IR 05000390/2018012
| ML18229A153 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/2018 |
| From: | Masters A NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| EA-16-061, EA-17-022 IR 2018012 | |
| Download: ML18229A153 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ust 17, 2018
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - FOLLOW-UP FOR NRC CONFIRMATORY ORDER EA-17-022 AND CHILLED WORK ENVIRONMENT LETTER EA-16-061; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2018012, 05000391/2018012
Dear Mr. Shea:
On June 29, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a follow-up inspection of NRC Confirmatory Order (CO) EA-17-022 (Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML17208A647) and Chilling Effect Letter (CEL) EA-16-061 (ML16083A479) at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. This inspection was conducted as a follow-up inspection as a result of items identified in the March 14, 2018, inspection report 05000390/2017009, 05000391/2017009 (ML18073A202). The NRC inspection team discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Paul Simmons and other members of your staff on June 29, 2018, followed by a discussion with NRC managers and staff on July 24, 2018. The team re-exited with TVA on August 10, 2018, with Lee Sanders and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection team reviewed Tennessee Valley Authoritys (TVA)s actions taken to date to address the NRC CO EA-17-022 and CEL EA-16-061. The team reviewed actions taken by the licensee to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE). In addition, the staff also interviewed station personnel and evaluated the attributes of a SCWE as described in inspection procedure (IP) 93100, Safety Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Follow-up. IP 93100 identifies a SCWE as an environment in which employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns, are free to raise concerns both to their own management and to the NRC without fear of retaliation, where concerns are promptly reviewed, given the proper priority, appropriately resolved, and timely feedback is provided to those raising concerns.
As part of the SCWE inspection activities, the inspection team conducted focused individual interviews with 92 percent of the Watts Bar staff and management within the Radiation Protection department. Information from the interviews was organized into the themes that are discussed in the attached report. Based on the interview results and NRC guidance, the NRC has determined that a Chilled Work Environment exists within the Radiation Protection department. The inspectors acknowledge that Watts Bar has taken corrective actions to address the concerns documented in NRC Chilling Effect Letter dated March 23, 2016. The results from the January 2018 follow-up inspection indicated that TVA had made progress in improving the nuclear safety culture at Watts Bar, and the work environment supported operators to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation (inspection report 2017009). However, the indications of a chilled work environment within the Radiation Protection (RP) department suggest continued challenges to Watts Bars ability to proactively detect and prevent chilled work environments.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos.: NPF-90, NPF-96
Enclosure:
05000390/2018012, 05000391/2018012 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos.: NPF-90, NPF-96 Report No.: 05000390/2018012, 05000391/2018012 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Dates: June 4 through June 29, 2018 Inspectors: S. Smith, Senior Construction Inspector (Team Lead)
S. Morrow, Human Factors Engineer (Lead Safety Culture Assessor)
A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist P. Heher, Project Engineer R. Sigmon, Reactor Systems Engineer (Trainee)
Approved by: Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000390/2018012 and 05000391/2018012; June 4 through June 29, 2018; Watts Bar, Units and 2; Follow-up for NRC Confirmatory Order and Chilling Effect Letter.
This inspection was initiated to review TVAs actions to address the NRC Confirmatory Order (CO) EA-17-022 and Chilling Effect Letter (CEL) EA-16-061. The team consisted of a senior construction inspector, human factors engineer, a senior health physicist, a project engineer, and a reactor systems engineer (trainee). Activities performed included a review of the root-cause analysis for the 2016 Chilled Work Environment and the recent audit for the Adverse Employment Action Process program. Inspectors also performed management and employee interviews to assess the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) within the Radiation Protection department.
Follow-up of Confirmatory Order EA-17-022 Commitments The team reviewed the current Adverse Employment Action (AEA) program and a sample of recent Employee Review Boards (ERB) held at Watts Bar. Review of the Adverse Employment Action Process identified that conditions that originally required a review, as a result of the 2009 CO, were no longer required by the latest AEA procedure revision. As a result, Unresolved Item (URI) 05000390,05000391/2018012-01 was issued so that additional inspection can be performed in order to determine if the licensee is in compliance with Confirmatory Orders EA-09-009, -203 and EA-17-022.
CEL Follow-up The team reviewed the final revision of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) for the 2016 Chilled Work Environment. In addition, inspectors reviewed corrective actions taken to address the observations and findings, specifically related to RCA 1155393, identified in the NRCs Problem,
Identification and Resolution (Part 2) inspection report (ML17069A133). No issues were identified.
Safety Conscious Work Environment Assessment The inspection team interviewed staff within the Radiation Protection department. Results of those interviews indicated that staff were impacted, multiple reporting avenues were affected, and the types of concerns personnel were hesitant to raise included regulatory and radiological safety concerns. Based on inspection results, the NRC has determined that a Chilled Work Environment exists within the Radiation Protection department. Additional details are provided in the following inspection report.
REPORT DETAILS
4OA5.A Other Activities: Follow-up of Confirmatory Order EA-17-022 Commitments (IP 92702)
1. Independent Oversight (Commitment V.1.d)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective actions associated with Section (Commitment) V.1.d of Confirmatory Order EA-17-022 to verify completion of corrective actions. Specifically, the inspectors performed the following:
- (1) Commitment V.1.d.1: The team reviewed the Third Independent Auditors Report of the TVA Adverse Employment Action Process, dated April 9, 2018. The team also verified that the audit included a review of all adverse employment actions, periodical attendance at Executive Review Boards, and a review of chilling effect mitigation plans. The audit was also reviewed to determine if:
- (1) evaluation of effectiveness of process for adverse employment actions comport with employee protection regulations;
- (2) adverse employment actions could negatively impact the SCWE; (3)development of plans to mitigate the potential chilling effects of adverse employment actions; and
- (4) that the auditor reports all findings and recommendations from audits to the Chief Nuclear Officer. Inspections of future audits may be performed at a later date.
As part of the scope for the audits, procedure NPG-SPP-01.7.4, Rev. 1, Adverse Employment Action and Executive Review Board, dated December 21,2017, was reviewed to ensure consistency with:
- Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.7,
- Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as amended,
- the NRCs Safety Culture Policy Statement,
- the NRCs Policy Statement for Nuclear Employees Raising Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation, and
- Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-18 Inspectors also performed an independent review of recent Adverse Employment Action and Executive Review Board (ERB) packages. Specific activities included review of the background information associated with recent ERBs, associated SCWE Mitigation Plan Screening, and SCWE Mitigation Plans when required.
b. Observations and Findings
Based on the review of the procedure, ERB packages, and audit; it was determined that the licensee was meeting the requirements identified in Commitment V.1.d.1 for Confirmatory Order EA-17-022. Specifically, NPG-SPP-01.7.4, Rev. 1, requires the following types of proposed adverse employment actions taken against TVA employees to be reviewed by an ERB:
- Suspensions (one or more days off without pay)
- Terminations For Cause
- Involuntary Reduction in Force
- No-fault Terminations of Employment The procedure also requires the following types of proposed significant adverse employment actions against TVA nuclear contractors to be reviewed by an ERB:
- Suspensions (one or more days off without pay)
- Terminations For Cause The requirement for ERB review of the adverse employment actions listed above is consistent with requirement V.1.c.1 in Confirmatory Order EA-17-022. However, the inspectors observed that there are a number of personnel actions that meet the definition of an adverse employment action, but are not required to be reviewed per the procedure (NPG-SPP-01.7.4, Rev. 1). These adverse actions are termed Non-ERB Adverse Actions in the procedure and include the following:
- Demotion
- Denial of Promotion
- Unfavorable Performance Appraisal
- Transfer to a Less Desirable Job
- Denial of Access
- Other Performance Management Actions NPG-SPP-01.7.4, Rev. 1, states that Non-ERB Adverse Actions do NOT require ERB review. However, management may elect to have these and other employee actions reviewed by ERB, as they deem necessary. Use of the SCWE screening form is encouraged As such, per the procedure, adverse employment actions that do not require ERB are also not required to be reviewed to determine 1) whether the proposed action comports with employee protection regulations, and 2) whether the proposed action could negatively impact the SCWE. As a result, an Unresolved Item (URI) was identified and is described in the section below.
Finally, as part of the Third Independent Auditors Report of the TVA Adverse Employment Action Process, dated April 9, 2018, inspectors noted that the auditor recommended that TVA include non-voluntary demotions as an action that required an ERB. Condition Report (CR) 1370916 was written, in part, to address the recommendation; however, the explanation provided little detail behind the decision and ultimately declined to accept the recommendation. The licensee initiated CR 1427236 to re-evaluate the decision and justification in CR 1370916.
.1 Unresolved Item (URI) 05000390, 391/2018012-01, Potential Failure to Implement
Reviews of Adverse Employment Actions in Accordance with Confirmatory Order, EA- 09-009 and EA-09-203
Description:
Confirmatory Order EA-09-009, -203 was issued to TVA on December 22, 2009 and requires the following:
By no later than ninety
- (90) calendar days after the issuance of this Confirmatory Order, TVA shall implement a process to review proposed licensee adverse employment actions at TVAs nuclear plant sites before actions are taken to determine whether the proposed action comports with employee protection regulations, and whether the proposed actions could negatively impact the SCWE. Such a process should consider actions to mitigate a potential chilling effect if the employment action, despite its legitimacy, could be perceived as retaliatory by the workforce The inspectors reviewed TVA procedure NPG-SPP-01.7.4, Adverse Employment Action and the Executive Review Board, Revision 0001, dated December 17, 2017. This procedure does not, in some instances, require TVA to review proposed licensee adverse actions before actions are taken to determine whether the proposed action could negatively impact the SCWE. Specifically, this procedure delineates adverse actions as shown below:
ERB Adverse Actions (TVA Non-ERB Adverse Actions Employees Only)
- Suspensions (one or more
- Demotion days off without pay)
- Denial of Promotion
- Terminations for Cause
- Unfavorable Performance
- Involuntary Reduction in Force Appraisal
- No-fault Terminations of
- Transfer to a Less Desirable Job Employment
- Denial of Access
- Other Performance Management Actions TVA is required per this procedure to conduct an ERB and review the proposed adverse actions for those actions listed under the ERB Adverse Actions (TVA Employees Only) category. TVA is not required per this procedure to conduct an ERB or perform a SCWE impact review for those proposed adverse actions listed under the Non-ERB Adverse Actions category. In addition, three of the adverse actions listed in the Non-ERB Adverse Actions category (Demotion, Transfer to a Less Desirable Job, and Denial of Access) were previously included in TVAs adverse action process, but excluded from the required ERB review in the latest revision and are therefore no longer required to be reviewed using their current procedure.
Planned Closure Action(s): Further inspection is needed in order to determine if the licensee is in compliance with Confirmatory Orders EA-09-009, -203 and EA-17-022.
Specifically, inspectors need to review samples of adverse employment actions taken and the licensees review of those actions to determine if the licensee is adequately implementing their reviews in accordance with their procedures and the confirmatory order.
4OA5.B Other Activities: CEL Follow-up (IP 92702)
1. Root Cause Analysis
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Condition Report (CR) 1155393, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Chilled Work Environment, Revision 3, dated May 24, 2018, to determine the overall effectiveness of the actions taken. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following documents related to the RCA:
- Events and Causal Factors and TapRoot analysis
- Root Causes, Contributing Causes, the associated corrective actions including the Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR) and the extent of condition
- Final Effectiveness Review for the RCA
- Corrective Actions associated with RCA 1155393 identified in the NRCs 2016 (Part 2) Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection (ML17069A133)
- Corrective Actions associated with the NRCs January 2018 Follow-up Inspection for NRC Confirmatory Order EA-17-022 and Chilled Work Environment Letter EA-16-061 (ML18073A202)
b. Observations and Findings
In the March 14, 2018, inspection report (ML18073A202), the inspection team recognized that observations and findings tied to RCA 1155393 in the NRCs PI&R (Part 2) Inspection (ML17069A133) required additional review. As part of this inspection, the team reviewed the licensees actions to address those observations and findings. Based on the inspection activities, the team concluded that those actions were adequate.
In conclusion, RCA 1155393, which was performed to address the 2016 chilled work environment within the Operations department along with precursors identified within other departments, was adequate. The inspectors also determined that overall, the final effectiveness review demonstrated that the corrective actions and enhancements were being implemented and were ultimately having a positive effect on the chilled work environment within the operations department in addition to providing site-wide monitoring of safety culture. However, the team also noted that the licensee faced challenges related to identification and evaluation of department-specific work environment trends. Additional discussion regarding this is covered in more detail in the following section. No findings were identified.
4OA5.C Other Activities: SCWE Follow-up (IP 93100)
1. Safety Conscious Work Environment Assessment
a. Inspection Scope
Qualified safety culture assessors performed a limited assessment of the safety conscious work environment at Watts Bar in accordance with IP 93100, Safety Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Follow-up, and other IPs as referenced by IP 93100. Specifically, the inspection scope focused on the SCWE in the radiation protection (RP) department. The objectives of the assessment were to:
- (1) determine if indications of a chilled work environment exist,
- (2) determine if employees are currently reluctant to raise safety or regulatory issues; and
- (3) determine if employees perceive that raising nuclear safety concerns to their employer or the NRC is being suppressed or is discouraged. Note that the scope of this inspection did not include investigation of individual personnel actions or determining the legitimacy of those actions.
The inspectors conducted individual interviews with 35 personnel in the RP department, including supervisors and managers. This sample constituted approximately 92 percent of TVA employees in the RP department, based on TVAs organizational chart dated May 4, 2018.
Interviewees were asked a series of questions in a semi-structured interview format.
Follow-up questions were asked as necessary to facilitate a full understanding of employees perceptions of the work environment. Questions included:
- Do you feel like your department encourages people to raise nuclear or radiological safety concerns (including challenging actions or decisions believed to be unsafe)?
- Do you feel like you can raise nuclear or radiological safety concerns without fear of retaliation?
- Are you aware of any instance where someone experienced a negative reaction from a supervisor or manager for raising a nuclear or radiological safety issue?
- Do you believe other employees may be hesitant to raise nuclear or radiological safety concerns? Why? What would make them hesitant?
- Do you believe management is aware of these issues? Have actions been taken to address the situation?
- If you did not feel comfortable using your chain of command, are there other avenues you would use to raise a nuclear safety concern?
- In the past 6 months, has the environment in your department gotten better, worse, stayed the same?
b. Observations and Findings
The vast majority of individuals interviewed (97 percent) reported being willing to raise nuclear and radiological safety concerns. However, approximately 25 percent of the personnel interviewed from the RP department felt like they may be retaliated against if they raise certain concerns. The types of concerns personnel would be hesitant to raise for fear of retaliation included concerns that challenge management decisions, concerns that would slow down or delay critical or time sensitive activities, concerns that may reflect badly on the department by revealing procedural violations or mistakes, or concerns that implicate managers in procedural violations or mistakes. The NRC inspectors determined that some of the concerns personnel would be hesitant to raise had a nexus to regulatory activities or radiological safety; for instance, a violation of procedural actions required by 10 CFR 20.
The reluctance to raise concerns partially affected multiple avenues for raising concerns.
For example, some personnel indicated they would be reluctant to report concerns to particular supervisors or managers because of how they would respond, write CRs that would reveal procedural violations in the department, write anonymous CRs, or use the Employee Concerns Program.
An additional approximately 25 percent of individuals did not report personally fearing retaliation, but perceived that others in the department may be hesitant to raise concerns for fear of retaliation. The inspectors asked probing questions about why other individuals may fear retaliation. Many individuals (more than just those who feared retaliation) perceived that people were not treated equally within the department.
Personnel who were perceived as more vocal and willing to challenge management were also perceived to be labeled as troublemakers and perceived to experience different treatment. When asked about what constituted different treatment, individuals gave examples of being denied assignments for special projects, lower performance appraisal ratings, assignment to less desirable jobs, denying or mandating overtime, or more significant discipline for mistakes as compared to other employees. These observations are relevant because they indicate that perceptions of different treatment for raising concerns were shared among a larger portion of the department than just those who reported personally fearing retaliation. The perceptions of differential treatment also appeared to be exacerbated by communication weaknesses - lack of proactive communication about the basis for personnel decisions and distrust of management intentions tended to lead to employees constructing their own explanations.
The inspectors also identified multiple individuals who did not feel comfortable participating in the focus groups conducted during the NRCs inspection in January 2018, or other past assessments that sampled a small portion of the department. These individuals perceived that if they were one of a small sample of participants and had negative things to say, then they would be identified and experience negative consequences.
Multiple individuals, including some supervisors, perceived an adversarial relationship within the department, such that some personnel were labeled as being for management, and some labeled as being against management, and both groups were in conflict with each other. As such, fears of retaliation were not limited to retaliation for raising nuclear safety concerns, but rather retaliation for any behaviors that were in conflict with one group or the other. Examples of disrespectful behaviors were provided from supervisors to staff, staff to supervisors, and between peers at the same level within the department. An inadequate respectful work environment within the department could have a significant negative impact on the safety conscious work environment.
The inspectors also observed that Watts Bars tools and processes for detecting and evaluating safety culture and SCWE were not designed or used in a manner that allowed for identifying department-specific trends in the work environment. The safety culture assessment tools tended to focus on sampling cross-sections of the total site workforce or making assessments of the overall site work environment, and were less effective at detecting work environment declines localized within specific departments. In addition, it appeared that Watts Bars internal assessments and investigations did not substantiate a chilled work environment as long as the majority of employees reported being willing to raise concerns and there were not proven instances of retaliation or discrimination. This criteria is not consistent with NRC guidance or definitions of a chilled work environment.
These observations were captured in CRs 1422365 and 1427232.
Overall Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment in RP Department A SCWE is defined as an environment in which employees are encouraged to raise nuclear or radiological safety concerns, are free to raise concerns both to their own management and to the NRC without fear of retaliation, where concerns are promptly reviewed, given the proper priority, and appropriately resolved, and timely feedback is provided to those raising concerns.
In contrast, a chilled work environment is one in which employees perceive that raising nuclear or radiological safety concerns to their employer or to the NRC is being suppressed or is discouraged and can occur because of an event, interaction, decision, or policy change. Note also that a chilled work environment does not necessarily mean that employees are unwilling to raise nuclear safety concerns, or that managers have discriminated against employees for raising nuclear safety concerns. Rather, a chilled work environment indicates that the condition of work environment does not fully support workers to feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
A determination of a chilled work environment is made based on:
- The number and organizational affiliation of personnel impacted;
- The number of reporting avenues to which personnel were hesitant to raise concerns;
- The types of concerns personnel were hesitant to raise.
No one factor is considered to be inherently determinative of a chilled environment.
Accordingly, the factors listed above were considered collectively rather than in isolation.
The NRCs primary interest is that workers feel free to raise nuclear, quality, and radiological concerns without fear of retaliation.
The inspectors assessment indicated that more than 20 percent of personnel in the RP department were impacted, multiple reporting avenues were affected, and the types of concerns personnel were hesitant to raise included regulatory and radiological safety concerns. Based on the NRCs independent review, it was concluded that there was a chilled work environment in the RP department.
The inspectors acknowledge that Watts Bar has taken corrective actions to address the concerns documented in NRC Chilling Effect Letter dated March 23, 2016. The results from the January 2018 follow-up inspection indicated that TVA had made progress in improving the nuclear safety culture at Watts Bar, and the work environment supported operators to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation (inspection report 2017009). However, the indications of a chilled work environment within the RP department suggest continued challenges to Watts Bars ability to proactively detect and prevent chilled work environments.
4OA6 Exit Meeting Summary
On June 29, 2018, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Simmons, Site Vice President; Tom Marshal, Plant Manager; and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was returned and that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
Inspection follow-up was discussed with TVA management on July 24, 2018. The purpose of this discussion was for TVA to provide additional information related to the CWE within the RP department.
The team re-exited with TVA on August 10, 2018, with Lee Sanders and other members of your staff.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
July 24, 2018 Drop-In Meeting Attendees:
- M. Balduzzi, Chief Nuclear Officer
- J. Shea, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs and Support Services
- E. Henderson, Director, Regulatory Affairs
- P. Simmons, Vice President, Watts Bar
- T. Marshall, Plant Manager, Watts Bar
- M. Augustin, Human Resources Manager, Watts Bar
- K. Hulvey, Licensing Manager, Watts Bar
- R. Fordham, Employee Concerns Program Manager, Watts Bar
NRC
- C. Miller, Region II Deputy Regional Administrator
- S. Price, Region II Regional Counsel
- S. Smith, Senior Construction Inspector
- S. Morrow, Human Factors Engineer
- A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist
- R. Sigmon, Reactor Systems Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000390, 391/2018012-01 URI Potential Failure to Implement Reviews of Adverse Employment Actions in Accordance with Confirmatory Order, EA-
09-009 and EA-09-203 (Section 4.OA5.A.1)