IR 05000338/1998007

Insp Repts 50-338/98-07 & 50-339/98-07 on 980720-23.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation & Evaluation of Biennial EP Exercise for North Anna Nuclear Station

ML20151T576
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/18/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151T558	List: IR 05000338/1998007 ML20151T553
References
50-338-98-07, 50-338-98-7, 50-339-98-07, 50-339-98-7, NUDOCS 9809100062
Download: ML20151T576 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II l

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Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4. NPF-7 Report No: 50-338/98-07, 50-339/98-07 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power' Company Facility: North Anna Power Station Location: 1024 Haley D I Mineral VA 23117 Dates: July 20-23. 1998 Inspectors: W. Sartor. Exercise Team Leader P. Hopkins. Project Engineer D. Jones. Senior Radiation Specialist G. Salyers. Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by: K. Barr, Chief. Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety 9009100062 990818 DR ADOCK O 38 Enclosure

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/98-07 and 50-339/98-07 !

This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the North Anna Nuclear Statio This NRC-FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with offsite aarticipation by the Commonwealth of Virginia and local governments !

within tie plume exposure pathway. The exercise was conducted on July 2 , from 8:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. This report summarizes the observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the licensee's emergency preparedness program in res)onse to the simulated accident. A separate FEMA report will be issued tlat evaluates the performance of the State and countie The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator (CRS), the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF). Based on the performance observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully )

demonstrated the ability to implement the Emergency Plan and Implerenting l Procedure )

Procram Areas Evaluated and Results  !

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• Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for '

testing the integrated emergency response capability for the onsite and offsite emergency organizations. (P4.1)

• Control Room Simulator --The control room simulator crew properly analyzed plant conditions and responded with timely and correct action (P4.2.b.1) i

• Technical Support Center--Command and control of TSC operations were l proficient. Better intergroup communication within the TSC would improve development of mitigation strategies. (P4.2.b.2)

• Operational Support Center--The OSC was effective in providing repair teams as directed by the TSC. (P4.2.b.3)

• Local Emergency Operations Facility--The LEOF Recovery Manager and staff were effective in providing timely emergency notifications. correct and timely PARS. and meaningful radiological reports to the State and countie (P4.2.b.4)

• Licensee Criticue Process--A thorough critique process was followed with a well-preparec presentation to site management that summarized the most significant exercise observations. (P4.2.b.5)

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Reoort Details IV. Plant Sucoort P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)

P4.1 Exercise Scenario Insoection Scope (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the licensee's pla Observations anc! Findinas The licensee submitted the scope and objectives for the biennial emergency exercise to the NRC with a letter dated April 16, 1998. The exercise scenario package was submitted with a letter dated May 19, 1998. A review of the package indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the offsite agencies for their participation in the exercis Conclusion The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency capability of the onsite and offsite emergency organizations.

l P4.2 Emeroency Resoonse Facility (ERF) Observations and Critiaue l Exercise Evaluation Scooe

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During this inspection the inspectors observed and evaluated the l

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licensee's biennial full-partici)ation, emergency preparedness exercise in the Control Room Simulator (CRS). Technical Support Center (TSC).

Operational Support Center (OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations l Facility (LEOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of l abnormal plant conditions. classification of emergency conditions.

l notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action l recommendations (PARS), command and control. communications. and the l overall implementation of the Emergency Pla In addition, the

! inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise. Acceptance criteria are contained in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, site Emergency Pla Emergency Plan implementing procedures, and industry guidance in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. Rev. 1. " Criteria for Preparations and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

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2 ERF Observations. Findinas. and Facility Criticues b.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)

Observation and Findinas The CRS crew was briefed on initial conditions by the lead facilitator and then assumed shift responsibilities at 8:00 a.m. The simulator annunciator alarmed at 8:10 a.m.. indicating the first off-normal condi.tions occurred. The Shift Supervisor recognized the Alert entry conditions.- 3romptly declared the emergency classification. and assumed i the'responsi)ilities as the Station Emergency Manager (SEM). The SE j assisted by the Unit 2 Supervisor of the unaffected unit, effectively responded in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1.0 i

"Res)onse to Alert". The SEM approved the initial notification message to tie State and local authorities which was then transmitted within 15 ,

minutes of the emergency declaration. The NRC was notified within approximately 35 minute !

The inspector observed good communications between the control room crew and other emergency response' staff in other emergency response  !

facilities.(ERFs). The SEM demonstrated effective command and control 1 with the SCR crew. Changing plant conditions and emergency status were ..

included in the SCR briefings. The inspector observed timely action and

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response of all CRS functions with the exception of .the' Emergency

. Response Organization Notification System-(ERONS) pager activation. The f

.pager activation occurred approximately 21 minutes after the Alert declaration. This did not negatively impact this day time staffing of

.ERFs which were initiated with a public address announcement, but could have a significant impact on timely staffing of ERFs during an off hours emergency. The licensee also identified the issue for review and corrective actio Conclusion The simulator control room crew properly analyzed plant conditions and I

responded with timely and correct action I b.2 Technical Suocort Center ()bservations and Findinas Staffing and activation of the TSC was efficient and timely. Personnel began arriving shortly after the public address announcement at 8:18 a.m. to activate the emergency response facilities (ERFs). Security maintained the accountability of personnel in the TSC and health physics

)ersonnel provided self reading dosimeters to the staff, conducted labitability surveys, and initiated the TSC radiation habitability monitoring syste The SEM exercised effective command and control. Initial briefings

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conducted by the SEM defined plant status and provided appropriate guidance to the TSC staff on current priorities. Subsequent, periodic

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facility. briefs were. scheduled by the SEM to include key facility ,

manager In addition to the briefings identifying status of-prioritized repair team activities, a repair team status / tracking board was effectively maintained and update The SEM~ demonstrated an awareness for the safety of onsite 3ersonnel. A site assembly and accountability were conducted following t1e Alert classification. Later, as plant conditions changed an evacuation of the auxiliary building and a steam safety valve house was appropriately conducted. Additional cnsite protective actions were demonstrated with the site evacuation of selected nonessential personnel to the primary assembly are The inspector noted that the different technical support areas within the TSC communicated and worked well within their respective group However, the inspector observed that better communication between groups was needed. Specifically. the-Operations Support Leader stated during a facility brief that they were looking at two different possibilities of invoking 10CFR50.54x in order to stop the release. Had the Operations Support group been adequately interfacing with the Dose Assessment-Team

'at this time, they would have known that the radiological release was not-of sufficient significance to warrant 50.54x consideration. The inspector concluded that if the groups within the TSC were to improve >

intergroup communication, better mitigation strategies would be develope Conclusion Command and control of TSC operations were proficient. Better intergroup communication within the TSC would improve development of mitigation strategie b.3 Ooerational Succort Center-Observations and Findinas

' Following^ the Alert declaration at 8:18 a.m.. personnel started arriving

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in the OSC and it was activated at 8:31 a.m. The OSC was located on the third floor of the maintenance building. An accountability log was aromptly established and minimum OSC staffing was achieved at 8:46 Within minutes of. minimum staffing. selected technicians of the different disciplines were dressed out for radiological entries and dispatched for staging at the entrance to the Radiological Control Are :This pre-staging of personnel for damage control teams made for timely

dispatch of teams. The inspector observed effective OSC o m rations with the exception that on one occasion there appeared to be cor asion at the HP access control point. . The licensee also noted this and their investigation attributed it to the operations organization and emergency maintenance organization generating and controlling critical tasks

'. independent of one anothe Conclusion L

j The'0perational Support Center was effective in providing repair teams as' directed by the TS '

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b.4 Local Emeraency Doerations Facility Observations and Findinas The LEOF was promptly staffed and activated following a turn over briefing from the TSC. The Recovery Manager was in frequent communication with the TSC and provided frequent and precise briefings to his staf The LEOF assumed responsibilities for communicating with the offsite agencies with Message Number 3 at 9:05 a.m., a Follow-up Report on the Alert. Timely communications were made throughout the exercise to the State E0C and the five counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Communications with the Commonwealth of Virginia were enhanced by conversations between the Recovery Manager and the Authorized Representative of the Governor of Virginia present in the LEOF. The notification for the General Emergency was initiated just 7 minutes after the declaration. Timely and correct PARS were provided to the State EOC within 12 minute Offsite dose assessment was satisfac .ty. Ti.e Radiological Assessment Coordinator and his staff provided bcc. cauter generated and hand calculated dose assessments to the Recovery Manage The Recovery

' Manager delayed the initial Report of Radiological Conditions to the State following the General Emergency and requested a reevaluation of the initial dose assessment. This was done to prevent confusion with the offsite agencies because the early calculations indicated insignificant dose projections that did not appear to support the decision to recommend evacuation of significant portions of the EP This information was also available to the State Bureau of Radiological Health which is located next to the licensee's dose assessment staff in the LEOF. The inspector also noted good communications between the LEOF and the offsite monitoring team Conclusion The LEOF Recovery Manager and staff were effective in providing timely emergency notifications, correct and timely PARS. and meaningful radiological reports to the State and countie b.5 Licensee Facility Critioues Following the exercise, the licensee conducted facility critiques where the players provided their own assessment of their performance and

' identified areas that needed improvement. The )ost-exercise critiques in the TSC. OSC. and LEOF were observed to be tlorough, open. and self-critical. The licensee controller / evaluator organization then conducted detailed discussions. reviewed documentation. and conducted interviews as required to develop their critique results. On July 21, 1998. the Emergency Preparedness Director provided an excellent presentation to licensee management of the critique result .

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Conclusion A thorough critique process was followed with a well-prepared management presentation that summarized the most significant exercise observation V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management on July 21. 199 The summary indicated the exercise was fully satisfactor ,

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i

I Licensee '

D. -Christian. Vice President. Nuclear Operations-J. Costello. Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist  !

G. Crismon. Supervisor. Operations Support <

E. Grecheck. Surry Site Vice Presiden l

.S. Harrison. Staff Emergency Preparedness Specialist  !

L. Hartz. Vice President. Nuclear Engineering and Services  :

J.. Hayes. Director. Nuclear Oversigh .

D. Heacock. Manager. Operations and Maintenance  !

E. Hellermann. Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist E. Henry. Emergency Preparedness Specialis LR. Kulp. Emergency Preparedness Specialist ,

J. Leberstien. Licensing Engineer j W. Madison. Staff Emergency Preparedness Specialist i W. Matthews. Site Vice President l J. O'Hanlon. Senior Vice President. Nuclear R. Prideaux. Staff Engineer J. Raymond. Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist W. Renz. Director. Emergency Preparedness K. Rhodes. Nuclear Specialist

. Roberts. Supervisor. Station Nuclear Safety H. Royal Su G. Salomone.perintenden Nuclear Training Nuclear Specialist A. Stafford. Superintendent. Radiological Protection T. Williams. Manager. Nuclear Oversight S. Wood. Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED-IP 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors Attachment (5 pagesh

. Exercise Scope. Objective Scenario narrative. and Time Line L

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 21,1998 EMERGENCY EXERCISE

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EXERCISE SCOPE The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the North Anna Emergency Plan, associated implementing procedures, and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency Response Plan in accordance with 10CFR50.47(b)(14), and to support the implementation of state and local govemments emergency response plan This plume exposure pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia and several local govemments. Tne exercise will demonstrate that the individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological emergency are capable of coordinating and assessing necessary protective measures to ensure the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at North Anna Power Statio The exercise will demonstrate responses to the emergency classes, commensurate with the stated exercise objectives, established by FJREG-0654, Criteria for Preoaration and Evaluation of Radiological Fmergenev Resnonse Plans and P1eosedness in Suonort of Nuclear Power Plant Free play is encouraged and the facilitators will interface with the participants only to provide scenario information. The facilitators will not alter the participants' responses unless the exercise lags behind schedule, emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry them to the

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next event or action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenari The focus items ofthis exercise are:

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EAL assessment and classification

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Use of the Emergency Response Organization Automated Notification Systems (EROANS) and the Emergency Personnel Notification List (EPNL)

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Off-site communications and the conununications turnover process  ;

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First aid response capability and process The exercise will fulfill the following drill requirements:

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Semi-annual Radiation Monitoring Drill

- Annual Medical Emergency Drill

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Annual Communications Drill l

At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the safe operation of the station. Station !

management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to l

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ensure this' goa Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the simulated inciden S&O-1 l

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION i JULY 21,1998 EMERGENCY EXERCISE

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OBJECTTVES The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, the Co2porate Emergency Response Plan and associated implementin; procedure The. objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the North Anna Power Station Emergency Pla l The simulated accident will involve: emergency classification, notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency coridition and initiation of accident l assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the event. The event will include a l simulated off-site radiological release to support a plume exposure pathway exercis .

As applicable to the exercise scenario events, the North Anna Power Station and Corporate  ;

Emergency Response Facilities will be activated. Each facility staff will demonstrate functions !

described in the implementing procedures. Emergency response functions which are impractical to I demonstrate will be simulate The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Six

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Year Plan, will be demonstrated as applicable to the schedule provisions of this plan. A matrix, identifying the objectives, the Virginia Power Emergency Response Facilities / Groups and facilities in which demonstrations will occur, is provided. The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the actual Station Control Roo The following is a list of corporate and station emergency response facilities and groups with their associated acronyrns:

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(1) Control Room Simulator (CRS)

(2) Technical Support Center (TSC)

(3) Operational Support Center (OSC)

(4) Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)

(5)- Coiporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

-(6) Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

(7) ' Local Media Center (LMC)  ;

(S) Heahh Physics (HP)  !

(9) Security (SEC)

(10) Chemistry (CHEM)

.(11) Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF)  !

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VIRGINIA POWER 1

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 21,1998 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE I l

A plume pathway exercise is scheduled to be conducted at the North Anna Power Station. For the purposes of the exercise, Unit 1 is designated as the affected uni i

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Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium at the middle oflife with a small 4 gpd ;

primary to secondary leak in the "B" steam generato :

Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium at the beginning oflif !

The exercise starts at 0800 and at 0810 an explosion, with no fire, occurs in the 1J1480v emergency bus. The resulting shock wave causes a loose failure detector card in a power supply :

cabinet resulting in a Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm. The unplanned explosion causing l

damage to safety related equipment establishes the conditions for an Alert classificatio '

At 0840 a medical emergency is reported outside the roll-up door at the Decontamination ,

Facility. The injuries are severe enough to require transport of the victim to an off-site medical facilit i i

At 0925 a loose part occurs in the lower reactor vessel resulting in gradual clad damage and l subsequent increase in reactor coolant system activit A tube rupture occurs in the "B" steam generator at 1030. At this time the reactor is tripped and I safety injection is initiated. Fuel clad damage increases significantly. When the reactor is tripped, the "B" steam generator PORV opens and sticks open resulting in a radioactive release to the environment. These events establish conU.tions for a General Emergenc Initial attempts to isolate or close the "B" steam generator PORV are not successful. Attempts to isolate or close the PORV will be successful at 113 Additional equipment failures include an overspeed trip of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump,1-FW-P-2, and an overcurrent trip of auxiliary feed water pump 1-FW-P-3 The escalation through the applicable emergency classifications provides activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site response organizations. Sufficient time is permitted to allow the response organizations to perform the required assessments and response action I

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The emergency phase of the exercise will terminate by 1230, followed by the facility critiques.

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VIRGINIA POWER NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 21, 1998 EMERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE -

TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE 0700 Facilitator exercise day briefin Final prep for exercise. Lead Facilitator ensures all changes and questions are addresse Simulator Briclin CRS Lead Facilitator briefs the operations shift on the initial conditions and simulator set u Start exercis Simulator placed in "Run."

0810 Explosion occurs in the 1J1480V emergency bus (mini- Potentially Fire Contingency 0-FCA-0 entered. SS declares Alert per scenario //1,1J1480V Emergency Bus Explosion). Tab K-6 (allow approximately 20 minutes for assessment and classification). Callout ERO (EPNL), notify state & locals (EPIP-2.01)

and NRC (EPIP-2.02, control cell). Activate facilities, and perform accountability. Callout ERO (EPNL), notify state & locals (EPIP-2.01)

and NRC (EPIP-2.02, control cell). Activate facilities, and perform accountabilit Rod Control Urgent Failure received (mini-scenario //2, Rod Control Urgent Failure).

0840 First aid emergency occurs (mini-scenario ll3, Medical CRS informed of medical emergency. Gai-Tronics announcement for Emergency). First Aid Team to respond. First Aid Team responds to scene, renders first aid, packages, and simulates transport of victim to off-site medical facility. AP-51 entered initially and EPIP-5.01 initiated for transport of the victi Loose Parts alarm is received (mini-scenario ll4, Loose Operators / STA identify the loose part in the vessel lower hea Paris).

0930 As a result of the loose part, fuel clad damage begins occurrin Cll-RI-128, Letdown Radiation Monitor, exceeds the Hi Initiate 1-AP-5 to verify the radiation monitor alarm. SEM reviews alarm setpoin EPIP-1.01 EALs for possible classification upgrad Cll-RI-128, Letdown Radiation Monitor, exceeds Ili-Ili SEM continues to review EPIP-l.01 EALs for possible classification alarm setpoin upgrad _ - . - - _ - - _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION JULY 21, 1998 EMERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE .

TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE ,

1030 Steam generator tube rupture occurs in the "B" steam Using EPIP-1.01, SEM declares GENERAL EMERGENCY per Tab generator. The reactor and turbine are manually tripped and B-2. Develop PAR (EPIP-1.06), Notify state and local governments safety injection is initiated. The "I3" steam generator PORV, (EPIP-2.01), and NRC (EPIP-2.02). Track plume (EPIP-4.15,4.16)

1-MS-PCV-101B, fails open (mini-scenario #5, I-MS-PCV- and perform dose assessment (EPIP-4.03). The stability class is "C".

10111 Fails Open) resulting in a radiological release to the The affected sectors are NPQ. The PAR should be #1. Operations environment. Steam driven Auxiliary Feedwatrer Pump 1- informs the TSC of equipment status. TSC prioritizes and assigns tasks FW-P-2 trips on overspeed (mini-scenario #6,1-FW-P-2 to DC Teams. DC Teams to investigate and attempt appropriate Overspeed Trip) corrective action Motor driven Auxiliary Feedwatrer Pump 1-FW-P-3 A trips on

~ Operations informs the TSC. TSC prioritizes and nesigns task to DC overcurrent (mini-scenario #7,1-FW-P-3A Overcurrent Team. DC Team to investigate and pem!M , attempt repair Trip)

1230 Terminate the emergency exercis ERO to restore the ERFs back to state of readiness. Lead Facilitators collect procedures and logs used during the exercis Facilitators conduct preliminary revie Conduct facility critique Participants critique their perfonnance and Facilitators brief participants on observation Summary: An explosion occurs in the "1J1" 480 emergency bu This event requires the declaration of an Aler .

A medical emergency occurs outside the Decontamination Facility. The victim requires victim be transport to an oft-site medical facilit .

A loose part occurs in the lower reactor vessel resulting in fuel clad damage and subsequent increase in reactor coolant system activit . A tube rupture occurs in the "B" steam generator. The "B" steam generator PORV fails open and its associated isolation valve can not be shut. The fuel clad damage increases significantly. The failed open PORV allows a radiological release into the environment. These events establish conditions for a General Emergency.

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