IR 05000338/1997003
| ML20216D317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1997 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Trimble D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| 50-338-97-03, 50-338-97-3, 50-339-97-03, 50-339-97-3, TIA-97-16, NUDOCS 9804150253 | |
| Download: ML20216D317 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 -
o REGION il l! , j ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
- 61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85 k'%,,+ 8 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 June 10, 1997 MEMORANDUM T0: David C. Trimble, Jr., Acting Director l Project Directorate II 1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office o Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
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FROM: n R. ohnson, Director ivision of Reactor Projects SUBJECT: TASK INTERFACE AGREEMENT (TIA 97 016) TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE TESTING REQUIREMENTS During a routine inspection at North Anna, questions were raised concerning the Technical Specification (TS) requirements for turbine governor valve testing. The licensee's TS (4.7.1.7.2) requires each turbine governor valve be cycled through one com)lete cycle of full travel every 31 days. The licensee does not cycle t1e Number 4 governor valve from full open to full closed during the surveillance testing because of the design of the_ turbine control system. The licensee has defined one complete cycle of full travel as the normal operating (pretest) position of the valve at full power to the full closed position and back to the pretest position. The testing performed actually exercises the valve past the operating position (approximately 30 percent open) but does not exercise the valve to the full open position. te attached Inspection Report Nos. 50 338, 339/97 03, pages 7-8.
The licensee's testing methodology meets the guidance provided by the vendor (Westinghouse). On May 14, the licensee submitted a proposed TS change to clarify the wording in TS 4.7.1.7.2 to reflect the actual test methodology.
Other licensees may have similar TSs.
We request that NRR perform a generically applicable technical review of the acceptability of the licensee's definition of one complete cycle of full travel for the turbine governor valves and whether failure to cycle the valve from full open to full closed places the licensee in a position of non-compliance and, if so, provide an evaluation of the safety significance of the non compliance.
This TIA was discussed with NRR on June 9, 1997.
I Docket Nos.: 50 ';38, 50 339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF 7 (h I
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Attachment:
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338, 339/97 03 l CONTACT: George Belisle 404 562-4550
REGION II==
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Docket Nos: 50 338, 50 339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report Nos: 50 338/97-03, 50 339/97 03
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Facility: North Anna Power Statio'n, Units 1 & 2 j Location: 1022 Haley Drive
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.- Mineral, Virginia 23117
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l Dates: April 6 through May 17, 1997 Inspectors: K. Poertner Acting Senior Resident Inspector R. Gibbs, Resident Inspector P. Byron, Resident Inspector (Surry)
i Approved by: G. Belisle, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 i
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Division of Reactor Projects l
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/97 03. 50 339/97 03
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I This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, j engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six week l
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l Doerations
. Operator actions to ret:uce power following detection of oil in the
! Unit 2 main generator were appropriate based on the alarm response procedure guidance. Licensee management actions to verbally approve a i change to the alarm response procedure were conducted in accordance with
. . ; T approved administrative procedures and based on sound technical j information (Section 01.2).
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A main feedwater pump swap was carefully controlled (Section 01.3).
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A non cited violation was identified for failure to perform the appropriate attachment to align the B boric acid transfer pump resulting
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in a loss of configuration control of the Unit 1 Boric Acid Transfer
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System. The loss of configuration control resulted from a lack of attention to detail on the part of the operators performing the evolution (Section 01.4).
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Unit I was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage on May 11, 1997.
Shutdown activities observed were conducted in accordance with approved i
procedures. Control room command and control during the power reduction l was good (Section 01.5).
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Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System draindown activities were adequately l controlled and water inventory was closely tracked by the operators and l
the shift technical advisor (Section 01.6).
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The Quench Spray System was properly aligned. The inspectors noted
! several minor material deficiencies that were appropriately addressed by l the licensee. The inspectors expressed a concern to plant management l about the presence of teflon tape on stainless steel threaded l connections (Section 02.1). .-
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Simulator training observed appeared challenging and training personnel provided appropriate feedback to the operating crew following completion of the simulator exercise (Section 05.1).
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A Manageme'nt Safety Review Committee meeting complied with Technical Specification (TS) requirements, and substantive assessment issues were addressed in committee discussions (Section 07.1).
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. The inspectors reviewed the most recent World Association of Nuclear Operators Peer Review Report during the inspection period (Section 07.2).
Maintenance
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An unresolved item was identified concerning TS testing requirements for the Number 4 turbine governor valve. The licensee has submitted a TS change request to clarify the testing requirement (Section M1.1).
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Operations took appropriate actions to halt an emergency diesel generator pre lube operation when procedure clarification was required (Section M1.2).
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fiaintenance activities observed were properly approved, associated
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arocedures were present at the job sites, and the work was performed by (nowledgeable individuals (Section M1.3).
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Control rod drop time testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures. Drop times met TS requirements and all control rods exhibited recoil following entry into the dashpot region (Section M1.4).
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Safety Evaluation 97-SE PROC 22 adequately justified installation of an electrical jumper to initiate manual spray actuation during the performance of Periodic Test 1-PT 66.3 (Section E1.1).
Plant Sunoort
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Radiation protection practices observed were conducted properly (Section R1.1).
. The protected area perimeter barrier was properly manned and maintained (Section S1.1).
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Report Details r
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l Summary of Plant Status l
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and operated l at or near full power until May 11 when the plant was shutdown for a scheduled
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j Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
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i I. Doerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500. 92901)
!.;V- The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures.
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I The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to
, . verify operational safety and compliance with Technical Specifications
- (TSs). Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically l reviewed from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent
, ,. plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping.
r Deviations Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were properly reported and resolved. The inspectors found that daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and plant procedures. Good equipment material conditions were also evident by extended problem free plant operation, j 01.2 Unit 2 Power Reduction
a. Inspection Stone (71707)
l l The inspectors mor.itored activities associated with a Unit 2 power i reduction due to oil being detected in a main generator water detector.
b. Observations and Findinas l
On April 9 at 11:18 a.m., a Unit 2 power reduction commenced due to l hydrogen seal oil intrusion into the main generator. The oil was i detected due to a high alarm on.the generator leads end water detector.
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Prior to the oil detection, a hydrogen seal oil transient had occurred resulting in a high level in the hydrogen seal oil defoaming tank. The power reduction was initiated in accordance with the alarm response procedure. Subsequent to the initiation of the power reduction the vendor was contacted and vendor reference material was reviewed. The review determined that the amount of oil collected from the water level detector (approximately 14 ounces) was acceptable and removal of the generator from service was not required. The alarm response procedure was revised verbally by station management and the power reduction was terminated at 11:44 a.m. at 97.5 percent power. The unit was returned
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2-to 100 percent power at 12:36 p.m. The alarm response procedure was subsequently revised tu reflect the vendor guidance.
The inspectors monitored activities in the control room during the power reduction and attended the meeting where plant management verbally changed the alarm response procedure based on the vendor recommendations. The inspectors also reviewed the completed procedure
! action request following verbal approval of the change.
- c. Conclusions Operator actions to reduce power folicwing detection of oil in the Unit 2 main generator were appropriate based on the alarm res)onse l
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procedure guidance. Licensee actions to verbar.y approve a clange to i, the alarm response procedure were conducted in accordance with approved
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administrative procedures and based on sound technical information.
01.3 Main Feedwater (MFW) Pumo Swao
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a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed operators starting Unit 2 MFW pump 2 FW P IC and
.. securing MFW pump 2 FW-P 1B.
b. Observations and Findinas On April 11, the inspectors observed a swap of MFW pumps in which MFW pump.C was started and MFW pump B was secured. The inspectors attended the are-brief in the control room and noted that.all personnel involved in tle evolution were present. The inspectors noted that communications by the unit Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) were difficult'to hear, but
,' observed that personnel involved ' asked questions to ensure the SRO's directions were clear. Overall, the inspectors concluded the brief was good. .The inspectors also observed local operation of placing the standby condensate pump in service and found no problems. In the l l
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control room, the inspectors observed that procedure execution, i communications, and supervisory oversight were appropriate. The l inspectors also observed that a third reactor operator carefully monitored steam generator water level. There were no unexpected equipment problems during the swap.
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! c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the MFW pump swap was carefully '
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01.4 Boric Acid Transfer Pumo (BATP) Operation With No Suction Path i Inspection Scope (71707) fi a.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding an inadvertent isolation of the suction flow path to the C BATP.
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b. Observations and Findinas At 9:00 a.m. on.May 8, BATP B was placed in service to allow installation of a suction pressure gauge on the A BATP. This evolution was accomplished using procedure 0 0P-8.8. " Transferring Boric Acid."
Revision 1. At 10 15 a.m.. the A BATP was restarted per 0 0P 8.8 and the B BATP was secured. On May 8, at approximately 3:15 p.m. during review of the comaleted procedure by the unit supervisor, it was-determined that t1e wrong attachment was used te place the B BATP in service. This resulted in-the B BATP b:iN aligned to the B Boric' Acid Tank (BAT) as opposed to the A BAT and it also resulted in isolation of the C BATP suction isolation valve with the C BATP still operating. The C BATP was secured. the system was realigned and the C BATP was
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TS 3.1.2.2 requires ttht a boron injection flowpath from the BATS via a BATP and a charging pump be operable during power operation. The inspectors verified that the boration flowpath to Unit I was operable during the period that the boric acid transfer system was misaligned.
The failure to properly implement procedure 0 0P-8.8 to align the B BATP
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the licensee and corrective actions.were initiated to address the
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failure to adequately implement the procedure. This licensee identified violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item is identified as NCV 50 338/
97003 01.
c. Conclusions An NCV was identified for failure to perform the appropriate attachment to align the B BATP resulting in a loss of configuration control of the Unit 1 boric acid transfer system. The loss of configuration control resulted from a lack of attention to detail on the part of the operators performing the evolution.
01.5 Unit 1 Shutdown for Refuelina a. Inspection Scope (71707)
On May 11. the inspectors observed portions of the Unit 1 shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage.
b. Observations and Findinas On May 11 at 1:45 a.m. , Unit I was removed from service to commence a scheduled refueling outage. The inspectors observed portions of the power reduction, removal of the generator from service, turbine overspeed testing, power reduction to below the point of adding heat.
opening of the reactor trip breakers, and rod drop time testing.
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-Activities' observed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Control room command and-control during the aower reduction
.was good. When the reactor was tripped in accordance wit 1 the controlling procedure, all rods indicated less than ten steps as required and emergency boration was not required. Operations management was in the control room during the shutdown activities, c. Conclusions-Unit I was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage on May 11'. 1997.
Shutdown activities-observed were conducted in accordance with approved procedures. Control room command and control during the power reduction was good.
,, 01.6 Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Draindown
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a. Inspection Scope (71707)
On May 14 the inspectors observed ' control room activities associated with RCS draindown to the 74-inch vessel level.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed control room activities associated with reducing RCS level below the reactor vessel flange to allow detensioning of the reactor vessel head. Prior to reducing RCS level below the pressurizer, the F.CS loops were isolated and drained. The inspectors observed that procedural' compliance was good and water inventory was being closely tracked by the operators and the shift technical advisor.
c. Conclusions RCS draindown activities were adequately controlled and water inventory was being closely tracked by the operators and the shift. technical advisor.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
, 02.1 Unit 1 Quench Sorav (OS) System Walkdown a. Inspection Scope (71707) .-
On April 30, the inspectors wrformed a walkdown of the primary and recirculation flowpaths of t1e Unit 1 QS system. The inspectors did not inspect inaccessible components in the containment. Since teflon tape was observed on the Unit 1 QS system, other plant areas were walked down to check for further evidence of teflon tape.
b. Observations and Findinas
. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Figure 6.2-67. Revision 30: " Piping and Instrument Diagram
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(P&ID)," 11715 FM-091A Revision 26 sheets I and 2: and 1 0P-7.4A.
" Valve Checkoff - Quench Spray System " Revision 7, as references for the required system valve positions. The inspectors found that all valves listed in 1-0P-7.4A were in their required positions.
The inspectors observed that housekeeaing in the safeguards and OS pump houses was excellent. It was noted tlat all components were properly labeled and that minor boron accumulations, none with observed active leakage, had Work Order (WO) requests in place that were not excessively ol d. Instrumentation was properly installed and indicated expected values with the 05 system in standby.
The inspectors noted several conditions that were brought to the attention of oper.ations and engineering. These conditions included the
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There was an inconsistent representation of heat traced piping on the referenced P& ids and the UFSAR figure listed above. The licensee subsequently prepare ~d DR N 97 1054 to address the
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inconsistencies.
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Piping insulation at the Refueling Water Storage Tank WST) area
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was in need of repair. The licensee subsequently prepered a deficiency card to initiate repairs.
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OS pump recirculation piping supports and spring cans supporting the high and low recirculation piping, which are attached to the RWST, were corroded. The licensee subsequently determined the supports to be operable, but in need of repair and issued DR N 97-1053.
ae inspectors observed that teflon tape was used in two different
!ocations in the 05 system. Specifically, teflon tape was found at the pipe cap threaded connection for 1-0S 104, which is located at test connection penetration 63, and at OS pump suction pressure gauge 1 05-PI 1048, both of which consisted of stainless steel piping. The inspectors informed appropriate licensee personnel and DR N 971087 was subsequently issued to document the use of teflon tape.
On May 2, the inspectors walked down the Unit 2 05. Outside Recirculation Spray, and Low Head-Safety Injection systems to determine if the teflon tape found on the Unit 105 system was an isolated occurrence. The inspectors identified that teflon tape was present on various stainless steel instrument connections. On later dates throughout the inspection period, the inspectors observed that teflon tape was in use in other plant locations, including the Auxiliary l Building Fuel Handling Building, and the Unit I containment. These
! findings were also discussed with the licensee.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program requirements to determine j the restrictions on the use of teflon tape. Document N-95-122, {
" Consumable Material Evaluation (CME)." Revision 2, was reviewed to l L
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determine if the use of teflon tape was acceptable on systems with stainless steel piping such as 05. Outside Recirculation Spray, and Low Head Safety Injection. The review determined that teflon tape was not allowed for use on these systems.
The inspectors discussed the use of teflon tape with engineering. The Engineering Department provided procedure NAI 0001. " Specification for Installation of Instrumentation." Revision 3. Section 7.2.9.7.1. which stated that types of teflon or other materials shall not be used on control pneumatic, control hydraulic or priniary instrument tube national pipe thread fittings, piping, or on instrument air distribution tubing fittings. Specification NAI 0001 also stated that when teflon tape is discovered in the plant during the course of maintenance activities, the tape should be removed and another approved sealant should be used. The specification further stated, however, that it is
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not necessary to disassemble threaded connections for the sole purpose of removing the tape. This guidance was added to the specification on February 15. 1994. The licensee subsequently issued engineering transmittal. CME 97-0055. " Justification for Installed Teflon Tape."
Revision 1. to formalize their position on the use of teflon tape.
The inspectors did not identify any instances where teflon tape has been
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' incorrectly used during maintenance activities. The fact that teflon tape was installed on systems was discussed with the station manager and he stated that the use of teflon tape would be reviewed further, c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that valves in the main and recirculation flow paths for the QS system were properly aligned. The inspectors noted several minor deficiencies in the QS system that were appropriately addressed by the licensee. The inspectors expressed a concern to plant management about the presence of teflon tape on stainless steel threaded connections.
05 Operator Training and Qualification 05.1 Licensed Operator Reoualification Simulator Trainina a. InspectionScope(71707).
On April 25. the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification simulator training.
b. Observations end Findinos The inspectors observed a simulator training scenario conducted as part l
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of the licensed operator requalification program. The exercise also included participation by Security personnel. The scenario observed appeared challenging to the operating crew and training personnel were professional and provided appropriate feedback to the crew following completion of the exercise. i f
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c. - Conclusions Simulator training observed appeared challenging and training personnel provided appropriate feedback to the operating crew following completion of the simulator exercise.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Hanagement Safety Review Committee (HSRC) Meetino (40500)
On' A3ril 30, the inspectors attended a regularly scheduled MSRC meeting at t1e North Anna site, and observed Station Manager's plant status reports. The inspectors determined that the MSRC meeting met TS 4.5.2 requirements for member composition and quorum and that the agenda V'-
2 appropriately included review items required by TS 6.5.2.7. The inspectors observed that the Station Manager's reports generated significant self critical discussions of station performance. The inspectors concluded that the MSRC meeting was in compliance with TS
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. 07.2 World Association of Nuclear Doerators (WANO) Peer Review Report During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the WAND Peer Review Report and. discussed the report with the Branch Chief. The North Anna. Branch Chief also reviewed the report during a site visit conducted during the insaection period. The WANO report findings were generally consistent wit 1 previous NRC observations.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Unit 2 Turbine Valve Freedom Test a. Inspection Scone (61726)
On Aaril 11, the inspectors observed operators performing 2 PT 34.3, i
"Turaine Valve Freedom Test." Revision 19. The test implements TS surveillance requirement 4.7.1.7.2.a to demonstrate the operability of
the turbine governor and throttle valves. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 92 percent for the test.
b. Observations and Findinos The inspectors attended the pre-brief and found that it was effective.
All personnel involved with the work were present and clear direction was provided by the unit Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) for personnel responsibility during the test. Good discussions regarding reactivity management were provided by the shift supervisor.
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The insoectors observed the test both in the control room and locally at the hig1 pressure main turbine. In the control room, the inspectors found that procedure execution, operating crew communications, and supervisory oversight were effective. In particular, the inspectors noted the effective SRO oversight prcvided to the reactor operator during the power reduction.
The inspectors verified'goverrar valve operation locally. All governor valves fully cycled when individually tested except governor valve Number 4. The insxctors observed that when the Number 4 governor valve was tested it stro(ed from less than approximately 10 percent open. The inspectors, however, observed that the Number 4 valve stroked from various other open positions when the other three governor valves were tested. The inspectors observed that the Number 4 governor valve was
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not tested from the full open position.
TS 4.7.1.7.2.a requires that each turbine governor valve be cycled through one complete cycle of full travel. The inspectors questioned whether the as tested condition of the Number 4 governor valve met the TS. requirement. The licensee stated that their interpretation of
" complete cycle" for the Number 4 governor valve was the position of the valve ,at 100 percent power and that the valve was cycled above the,100
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. percent value when the other governor valves were cycled. . The licensee further stated that testing the valve from the fully open position was not possible due to the design of the electrohydraulic system.
Based on the inspectors * question, the licensee contacted the vendor and verified that the testing conducted was in accordance with the vendor's requirements for operability. This 'information was provided to the 1 inspectors for review. The purpose of the surveillance requirement is to exercise the valves and verify freedom of movement. Standard TSs do not contain a requirement to test the turbine governor valves and the licensee's testing meets vendor requirements. The licensee has submitted a TS change request to clarify the testing requirements for the Number 4 governor valve. This item is identified as Unresolved Item (URI) 50-338, 339/97003 02 pending further NRC review of the licensee's TS interpretation. )
c. Conclusions A URI was identified concerning.TS testing recuirements for the Number 4 turbine governor valve. The inspectors consicered that the testing conducted adequately demonstrated operability of the Number 4 governor valve. The licensee has submitted a TS change request to clarify the
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testing requirement.
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M1.2 2H Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fast Start Test a. Inspection Scope (61726).
On May 7. the inspectors observed portions of 2-PT-82.3A, ~2H Diesel Generator Test (Simulated Loss of Offsite Power in-Conjunction with an l
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ESF Actuation Signal)," Revision 37. The inspectors also observed operators performing portions of 2-0P 6.6A. " Emergency Generator Pre-0)erational Check for 2H and 2J Diesel." Revision 15.The purpose of t1e test was to demonstrate the operability of the 2H EDG to fast start from a simulated loss of offsite power with a Safety Injection signal and to be loaded and operated for 60 minutes in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2.c(b) and 4.8.1.2.
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors attended the are brief and observed that the Unit 2 SR0 conducted it effectively. T1e SRO used the "0)erations Evolution
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Checklist" as a guide to ensure the brief was aeneficial. The
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inspectors concluded that all personnel involved with the test were properly briefed.
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The inspectors observed the pre lube operation of the EDG. One of the notes in the procedure, before Step 5.1.20. informs the operator to not
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run the EDG if any liquid is observed coming from the cylinder exhaust petcocks. When the EDG was cranked, using starting air, some evidence -
of liquid oil was observed. The operator therefore elected to halt the -
. test and obtain an engineering clarification. The licensee subsequently
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performed a procedure action request to the procedure which clarified the liquid as water. The inspectors concluded that appropriate acticas were taken by operations to clarify the note before proceeding with the test.
The inspectors observed operation of the diesel from the control room and found that the operator carefully monitored its operation and that supervisory oversight for the test was approariate. The inspectors also discussed with the shift technical advisor tie results of the test to determine if the TS requirements were satisfied. The shift technical advisor effectively demonstrated understanding of the test results for engine speed, generator frequency, and generator voltage.
The inspectors reviewed previous test results to determine if the recuired surveillance interval was satisfied and found no discrepancies.
Adcitionally, the inspectors ensured that test instrumentation was properly ' calibrated, c. Conclusions .-
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The inspectors concluded that TS requirements were satisfied for the 2H EDG during the simulated loss of off site power and engineered safety features actuation signal fast start test. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that o>erations took appropriate actions to halt the EDG pre-lube operation wien procedure clarification was required.
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Hl.3 Maintenance Activities a. Inspection ScoDe (62707)
On May 2 through May 6, the inspectors observed various maintenance activities. Specifically, the inspectors observed the replacement of the Service Water (SW) intake screen for SW pump 1 SW P 1B, removal of the MFW pump motor for MFW pump 1 FW P 1B, repair of the Refuel Purification Ion Exchange Resin Fill Valve,1-RP-71, and heat trace troubleshooting efforts.
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors reviewed the following W0s at the job site to ensure the
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activities and to ensure the actual work reflected the WO instructions.
-WO 00262090-01, " Install Rebuilt SW Screen Assembly for 1 SW P-1B"
-WO 00363008-01, "1-FW-P-1B Pump Motor #1 (Outboard) Removal"
, WO.00364537 01, " Refuel Purification Ion Exchange Resin Fill Valve, 1-RP 71 Repair"
-WO 00362731 01 " Check / Repair Heat Trace Circuit"
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The inspectors verified that plant management was aware of the work by ensuring the activities were included on the plan of the day. The inspectors also observed that applicable procedures were at the job site and were properly executed by knowledgeable individuals- When
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replacement parts were used, the inspectors verified the parts were identical.
During the replacement work on the SW intake screen, the inspectors observed that workers .were kept aware of confined space conditions in the SW intake bay area. The inspectors observed multiple uses of the air quality monitor.
Before actual work began on the 1 RP-71 valve, the inspectors noted that maintenance personnel stopped the work when they determined the j procedure was not adequate for the job. The inspectors also observed that' careful radiological practices were followed and that health physics support was effective.
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c. Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the maintenance activities observed were properly ap3 roved, associated 3rocedures were present at the job sites, and the wor ( was performed by (nowledgeable individuals.
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Hl.4 Control Rod Testina a. . Inspection' Stone (61726)
On May 11. the inspectors observed control rod drop testing.
b. Observations and Findings During the Unit 1 shutdown for refueling, the licensee performed hot rod drops prior to initiating plant cooldown. The inspectors monitored activities in the control room and at the control rod drive panels during the drop time tests. The testing was performed in accordance with procedure 1-PT 17.2, " Rod Drop Time Heasurement," Revision 16. The-ins]ectors verified that shutdown margin requirements were: met prior to wit 1 drawing control rods, rod drop t.imes met TS requirements, and that me, :' - all control rods exhibited recoil.
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Control rod drop time testing was performed in accordance with approved procedures. Drop times met TS requirements and all control rods exhibited recoil following entry into the dashpot region.
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III. Enaineerina
El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Unit 1 Electrical Jumoer Safety Evaluation Review a. Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Safety Evaluation 97 SE PROC-22, applicable electrical schematics, and held discussions with engineering personnel performing the safety evaluation.
b. Observations and Findinas During the performance of Periodic Test 1-PT-66.3, " Containment Actuation Functional Test " the A train failed to initiate using the manual spray actuation switches in the control room. Troubleshooting determined that the failure resulted from a defective switch and a replacement switch was not available. The safety evaluation was performed to allow a temporary jumper to be installed across the defective switch to allow testing to continue until a replacement switch could be obtained.
The manual spray actuation switches were not required to be operable v when the unit is in Mode 5. A WO was initiated to replace the defective e switch prior to startup.
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c. Conclusions Safety Evaluation 97 SE PROC-22 adequately justified installation of an electrical jumper to initiate manual-spray actuation during the performance of procedure 1 PT 66.3.
IV.~P1 ant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls (71750)
On numerous occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed Radiation Protection (RP) practices including radiation control area entry and exit, surve.y results, and radiological area material conditions. No discrepancies were noted, and the inspectors determined
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51 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)
- On numerous occasions during the inspection period, the inspectors performed walkdowns of the protected area perimeter to assess security and general barrier conditions. No deficiencies were noted and the
.. inspectors concluded that security posts were properly manned and that the perimeter barrier's material condition was properly maintained.
V. Manaoement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Sunnary The inspectors aresented the inspection results to members of licensee management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on May 23, 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors ~ asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
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B. Foster, Superintendent Station Engineering C. Funderburk. Superintendent. Outage Planning E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance J. Hayes. Superintendent, Operations D. Heacock, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing <
H.:Kansler, Vice President. Nuclear Operations W. Matthews, Station Manager
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M. McCarthy. Director, Nuclear Ovef sight R. Shears, Superintendent Maintenance A. Stafford, Superintendent. Radiological Protection T. Williams, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
. IP 40500:. Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
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. 1P 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup.- P1 ant Operations ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
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Opened 50 338/97003-01 NCV Failure to properly implement procedure to align .
boric acid transfer pump (Section 01.4).
50 338, 339/97003 02 URI Main steam governor valve Number 4 testing receircments (Section M1.1).
Closed 50 338/97003-01 NCV Failure to properly implement procedure to align BATP (Section 01.4).
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