices. The licensee used computer software as an aid in classifying and characterizing the material, pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 61.55.and 61.56 for radioactive waste shipped for land disposal. The i
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software was also used to generate the shipping pa)ers and manifest forms for the shipment. The inspectors reviewed t1e shipping papers and manifest and determined that they included the pertinent information required by 49 CFR 172 Subpart C. .As the vehicle used to trans) ort the l
shi) ping cask was released from the RCA, the inspectors noted tlat the l marcing and placarding on the cask and vehicle were appropriate, and that the driver was provided with copies of the shipping papers as require Conclusions l' .The licensee had 3roperly prepared radioactive waste for shipment in
- accordance with NRC and Department of Transportation requirements for transport and disposal of radioactive material ,
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
'S1.1 Observation of Security Compensatory Actions I Insoection Scoce'(71750)
The ' inspectors observed security compensatory actions during the observation of, in-plant work activitie b .' Observations and Findinos During observation of CCW ump breaker replacement the inspectors y observed security personne properly controlling access to the B train l vital switchgear room. The door card reader was disabled following removal of the mullion (vertical member between double doors) to allow changeout of the breake Conclusions Security compensatory actions during plant work activities ensured that the appropriate level of security was maintaine Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summar The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee management at tie conclusion of the inspection on July 29, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during-the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee F; Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics M Browne, Manager, Plant Support Engineering-S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations S. Furstenberg, Ha' 7er, Maintenance Services
.D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services G. Moffatt, Manager,' Design Engineering L. Hipp, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services t
~A. Rice, Manager. Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience G. Taylor, Vice President. Nuclear Operations R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authnrity B. Williams, General Manager. Engineering Services G. Williams,. Assocute Managy, Operations i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations 4 IP 71707: Plant Operations j IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 86750: Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioa.ctive l Materials IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Writtten Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities
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IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Ooened i 60-395/98006-01 URI Licensee controls of steam propagation barriers (Section El.1)
Closed 50-395/97013-07 VIO Failure to conduct Technical Specification required snubber inspection (Section M8.1)
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'50-395/97014-01 VIO Two examples: failure to initial and date the i Prerequisites Complete and Limits and Precautions !
Reviewed steps when performed as required by '
maintenance control procedures and failure to meet the specified criteria for the storage of a portable air monitoring cabinet in the vicinity of ;
safety-related service water system (Section M8.2) '
50-395/97004-00 LER Technical Specification noncompliance and pi)ing analysis exceeds code allowables due to snub)er failures (Section M8.3)
50-395/97004-01 LER Technical Specification noncompliance and pi aing analysis exceeds code allowables due to snub)er failures (Section M8.3)
50-395/97001-02 IFI Actions to address weaknesses in valve factors (Section E8.1)
50-395/97007-02 VIO Inadequate procedure for snubber replacement )
(Section E8.2) i
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50-395/98007-00 LER Potential failure of Westinghouse fuel rod design criteria discovered by Westinghouse while updating PAD code (Section E8.3)
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