IR 05000382/2019004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2019004

ML20031E865
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	01/30/2020
From:	John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D
To:	Vazquez S Entergy Operations
References
IR 2019004
Download: ML20031E865 (19)

Text

ary 30, 2020

SUBJECT:

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2019004

Dear Mr. Vazquez:

On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On January 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000382 License Number: NPF-38 Report Number: 05000382/2019004 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0002 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Killona, LA 70057 Inspection Dates: October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019 Inspectors: M. Chambers, Physical Security Inspector P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector S. Hedger, Emergency Preparedness Inspector S. Makor, Resident Inspector F. Ramirez Munoz, Senior Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. Smith, Nuclear Systems Engineer C. Speer, Resident Inspector T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71114.04.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Adequately Implement the Operability Determination Process When Applied to the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.6] - Design 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000382/2019004-01 Margins Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which occurred because the licensee did not perform an operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures. Specifically, the licensees operability determination, when applied to the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water temperature control valve, did not consider all the valves safety functions and mission times as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process,

Revision 16.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000382/2019-001-00 LER 2019-001-00 for 71153 Closed Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Past Inoperability of Effluent Accident Monitor Exceeds Allowed Outage Time Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications LER 05000382/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for 71153 Closed Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Control Room Envelope Declared Inoperable due to Outside Air Intake Isolation Valve Exceeding Closed Stroke Time During Inservice Testing Resulting in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Component cooling water train B with train A inoperable for maintenance on October 17, 2019

(2) Emergency diesel generator B following maintenance on November 2, 2019

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the emergency feedwater system on October 9, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Fire area CT1, dry cooling tower area A on October 3, 2019

(2) Fire area RAB40, diesel oil storage tank A on October 3, 2019

(3) Fire area RAB1E, cable vault on November 5, 2019

(4) Fire area RAB11, battery room 3B on November 5, 2019

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a period of increased activity due to inclement weather, reactivity changes and instrument calibrations on safety-related systems on December 10, 2019 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator scenario on November 20, 2019

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Auxiliary component cooling water system on October 5, 2019

(2) Maintenance rule program (a)(3) assessment on November 1, 2019

(3) 480 V station service distribution on December 21, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Risk assessment associated with maintenance on electrical bus 1A and concurrent work on emergency feedwater pump AB on October 15, 2019

(2) Emergent work review associated with degraded conditions discovered during testing of the component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve on October 22, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Operability determinations associated with erratic operation of auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve on October 8, 2019

(2) Operability determination associated with the failure to align the AB electrical buses due to a relay failure on October 10, 2019

(3) Operability determination associated with an unexpected shutdown of emergency diesel generator B during surveillance testing on October 28, 2019

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Reactor trip circuit breaker 7 following replacement on October 21, 2019

(2) Emergency diesel generator A following maintenance on November 7, 2019

(3) Component cooling water pump A following maintenance on December 9, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Component cooling water pump A on October 8, 2019

(2) Containment spray pump A on October 18, 2019

(3) Safety injection recirculating header B to refueling water storage pool downstream isolation valve on October 31, 2019

71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.11)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise conducted on November 20, 2019. The exercise scenario simulated a loss of coolant accident inside containment; failures of high pressure core injection, component cooling water, and containment spray pumps; an emergency diesel generator trip; and a containment penetration failure causing a monitored and filtered radiological release through the plant stack. Inspectors also observed the licensee's management critique conducted December 11, 2019, and participated in the FEMA Region VI Public Meeting conducted November 21, 2019.

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Revisions 49 and 50 to the Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan. These evaluations do not constitute NRC approval of the licensees changes.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Simulator training evolution on December 2, 2019

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation Scenario Review Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the proposed scenario for the Waterford 3 biennial emergency plan exercise to be conducted on November 20, 2019. The licensee submitted the proposed scenario to the NRC on September 19, 2019, in accordance with the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50. The NRC provided comments on the proposed scenario to the licensee on October 15, 2019, in accordance with the requirements of IP 71114.08. The inspectors discussed the scenario with Ms. N. Williams, FEMA Region VI Team Leader, as part of their review of the proposed scenario.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12) ===

(1) The inspectors reviewed selected Drill/Exercise Performance opportunities conducted between July 2018 and September 2019

EP02: ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed ERO Participation information for the period July 2018 through September 2019 EP03: Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors review the results of Alert and Notification system siren tests conducted between July 2018 and September 2019 BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

(1) October 2018 through September 2019

BI02: Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

(1) October 2018 through September 2019

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Adequacy of risk assessment during emergency feedwater system maintenance work windows on November 20, 2019

(2) Incore instrumentation boric acid leaks during Refueling Outage 22 on December 11, 2019

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000382/2019-01-00, Past Inoperability of Effluent Accident Monitor Exceeds Allowed Outage Time Resulting in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19042A787). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.

(2) LER 05000382/2019-02-00, Control Room Envelope Declared Inoperable due to Outside Air Intake Isolation Valve Exceeding Closed Stroke Time During Inservice Testing Resulting in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML19049A028). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Adequately Implement the Operability Determination Process When Applied to the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.6] - Design 71111.15 Systems NCV 05000382/2019004-01 Margins Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which occurred because the licensee did not perform an operability determination in accordance with licensee procedures.

Specifically, the licensees operability determination, when applied to the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water temperature control valve, did not consider all the valves safety functions and mission times as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 16.

Description:

On August 16, 2019, the licensee discovered the auxiliary component cooling water header train A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve, ACC-126A, allowing between 3000 and 5500 gpm despite 0 percent output from its automatic controller.

Locally, operators noted the valve modulating between 16 to 100 percent open. Control room operators manually lowered the controller setpoint from 86°F to 84°F, which lead to a steady valve position of 97 percent open and a steady flow of 5500 gpm from the valve.

The licensee initiated condition report (CR) WF3-2019-06698 to document the issue and assess the operability of ACC-126A. The licensees operability determination concluded that the valve was operable. The operability determination considered the valves safety functions to open following design basis accidents and to control component cooling water outlet temperature. However, the operability determination did not address the impact modulation would have on the valves design basis safety function to automatically operate for up to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory following design basis accidents.

A similar condition occurred on September 5, 2019, where CR-WF3-2019-07024 documented erratic operation of ACC-126A and the valve not fully closing. For this occurrence on September 5, 2019, the operability determination specifically considered the design basis function of ACC-126A to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory following design basis accidents and concluded that the valve was inoperable. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a failure associated with the transducer for ACC-126A. The licensee replaced the failed component, tested the valve, and declared it operable on September 6, 2019.

The inspectors noted that the operability for ACC-126A had not been properly evaluated on August 16, 2019, and questioned the licensees basis for declaring it operable since it was found modulating at that time. This meant that the valves operability was incorrectly assessed for the 21-day period between August 16 and September 6, 2019, when repairs to the valve were finally completed. Consequently, the licensee performed an engineering calculation, tracked in CR-WF3-2019-07164, and determined that the conditions on August 16, 2019, would have caused the valve to only function automatically for up to 74 minutes following a design basis accident, rather than the 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> credited in the licensees design basis. The failure of ACC-126A to operate automatically for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> as designed would reduce the water inventory margin available in the ultimate heat sink to combat a design basis accident by approximately 25 percent. This reduction in margin was bounded by the assumption that all the wet and dry cooling tower fans were available.

The licensees evaluation also revealed that the sites technical specifications would allow for the removal of wet and dry cooling tower fans from service depending on ambient air temperatures. If the fans allowed by technical specifications were taken out of service with the condition observed in ACC-126A, the ultimate heat sink system would not have been able to perform its safety function. As a result, the licensee enacted compensatory measures to ensure that all wet cooling tower and dry cooling tower fans were available with the observed condition to ensure adequate ultimate heat sink water inventory. The inspectors noted that these compensatory measures should have been in place since the valves initial failure on August 16, 2019.

The licensee assesses the operability in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 16. Step 8.2 of EN-OP-104 requires that the licensee determine the impact that degraded or nonconforming conditions have on the technical specification safety functions and mission times. The inspectors concluded that the licensees operability determination performed for the condition observed on ACC-126A on August 16, 2019, did not meet the requirements of Procedure EN-OP-104 in that it did not consider the impact the observed condition would have on the valves design basis function to operate automatically for up to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> following accidents to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory.

The licensee performed a retroactive look and concluded that even though no compensatory measures were enacted between August 16 and September 6, 2019, adequate wet cooling tower fans and dry cooling tower fans remained in service for the ultimate heat sink to perform its safety function.

Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate corrective action was to perform an engineering calculation to evaluate the effects of ACC-126A cycling had on its ability to perform all design basis functions. The licensees ongoing corrective actions include initiating a performance analysis to evaluate why all design basis functions were not considered when making operability determinations for ACC-126A and to determine any future actions necessary to ensure all design basis functions are considered when performing future operability determinations.

Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2019-06698, CR-WF3-2019-07024, CR-WF3-2019-07164

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to consider all the impacted safety functions of ACC-126A when assessing its operability in accordance with Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the impact of ACC-126A oscillating despite a closed demand from its controller. As a result, ACC-126A was relied on to perform its safety function to automatically modulate closed to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory when it was unable to do so, reducing the design margin of the ultimate heat sink water inventory by approximately 25 percent. In addition, since compensatory measures needed to maintain the ultimate heat sink operable were not implemented, had the licensee taken fans out of service as allowed by technical specifications, the ultimate heat sink would have been inoperable and unable to perform its safety function for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low risk significance (Green) because the structure, system, and component maintained operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment. Specifically, the licensee did not consider the impact modulation of ACC-126A would have on the ultimate heat sink water inventory margin, or identify the resulting 25 percent decrease in margin, until questioned by the inspectors.

Enforcement:

Violation: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to the above, on August 16, 2019, the licensee did not accomplish an activity affecting quality in accordance with procedures. Specifically, when a degraded condition was discovered associated with ACC-126A, the licensee did not determine the impact of the degraded condition on the ability of ACC-126A to perform its safety function to automatically operate for up to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> following a design basis accident to preserve ultimate heat sink water inventory, as required by Step 8.2 of Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 16.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71114.04 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) states, in part, that a licensee shall submit to the NRC a report of each change to its emergency plan, including a summary of its analysis, within 30 days after the change is put in effect. Contrary to the above, Waterford 3 failed to submit to the NRC a report of two changes made to its Emergency Plan within 30 days after the changes were put in effect. Specifically, between November 2015 and November 2019, Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 49, was put into effect May 21, 2019, and a report of the change was made to the NRC on November 14, 2019. Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revision 50, was put into effect September 9, 2019, and a report of the change was made to the NRC on November 30, 2019. In addition, the licensee submitted Emergency Plan, Revision 47 (dated December 10, 2016), EPP-01-001, Emergency Classification, Revisions 31 (dated September 29, 2015) and 33 (dated May 31, 2018), and the Evacuation Time Estimate Study, Revision 1 (dated November 30, 2012) to the NRC on November 14, 2019. The inspectors determined that Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, Revisions 49 and 50, did not reduce the effectiveness of the site emergency plan.

Significance/Severity: Severity Level IV. The violation is a failure to comply with NRC requirements which is not associated with the classification of emergencies or notification of emergency conditions to offsite agencies.

Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2019-08488

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On December 16, 2019, the inspectors presented the exit meeting for the 2019 Emergency Preparedness Exercise inspection results to Mr. S. Vazquez, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

• On January 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. S. Vazquez, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04Q Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2019-08086, 2019-08111, 2019-08173, 2019-08207,

Documents NNNN 2019-08210, 2019-08219

71111.04Q Procedures OP-002-003 Component Cooling Water 319

71111.04Q Procedures OP-009-002 Emergency Diesel Generator 351

71111.04Q Procedures OP-009-003 Emergency Feedwater 309

71111.05Q Miscellaneous CT1-001 Dry Cooling Tower "A" 7

71111.05Q Miscellaneous RAB 11-001 Battery Room "3B" 7

71111.05Q Miscellaneous RAB 1E-001 Cable Vault 10

71111.05Q Miscellaneous RAB 40-001 Diesel Oil Storage Tank "A" 5

71111.11Q Procedures EN-OPS-115 Conduct of Operations 26

71111.11Q Procedures OI-042-000 Operating Instructions Watch Processes 61

71111.12 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2017-01098, 2018-02871, 2018-04139, 2018-05221,

Documents NNNN 2019-02702, 2019-03144, 2019-05823, 2019-08054,

2019-06162, 2019-06698, 2019-07164, 2019-08095,

2019-08126, 2019-08127, 2019-08009, 2019-08184,

2019-08187

71111.12 Miscellaneous EC-83893 Cycle 22, Refuel 22 Maintenance Rule (A)(3) Periodic 0

Assessment

71111.12 Procedures EN-DC-203 Maintenance Rule Program 4

71111.12 Procedures EN-DC-204 Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis 4

71111.12 Procedures EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring 7

71111.12 Procedures EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Process 3

71111.12 Procedures EN-DC-207 Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment 3

71111.13 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2019-08031, 2019-08002, 2019-08001, 2019-07833

Documents NNNN

71111.13 Procedures EN-WM-104 On Line Risk Assessment 21

71111.13 Procedures OI-037-000 Operations Risk Assessment Guideline 314

71111.13 Work Orders 52810798, 52822009

71111.15 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2019-07716, 2019-07996, 2019-07998, 2019-08002,

Documents NNNN 2019-08086, 2019-07343, 2019-02217, 2019-05832,

2019-05877, 2019-06162, 2019-06698, 2019-06759,

2019-07024, 2019-07043, 2019-07044, 2019-07055,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2019-07164, 2019-07167, 2019-07752, 2019-07833,

2019-08184, 2019-08187, 2019-04868, 2019-08198

71111.15 Drawings 1564-2171 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence 28

CWD, Sheet 1

71111.15 Drawings 1564-2173 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence 11

CWD, Sheet 3

71111.15 Drawings 1564-2174 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence 7

Description, SHT

71111.15 Drawings 1564-2175 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Starting Sequence 6

Description SHT

71111.15 Drawings 1564-2182 Emergency Diesel Generator "B" - Shutdown & Alarm Sys 18

CWD & CONN

71111.15 Miscellaneous EC-38218 Provide Engineering Input for CR-WF3-2012-2870 - ACC- 0

26A(B) Leak criteria

71111.15 Procedures EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 16

71111.15 Procedures EP-002-100 Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation, Operation, 50

and Deactivation

71111.15 Procedures OP-901-511 Instrument Air Malfunction 17

71111.15 Procedures OP-903-118 Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests 47

71111.19 Procedures ME-004-155 Reactor Trip Switchgear 309

71111.19 Procedures OP-903-050 Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component 42

Cooling Water Pump and Valve

71111.19 Procedures OP-903-068 Emergency Diesel Generator and Subgroup Relay 325

Operability Verification

71111.19 Procedures OP-903-127 Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Post-Maintenance Retest 309

71111.19 Work Orders 52782214, 52830113

71111.22 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2019-07950

Documents NNNN

71111.22 Procedures OP-903-035 Containment Spray Pump Operability Check 32

71111.22 Procedures OP-903-050 Component Cooling Water & Auxiliary Component 41

Cooling Water Pump and Valve Operability Test

71111.22 Procedures OP-903-100 MOV Overload Bypass Test 311

71111.22 Work Orders 52890248, 52823091

71114.01 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2013-05860, 2018-01956, 2018-02988, 2018-03815,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents NNNN 2018-03842, 2018-04416, 2018-06293, 2018-06590,

2018-06331, 2019-04355, 2019-05722, 2019-06141,

2019-06195, 2019-06196, 2019-06197, 2019-06198,

2019-06199, 2019-06431, 2019-06444, 2019-08488,

2019-08602, 2019-08611, 2019-08612, 2019-08638,

2019-08640, 2019-08643, 2019-08644

71114.01 Engineering EC78595 Plant Paging System Upgrade 11/14/2019

Changes

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the Orange Team NRC Dress 9/25/2019

Rehearsal

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the HP Drill 6/30/2019

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the Red Team Site Drill 4/30/2019

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the Blue Team Training Drill 4/3/2019

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the ERO Red Team Site Drill 8/29/2018

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the ERO Green Team Site Drill 6/20/2018

71114.01 Miscellaneous After-Action Report for the ERO Orange Team Site Drill 2/21/20158

71114.01 Miscellaneous Attachment 9.2, 10 Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions 4/26/2018

CFR 50.54(q)(3)

Screening,

Procedure/Document

Number: EP-001-

001, Revision: 33

71114.01 Miscellaneous Attachment 9.3, 10 Recognition & Classification of Emergency Conditions 4/26/2018

CFR 50.54(q)(3)

Evaluation,

Procedure/Document

Number: EP-001-

001, Revision: 33

71114.01 Miscellaneous W3F1-2019-0081 Emergency Preparedness Historical Documents 11/14/2019

71114.01 Procedures After-Action Report for the ERO Blue Team Site Drill 12/6/2018

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-610 TSC Operations 8

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 1, OSC Manager 11/20/2019

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 2, OSC Operations Support 11/20/2019

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 3, Work Control Coordinator 11/20/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 4, Mechanical and 11/20/2019

Electrical/I&C Coordinators

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 5, Rad/Chem Coordinator 11/20/2019

71114.01 Procedures EN-EP-611 OSC Operations, Attachment 6, OSC Log Keeper 11/20/2019

71114.01 Procedures EN-IS-123 Electrical Safety 21

71114.01 Procedures EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Program, R38 9/6/2019

71114.01 Procedures EN-RP-505 PortaCount Respirator Fit Testing, Revision 7 12/10/15

71114.01 Procedures EP-001-001 Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions 33

71114.01 Procedures EP-001-010 Unusual Event, R307 2/12/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-001-020 Alert, R310 2/12/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-001-030 Site Area Emergency, R309 2/12/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-001-040 General Emergency, R310 2/12/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-010 Notifications and Communications, R316 4/15/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-015 Emergency Responder Notification, R304 4/25/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-030 Emergency Radiation Exposure Guidelines and Controls 10

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-031 In-Plant Radiological Controls and Surveys During 9/14/2016

Emergencies, R302

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-034 Onsite Surveys during Emergencies 302

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-050 Offsite Dose Assessment, R308 8/13/2018

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-052 Protective Action Guidelines, R26 4/25/2019

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-071 Site Protective Measures, R303 11/25/2015

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-090 Core Damage Assessment, R303 12/19/2016

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-100 Technical Support Center Activation, Operation, and 5/19/2019

Deactivation, R50

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-101 Operations Support Center Activation, Operation, and 7/26/2017

Deactivation, R308

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-102 Emergency Operations Facility Activation, Operation, and 2/12/2019

Deactivation, R310

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-130 Emergency Team Assignments, R24 12/19/2016

71114.01 Procedures EP-002-190 Personnel Accountability, R22, 9/12/2018

71114.01 Procedures EP-003-020 Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises, R304 12/19/2016

71114.01 Procedures EPP-428 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 307

71114.01 Procedures ME-004-463 Paging System 11

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71114.01 Work Orders Work Order Number 505131

71114.04 Miscellaneous 50.54(Q)(2) Review for EP-002-052, Protective Action 4/24/2019

Guidelines, Revision 26

71114.04 Procedures EP-003-070 Emergency Preparedness Routine Tests and Checks, 2/5/2019

R306

71114.06 Procedures WSIM-LOR-196SIM1 2019 Cycle 6 Practice 1 0

71151 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2018-02870, 2018-03784, 2019-05429, 2018-05551,

Documents NNNN 2018-05591, 2018-05882, 2018-06295, 2018-07075,

2019-03286, 2019-04005, 2019-06327, 2019-04355,

2019-04362, 2019-05344, 2019-06325, 2019-07034,

2019-07528

71151 Miscellaneous W3F1-2019-0003 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 4th Quarter 2018 01/10/2019

ROP Data

71151 Miscellaneous W3F1-2019-0030 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 1st Quarter ROP 04/11/2019

Data

71151 Miscellaneous W3F1-2019-0075 NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter ROP 10/17/2019

Data

71151 Procedures EN-FAP-EP-005 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators 9

71151 Procedures EN-FAP-OM-005 Nuclear Performance Indicator Program 8

71151 Procedures EN-LI-114 Regulatory Performance Indicator Process 17

71151 Procedures EPP-422 Siren and Helicopter Warning System Maintenance 12

71151 Procedures EPP-424 Siren Testing and Siren System Administrative Controls 20

71152 Calculations 19-WF3-0025 Boric Acid Leakage Identification Evaluation 08/04/2019

71152 Corrective Action CR-WF3-YYYY- 2019-06358, 2019-06379, 2019-06384, 2019-06415,

Documents NNNN 2019-06448, WT-WTWF3-2019-00018

71152 Work Orders 529149

16