IR 05000348/1985026

Insp Repts 50-348/85-26 & 50-364/85-26 on 850618-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Surveillance & Insp Program for Snubbers & Followup on Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings

ML20132D802
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/08/1985
From:	Jape F, Lenahan J, Macdonald J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20132D797	List: IR 05000348/1985026 ML20132D792
References
50-348-85-26, 50-364-85-26, NUDOCS 8508010463
Download: ML20132D802 (7)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 E d 0 101 MARIETTA STREET ' i f ATLANTA,GEOF:GI A 3 d3 g ..v... /

Report Nos.: 50-348/85-26 and 50-364/85-26 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: Ju e 18-21, 1985 Inspectors: 8- - - J #

J. i aha Date Signed a

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cdona Date Signed Approve 3 by: //[444 f

N [3 Date Signed F. Jape, Section Chief ' y Engineering Bracnh Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 56 inspector-hours on site in the areas of review of the surveillance and inspection program for snubbers, followup on licensee action on previous inspection findings, and review of the repairs to Units 1 and 2 containment building post tensioning syste f,esul ts: No violations or deviations were identifie DR ADOCK050g3jB

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. D. Woodward, Plant Manager

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R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning, Superintendent

• R. G. Garland, Maintenance Supervisor J. Hornbuckle, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

• D. Shipman, Assistant Plant Manager Other licensee employees contacted included three mechanic NRC Resident Inspector

• H. Bradford

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 21,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding The Technical Specifications (TS) requirements pertaining to visual inspec-tion of snubbers were discussed. The licensee disagreed with the inspector regarding the need for tabulating snubbers which are found to be inoperable between scheduled inspections and to consider these inoperable snubbers when selecting the intervals for performance of the next visual inspectio However, pending further review of this item, the licensee committed to revise their snubber surveillance procedures to implement this requiremen The licensee stated that they would perform a review of the snubber TS and consider submitting a request for an amendment to delete this requirement in the future. No other comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Unresolved Item 364/85-09-01, Tabulation of Snubber Visual Inspec-tion Failures Which Occur Between Visual Inspection Surveillance Interval Review of the snubber surveillance program during a previous inspection disclosed that snubbers found to be inoperable were not considered when selecting the interval for performance of the next required visual inspec-tion cf snubbers. The inspector discussed the Technical Specifications (TS)

requirements pertaining to visual inspection of snubbers with licensee

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engineers and management personnel. These discussions disclosed that there was some confusion regarding the TS requirements. The purpose of visual inspection of hydraulic snubbers is to identify inoperable snubbers and determine the cause of the failures. The visual inspection frequency specified in Section 4.7.9.a of the TS is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. The inspection schedule is short-ened when inoperable snubbers are found. The shortened schedule is required because additional snubber failures are likely to occur in the near future which would jeopardize the plant's operating safety. The shortened schedule permits these deficiencies to be discovered and corrected on a timely basi The snubber inspection period starts after completion of the previous visual snubber inspection and runs through completion of the next visual snubber inspection. The snubber inspection period is not limited to the time the actual snubber inspection is being performed. When a snubber is found to be visually inoperable prior to performance of a scheduled inspection, it is necessary to repair or replace the failed snubber in accordance with TS Section 3.7.9. It is also necessary to record these failures and add them to the number of failures found during the next scheduled inspection. The subsequent inspection interval is based on the total number of visually inoperable snubbers discovered since the last completed snubber inspection, plus the number of inoperable snubbers found during the most recently completed scheduled inspectio As stated in Inspection Report No. 50-348/85-09 and 50-364/85-09, two visually inoperable snubbers (snubbers had empty reservoirs and failed functional testing) were discovered in Unit 2 in September 1984, prior to the January - February 1985, Unit 2 snubber inspection, One snubber was accessible during reactor operation, while the other was inaccessible. (The TS categorizes snubbers into two groups: those accessible and those inac-cessible (due to high radiation) during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently.) During the January - February 1985 Unit 2 snubber inspection, no inoperable snubbers were discovere The licensee did not consider the two inoperable snubbers found in September 1984, when selecting the interval for performance of the next inspectio Instead, the licensee incorrectly selected the next visual inspection interval based on zero inoperable snubbers (18 months per TS 4.7.9.9). The correct inspection interval is 12 months, for both the accessible and inaccessible group of snubbers, based on one visual inopers-ble snubber in each group occurring during the previous inspection perio However, since the licensee had not yet exceeded the required visual inspec- .

tion interval of 12 months, plus or minus 25 percent (last inspection l completed in February 1985, next inspection required to be performed between 1 December 1985 and May 1986), this item is not a violation. The licensee committed to revise their snubber inspection program to require tabulation of snubbers that are found to be visually inoperable between required scheduled inspections. Subsequent visual inspection periods will be based l upon the total number of inoperable snubbers found between scheduled inspec- ,

tions plus the number of visually inoperable snubbers found during the most i recently completed visual inspectio Unresolved Item 364/85-09-01 is close .

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' Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Independent Inspection Effort The inspector reviewed emergency diesel generator maintenance and surveil-lance procedures and verified that they met the acceptance criteria speci-fied in Technical Specifications 4.8. Procedures examined were as follows: Maintenance Procedure FNP-0-MP-13.7, Model 38TD-1/8 Diesel Engine (Quarterly Inspection) Maintenance Procedure FNP-0-MP-14.6, Model PC-2V Diesel Engine (Quar-terly Inspection) Surveillance Test Procedure FNP-0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test Surveillance Test Procedure FNP-0-STP-80.5 Diesel Generator Auto Start Test (1-2A,1C,2C) Surveillance Test Procedure FNP-1-STP- v.6 Diesel Generator 1B 24 Hour Load Test Surveillance Test Procedure FNP-1-STP-80.14 Diesel Generator A Train LOSP Test Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Snubber Surveillance Program - Units 1 and 2 (Module 61729)

The inspector reviewed procedures and quality records relating to the snubber surveillance program and inspected snubbers on safety-related piping systems. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector appears in Technical Specification 3/4. Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedures The inspector examined the follcwing Unit 1 procedures which control snubber surveillance and inspection activitie (1) Procedure Number FNP-1-STP-6.10.1, Hydraulic Snubber Functional j Test Using ITT Grinnel Model 5434 Snubber Test Machine j

(2) Procedure Number FNP-1-STP-6.10.2, Accessible Snubbers Visual Inspection

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(3) Procedure Number FNP-1-STP-6.10.6, Inaccessible Snubbers Visual Inspection (4) Procedure Number FNP-1-STP-6.10.7, Snubber Functional Test (Hydraulic and Mechanical) Using Wyle Laboratories Model 100 Snubber Test Machine (5) Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Snubber Manual, Number FNP-1-M-034 b. Inspection of Snubbers The inspectors, accompanied by licensee engineers, performed a visual inspection of the hydraulic snubbers listed below and verified that the snubbers were not damaged, that attachment to the supporting structure was secure, that the fluid level in the snubber reservoirs was higher than target levels, and leakage of the ' fluid was not occurrin Snubbers examined were as follows:

(1) Snubber numbers 1-MS-BR-1, R-36, R-126, R-127A, R-134, R-201A, and R-282 on the Unit 1 main steam system (2) Snubber numbers FW R-190A, R-1908, R-405, R-406, and R-408 on the-Unit 1 feedwater system (3) Snubber number ASH 367 on the Unit 1 auxiliary steam system (4) Snubber number AFW R54 on the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater system (5) Snubber number 2FWR 71 on the Unit 2 feedwater system

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(6) Snubber numbers 2MS-BR-3, R-71, R-516A, R-516B, R-517, R-803, '

R-813, and R-814 on the Unit 2 main steam system During the above inspection, the fluid reservoir on snubber number ASH 367 was found to be empt Licensee engineers identified this problem to the ' shift supervisor who followed the Action Statement of TS 3.7.9 regarding inoperable snubbers. The Action Statement requires-repair or. replacement of the snubber within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Maintenance work request number 112441 was initiated to replace the snubber with a new snubber and perform a functional test on snubber ASH 367 to determine if the snubber was operable. The inspectors witnessed performance of the functional . test on the new snubber to verify that it was operable )

prior to installation, removal of the snubber with the empty reservoir, and installation of the new snubber. The inspectors witnessed the performance of the functional test on the snubber with the empty reservoir in its as-found condition, i.e., no fluid was adde The functional test results were acceptable, that' is, lock up and bleed rates met acceptance criteri Therefore, the snubber was determined

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to be operable. This problem was resolved within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of discovery of the empty snubber reservoir, well within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time limit specified in the Technical Specificatio The licensee will try to determine the cause of the empty reservoir when the snubber is rebuil Review of Quality Records The inspectors reviewed the quality records documenting the results of visual inspections performed on Unit 1 and 2 accessible and inaccessi-ble snubbers during the 1985 refueling outages. All snubbers were found to be operable during the scheduled visual inspection Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Results of Inspections Performed on Units 1 and 2 Containment Building Post Tensioning System On January 28, 1985, while conducting a pre-integrated leak rate test on the exterior of the Unit 2 containment building, a licensee employee noticed that a grease can (cap) covering the top of a vertical tendon was deforme Inspection of the lower grease can on the same tendon disclosed that the lower grease can was deformed also. Removal of the lower grease can dis-closed that the field anchor head had broken into seven pieces. Inspection of another tendon disclosed that the field anchor head on this tendon was cracked and separated into two pieces. Review of tendon fabrication and installation records disclosed that both of the damaged field anchor heads had the same fabrication lot control number, lot control number H In order to determine the cause of this problem, the licensee implemented an extensive inspection and testing program. Based on the laboratory test results the licensee concluded that the problem was not related to a specif-ic lot control number, and that hydrogen stress cracking caused the anchor head failure. As a result, the licensee modified and expanded the inspec-tion program to inspect all Unit 2 vertical tendons, which also included removal of the field anchor head from each tendon and performance of magnet-ic particle testing on the anchor head The expanded inspection program also involved visual inspection of randomly selected dome and horizontal tendons to establish a 95 percent probability with a 95 percent confidence limit for no cracked anchor heads. The inspection program was expanded to

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the Unit 1 tendon The inspectors reviewed the results of the visual inspections and magnetic particle testing performed on the Unit 1 and 2 vertical tendon anchor head This work was completed in May 1985. A summary of the results of the licensee's inspections is as follows: 'none of the 130 Unit 1 vertical tendon anchor heads were found to be damaged (cracked) by visual inspection; six Unit 1 anchor heads were rejected, that is cracks were found, by magne-tic particle examination; a total of three of the 130 unit 2 vertical anchor heads were found cracked by visual inspection (tendon numbers V-17, V-21,

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and V-31); and 17 anchor heads were found cracked by magnetic particle examinatio '

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During the inspection, the licensee was in the process of greasing the dome tendons. The inspectors witnessed greasing of dome tendon numbers D-127 and D-328. These tendons were greased from one end only due to proximity of one end over the safety relief valve Greasing of the other end will be performed during the next outag Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie I i

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