IR 05000317/1986025

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Radiological Safety Insp Rept 50-317/86-25.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Radiological Controls During Outage
ML20207P846
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1987
From: Mcfadden J, Shanbaky M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207P841 List:
References
50-317-86-25, NUDOCS 8701200315
Download: ML20207P846 (7)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /86-25 Docket N License N OPR-53 Category C Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Facility Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: _Lusby, Maryland Inspection Conducted: December 1-5, 1986 Inspectors: kl dd b J. McFadden, Radiation Speciali!t ik 6k D date -

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Approved by: W Sd i V Y1 M. Sharibaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation dhte Protection Section r Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 1-5, 1986 (Inspection Report N /86-25)

Areas Inspected: An unannounced in plant radiological safety ction at Unit 1 during an outage including: implementation of radiolo9, .ontrols during an outage. One regionally-based inspector was'onsite for this inspectio Results: No violations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000317

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted During the course of this inspection, the following personnel were contacted or interviewed:

1.1 Licensae Fersonnel

  • A. Anuje, Supervisor-Quality Audits Unit A. Sutler, Supervisor-Security Screening Unit
  • J. Carroll, General Supervisor-QA T. Goff, Supervisor-Dosimetry S. Hutson, Supervisor-ALARA Group
  • L. Larragoite, Licensing Engineer
  • J. Lemons. Manager-Nuclear Operations Department
  • J. Lenhart, Supervisor-Materials Processing N. Millis, General Supervisor-Radiation Safety
  • G. Phair, Supervisor-Radiation Controi Operations
  • E. Roach, QA Auditor E. Reimer, Plant Health Physicist
  • L. Smialek, Senior Plant Health Physicist B. Watson, Assistant General Supervisor-Radiation Control ard Support
  • Attended exit interview on December 5, 198 Additional licensee personnel were contacted or interviewed during this inspectio .2 NRC Personnel Attending the Exit Interview T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector 2.0 Purpose The purpose of this in plant radiation safety inspection was $wo-fold as

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To review the implementation of radiological controls during an outage in the following areas:

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Training and qual.fication of new personnel l

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External exposure and personnel dosimetry

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Internal exposure control and assessment

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Control of radioactive materials and contamination, surveys, and monitoring

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ALARA

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3.0 Implementation of Radiological Controls During an Outage The licensee's implementation of radiological controls during an outage was reviewed against criteria contained in:

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10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation

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Licensee's Technical Specification 6.0, Administrative Controls

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Licensee's Radiological Safety Procedure Manual The licensee's performance relative to these requirements was reviewed by the following:

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Discussions with radiation safety personnel

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Observation of the performance of radiation safety activities

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Tours of the reactor containment and of the auxiliary building

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Review of documentation Within the scope of this review, no items of noncompliance were identi-fle .1 Selection, Training and Qualification of New Personnel The licensee's selection, training and qualification of contractor personnel as radiation protection technicians was reviewed against additional specific criteria in ANSI /ANS-3.1-1981, " Selection, Quali-fication and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants".

The licensee's performance relative to these specific criteria was reviewed in discussions with the supervisor of radiological control (operations). The inspector reviewed selected personnel folders for contracted radiation protection technicians. The licensee's mechan-ism for controlling work assignments for junior and senior techni-cians was reviewed. The review of personnel folders indicated that the licensee had addressed the ANSI standard experience requirement A number of the technicians had prior work experience at this sit In addition to general employee, radiation worker, and general radia-tion protection procedures training, the contracted technicians are tested for their knowledge of theoretical radiation protection prin-ciples and receive training for coverage of specific special work permits (SWPs). The status of contracted technicians as senior or junior is clearly identified on posted "radcon operations unit sign-in/out" sheets for each shift. The licensee stated that only senior technicians are used to perform activities involving active exposure control such as SWP coverag .2 External Exposure and Personnel Dosimetry The licensee's program for external exposure and personnel dosimetry was reviewed against additional specific criteria in:

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RSP 1-110 Controlled Area Access Control ]

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RSP 1-112 Special Maintenance Radiological Control Proce-dures

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RSP 1-116 Dosimetry Issue and Dose Calculations Performed by Radiation Safety Units

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RSP 1-201 SWP Preparation The licensee's performance relative to these specific criteria was reviewed as follows. The SWP program appeared effectiv Color-coded (three colors designating three different levels of area dose rate) stick-on labels are used on posted SWPs to alert users. Addi-tionally, these labels are used on the wall maps by the SWP sign-in/

out desk. Bulletin boards and a changing electronic message display, in the same area, carry radiation protection statistics for the out-age, a listing of areas where respiratory protection is required, and current radiological condition Cumulative dose for each worker is tracked at the sign-in/out desk. Normally, a twice-daily report of the cumulative dose for each worker is provided to each supervisor of a group with significant exposur The individual exposure control and tracking system also appeared to be effective. A technician read and recorded a worker's self-reading dosimeter (SRD) reading for each entry and exit on a SWP. The tech-nician also issues a dose status card to each worker before entry and this card must be returned at the sign-out desk. Inside the radia-tior.-controlled area (RCA), special control point watch stations (SCPWs) are set up near high radiation areas (HRAs). Before entry into a HRA, each worker must have his SRD read and recorded and must turn in his dose status card at the SCPW. Again, upon exiting the HRA, his SRD must be read and recorded, and his dose status card is returned. Each group supervisor is authorized to sign exposure exten-sions above certain administrative limits, but, before implementa-tion, all exposure extensions receive an extensive exposure records review by dosimetry personne Review of SWP packages indicated the following. Pre-job briefings, ALARA reviews (pre- and post-job), and ALARA field service inspection reports were frequently required and were documented. Special dosi-metry was required for jobs involving high dose gradients. Surveys performed during SWP activity were listed on a " resurvey resume" form, and their frequency appeared adequate to detect changing radio-logical conditions. Two types of remote manipulator were used for tasks inside the primary side of the steam generators (S/Gs). One was used primarily for eddy-current testing, and the other primarily

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for tube cutting and plugging. The licensee reported that one of the type used for eddy-current testing had been permanently acquire (See other ALARA information in Section 3.5).

During tours of the RCA, the following were noted. "ALARA low dose area" signs were in use. Temporary local shielding had been used in HRAs, Closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems (eight cameras in containment and two in the auxiliary building) were in place with

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monitors at the SCPWs and in the HP office / main HP access control point. Provisions for verbal communication between the two monitor-ing points and the work site had been provided. A wireless teledose system, acquired before the outage, was in use at one SCPW statio The licensee stated that the use of the CCTV and teledose systems had resulted in significant dose saving Dosimetry records were reviewe Inspection of selected exposure files for individuals with exposure greater than 1.25 rem for the current quarter indicated that documentation of past and current exposures were being adequately maintaine .3 Internal Exposure Control and Assessment The licensee's internal exposure control program was reviewed against additional specific criteria in:

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RSP 1-101 Radiological Surveys

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RSP 1-103 Operation of Counter Scaler Systems

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RSP 1-117 Selection, Issuance and Wearing of Respiratory Protection Devices Used at CCNPP The licensee's performance relative to these specific criteria was reviewed as follow Review of SWPs appeared adequate in regard to requirements for additional air sampling, use of respiratory protect-ive equipment, and use of HEPA-filtered exhaust units. During this cutage and the last one, partially-solid-contamination-containments (partly plastic sheet / partly woven wire screening) were being used, and the HEPA-filtered units had been utilized as a suction source directly connected to the internally contaminated volume (e primary-side S/G manways) or as local exhausts close to the point source of potential airborne radioactivit Review of the MPC-hours log indicated that there were no recorded cumulative totals greater than 10 MPC-hours over any seven consecutive days and that most of the recorded totals were fractions of or only several MPC-hours. The licensee's program for posting airborne radioactivity areas and for tracking intake is more rigorous than that regulatory required in that areas are posted starting at 0.1 MPC and quantities equal to and greater than 0.1 MPC-hours are tracked. Air sample records for SWP coverage were also reviewed.

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3.4 Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination The licensee's program for control of radioactive materials and con-tamination was reviewed against additional specific criteria in:

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RSP 1-104 Area Posting and Barricading

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RSP 1-107 Personnel and Clothing Contamination Assessment /

Decontamination by Radiation Control-Operations

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The licensee's performance relative to these specific criteria was reviewed during observations in the RCA. At the exit of the RCA there was a half-body automated frisker in addition to several hand-held frisker stations. Past these friskers, there was an exit portal monitor. There was also a posting at the RCA exit stating the requirements for a release survey for materials or equipment by radia-tion control personnel before their removal from the RCA. There appeared to be adequate portable survey and counting instrumentation-in the radiation office at the main RCA access control point to sup-port surveying and counting requirements. During a tour of contain-ment, it was noted that there were clear aisles and that there were not numerous or large quantities of packaged radioactive waste accumu-lating which indicated that radioactive waste removal from the work areas was being routinely addressed. A licensee representative stated that an outage coordinator had been assigned to routinely tour the containment building and to note and expedite any accumulated and unneeded materials or equipmen .5 ALARA The licensee's ALARA program was reviewed against additional specific criteria in:

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RSP 1-200 ALARA Administrative Procedure

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RSP 1-202 ALARA Field Services

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RSP 1-203 Temporary Shielding The licensee's performance relative to these specific criteria was evaluated while reviewing the implementation of the planning and pre-paration done for the outage and while reviewing the status of the person-rem goal . Implementation of Planning and Preparation During a preoutage inspection (NRC Inspection No. 86-17),

the inspector noted that planning and preparation for the outage was being performed and that numerous ALARA reviews for SWPs to be used during the outage were being develope Iaplementation of this planning, preparation, and SWP re-view was investigated during this inspection. The use of mock-up training, automated manipulators, CCTVs, temporary shielding, teledose instrumentation, twice daily dissemina-tion of individual cumulative dose standings, color-coded labels on SWPs, and extensive use of HEPA-filtered exhaust units were mentioned previously. The ALARA effort for the following SWPs was reviewed:

-#1303 Remove neutron shield supports, lower ducts, pool

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-#1310 Detention RV head studs, lift studs, install guide pins and stud hole plugs

-#1406 Remove #11 and #12 S/G primary manways and perform initial surveys

-#1407 Entries into #11 and #12 S/G primary side to install, remove, and repair nozzle dam equip-ment

-#1420 Remove and replace #12A rotating assembly (RCP)

-#1424 Installation, maintenance, use, and removal of the CE Genesis machine in #11 and #12 S/Gs

-#1635 Perform inspection and repairs on RCP rotat-ing assembly 3. ALARA Goals Prior to this outage, the licensee had set the following:

1986 goals: 390 annual site person-rem and 250 Unit I re-fueling outage (10 year ISI) person-rem. During this in-spection, the licensee reported that the outage goal had been increased to 280 due to additional outage work includ-ing the inspection and replacement of a reactor coolant pump. As of November 30, 1986, the actual site person-rem total was approximately 231 versus a projected value of approximately 295, and approximately 150 person-rem had been accumulated due to the outage. The licensee is work-ing towards achieving final totals of about 255 person rem for the outage (versus 280 projected) and about 370 person rem for the annual site total (versus 390 projected).

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4. 0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the personnel denoted in Section 1.0 at the conclu-sion of the inspection on December 5, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed at that tim _

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