IR 05000335/1985020

Insp Repts 50-335/85-20 & 50-389/85-20 on 850709-0812. Violation Noted:Operating Procedure 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, Not Adequately Established & Maintained

ML20135E929
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	09/04/1985
From:	Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135E909	List: IR 05000335/1985020 ML20135E905 ML20135E924
References
50-335-85-20, 50-389-85-20, NUDOCS 8509170093
Download: ML20135E929 (6)

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UNITED STATES l [># Krog o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j [ o REGION li >

I g .j 101 MARIETTA STREET, *

e ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323

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i Report Nos.: 50-335/85-20 and 50-339/85-20 ,

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Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street

Miami, FL 33102 f

j Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2  !

j Inspection Conducted: July 9 - August 12, 1985 Inspection at St. Lucie site, near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors: *

A Eph bm-J R. V. Crienjak, Senior Resident Inspector Dat'e Signed

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H. E..Bibb Res dent Inspector vts SJr Dath Signed bW Approved by: ,

S.'A.'Elrod, Section Chief

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$/$/6 i Vate Signed .

J Division of Reactor Projects  !

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} SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 218 inspector-hours onsite '

j in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance, operator performance,

overall plant operations, Quality Assurance (QA) practices, station and corporate l

management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site  !

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security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance activities and reactor trip I l Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified (paragraph 11).  !

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• K. N. Harris, St. Lucie Vice President

• D. A. Sager, Plant Manager J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent T. A. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent

• L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor C. F. Leppla, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor P. L. Fincher, Training Supervisor

• C, A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)

E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting)

H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics (HP) Supervisor J. G. West, Security Supervisor J. Barrow, Fire Prevention Coordinator J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Electrical G. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent - Mechanical N. G. Roos, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 15, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed - Unit 1) Unresolved Item 50-335/84-25-01, Routing and Tracking IE Notice The inspector reviewed the licensee's operating experience feedback program and determined it to be 2atisfactory at this tim (Closed - Unit 1) Violation 50-335/84-29-01, Failure to wear Protective Clothing Required by RW The inspector has continued to observe the use of protective clothing in various radiation controlled areas and found present practices to be satisfactor .

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4. Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection period to verify that: monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly ,

established, that critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, that excess equipment or material was stored properly and that combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration date Some tours were conducted on backshift The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of emergency core cooling systems. Valve, breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room. During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and that equipment material conditions were satisfactor . Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

During the inspection period, the inspectors periodically reviewed shif t logs and operations records including data sheets, instrument traces and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. Operator performance and actions were observed and evaluated. The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shif t turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedure . Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2) ,

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and review of completed logs and record The licensee's compliance with selected LC0 action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happene _ . . . . - - _ - . _ _ _ - - _ . _ _

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, Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and 3 components were observed, reviewed or both to ascertain that they were i conducted in accordance with requirement The following items were i

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considered during this review: LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; QC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were

implemented as required. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related j equipmen . Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2) i The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirement Areas inspected included the organi-zation of the security force, the estabitshment and maintenance of gates, '

doors, and isolation zones in the proper conditions, and verification that access control and badging were proper and that procedures were followe ;

1 Surveillance Observations i

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that plant operations were in compliance with selected TS requirements. Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry,

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refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC l and DC electrical sources. The inspectors verified: that testing was i performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that LCOs were met, that removal and restoration of the

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affected components were accomplished, that test results met requirements i and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

, The inspector observed the performance on Unit 1 of I&C procedure 1-1400050, Revision 28, Reactor Protection System Monthly Functional Tes . Reactor Trips (Unit 2) On July 18, 1985, the St. Lucie Unit 2 reactor was operating at normal full power with all systems functional. At approximately 1:00 p.m., a

"DC Ground Alarm" was received in the Unit 2 control room. The Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor (ANPS) was notified by the operators and began execution of the DC ground isolation procedure. The ground i was soon determined to be on the B safety-related DC bus. In an effort j to further isolate the ground, the ANPS followed the procedure i instructions, sequentially removing and replacing fuses in various

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B DC bus loads. When the ANPS removed the fuses to the B main steam isolation valve (MSIV) air supply solenoid valves, the reactor tripped on asymmetric steam generator (SG) pressur The operators observed that the A MSIV closed, and upon reactor trip carried out the immediate operator actions of the reactor trip - turbine trip procedur The operators ensured that AFV was supplied to both SGs and, as opposed to reopening the A MSIV, took manual control of the A steam header atmospheric dump valves and verified all main stean safety valves (MSSV) reseated. The unit was stabilized in hot standby without further inciden i The cause of the event was an error in Operating Procedure (0P)

2-0960030, Revision 4, DC Ground Isolation, which was being executed by the operators at the time of the event. The procedure had originally been implemented on Unit 1 and had been updated to reflect a plant change / modification (PC/M) which changed the MSIV closure logic circui When Unit 2 became operational, the same procedure was implemented on Unit 2 without proper verification of the plant's configuration to validate the procedure. The PC/M had never been implemented on Unit 2, so the procedure did not accurately reflect the as-built operation of the MSIV closure logic circui The error has been present in the procedure since its initial issue for Unit 2 but went undiscovered because, in each previous use of the procedure, the ground fault was isolated before the B MSIV fuses were pulled, e

An additional discrepancy discovered during investigation of this incident was a jumper found installed in the reactor / turbine gage board (RTGB) which connected the positive legs of the MSIV control power and test circuits to the MSIV. A PC/M had been implemented to separate these two circuits (PC/M 145-283), but this jumper did not appear on the original RTGB wiring diagrams; therefore, it was missed i in the process of separating the circuit This jumper did not

, degrade the system's normal operation, but created some confusion when ,

a fuse was removed and power remained on the MSIV. The jumper was l l removed through proper procedure TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained concerning activities recommended in Appendix A of USNRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 6

, of Appendix A of RG 1.33 states that a loss of electrical power / degraded i

power source is an event / activity which should be covered by a written

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procedur Contrary to the above, OP 2-0960030, DC Ground Isolation, was not adequately established and maintained to reflect the operating character-istics of the Unit 2 MSIV air supply solenoid valve logic control circui This failure to comply with TS 6.8.1 constitutes violation 50-389/85-20-0 ,

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b. On August 8, 1985, the St. Lucie Unit 2 reactor was operating at normal full power with all systems functional. At approximately 2:02 a.m. , a fuse blew in the A train electrical supply to the SA engineered safeguards actuation cabinet relay This initiated an A train containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS), a MSIS and a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) which auto-started the A train high pressure safety injection (HDSI) pump, low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump and the emergency diesel generator (EDG). The MSIS closed tr.e A and B MSIV The reactor protection system initiated a reactor trip on low steam generator water level with subsequent turb?ne trip, electric generator trip and station power transfer to the start-up transformer Several MSSVs opened and a power operated relief valve (PORV) actuated for about one second. The A, B, and C AFW pumps started giving full auxiliary feed to the SG Subsequently, the operator opened the atmospheric steam dumps to reseat the MSS The CIAS signal caused isolation of the component cooling water (CCW)

to the 2A1 and 282 reactor coolant pumps (RCP). The reactor operator then secured RCPs 2A1 and 2B A B channel SIAS actuated about 2:09 a.m. due to low reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure caused by the excessive RCS cooldown. The operator lef t RCPs 2A2 and 281 running. The B train HPSI, LPSI and EDG auto-starte By 2:15 a.m. the MSSVs had rescated; the cooldown was stopped; and RCS pressure was returning to normal. At 2:18 a.m. the operators secured RCPs 2A2 and 281 due to approaching ten minutes with no CCW coolin At 2:23 a.m. SIAS channel B reset as RCS pressure recovered. At 2:30 a.m. CCW flow was re-established to RCPs 2A2 and 281. Natural circulation cooldown was verified. RCS pressure and temperature were stabilized at 2200 psig and 530 degrees respectivel At 2:41 a.m. the B train HPSI, LPSI and EDG were secured. At 2:42 there were two brief PORV actuations due to high RCS pressure. Valve reseating was confirme At 3:28 a.m. the A train HPSI and LPSI were secure At 5:50 a.m. the blown fuse in the channel A engineered safety features actuation system power supply was replaced; SIAS channel A was reset; the A train EDG was secured; and the A train HPSI and LPSI were returned to the automatic mode. CCW was restored to the RCPs with 2A2 and 281 being started to begin forced cooldown. The RCP seals were damaged due to the CCW interruption, and all four pumps' seals are being replaced during the short outage.