IR 05000390/2018002
| ML18219A684 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/2018 |
| From: | Masters A NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2018002 | |
| Download: ML18219A684 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ust 7, 2018
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2018002 AND 05000391/2018002
Dear Mr. Shea:
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On July 25, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Paul Simmons and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
Further, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Sections 2.2.4 and 6.1.d.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos.: NPF-90, 96
Enclosure:
IR 05000390/2018002, 05000391/2018002
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 50-390, 50-391 License Numbers: NPF-90, NPF-96 Report Numbers: 05000390/2018002, 05000391/2018002 Enterprise Identifier: 1-2018-002-0033 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Inspection Dates: April 1 to June 30, 2018 Inspectors: J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector J. Hamman, Resident Inspector W. Satterfield, Resident Inspector J. Jandovitz, Senior Resident Inspector J. Lizardi-Barreto, Construction Inspector A. Wilson, Project Engineer P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector Approved By: A. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a quarterly integrated inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A self-revealed non-cited violation (NCV) and additional tracking items are summarized in the tables below.
Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section 71153.
List of Findings and Violations Inadequate Procedure Results in Exceeding the Design Pressure of the RHR Piping Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating NCV 05000390/2018002-01 H.1 - 71111.15 Systems Closed Resources A self-revealed Green NCV was identified when the licensee failed to consider potentially adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality. Specifically, the licensee exposed Unit 1 residual heat removal system piping to higher than its design pressure while performing two evolutions simultaneously in accordance with associated procedures.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue number Title Report Status Section LER 05000391/2017-006-00 Manual trip in response to 71153 Closed indication of multiple dropped control rods LER 05000391/2017-004 Manual reactor trip due to rod 71153 Closed position indication being inoperable LER 05000390/2017-016-00 System actuations due to 71153 Closed opening of feeder breaker to 1B-B 6.9 kV shutdown board LERs 05000390,391/2017-007- Multiple Unreported Potential 71153 Closed 00, 01 Loss of Safety Function Events Associated with Inoperable Single Train Systems Due to Misinterpretation of Reporting Guidance LERs 05000390,391/2017-013- Incorrectly Adjusted Auxiliary 71153 Closed 00, 01 Building Gas Treatment System Damper Leads to a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power from the beginning of the inspection period until April 6, 2018, when they reduced power to approximately 85 percent for planned main turbine valve testing. The unit returned to 100 percent power later that same day. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power until April 12, 2018, when the unit tripped automatically due to an indicated reactor coolant system loop 1 flow perturbation during maintenance on associated pressure instrumentation. The unit returned to near rated thermal power on April 16, 2018. Unit 2 remained at or near rated thermal power until May 8, 2018, when it reduced power to 58 percent rated thermal power for repairs to the 2A main feedwater pump. Unit 2 returned to near rated thermal power on May 11, 2018. Unit 2 remained at or near rated thermal power until June 20, 2018, when it reduced power to 58 percent rated thermal power for repairs to the 2A main feedwater pump. Unit 2 returned to 95 percent rated thermal power on June 22, 2018. Unit 2 automatically tripped again on June 22, 2018, due to a turbine trip caused by a main bank transformer phase-to-phase differential relay actuation. The unit was in power ascension at approximately 45 percent power at the end of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness
The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)power systems.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) 1A emergency diesel generator while 1B was out of service for starting air compressor work on May 14, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 residual heat removal trains A and B after 1B-B pump maintenance on May 31, 2018
- (3) Unit 1 train A and B auxiliary feedwater and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump on
June 20, 2018 Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the component cooling water system.
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Auxiliary building 692' elevation on April 3, 2018
- (2) Auxiliary building 676' elevation on April 4, 2018
- (3) Auxiliary building 757' elevation on April 4, 2018
- (4) Emergency diesel generator building on May 14, 2018
- (5) Unit 1 pipe chase, auxiliary building 676' elevation on June 21, 2018
- (6) Unit 2 pipe chase, auxiliary building 676' elevation on June 21, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the auxiliary building, 676 elevation (basement).
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
On May 16, the inspectors evaluated a simulator exercise involving a steam generator tube leak, tube rupture, and a ruptured steam generator also faulted outside containment.
Operator Performance (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during the following conditions:
- (1) Unit 2 reactor trip on April 12, 2018, and reactor startup on April 13, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 reactor trip on June 22, 2018, and reactor startup on June 29, 2018
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Condition Reports (CRs) 1360056, 1360060, Failure of Unit 1 vital inverter 1-IV
- (2) CRs 1395711, 1395714, During performance of 0-SI-235-22, 125VDC Vital Battery II Quarterly Inspection, cell 2 voltage was found low resulting in unplanned TS entry
- (3) CR 1415507, Intake pumping station strainer room B sump pump 1 discharge check valve leakby
- (4) CR 1397190, Failure of essential raw cooling water pump E-B to start
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Risk Assessment for April 12, 2018, with Unit 1 train A solid state protection system (SSPS) testing and planned boric acid corrosion control walkdowns in Unit 2 lower containment
- (2) Risk assessment for work week 0521 with C common station service transformer (CSST) component outage
- (3) Risk assessment for WO 116466970, Replacement of check valve WBN-0-CKV-067-0503E-B, ERCW Pump E-B Discharge Check Valve, dated April 18, 2018
- (4) Risk assessment for June 8, 2018, during switching in the switchyard and associated maintenance on the Roane offsite power line
- (5) Risk assessment for work week 0618 with Unit 1 train B SSPS intermediate range trip circuit degraded and a conservative operations alert declared
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Prompt determination of operability (PDO) for CR 1401314, Unit 2 ice condenser lower inlet door open indication on zone F
- (2) Immediate determination of operability (IDO) for CR 1399798, 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchanger inlet valve seat leakage
- (3) IDO for CR 1408573, Misposition results in residual heat removal piping exceeding its design limit of 600psig
- (4) PDO for CR1407257, ECCS gas void acceptance criteria may not be bounded by worst case water hammer
- (5) Past operability evaluation (POE) for CR 1408573, Safety injection system test header valve misposition results in residual heat removal system train A discharge piping overpressure condition
- (6) POE for CR 1376221, Vital Inverter 0-II failure
- (7) PDO for CR 1422717, Unit 1 unexpected reactor trip breaker operation during 1-SI-99-10-B
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) 50.59 screening for temporary shielding request 2011-03, Install lead blankets on Unit 2 pipe chase demineralizer waste line
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) WO 119528545, Multiple valve strokes of the U2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater valve 2-FCV-001-0051-S, on April 11, 2018
- (2) WO 116466970; Inspect Check Valve Internals, Replace Soft Parts, Refurbish as Required on Valve WBN-0-CKV-067-0503E-B, ERCW Pump E-B Discharge Check Valve, on April 20, 2018
- (3) WO 112901088 Rebuild C-S SPF Circulation Pump, on June 5, 2018
- (4) WO 119644407, Troubleshoot RTB opening during performance of WO 119167443, Functional Test of Unit 1 SSPS Train B, on June 14, 2018
==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities (2 samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities during the following Unit 2 forced outages:
- (1) WBNF205 from April 12, 2018, until April 14, 2018
- (2) WBNF206 from June 22, 2018, until June 29, 2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine==
- (1) WO 119547677, 1-SI-63-10.1-A, Emergency Core Cooling System Venting Inside Containment, on May 4, 2018
- (2) WO119147743, 0-MI-235.002 120 VAC Inverter Automatic Transfer Test, Inverter 1-III, on May 21, 2018
- (3) WO 119547787, 1-SI-63-10.1-A, Emergency Core Cooling System Venting Inside
Containment, on April 23, 2018 In-service (2 Samples)
- (1) WOs 119525715, 119526591, 119524907, 119025475, 2-SI-3-902, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-S Quarterly Performance Test, on April 12, 2018
- (2) WO 119236259, 2-SI-62-901-A, Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A-A Quarterly Performance Test, on June 19, 2018
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill
The inspectors evaluated an emergency planning drill on May 9, 2018, for a steam generator tube leak, tube rupture, and a ruptured steam generator also faulted outside containment. These failures led to a Site Area Emergency declaration.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicator submittals listed below for the period from second quarter 2017 through first quarter 2018.
- (1) Emergency AC Power Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator (MSPI) - Unit 1
- (3) Heat Removal MSPI - Unit 1
- (4) Heat Removal MSPI - Unit 2
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue.
- (1) CRs 1285649, 1285719, Hoses used for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) left out on the auxiliary building floor for an extended period of time
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Events
- (1) The inspectors evaluated both the plant and the licensee response to an automatic Unit 2 reactor trip on April 12, 2018, caused by a reactor coolant system loop 1 flow indication instrument.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated both the plant and the licensee response to an automatic Unit 2 reactor trip on June 22, 2018, caused by a main generator electrical trip due to actuation of an A phase differential current relay.
Licensee Event Reports (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
- (1) LER 05000391/2017-004-00, Manual reactor trip due to inoperable rod position indication, April 17, 2018; the NRC reviewed LER 05000391/2017-004, and no findings were identified.
(2&3) LERs 05000390,391/2017-007-00 and 01, Multiple Unreported Potential Loss of Safety Events Associated with Inoperable Single Train Systems Due to Misinterpretation of Reporting Guidance, August 8 and November 3, 2017, respectively; the NRC reviewed these LERs and associated findings were documented in quarterly integrated inspection report dated August 11, 2017 (ML17223A026).
- (4) LER 05000391/2017-006-00, Manual trip in response to indication of multiple dropped control rods, February 9, 2018; the NRC reviewed LER 05000391/2017-006-00, and no findings were identified.
- (5) LER 05000390/2017-016-00, System actuations due to opening of feeder breaker to the 1B-B 6.9 kV shutdown board, February 20, 2018; the NRC reviewed LER 05000390/2017-016-00, and no findings were identified.
(6&7) LERs 05000390, 391/2017-013-00 and 01, Incorrectly Adjusted Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Damper Leads to a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, November 6, 2017, and January 24, 2018, respectively; the NRC reviewed these LERs and one licensee-identified violation was identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings during the week of May 14,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation 71152 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues The inspectors reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee regarding FLEX hoses being left on the auxiliary building floor for an extended period of time instead of being placed in their storage box when not being tested. The inspectors reviewed CR 1285649, which documented that the FLEX hoses had been left out on the floor of the auxiliary building 692 level for over four months. The inspectors found that CR 1285649 was closed to CR 1285719, which documented issues with the A 6.9kV FLEX diesel and the A and B 480v FLEX diesels. The inspectors noted that the corrective actions for CR 1285719 only related to the FLEX diesels, and not the FLEX hoses. This is contrary to the WBN Corrective Action Program (NPG-SPP-22.300). The licensee was informed of this matter and entered it into their corrective action program as CR 1408912. The inspectors also determined that the hoses were eventually returned to their assigned storage box. The inspectors determined that although the hoses were on the floor, they were available to implement FLEX strategies since they were still in close proximity to their likely connection points. Additionally, subsequent use of the hoses for testing showed that they were not damaged by having been left on the floor for over four months.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
LER: 05000390, 391/2017-013-00, Incorrectly Adjusted Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Damper Leads to a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, November 6, 2017.
Violation: Watts Bar Unit 1 TS 3.7.12, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS),
Condition A, requires that an inoperable ABGTS train to be restored to operable status within 7 days. Condition B of TS 3.7.12 requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> if one train of ABGTS is inoperable longer than 7 days.
Contrary to the requirements of TS 3.7.12, ABGTS, train A was determined to be inoperable from July 7, 2017, at 2030 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) to September 5, 2017, at 1645 EDT while the plant remained in Mode 1.
Significance/Severity Level: This violation was characterized using traditional enforcement because the NRC determined that this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and, therefore, is not a performance deficiency. The violation was assessed using Sections 2.2.4 and 6.1.d.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy and determined to be a SL IV violation.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Condition Report (CR) 1335791 Inadequate Procedure Results in Exceeding the Design Pressure of the RHR Piping Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating NCV 05000390/2018002-01 H.1 - 71111.15 Systems Closed Resources A self-revealed Green NCV was identified when the licensee failed to consider potentially adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality. Specifically, the licensee exposed Unit 1 residual heat removal system piping to higher than its design pressure while performing two evolutions simultaneously in accordance with associated procedures.
Description:
On April 24, 2018, during performance of 1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Inside Containment, Revision 26, the A train residual heat removal (RHR) relief valve lifted on an overpressure condition. At the time, Unit 1 was performing the monthly ECCS venting technical specification surveillance once every shift due to an error discovered in piping stress analysis calculations that impacted the allowable void size for system operability. Additionally, on the prior shift a number of accumulator test header and isolation valves had been manually closed inside containment as part of a troubleshooting activity to determine the source of gas inleakage to the ECCS systems. The ECCS accumulators were a suspected contributor to ECCS voiding. Specifically, accumulator #3 had known leakage and had to be refilled approximately once per day. The refill process involves starting a safety injection pump and manipulating remote valves from the control room in accordance with standard operating procedure (SOI) 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Revision 13. On the morning of April 24, 2018, the shift work schedule included both the planned ECCS venting surveillance and the need to refill accumulator #3. However, because of the ECCS troubleshooting that had occurred the shift prior, some manual valves in the lineup to fill the accumulator were closed and would require local operation in containment to accomplish the fill procedure.
In an attempt to be efficient with the available operations resources for the day, the Unit 1 supervisor decided to perform a single containment entry where the auxiliary unit operators (AUOs) could align the safety injection system for the fill of accumulator #3 and then immediately begin the procedure for ECCS venting, which is accomplished by opening manual vent valves inside containment. The system drawings and flow paths for ECCS were reviewed and it was determined that both the accumulator #3 fill procedure and the ECCS venting surveillance could be accomplished simultaneously with no issues. In fact, with the 1A safety injection pump running for the accumulator #3 fill procedure and the B RHR pump running for the ECCS venting surveillance, the two systems became cross-connected when operators opened a safety injection test header valve in accordance with the ECCS venting surveillance procedure. This resulted in a peak pressure of 614 psig and the lifting of a relief valve on the pump discharge side of RHR train A when the higher discharge pressure of the safety injection pump pressurized the non-running train of RHR. Piping design pressure in the RHR system is 600 psig. The residents reviewed the two procedures used during these evolutions and determined that 1-SI-63-10.1-A was inadequate because it had no precautions or limitations that warned against performing the procedure when a safety injection pump is in service.
The licensee reviewed the past operability of the RHR piping due to the overpressure condition and also the lifted relief valve and determined that the system maintained operability during this event.
Corrective Actions: In response to this event the licensee plans to identify all procedures that allow alignment of the discharge of a safety injection pump to the test header and revise them to include a caution statement that warns of adverse consequences when operating test header valves.
Corrective Action Reference: This issue is being tracked in TVAs corrective action program by Condition Report 1408573.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to consider potentially adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the RHR system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: Inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, from IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power because operability of the RHR system was not affected.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources attribute of the Human Performance area as defined in IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were adequate to support nuclear safety.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, since July 2010, it was determined that procedure 1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Inside Containment, Revision 26, is an activity that affects quality that was not appropriate to the circumstances because the potential adverse system interactions that can occur when a safety injection pump is in service were not included.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 25, 2018, the inspector presented quarterly resident inspection results to Paul Simmons and other members of the licensee staff.
LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Certification of 2018 Summer Readiness - Watts Bar, letter dated May 11, 2018
NPG-SPP-07.1.7, Station Seasonal Readiness, Rev. 0006
0-PI-OPS-1-SO, Summer Operation, Rev. 0014
CR 1424363
CR 1418580
CR 1418584
CR 1418586
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
1-PI-OPS-1-PE, Protected Equipment, Rev. 0021
1-SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Checklist, Attachment 1V, Rev. 14
1-SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Power Checklist, Attachment 1P, Rev. 13
1-SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Handswitch Checklist, Attachment 1H, Rev. 8
0-SOI-70.01, U1 CCS Normal Valve, Attachment 1V, Rev. 24
0-SOI-70.01, Pump 1A-A Normal Valve Checklist, Attachment 2V, Rev. 22
0-SOI-70.01, Pump 1B-B Normal Valve Checklist, Attachment 3V, Rev. 22
0-SOI-70.01, U1 Pump C-S Normal Valve Checklist, Rev.22
0-SOI-70.01, Pump 1B-B Normal Valve Checklist, Attachment 5V, Rev. 25
0-SOI-70.01, Residual Heat Removal System Valve Checklist, Attachment 1V, Rev. 00
0-SOI-70.01, Residual Heat Removal System Valve Checklist, Attachment 1P, Rev. 00
0-SOI-70.01, Residual Heat Removal System Power Checklist, Attachment 3P, Rev. 00
0-SOI-70.01, Residual Heat Removal System Power Checklist, Attachment 3V, Rev. 00
Drawings
1-47W803-2, Rev. 35
0-47W859-1, Rev. 85
1-47W810-1, Rev. 20
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
WBN Prefire Plan DGB-0-760-01 R2 & R3
WBN Prefire Plan DGB-0-742-01 R3 & R4
PFP No: AUX-0-676-01, Rev. 03
WBN Prefire Plan AUX-0-676-01, Rev. 3
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Procedure 71111, Attachment 06, Flood Protection Measures
Drawing 47W803-2, Rev. 27
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Simulator Exercise Guide SEG # 3-OT-SRT-E3-1, Rev 02, dated 4/19/18
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
CR 1415507
CDE 1577, 5/17/2018
CDE 1569, 4/4/2018
0-TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Rev. 0006
CR 1397190
CDE 1568, 3/17/2018
CR 1360056
CR 1360060
Log Entries Report dated 2/2/2016
0-TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Rev. 0008
NRC Inspection Procedure 71111 Attachment 12, Maintenance Effectiveness
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Operators Risk Report - WBN Unit 1 EOOS Status Panel
Operators Risk Report - WBN Unit 2 EOOS Status Panel
Operators Risk Report for Watts Bar Unit 1, 5/21/18 & 5/22/18
Operators Risk Report for Watts Bar Unit 2, 5/21/18 & 5/22/18
CR 1417506
CR 1416745
Operators Risk Report, 6/20/18
NPG-SPP-09.11.1, Equipment Out of Service Management, Rev. 0012
NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Rev. 0023
UNID WO 116466970, WBN-0-CKV-067-0503E-B, Attachment A, Rev. 0
0-MI-0.007, Check Valve, Rev. 0016
Repair/Replacement Activity Planning Form for WO 116466970
CR 1406800
CR 1406829
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
CR 1401376
CR 14-1314
Technical Requirement Manual, Section B3.6.2, Inlet Door Position Monitoring System, Rev. 9
CR 1399798
WBN-SDD-N3-67-4002, Essential Raw Cooling Water System, System 67, Rev. 0035
SDD-N3-82-4002, Standby Diesel Generator System, Unit 1 / Unit 2 QA Record, Rev. 0025
Drawing 0-47W845-1, R9
Watt Bar Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 6.2.4-15
Past Operability Evaluation Documentation for CR 1408573
CR 1408573
Past Operability Evaluation Documentation for CR 1376221, R0
Past Operability Evaluation Documentation for CR 1376221, R1
CR 1407257
Prompt Determination of Operability Documentation for CR 1407257, Rev. 5
PARR for stress analysis 0600250-09-02 Model Y
Standing Order 18-10, dated 5/4/18
Prompt Determination of Operability Documentation for CR 1407257, Rev. 6
Engineering Work Request EWR18CIV063264 - Civil Evaluation for PDO 1407257 for U1
safety injection
Engineering Work Request EWR 18MEC063262 - IDO Support for U1 SI Gas Voids
2-SI-63-10.2-A, ECCS Pumps and Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Outside Containment,
Rev. 0006
Drawings 1-47W812-1, Rev. 29; 1-47W432-200D, Rev. 3; 1-47W432-200B, Rev. 2
Prompt Determination of Operability Documentation for CR 1422717
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Screening Review/50.59 Evaluation Coversheet for TSR 2011-003, Rev. 0
Temporary Shielding Request for TSR 2011-003
Civil Engineering Evaluation for TSR 2011-003
Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing
Unit 2 Operations log (night shift) on April 11, 2018
WO 119528545, Attachment A
UNID WO 116466970, WBN-0-CKV-067-0503E-B, Attachment A, Rev. 0
0-MI-0.007, Check Valve, Rev. 0016
Repair/Replacement Activity Planning Form for WO 116466970
CR 1406800
CR 1406829
0-MI-78.001, Removal, Inspection, and Replacement of Spent Fuel Pit Circulating Pump, Rev 0
TI-50.040, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump C-S Quarterly Performance Test, Rev. 12
NPG-SPP-01.16, Condition Report Initiation, Rev. 0001
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 0010
STS for WO 119148406, TI-50.040 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump C-S Quarterly Performance
Test
0-TI-31.02, Plant Equipment Vibration Monitoring & Vibration Diagnostics Program, Rev, 0002
CR 1424654
NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing, Rev. 0002
NPG-SPP-06.1, Work Order Process, Rev. 0007
1-SI-99-10-B, 62 Day Functional Test of SSPS Train B and Reactor Trip Breaker B, Rev. 0066
Troubleshooting Plan for CR 1422717, 1-SI-99-10-B Issue, dated 6/13/18
CR 1422717 Unit 1 SSPS Train B Operability Evaluation
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
WO 119525715
WO 119025475
2-SI-3-902, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-S Quarterly Performance Test,
Rev. 0007
1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Inside Containment, Rev. 0026
Technical Product Risk, Complex Troubleshooting, Rev. 0, for CR 1407257, ECCS Voiding on
Unit 1 and Unit 2
0-MI-235.002, 120 VAC Vital Inverter Automatic Transfer Test, Rev. 0006
1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Inside Containment, April 23, 2018
N-UT-11, Ultrasonic Examination for Detecting and Measuring Fluid Levels in Austenitic and
Ferritic Systems, Rev. 7
Calibration Report for Ultrasonic Flow Detector E53749, dated February 13, 2018
Ultrasonic Certification for
- C.L. Rievley, dated March 17, 2017
2-SI-62-901-A, Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A-A Quarterly Performance Test, Rev. 0003
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
AFW Unavailability Log thru 6/5/2018
Unit 2 AFW Unavailability Log thru 5/22/18
Emergency AC Power (MSPI) Spreadsheet
Reference derivation reports
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
CRs 1410212, 1414559, 1415268, 1414843, 1278974
CRs 1397190, 1409393, 1409258, 1361223
General Engineering Specification G-54, Receipt, Verification, Storage, and Maintenance
During Storage of Electrical Motors
NPG-SPP-22.207, Procedure Use and Adherence, Rev. 4
NPG-SPP-04.3, Material Storage and Handling, Rev. 5
TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, Rev. 36
0-MI-57.001, 6900 Volt Circuit Breaker Inspection, Rev. 13
WO 117001297
WO 118930763
Section 4OA3: Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
CR 1367005
0-TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Rev. 8
CR 1321966
Level 2 Evaluation Report - CR 1320840 - Rev. 0 dated 7/25/2017
Equipment Failure Investigation Checklist, CR 1320840: WBN Unit 2 CBA (Control Bank A)
failed to move, dated 8/3/2017
Operations Log dated 7/25/2017
WO 118898233
CRs 985860, 910194, 909000, 912154, 967964, 903067, 862708, 901207, 899633, 948571,
901207, 894134, 1170567, 1129073, 1274363, 12811767, 866226, 986637, 11277775,
1104089, 1128181, 1099592, 1092726, 1121123, 1099526, 1112234, 1000413, 988464,
1061510, 1071973, 1040054, 1187273, 1225143, 1295376, 1137634, 1197627, 1162773,
275203, 907544, 864251, 998890, 1272224, 1177619, 1310096, 1273873, 1317307
LER 2017-007-01, Multiple Unreported Potential Loss of Safety Function Events Associated
with Inoperable Single Train Systems Due to Misinterpretation of Reporting Guidance,
dated October 17, 2017
LER 2016-007-00, Technical Specification Action Not Met for Rod Position Indication, dated
June 20, 2016
NRC letter to the licensee, Exelon Generation Company, LLC Request to Revise NUREG-
22, dated January 8, 2015
Licensee letter to the NRC, Licensee Event Report (LER) 2017-007-01, Multiple Unreported
Potential Loss of Safety Function Events Associated with Inoperable Single Train Systems
Due to Misinterpretation of Reporting Guidance, dated November 3, 2017
EWR17MEC063295, Engineering Work Request, WBN Safety Functional Failure Reporting for
Single Train Systems, dated September 18, 2017.
EWR17MEC065291, Engineering Work Request, WBN Safety Functional Failure Reporting for
Single Train Systems, dated September 13, 2017.
Evaluation No. 2017-09024, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 & 2, Buoyancy-Driven Flow
Through Door C36/C54, Revision 0, dated October 6, 2017.
Instruction No. 2-PTI-262-02, Unit 2 Integrated Safeguards Test - Train 2B, Revision 0001,
dated September 5, 2017.
Power Ascension Test No. 2-PAT-5.2, Turbine Generator Trip with Coincident Loss of Offsite
Power Test, Revision 0003, dated July 13, 2016.
CR 1370572
0-MI-57.200
17