IR 05000313/2019004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000313/2019004 and 05000368/2019004

ML20030C514
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	01/29/2020
From:	John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D
To:	Dinelli J Entergy Operations
References
EPID L-2019-004-0005 IR 2019004
Download: ML20030C514 (40)

Text

ary 29, 2020

SUBJECT:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2019004 AND 05000368/2019004

Dear Mr. Dinelli:

On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. On January 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is also documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000313 and 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000313 and 05000368 License Numbers: DPR-51 and NPF-6 Report Numbers: 05000313/2019004 and 05000368/2019004 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0005 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: Russellville, AR Inspection Dates: October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019 Inspectors: L. Carson, Senior Health Physicist W. Cullum, Reactor Inspector T. DeBey, Resident Inspector N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Sullivan, Resident Inspector Approved By: John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section: 71111.04Q.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Restore a Fire Barrier to Functional Prior to De-Posting a Fire Watch Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71111.05Q Systems NCV 05000313/2019004-01 Management Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement program procedures to restore a fire barrier to a functional status prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch and failed to identify a degraded fire barrier in accordance with documented inspection criteria.

Failure to Torque Temporary Power Supply Terminal Screws in accordance with Station Procedures and the Vendor Manual Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.5] - Work 71153 FIN 05000313/2019004-02 Management Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding associated with the licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with torque specifications contained in Procedure EN-MA-145, Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications,

Revision 9, and the vendor manual.

Additional Tracking Items None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at full power. On October 5, 2019, the unit was shut down to begin Refueling Outage 1R28. On November 17, 2019, Unit 1 commenced a reactor startup and the reactor was made critical on November 18, 2019. The unit was returned to full power on November 22, 2019, where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor power reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power where it remained for the rest of the reporting period except for minor reductions in power to support scheduled surveillances.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 crankcase pressure trip device on October 28, 2019

(2) Unit 1 train A low pressure injection/decay heat removal system on November 9, 2019

(3) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system on December 12, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Unit 1 auxiliary building, 335 feet elevation, Fire Zone 162-A, Fire Area B-10, on October 15, 2019

(2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal degradation, Fire Zone 129-F and 1052, Fire Area B-1 and G, on October 21, 2019

(3) Unit 1 reactor building, Fire Zones 32-K, 33-K, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, and 1067, Fire Area J, on October 30, 2019

(4) Unit 1 computer and control rod drive equipment room, Fire Zone 160-B, Fire Area B-1, on November 17, 2019

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities from October 15, 2019, to October 23, 2019:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities:

• 14-017, Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg to Full Penetration Weld - Visual

• 07-012, Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg to Full Penetration Weld - Visual

• CF-1003, Feedwater Welds FW-6AC1 and FW-6BC2 - Dye Penetrant

• 01-029, Reactor Vessel Interior - Visual

• 1-BOP-RT-19-018, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-3 -

Radiography

• 1-BOP-RT-19-017, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-5 -

Radiography

• 1-BOP-RT-19-015, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-17C1 -

Radiography

• 1-BOP-RT-19-016, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-19 -

Radiography

• 1-BOP-RT-19-030, Service Water System Pipe to Pipe Weld FW-1C1 -

Radiography

• A-10303A, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• 21-121, Makeup and Purification System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• 21-062, Makeup and Purification System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• A-10347, Decay Heat Removal System Elbow to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• A-10342, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• A-10343, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination

• A-10340, Decay Heat Removal System Pipe to Pipe Weld - Ultrasonic Examination 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities:

• The inspector reviewed a portion of the remote visual examination of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations. The examination was incomplete because the areas of interest were obscured by deposits caused by a leak of the nonsafety intermediate cooling water system. As a result, the licensee was unable to complete the required examination and will have to re-perform the examination during the next refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the relief request submitted by the licensee (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19304A290) which was approved by the NRC on November 13, 2019, (ADAMS Accession No. ML19318D042).

03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities:

• CR-ANO-1-2018-01843 - Boric acid piling up on cable trays in the basement of the reactor building

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02077 - Three injection block valves, two flow elements, one flow transmitter valve block and one flow orifice were observed having dry inactive white boron residue located at the packing or seal ring area

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02609 - Boric acid leak found on letdown cooler outlet isolation valve CV-1216

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02620 - Boric acid deposit was discovered in the packing area of decay heat removal valve DH-1003

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02727 - Boric acid deposit was discovered in the packing area of pressurizer spray isolation valve RC-3

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02757 - Boric acid deposit was discovered on the valve packing area of seal flow transmitter isolation valve PDT-1280 03.01.e - Problem Identification and Resolution:

• The inspector reviewed 21 condition reports associated with inservice and operating experience issues and concluded that nondestructive examination/inservice inspection-related issues and operating experience are put into the corrective action program at low levels to ensure conditions and problems are identified.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 reactor shutdown for Refueling Outage 1R28 on October 5, 2019 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the Unit 1 licensed operator re-qualification scenario on December 19, 2019

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Unit 2 chemical and volume control system failures when in 50.65(a)(1) on October 22, 2019

(2) Unit 1 reactor building equipment hatch exceeding administrative local leak-rate test requirements on multiple tests on December 31, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal degradation on October 21, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator 2 high crankcase trip during surveillance testing common cause operability on October 15, 2019

(2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 loop seal operability on October 21, 2019

(3) Unit 1 mode restraint operabilities on November 21, 2019

(4) Unit 1 reactor building spray system check valves BS-4A and BS-4B leakage operability on November 27, 2019

(5) Unit 1 reactor building Column 17 operability on December 9, 2019

(6) Unit 1 and Unit 2 startup transformer 2 and Unit 2 startup transformer 3 degraded voltage operability on December 9, 2019

71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from November 18-21, 2019:

(1) Engineering Change EC-51967, Cooling Capability of Switchgear Room Coolers 2VUC-2A, 2B, 2C, 2D with New Service Water Temperature Profile, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(2) Engineering Change EC-61243, Tornado Missile Protection Features and Licensing Basis, Revision 1 (Evaluation)

(3) Engineering Change EC-78439, ANO-1 Cycle 29 Core Reload Evaluation, Revision 0. The inspectors reviewed the composition of the limited number of lead test assemblies (LTAs), placement of LTA in nonlimiting core locations, and Core Operating Limits Reports including the analytical methods that were previously reviewed and approved by the NRC (Evaluation)

(4) Engineering Change EC-45077, ANO Cask Transfer Facility, Revision 0 (Screening)

(5) Engineering Change EC-52059, Anchor Darling Wedge Pin Shear Stress Calculations, Revision 0 (Screening)

(6) Engineering Change EC-50092, Room 72 Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Flood Mitigation Modifications, Revision 0 (Screening)

(7) Engineering Change EC-44152, NE-0501 Source Range Fission Chamber Bypass due to Noise Susceptibility, Revision 1 (Screening)

(8) Engineering Change EC-66364, Emergency Diesel Generator Crank Case Over-pressure Switch Gasket and Plate Addition, Revision 0 (Screening)

(9) Engineering Change EC-67516, Removal of Unit 2 Door 260, Revision 0 (Screening)

(10) Engineering Change EC-49799, Temporary Modification to Remove 2P-32C RCP Axial Position 2ZIY-6066 from Service, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(11) Engineering Change EC-58249, Cable Re-Routes and Interposing Relays NPFA 805 ANO Unit 1 Items S1-4, S1-7, S1-8, S1-24, S1-25 and S1-26 Base EC, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(12) Engineering Change EC-66983, ANO-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Woodward Governor Controls Upgrade, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(13) Engineering Change EC-80461, Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation in Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Methodology, Revision 0 (Evaluation)

(14) Engineering Change EC-57619, Change Equipment Database (EDB) for valves 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-2806A, 2PSV-2823A, and 2PSV-2826A to reclassify valves from safety-related to nonsafety-related, Revision 0 (Screening)

(15) Engineering Change EC-66585, TSR 1702-110 'B' Safety Injection Discharge - A shielding evaluation was requested to facilitate removal and replacement of shutdown cooling heat exchanger 2E-35B, Revision 0 (Screening)

(16) Engineering Change EC-70658, K-4A and K-4B Crankcase Pressure Change Trip Device Isolation Valve, with Child ECs 70659 and 70864, Revision 0 (Screening)

(17) Engineering Change EC-72501, Integrated Control System Reverse Engineered Module Change Evaluation for Input Buffer and Signal Lag Action Unit, Revision 0 (Screening)

(18) Engineering Change EC-72578, Replace Valve 2SV-5061-2 with a bolted bonnet Target Rock Model 97AA-001-1, Revision 0 (Screening)

(19) Engineering Change EC-76046, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade (Train A) Child EC For MPU Bracket Installation Parent EC 73078, Revision 0 (Screening)

(20) Engineering Change EC-76269, P-36A, P-36B, AND P-36C Retainer Sleeve Spacer Equivalency - adds a spacer ring in between the retaining sleeve and mechanical seal sleeve, Revision 0 (Screening)

(21) Engineering Change EC-76707, 1R27 TSR 18-1-128 / 18-1-129 DH-17, DH-18 Replace EN-DC-218, PS-S-005, Revision 0 (Screening)

(22) Engineering Change EC-77219, Evaluation of HBD-14-18" Wall Thickness, Revisions 0 and 1 (Screening)

71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 1 core lead test assemblies loaded for Operating Cycle 29 on October 8, 2019

(2) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump train B steam admission valve temporary modification on November 7, 2019

(3) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump governor valve replacement to digital control on November 8, 2019

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope air conditioning unit VUC-9 degraded loop seal repair on October 30, 2019

(2) Unit 1 emergency diesel generator exhaust stack replacement and lube oil cooler preventive maintenance on November 6, 2019

(3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room envelope penetration post-maintenance testing for cable installation on November 12, 2019

(4) Unit 1 containment liner repair post-maintenance test on November 13, 2019

(5) Unit 1 high pressure injection pump C rebuild post-maintenance testing on November 18, 2019

(6) Unit 1 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump governor valve replacement post-maintenance testing on November 22, 2019

(7) Unit 1 reactor building spray pump A and B lube oil cooler service water air operated inlet valve rebuild post-maintenance testing on December 12, 2019

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1R28 on November 20, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 1 integrated leak rate surveillance testing on December 10, 2019

(2) Unit 2 train B main steam and feedwater isolation Channel 1 response time surveillance testing on December 10, 2019

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 high pressure injection pump C inservice test reference value determination following major pump maintenance on November 18, 2019 Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 train A core flood tank fill check valve MU-36A on October 21, 2019

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 flex portable emergency diesel generators K11 and K12 surveillance testing on December 9,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiological Surveys

• ANO-1910-01302, Unit 1 Reactor Building 354 feet elevation General Area

• ANO-1910-01301, Unit 1 Reactor Building 335 feet elevation General Area

• ANO-1908-00356, Low Level Rad Waste

• ANO-1909-00218, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation General Area

• ANO-1909-00222, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation General Area North End Room Number 45

• ANO-1910-00068, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation Drumming Station Room No. 2026

• ANO-1910-00471, Unit 2 AUX 354 feet elevation General Area

• ANO-1910-00692, Unit 2 AUX 317 feet elevation General Area Risk Significant Radiological Work Activities

• RWP 2019-1420, Remove/Replace Scaffold

• RWP 2019-1421, Remove/Replace Insulation

• RWP 2019-1430, Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly

• RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support

• RWP 2019-1501, VCC-2C/2D Piping

• RWP 2019-1902, P-32D Seal and Upper Thrust Bearing

• RWP 2019-2056, Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor Maintenance Air Sample Survey Records

• ANO-AS-092619-0298, Unit 1 AUX 335 feet elevation

• ANO-AS-100619-0339, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building 401 feet elevation

• ANO-AS-100719-0344, Reactor Auxiliary Building 404 feet elevation

• ANO-AS-100919-0360, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building North Cavity

• ANO-AS-101219-0397, Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building 404 feet elevation

• ANO-AS-101319-0406, Unit 1 AUX 386 feet elevation

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiation Work Packages (RWP)

• RWP 2019-1430, Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly

• RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support

• RWP 2019-1902, P-32D Seal and Upper Thrust Bearing

• RWP 2019-2056, Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor Maintenance Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms

• CR-ANO-C-2018-02066

• CR-ANO-C-2018-03843

• CR-ANO-1-2019-02993

• CR-ANO-2-2018-03070

• CR-ANO-2-2019-00530 Labeling of Containers

• Various sealed containers in the Low Level Radwaste Building

• Various waste drums stored in the Drumming Station and Radwaste Building Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) The inspectors verified the following sealed sources are accounted for and are intact:

• Source ID 49

• Source ID 223

• Source ID 724

• Source ID 1210

• Source ID 1211

• Source ID 1468

• Source ID 1798

• Source ID 2552

• Source ID 2553

• Source ID 2612 Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

(1) The inspectors also reviewed the following RWP for areas with airborne radioactivity:

• RWP 2019-1432, Fuel Movement and Support High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation Engineering Controls (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated airborne controls and radioactive monitoring.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Installed Ventilation Systems

• Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust

• Control Room Ventilation

• Reactor Building Ventilation

• Radwaste Area Ventilation Temporary Ventilation System Setups

• There was one temporary high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) ventilation system available for observation in the Unit 1 containment area during this inspection.

Portable or Installed Monitoring Systems

• Control Room Ventilation and Radiation Monitoring System

• AMS-4 Spent Fuel Pool Area

• AMS-4 Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Elevation 335 feet

• AMS-4 Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Elevation 404 feet

• Reactor Building/Containment Area Unit 1 Equipment Hatch Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices by:

(1) Observing in-field applications; verifying the licensee validated the level of protection provided by the devices; inspecting the material condition of devices, reviewing records and certification of devices issued for use; reviewing the qualifications of workers that use the devices; and observing workers donning, doffing and testing devices.

The inspectors observed three operations personnel and three radiation protection technicians adequately don and doff self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

The inspectors observed and inspected the material condition of SCBAs stored and staged near the control room, the fire brigade area, and operation support center for emergencies. The material conditions were determined to be adequate.

The inspectors verified that the plant breathing air systems, SCBA filling stations, and air compressors met or exceeded Grade-D air specifications.

The inspectors reviewed records and certification of devices issued for use and reviewed the qualifications of workers that use the devices.

The inspectors reviewed medical qualifications, respirator fit test records of several workers.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated self-contained breathing apparatus program implementation.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Status and Surveillance Records for Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus

• SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-003, July 28, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-006, July 28, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-036, July 28, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. UEL-041, July 28, 2019 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Fit for On-Shift Operators and Health Physics Technicians

• 1 Senior Reactor Operator, October 24, 2019

• 2 Reactor Operators, October 24, 2019

• 3 Senior Health Physics Technicians, October 24, 2019 Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Maintenance Check

• SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3176, July 3, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3185, July 3, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3206, July 3, 2019

• SCBA - Air Supply No. R-3235, July 3, 2019 Compressed Air Quality Test

• Eagle Air System Report No. 369034; August 2, 2019

• Bauer Air System Report No. 369035; August 2,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) ===

(1) Unit 1 residual heat removal systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 residual heat removal systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 cooling water support systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 cooling water support systems (October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1) (April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

(1) (April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02)

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 potential adverse trend in implementation of fatigue management program and corrective actions closed to work order backlog on December 9, 2019 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 1 emergency feedwater steam admission valve CV-2663 push button failure on October 23, 2019

(2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Siemens breaker anti-pump relay contact with high resistances extent of condition on November 21, 2019

(3) Unit 2 spent fuel pool lowering level due to failed cask loading pit seal on December 12, 2019

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)

(1) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling pump B trip and licensee entry into spent fuel pool cooling abnormal procedure with reactor core in the spent fuel pool on October 22,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.04Q This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33. Appendix A, Section 3.s.(2)(a), requires procedures for emergency power sources (e.g., diesel generators, batteries). The licensee established Procedure OP-1104.036, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 82, for operation of the emergency diesel generators.

Contrary to the above, from September 2017 to September 2019, the licensee failed to maintain Procedure OP-1104.036 for operation of the emergency diesel generators.

Specifically, the licensee failed to establish a procedure verification step to ensure the crankcase pressure trip device was not in the trip condition prior to placing it into service, and that there was no indication of an emergency diesel generator positive crankcase pressure condition.

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it

(1) did not represent a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component;

(2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function;

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for more than its technical specification allowed outage time; and

(4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02219 Failure to Restore a Fire Barrier to Functional Prior to De-Posting a Fire Watch Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71111.05Q Systems NCV 05000313/2019004-01 Management Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement program procedures to restore a fire barrier to a functional status prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch and failed to identify a degraded fire barrier in accordance with documented inspection criteria.

Description:

On October 2, 2019, during a plant status walk-down of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, auxiliary building elevation 335 feet fire barrier penetrations contained in Fire Area B-10 of Fire Zone 162-A, the inspectors identified separation of the sealant around Fire Barrier 60-008 (FB-60-008). The licensee performed a walk-down to assess its condition to prevent the spreading of a fire from the Unit 1 auxiliary building stair well to the 335 feet elevation that contained the three safety-related high-pressure injection pumps. The licensee also determined there was separation of the sealant around Fire Barrier FB-60-008, and it was difficult to determine how far the separation penetrated the fire seal. Based on the identified condition the licensee declared Fire Barrier FB-60-008 nonfunctional and entered Technical Requirements Manual, Section 3.7.12, Fire Barriers, Action Statements A.3.1 and A.3.2, implemented an hourly fire watch under Fire Impairment 8556, and documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02493.

The inspectors reviewed the surveillance history of Fire Barrier FB-60-008 and identified that it was declared nonfunctional in May 2016. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522 and implemented an hourly fire watch under Fire Impairment 4265. Additionally, Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522 was closed to Work Order 446193 to repair Fire Barrier FB-60-008. Work Order 446193 was still in planned status as of October 2019, and the penetration remained unchanged from when the condition was identified in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01552. However, the hourly fire watch was de-posted in July 2016, and Fire Impairment 4265 was closed prior to Fire Barrier FB-60-008 being restored to functional status, which was not in accordance with Procedure OP-1000.120, ANO Fire Impairment Program, Revision 25, Section 6.3 prerequisites (i.e., the work order assigned to restore fire barrier functionality was completed).

Additionally, the repair of Fire Barrier FB-60-008 was assigned a Priority 3 in accordance with the licensee work management process, which required the licensee to restore Fire Barrier FB-60-008 to functional status around August 2016.

On September 5, 2018, a fire barrier surveillance was performed in accordance with Procedure OP-1405.016, Unit 1 Penetration Fire Barrier Visual Inspection, Revision 26, under Work Order 52746507 and was marked as satisfactory, without identifying the nonfunctional condition documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2016-01522. However, Fire Barrier FB-60-008 did not meet three of the inspection criteria documented in Procedure OP-1405.016 at the time of the inspection, and it should have been declared as nonfunctional. The licensee documented the potential human performance gap associated with the performance of the fire barrier surveillance that did not identify the nonfunctional fire barrier in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-02833.

Corrective Actions: The licensee implemented the required hourly fire watch under fire impairment and performed Work Order 532521 to restore Fire Barrier FB-60-008 to functional.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-2019-02493 and CR-ANO-1-2019-02833

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to restore a nonfunctional fire barrier prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the nonfunctional fire barrier coupled with the lack of a required fire watch could have resulted in a fire spreading from the Unit 1 auxiliary building stairwell to the 335 feet elevation that contained the three safety-related high-pressure injection pumps.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors assigned the finding to fire finding Category 1.4.1 and 1.4.4 using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet, dated May 2, 2018, because the finding involved fire prevention and administrative controls and fire confinement. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the finding:

(1) did not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted; and

(2) the degraded fire confinement element continued to provide adequate fire endurance to prevent fire propagation through the fire confinement element given the combustible loading and location of equipment important to safe shutdown in the fire area of concern.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to effectively plan and execute work activities by incorporating risk insights, job site conditions, and coordinate with different groups to restore the nonfunctional Fire Barrier FB-60-008, within the required 90 days, prior to de-posting an hourly fire watch.

Enforcement:

Violation: License Condition 2.C.(8), Fire Protection, requires in part, Entergy Operations, Inc. (ANO-1) shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Procedure OP-1000.120, ANO Fire Impairment Program, Revision 25, was established as part of the provisions of the approved fire protection program. Procedure OP-1000.120, Section 6.3, provides instructions for de-posting a fire watch if it was posted due to equipment failure, and the shift manager or designee was responsible for releasing the fire watch when the system or equipment was returned to service.

Contrary to the above, from July 12, 2016, to October 2, 2019, the licensee failed to implement all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, after a fire watch was posted due to equipment failure, the shift manager or designee failed ensure that the system or equipment was returned to service before releasing the fire watch in accordance with Procedure OP-1000.120. In particular, the individual released the fire watch prior to repair of the failed fire barrier and without the barrier being properly returned to service.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Backlog of Condition Reports/Corrective Actions Closed to Work 71152 Management Process Semiannual Trend Review The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program documentation associated with the backlog of condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process. The inspectors reviewed the backlog associated with condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process, condition reports associated with this backlog, and the adverse condition analysis for Nuclear Independent Oversight (NIOS) quality assurance finding documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2019-04254. The inspectors noted the following:

• CR-ANO-C-2019-01330: The licensees problem identification and resolution-focused self-assessment identified a standard performance deficiency for the high number of condition reports closed to work orders without scheduled dates.

• CR-ANO-C-2019-01541: In April 2019, the licensee identified that the backlog of adverse conditions closed to the work management system process had risen. The performance review group approved an aggregate performance issue on this issue, which was closed to work tracking actions associated with work order burn down curves. These actions remained open with a combined 25 extensions.

• CR-ANO-C-2019-02072: In June 2019, the licensees NIOS identified that the required reviews of open condition reports associated with safety-related equipment and performance review group oversight work orders with condition reports closed to them where not performed consistently in accordance with the licensees corrective action program. The corrective action was to perform the review by January 2020.

• CR-ANO-C-2019-04252: The licensee identified that multiple Priority 3 work orders have not been implemented in the next available system/component outage opportunity or have been scheduled beyond it. The licensees work management requires Priority 3 work orders be scheduled at the next available system/component outage within the cycle plan or based on a modified schedule.

• CR-ANO-C-2019-04253: The licensee identified multiple condition reports closed to work orders that did not have scheduled completion dates. Others had scheduled completion dates that were in the past or were unrealistic dates. An example was Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-02479 that was closed to Priority 3 Work Order 38483 and was scheduled for October 10, 2606.

The adverse condition analysis documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2019-04254 identified three causal factors and their associated corrective actions:

• Causal Factor 1: Priority 3 work orders have not been scheduled in accordance with the work management program. Approximately 50 percent of the Priority 3 work orders either did not have a scheduled completion date or the dates were in the past.

This was contrary to scheduling requirements of the work management process. The corrective action is to schedule all Priority 3 work orders/work requests in accordance with the work management process and the 13-week cycle plan. This action is scheduled to be completed after the backlog review.

• Causal Factor 2: The performance review group and the production department have not effectively managed the backlog of condition reports/corrective actions closed to the work management process, nor appropriately managed the risk associated with the backlog. The corrective action is to develop a burndown curve to track the backlog reduction and develop backlog metrics. The intent of this action is to allow the licensee to determine the status of the backlog and reduction efforts to provide support, challenge as necessary, and to be able to review a manageable sized backlog.

• Causal Factor 3: The production department has scheduled backlog reviews, as required by the licensees work management process; however, the meeting has not been supported by the licensees organization as indicated by the multiple condition reports documenting the inability of the licensee to meet quorum for the backlog review. The corrective action is to perform a review of all the Priority 3, 4, 8, and 9 work orders with condition reports closed to them, in accordance with the work management process.

The inspectors noted the following areas of concern:

1. Work orders have not been scheduled in accordance with the work management process, and a number of work orders have been in the backlog for greater than 3 years.

2. The performance review group and work management personnel have not effectively managed the work order backlog, and appropriately managed the risk associated with the back log.

3. The work order backlog reviews have not been effective, because the licensees organization has not fully supported the reviews.

4. The licensee has previously identified this issue during problem identification and resolution self-assessment, Aggregate Performance Issue Review, and by NIOS. In each case the corrective action closes the condition reports to the work tracking action process (a non-corrective action program process) to review the work order backlog and perform the required backlog reviews. These issues where identified by the licensee in April 2019 and June 2019.

Failure to Torque Temporary Power Supply Terminal Screws in accordance with Station Procedures and the Vendor Manual Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green [H.5] - Work 71153 FIN 05000313/2019004-02 Management Open/Closed The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green finding associated with the licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with torque specifications contained in Procedure EN-MA-145, Maintenance Standard for Torque Applications, Revision 9, and the vendor manual.

Description:

On October 6, 2019, the licensee installed a temporary power supply to provide power to spent fuel pool pump B (P-40B) under Work Order 493512 to support maintenance activities for its primary power supply. Work Order 493512 directed maintenance personnel to implement Procedure OP-6030.110, Termination Splicing and Soldering of Cable and Wire, Revision 24, for the installation of pump P-40Bs temporary power supply. Specifically, Procedure OP-6030.110 provides directions to make the temporary power supply terminal set screw connections snug tight and to subsequently perform a wiggle test on the connections to ensure they are tight. This was contrary to the torque requirements of 90 to 100 inch-lbs specified in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.

On October 22, 2019, Unit 1 was in a defueled status with the reactor core being stored in the spent fuel pool in support of Refueling Outage 1R28 maintenance activities when pump P-40B tripped. Spent fuel pool pump A (P-40A) remained in service during the timeframe pump P-40B was tripped, providing uninterrupted cooling to the spent fuel pool, although at a reduced capacity. Licensee electricians discovered loose connections on the temporary power supply terminal set screws for all three phases of the lower portion of the overload heaters. This condition resulted in a loss of circuit continuity between the lugs and the terminals. The loose connections allowed heat to build up to the thermal overload limit for pump P-40B, causing it to trip. The licensee torqued the terminal connections in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual, and pump P-40B was returned to service. During the timeframe pump P-40B was unavailable, spent fuel pool temperature rose from 110 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit (F); however, it remained below the safety analysis report design criterion of 150 degrees F. The licensee documented this deficiency in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-03440 and performed an adverse condition analysis. The licensee identified one direct cause and causal factor:

• Direct

Cause:

Pump P-40B temporary power supply terminal set screws had insufficient torque applied resulting in a high resistance and loss of circuit continuity between the lugs and the terminals.

• Causal Factor: WO 493512 contained inadequate instructions to ensure pump P-40Bs temporary power supply terminal set screws where torqued to the required value of 90 to 100 inch-lbs.

The inspectors noted that Procedure EN-MA-145 provides torque values for electrical bus assemblies. Procedure EN-MA-145 states, This document applies to all bolted connections regardless of size and nonsafety-related electrical connections made via threaded fasteners. Procedure EN-MA-145 continues on to state the following, When a torque value cannot be determined from controlled drawings, vendor manuals, manufacturers specifications, engineering documents, or Attachment 9.11, the planner initiates a request to design engineering to provide the proper torque value for the application. The planner provides work order step text ensuring that the torque values, fastener material and size, torque pattern and specific assembly instructions are documented in the work order package. Paragraph 5.7, items [6] and [7] of Procedure EN-MA-145 state the following, Torque application values for various electrical bus bar combinations are provided in 9.12 or as per applicable site specific procedures or standards, and, Connections to terminal blocks and bolted splice connections using 1/4 inch diameter and smaller hardware shall be tightened to snug-tight and not torqued unless a torque value is specified in site procedures/drawings/specifications or vendor supplied documents. Check for tightness by applying light finger pressure to the terminal barrel in a clockwise (tightening)direction and verify no rotation of the terminal. The connections in question are size 5/16 inch.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide the required 90 to 100 inch-lbs torque value into work order instructions for pump P-40Bs temporary power supply terminal set screw connections in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.

Corrective Actions: The licensee updated pump P-40Bs temporary power supply installation model work order to include:

(1) the required torque specification of 90 to 100 inch-lbs for the terminal set screws;

(2) a post-maintenance testing requirement to perform in-service thermography testing after installation of the temporary power supply. Additionally, the licensee took steps to ensure Procedure OP-6030.110 aligns with the requirements of Procedure EN-MA-145.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2019-03440

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to torque temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the structure, system, and component performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensees failure to torque the temporary power supply terminal screws in accordance with Procedure EN-MA-145 resulted in the trip of spent fuel pool pump B and a 10 degree F rise in spent fuel pool temperature.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not:

(1) adversely affect decay heat removal capabilities from the spent fuel pool causing the pool temperature to exceed the maximum analyzed temperature limit specified in the site-specific licensing basis;

(2) result from fuel handling errors, dropped fuel assembly, dropped storage cask, or crane operations over the spent fuel pool that caused mechanical damage to fuel clad and a detectible release of radionuclides;

(3) did not result in a loss of spent fuel pool water inventory decreasing below the minimum analyzed level specified in the site-specific licensing basis;

(4) affect the spent fuel pool neutron absorber, fuel bundle misplacement, or soluble boron concentration.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide the correct temporary power supply set screw torque value into instructions during the planning of WO 493512, because the licensee used the torque requirements contained in Procedure OP-6030.110, instead of the torque requirements contained in Procedure EN-MA-145 and the vendor manual.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 23, 2019, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection Activities inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On October 25, 2019, the inspectors presented the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone inspection results to Mr. R. Pitts, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On November 21, 2019, the inspectors presented the Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59) inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On January 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04Q Calculations CALC-88-E-0098- ANO-1 DBA Reanalysis 2

CALC-91-R-2013- Service Water Performance Testing Methodology 29

CALC-95-R-0014- DH Cooler Test Protocol 4

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-01722, 1-2019-02219, 1-2019-03439, 1-2019-03440,

Documents 1-2019-03447, 1-2019-03452

Drawings M-217, Sheet 2 P&ID EDG K-4A (DG-1) 44

M-217, Sheet 3 P&ID EDG K-4B (DG-2) 25

M-232, Sheet 1 P&ID Decay Heat Removal System 108

Engineering EC-70658 K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device 0

Changes Isolation Valve

EC-70659 K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

EC-70864 K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

Miscellaneous ER 994916E101

Procedures OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure 131

OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operation 82, 83

OP-1309.016 Decay Heat Cooler Thermal Testing 8

Work Orders WO 493512, 500672, 531004, 52712881, 52804684

71111.05Q Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2016-01522, C-2019-04090

Documents

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02493, 1-2019-02833, 1-2019-04099, C-2019-04429

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-210 Piping and Instrumentation Service Water

Miscellaneous Fire Impairment 4265, 8556

Procedures OP-1000.120 ANO Fire Impairment Program 24, 25

OP-1405.016 Unit 1 Penetration Fire Barrier Visual Inspection 26

Work Orders WO 446193, 52746507

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.08P Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02577, 1-2018-01843, 1-2018-04927, 1-2019-01734,

Documents 1-2019-02077, 1-2019-02609, 1-2019-02620, 1-2019-02643,

1-2019-02675, 1-2019-02710, 1-2019-02726, 1-2019-02727,

1-2019-02729, 1-2019-02757, 1-2019-02766, 1-2019-02772,

1-2019-02838, 1-2019-02923, 1-2019-02924, 1-2019-02940,

1-2019-03094, 1-2019-03150, 1-2019-03174, 1-2018-04698,

1-2019-01574, 1-2019-01722, 1-2019-01823, 1-2019-02218,

Engineering 0000077083 Support MS-147 Functional with Locking Nuts Loose 0

Changes

Miscellaneous 1CAN041402 Request for Alternative from Volumetric/Surface Examination 04/28/2014

Frequency Requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1,

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-313, License

No. DPR-51

1CAN061601 Request for Alternative from Volumetric/Surface Examination 06/17/2016

Frequency Requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1,

Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-313, License

No. DPR-51

1CAN071802 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh, 07/25/2018

Refueling Outage (1R27), Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1,

Docket No. 50-313, License No. DPR-51

Procedures CEP-BAC-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program Plan 2

CEP-CII-003 Visual Examinations of Class MC Components 308

CEP-NDE-0255 Radiographic Examination of ASME, ANSI, AWS, API, AWWA 10

Welds and Components

CEP-NDE-0400 Ultrasonic Examination 7

CEP-NDE-0404 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds 8

(ASME XI)

CEP-NDE-0423 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds 8

(ASME XI)

CEP-NDE-0641 Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME Section XI 9

CEP-NDE-0731 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) for ASME Section XI 6

CEP-NDE-0901 VT-1 Examination 6

CEP-NDE-0902 VT-2 Examination 9

CEP-NDE-0903 VT-3 Examination 6

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CEP-NDE-0955 Visual Examination (VE) of Bare-Metal Surfaces 306

CEP-NDE-0965 Visual Welding Inspection ASME, ANSI B31.1 6

CEP-WP-002 Qualification, Development, and Control of Welding Procedure 1

Specifications

CEP-WP-003 Qualification and Control of Welders 2

CEP-WP-004 Control and Documentation of Welding Activities 4

CEP-WP-005 Control and Issuance of Welding Material 1

CEP-WP-GWS-1 General Welding Standard ASME/ANSI 2

CEP-WP-WIIR-1 Weld Inprocess Inspection Requirements 3

EN-DC-319 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) 12

EN-DC-328 Entergy Nuclear Welding Program 4

SEP-BAC-ANO- Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Inspection and 3

001 Identification of Boric Acid Leaks for ANO-1 and ANO-2

71111.11Q Procedures OP-1102.016 Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown 36

OP-1105.004 Integrated Control System 5

OP-1107.001 Electrical System Operations 124

71111.12 Calculations CALC-ANO2-FP- NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Scoping 0

15-00001

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2016-02355, 1-2018-03086, 1-2019-02481, 1-2019-02548,

Documents 1-2019-02586, 1-2019-03560, 1-2019-04092, 2-2016-03156,

2-2016-03178, 2-2019-01430, 2-2019-01432, 2-2019-01770,

2-2019-01771, C-2019-04424

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-02300, 1-2019-04407

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures EN-DC-357 NFPA Monitoring Program 3

OP-1003.015 ANO NFPA 805 Monitoring Program 1

OP-1015.002 Decay Heat Removal and LTOP System Control 66

OP-1015.036 Containment Building Closeout 56

OP-1305.037 Unit 1 Reactor Building Access & Ventilation Leak Rate 11

Testing

OP-1402.038 Unit 1 Equipment Hatch Opening, Closing, and Maintenance 17

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

OP-2203.014 Alternate Shutdown 37

OP-2203.030 Remote Shutdown 18

OP-2203.049 Fires In Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown 19

OP-3305.001 Ops System Alignment Tests 0

Work Orders WO 455290

71111.13 Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130

Documents

71111.15 Calculations CALC-11-E-0007- ANO-2 Startup #3 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Millstone Studies 0

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-02589, 1-2018-03079, 1-2019-02219, 1-2019-02383,

Documents 1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02447, 1-2019-02448, 1-2019-02508,

1-2019-02916, 1-2019-03459, 1-2019-03627, 1-2019-03628,

1-2019-03667, 2-2019-02767, C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130,

C-2019-04137, C-2019-04191

Drawings M-217, Sheet 2 P&ID EDG K-4A (DG-1) 44

M-217, Sheet 3 P&ID EDG K-4B (DG-2) 25

Engineering EC-70658 K-4A and K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device 0

Changes Isolation Valve

EC-70659 K-4A EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

EC-70864 K-4B EDG Crankcase Pressure Trip Device Isolation Valve 0

EC-77716 Disposition of Test Results and Check Valve Health for BS-4A 0

1R27

EC-84667 Clarification of IST Requirements for Spray Header Check 0

Valves, BS-4A and BS-4B

Engineering ANO-290342-S04 Operability Evaluation of Unit 1 Reactor Building Column 17 0

Evaluations for Dead+Live_Seismic

Miscellaneous CES-02 ANO-1 General Structural Design Guide 2

SEP-ANO-1-IST- ANO Unit 1 Inservice Testing Bases 5

SPEC-APL-C-501 Technical Specification for Earthquake Resistance Design of 2

Structures and/or Components Located in the Reactor

Building for the Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Power Plant

Procedures EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process 16

OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operation 82, 83

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Work Orders WO 531004, 52271396, 52399617, 52508169, 52612456,

2733039, 52812299

71111.17T Calculations 92-E-0021-01 Emergency Duty Cycle and Battery Sizing Calc 15

94-E-0043-01 ANO-1 Reactor Building Surface Areas for the Heat Sink and 11

Hydrogen Generation Calcs.

CALC-72 Auxiliary Bldg Floor Framing. 6

CALC-82-D-1111- EC-66983. Room 112 Heat Load Assessment due to Addition 0

of New Q Equipment.

CALC-85-E-0053- Fire Area 1-3 Combustible Loading Evaluation. 1

CALC-87-E-0026- EFW Pump Room Temperature Profiles. 0

CALC-91-E-0120- Seismic Qualification Review Summary for EFW Replacement 0

244 Tachometer SI-6601A (Panel C531).

CALC-92-E-0103- ANO-1 Switchgear, Battery, DC, and Corridor 98 HVAC 5

Evaluation

CALC-92-E-0103- ANO-1 4160V Switchgear, Battery, DC and Corridor 98 0

Alternate Ventilation System Analysis

CALC-93-SQ- Seismic Qualification Summary for MCC D15 & D25 and 0

0002-247 Internals

CALC-ANO1-IC- To determine the heat rise within the Turbine Control Panel 0

18-00001 provided as part of the Terry Turbine Governor Upgrade.

CALC-ANOC-CS- ANO Flood Protection Design Basis 8

15-00003

CALC-ANOC-CS- ANO Flood Protection Room Evaluations - UNITS 1 and 2 2

15-00012

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2016-01078, C-2018-01363, HQN-2018-01637, HQN-2018-

Documents 00717,

Drawings 8002891-1 Turbine Control Schematic F

C-272 Equipment Support Details, EFW Turbine Control Panel 0

E-295 Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's 11

E-531 Connection Diagram Terminal Boxes 18

E-559 Connection Diagram Main Control Panel CO9 16

M-158, Sheet 1 Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning Aux. Building 18

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Switchgear Cable Supply and Relay Rooms Plans and

Sections EL. 372' 0"

M-158, Sheet 4 Heating, Ventilating & Air Conditioning Seismic Supports for 6

Emergency Cooling of Switchgear & Battery Rooms Area 4

EL. 372' 0"

M-263, Sheet 2 Piping & Instrument Diagram Aux. Building HVAC Elevation 23

2' 0"

M-263, Sheet 3 Piping & Instrument Diagram Aux. Building HVAC Elevation 13

386' 0"

Engineering EC-58249 Cable Reroutes and Interposing Relays 0

Changes EC-44152 NE-0501 Source Range Fission Chamber Bypass 1

EC-45077 ANO Cask Transfer Facility 0

EC-45808 EC Markup for CALC-92-E-0103-01 to Update Room 104 Free 0

Convection Model and Determine New Operator Actions

EC-49799 This temporary modification disconnects the RCP axial 0

position indication, ribbon

cable on the back of the module in 2C404. Evaluation #: 14-

2.

EC-49799 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. This 0

temporary modification disconnects the axial position

indication, ribbon cable on the back of the module in 2C404.

EC-49799. Temporary Modification to Remove 2P-32C RCP Axial 0

Position 2ZIY-6066 from Service.

EC-50092 Room 72 Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Flood 0

EC-51967 Update Calc 91-E-0090-03 to Show Cooling Capability of 0

Switchgear Room

Coolers 2VUC-2A, 2B, 2C, 2D With New ECP SW

Temperature Profile

EC-52059 Anchor Darling DD 10 CFR Part 21 Wedge Pin Shear Stress 0

Calcs

EC-57619 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Change 0

Equipment Database (EDB) for valves 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-

2806A, 2PSV-2823A, and 2PSV-2826A to reclassify valves

from Safety Related to Non-Safety Related.

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

EC-57619 Reclassification of Inter-Stage Relief Valves for the U2 0

Starting Air Compressors from Safety Related to Non-Safety

Related. (VALVES: 2PSV-2803A, 2PSV-2806A, 2PSV-2823A,

2PSV-2826A)

EC-58249 Cable Reroutes and Interposing Relays. Evaluation#: FFN- 0

2016-003

EC-58249 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Cable 0

Reroutes and Interposing Relays

EC-61243 Tornado Missile Protection Features and Licensing Basis 1

EC-63697 Assessment of Reactor Building Corrosion as an Unqualified 0

Coating and Sump Debris Source

EC-66091 Change Design Basis Flooding Requirements for ANO-1 and 0

ANO-2 Decay Heat and ESF Vaults

EC-66364 EDG Crank Case Over-Pressure Switch Gasket and Plate 0

Addition CR-ANO-1-2016-2498

EC-66585 ANO-2 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Replacement 0

Project under the SGT, LLC Appendix B (QA) Program.

EC-66983 ANO-1 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Woodward 0

Governor Controls Upgrade. Evaluation # FFN-2018-003

EC-66983 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. ANO-1 EFW 0

Pump Woodward Governor Controls Upgrade

EC-66983 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Emergency Feedwater Turbine 0

Governor Control System, Dresser-Rand, Curtis-Wright,

Engine Systems, Inc., Woodward, Vendor Manual for ANO

Unit 1 EFW Turbine Governor Control System, Vendor

Document ID: 85005G, 85017V1, 85017V2, 801283,

890038A, 82510, CB92387, CDS36294, 16540.

EC-67516 Remove Unit 2 Door 260 0

EC-68304 Revision of ANO-1&2 LOCA Dose Analysis to Reflect 0

December 2011 RADTRAD Error and DH Vault Leakage

EC-70658 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. Install a 0

valve on the upstream oil supply to the Emergency Diesel

Generator (EDG) crankcase pressure trip device on each

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

ED

G.

EC-72501 The Bailey 820 Analog Control, System is obsolete. The ANO 0

Electronic Resource Group (ERG) has reverse engineered

these modules and Engineering Change (EC) Evaluation

2501 approves them for use as an acceptable alternate

configuration.

EC-72578 Authorized valve 2SV-5061-2 to be replaced with a bolted 0

bonnet Target Rock Model 97AA-001-1.

EC-72713 HPSI Pump Seal Cooler Service Water Flow Requirements 0

EC-76046 Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Governor Upgrade (Train 0

A)

EC-76269 This engineering change for Byron Jackson Horizontal 8

Double-Bearing Pump adds a spacer ring in between the

retaining sleeve and mechanical seal sleeve. It also

allows for 316SS to be used as an alternative material for all

impeller keys.

EC-76707 Temporary shielding calculation to support the activity of 0

Removing Valve DH-17

EC-77203 Removal of DR-200 in the Shift Manager's Office 0

EC-77219 Performance of an Engineering Change, Evaluation (EC 1

EVAL) to ensure reduction in wall thickness of Service Water

pipe HBD-14-18 does not exceed design limits.

EC-78350 Justification for Continued Operation Until Next Maintenance 0

Window Without Hardened Washers on P-36C

EC-78439 ANO-1 Cycle 29 Core Reload Evaluation 0

EC-80461 ANO-1 large break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) using 0

the latest NRC-approved LOCA methodology of BAW-

10192P-A that explicitly accounts for fuel thermal conductivity

degradation (TCD). Evaluation #: FFN-2019-001

EC-80461 Process Applicability Determination - Screening. ANO-1 large 0

break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) using the latest

NRC-approved LOCA methodology of BAW-10192P-A that

explicitly accounts for fuel thermal conductivity degradation

(TCD).

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

EC-80488 Revise CALC-88-E-0100-27 for Unit 1 Core Flood System 0

EC-80594 TMOD to Support Online Work for 2PSV-5082. 2PSV-5082 0

Maintenance Could Create Voids That Are Problematic

Engineering EC-66983 (FCR EC66983 replaces the governor control system for the ANO 1 0

Evaluations 81113) EFW Pump Turbine K-3. This document captures lengthy

mechanical evaluations (Section B.5) for Form 4 (P2E

7.001).

EC-66983 (FCR EC66983 replaces the governor control system for the ANO 1 0

81113) EFW Pump Turbine K-3. This document captures lengthy civil

evaluations (Section B.5) for Form 4 (P2E Attachment 7.001).

Procedures 1104.027 Battery and Switchgear Emergency Cooling System 51

EN-DC-115 Engineering Change Process 27

EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination 26

EN-LI-101 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 19

OP-1203.012N Annunciator K16 Corrective Action 0

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2019- Pre-NRC Focused Self-Assessment for the NRC Inspection of 08/15/2019

00026 10 CFR 50.59 (IP 71111.17T).

71111.18 Calculations ECH-NE-19- ANO-1 Cr-Coated Mark-B-HTP Lead Test Assembly (LTA) 0

000032 Engineering Basis Summary

ECH-NE-19- ANO-1 Lead Coated Rods - Mechanical Review for 0

000033 Operations

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2011-00147, 1-2011-00188, 1-2011-00194, 1-2011-00195,

Documents 1-2016-01517, 1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02446,

1-2019-03079, 1-2019-03257, 1-2019-03738, C-2000-00076,

C-2011-00303

Drawings E-295, Sheet 3A Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's 2

Engineering EC-27266 Operability Engineering Input for CR-ANO-1-2011-00147 PB- 0

Changes 2613 CV-2613

EC-66983

EC-78439 ANO-1 Cycle 29 Reload Core Lead Test Assemblies 0

EC-83800 Force CV-2663 into Auto by Removing Fuses F10 and F11 in 0

C09

Miscellaneous ER-10090E101 Equivalency Evaluation for GE "CR2940" Model Selector 0

Switch

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

FS1-0045558-1.0 ANO1-29 Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1-Cycle 29 Reload 08/08/2019

Report

Procedures EN-LI-101 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 17, 19

OP-1106.006 Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation 109

Work Orders WO 263583, 381789, 445681, 499686, 529000, 529076,

2826120

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02454, 1-2019-02466, 1-2019-02467,

Documents 1-2019-02476, 1-2019-02511, 1-2019-02592, 1-2019-02987,

1-2019-03446, 1-2019-03450, 1-2019-03552, 1-2019-03619,

1-2019-03756, 1-2019-03758, 1-2019-03769, 1-2019-03774,

1-2019-03779, 1-2019-03941, 1-2019-03945, 1-2019-03966,

1-2019-03973, C-2019-04090, C-2019-04130

Engineering EC-80342 Fill ANO-1 Liner Plate Trough with Grout. Calculate Minimum 0

Changes Thickness Requirement for ANO-1 Liner Plate

Miscellaneous CEP-IST-4 Standard On Inservice Testing 309

ECT-66983-002 Post Modification Offline Test of EFW Digital Governor 0

Procedures EN-DC-177 Control Habitability Program 5

EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing 5, 6

OP-1000.120 ANO Fire Impairment Program 25

OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 96

OP-1104.005 Reactor Building Spray System Operation 83

OP-1104.036 Emergency Diesel Generator Operation 83

OP-1106.006 Emergency Feedwater Pump Operations 110

OP-1402.066 24 Month Inspection on Unit One Emergency Diesel 40

Generator Engine

OP-5120.523 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program 3

OP-6030.101 Installation of Penetration Seals 19

OP-6030.103 Installation of Concrete and NonShrink Grout 9

Work Orders WO 444113, 448859, 465327, 499686, 504742, 510330, 532923,

2826120, 52841640, 52850596, 52857465

71111.20 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2017-01344, 1-2019-02417, 1-2019-02420, 1-2019-02468,

Documents 1-2019-02511, 1-2019-02625, 1-2019-03442, 1-2019-04082

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-02838, 1-2019-04226, 1-2019-04233, 1-2019-04234,

Documents 1-2019-04236

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-230, Sheet 1 P&ID Reactor Coolant System 122

M-231, Sheet 1 P&ID Makeup and Purification System 116

M-231, Sheet 2 P&ID Makeup and Purification System 50

M-231, Sheet 3 P&ID Makeup and Purification System 11

M-232, Sheet 1 P&ID Decay Heat Removal System 108

Engineering EC-ANO-69592- Haul Path and Load Path Evaluation Associated with the 2

Changes 002 Placement of the Exhaust Stacks on the Unit 1 and Unit 2

EDG

Engineering ER-ANO-2006- ANO-1 and ANO-2 Aux Bldg Susceptibility to Boric Acid 0

Evaluations 0332-000 Corrosion

Miscellaneous SEP-BAC-ANO- Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Inspection and 3

001 Identification of Boric Acid Leaks ANO-1 and ANO-2

STM 1-51-3 Fuel Transfer System 23

Procedures EN-DC-319 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) 12

EN-MA-118 Foreign Material Exclusion 16

OP-1005.002 Control of Heavy Loads 40

OP-1015.036 Containment Building Closeout 56

OP-1102.002 Plant Startup 112

OP-1102.008 Approach to Criticality 33

OP-1102.010 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown 85

OP-1102.016 Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown 36

OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Procedure 131

OP-1203.028 Loss of Decay Heat Removal 30

OP-1502.004 Control of Unit 1 Refueling 63

OP-1504.005 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Stud Detensioning and 23

Removal

OP-1504.006 Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Stud Detensioning and 23

Removal

OP-1504.007 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Removal and Storage 29

OP-1504.038 Removal and Replacement of the Core Support Assembly 12

Work Orders WO 462960, 528927

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.22 Calculations CALC-00-E-0023- Unit 1 Appendix J Containment Maximum Allowed Leakage 1

Rate (La)

CALC-88-E-0098- ANO-1 DBA Reanalysis 2

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2003-00760, 1-2019-02281, 1-2019-02446, 1-2019-02447,

Documents 1-2019-03752, 1-2019-03813, 1-2019-03927, 1-2019-03941,

1-2019-03945, 1-2019-04100, 1-2019-04102, 2-2019-00328,

2-2019-02477

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-04088

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings M-230, Sheet 1 P&ID Reactor Coolant System 122

M-236, Sheet 1 P&ID Reactor Building Spray and Core Flood System 95

Engineering EC-73910 Baseline the Reference Values for the ANO1 IST Components 0

Changes EC-84891

Engineering ER-ANO-2003- Evaluation of the Unit 1 Appendix J Test Pressure (Pa) with 0

Evaluations 0564-000 Allowances for Reactor Building Pressure Up to 3 psi

Miscellaneous ANO1ILRT.19- Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 2019 ILRT Final Test Report 0

R191110B

EN-OP-201-01 Flex Program Document

HES-02 Containment Leak Rate Testing Program 9

SEP-APJ-002 Arkansas Nuclear One Primary Containment Leakage Rate 8

Testing (Appendix J) Program Section

Procedures OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 96

OP-1305.018 Local Leak Rate Testing - Type C 36

OP-1305.031 Integrated Leak Rate Testing 13

OP-2304.112 Plant Protection System Response Time Test Channel A 31

OP-2305.003 ESF Response Time Test 40

OP-3305.001 OPS System Alignment Tests 0

OP-4120.404 Unit 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test 4

OP-5120.400 Unit 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test 6

OP-5120.402 Unit 1 Primary Containment Leak Rate Running Total 12

Work Orders WO 398744, 398746, 507360, 530402, 50573613, 52510650,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2541798, 52770826, 52852885, 52886070

71124.01 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-01336; 1-2018-01377; 1-2018-02231; 1-2018-02388;

Documents 1-2018-04973; 1-2019-01279; 1-2019-02993; 2-2018-00740;

2-2018-03070; 2-2018-03171; 2-2018-03258; 2-2018-03601;

2-2018-03880; 2-2019-00530; 2-2019-01431, C-2018-02066;

C-2018-02084; C-2018-03843; C-2019-01454

Corrective Action CR-ANO- C-2019-04152

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous ANO Alpha Hazard Evaluation 10/15/2018

LHRA/VHRA Key Inventory 10/23/2019

ANO 1R28 Outage Status Report 10/25/2019

ANO-2018-0083 2018 Radiation Energy Distribution Evaluation 02/28/2019

ANO-2019-0011 ANO 2018 Annual Radiation Protection Report 02/28/2019

Att. 9.3 to EN-RP- Quarterly Whole Body Counting Report 06/30/2019

208

Att. 9.4 to EN-RP- Radioactive Seal Source Leak Test 02/29/2019

143

NRC Form 748 NSTS Annual Inventory Reconciliation Report 01/10/2019

Procedures 1601.502 Radioactive Material Control at Radwaste 8

EN-RP-100 Radiation Worker Expectations 12

EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Area 15

EN-RP-102 Radiological Control 7

EN-RP-108 Radiation Protection Posting 22

EN-RP-109 Hot Spot Program 5

EN-RP-121 Radioactive Material Control 16

EN-RP-131 Air Sampling 17

EN-RP-143 Source Control 13, 14

EN-RP-208 Whole Body Counting and In-Vitro Bioassay 7

Radiation Surveys ANO-1908-00356 Low Level Rad Waste 08/28/2019

ANO-1909-00218 Unit 1 AUX 335' General Area South End 09/14/2019

ANO-1909-00222 Unit 1 AUX 335' General Area North End 09/14/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

ANO-1910-00068 Unit 1 AUX 335' EL Drumming Station Room Number 2026 10/03/2019

ANO-1910-00471 Unit 2 AUX 354 EL General Area 10/09/2019

ANO-1910-00692 Unit 2 AUX 317' General Area 10/12/2019

ANO-1910-01301 Unit 1 RX Building 335' General Area 10/23/2019

ANO-1910-01302 Unit 1 RX Building 354' General Area 10/22/2019

Radiation Work 2019-1027 Maintenance Activities Make-Up Pumps 1

Permits (RWPs) 2019-1420 Scaffold Activities in Non-High Radiation Areas 0

2019-1421 Insulation Activities (Non-LHRAs) - 1R28 0

2019-1430 Reactor Disassembly, Reassembly and Support Activities 0

During 1R28

2019-1432 De-fuel and Re-fuel the Reactor 0

2019-1432 De-fuel and Re-fuel the Reactor 0

2019-1480 Remove and Install the Core Barrel 0

2019-1501 Replace VCC-2C/2D Service Water Piping 0

2019-1902 Replace P-32D Seal Cartridge and P-32D Upper Thrust 0

Bearing

2019-2056 Unit 2 Containment Power Entries for Inspection and Minor 0

Maintenance

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2018- Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and 08/05/2019

00063 Performance Indicators

QA-14/15-2017- Quality Assurance Audit Report: Combined Radiation 11/16/2017

ANO-01 Protection and Radwaste

71124.03 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2018-00771, 1-2018-02145, 1-2018-04993, 2-2018-01418,

Documents 2-2018-01420, 2-2018-03288, C-2018-01793, C-2019-02193,

C-2019-02377, C-2019-03205, C-2019-03401

Procedures 1601.488 Eberline Model AMS-4 Beta Particulate Air Monitor Calibration 1

2104.007 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation 77

3E4-1104.035 Fuel Handling and Radwaste Ventilation 35

3E4-1104.33 Reactor Building Ventilation 79

3E4-2104.035 Ventilation System Operations 43

EN-RP-310 Operation and Initial Setup of the Eberline Model AMS-4 4

Continuous Air Monitor

EN-RP-402 DOP Challenge Testing of HEPA Vacuums and Portable 4

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Ventilation Units

EN-RP-404 Operation and Maintenance of HEPA Vacuum Cleaners and 8

HEPA Ventilation Units

EN-RP-501 Respiratory Protection Program 6

EN-RP-502 Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection 10

Equipment

EN-RP-503 Selection, Issue and Use of Respiratory Protection Equipment 7

EN-RP-504 Breathing Air 4

Radiation Work RWP 2018-1508 Remove and Replace CRDM 04/10/2018

Permits (RWPs)

Self-Assessments ANO-2019-0011 Arkansas Nuclear One 2018 Annual Radiation Protection 02/28/2019

Report

LO-ALO-2018- Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and 08/05/2019

00063 Performance Indicator

QA-14/15-2017- Combined Radiation Protection and Radwaste 11/06/2017

AN0-01

Work Orders WO 52746663 Perform Test on 2VEF-14 Fuel Handling Area Exhaust 08/29/2018

WO 52775596 Perform 18 Month Test of 2VSF-9 Control Room Filtration 01/31/2019

System

WO 52806599 Perform 18 Month Test of VEF-38A 05/22/2019

WO 52866018 Perform 18 Month Test 2VEF-15 Reactor Building 06/12/2019

71151 Miscellaneous 1Q2019 MSPI RHR & SW

2Q2019 MSPI RHR & SW

3Q2019 MSPI RHR & SW

4Q2018 MSPI RHR & SW

Procedures EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas 15

Self-Assessments LO-ALO-2018- Radiation Safety - Hazard Assessment, Airborne Controls, and 08/05/2019

00063 Performance Indicators

71152 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2011-00147, 1-2011-00188, 1-2011-00194, 1-2011-00195,

Documents 1-2016-01003, 1-2016-01004, 1-2016-01517, 1-2016-01769,

1-2017-02104, 1-2019-01847, 1-2019-02763, 1-2019-02987,

1-2019-03079, 1-2019-03581, 2-2012-02766, 2-2016-00097,

2-2017-01673, 2-2017-05811, 2-2019-00554, 2-2019-00557,

2-2019-00770, 2-2019-02306, 2-2019-02506, 2-2019-02509,

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2-2019-02571, C-2000-00076, C-2011-00303, C-2019-03563,

C-2019-04471

Corrective Action CR-ANO- 2-2019-03115

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering EC-27266 Operability Engineering Input for CR-ANO-1-2011-00147 PB- 0

Changes 2613 CV-2613

EC-83800 Force CV-2663 into Auto by Removing Fuses F10 and F11 in 0

C09

Miscellaneous 4220 Fire Impairment

CEP-IST-4 Standard On Inservice Testing 309

E-295, Sheet 3A Schematic Diagram Emergency Feedwater Turbine MOV's 2

ER-10090E101 Equivalency Evaluation for GE "CR2940" Model Selector 0

Switch

Procedures OP-1104.005 Reactor Building Spray System Operation 83

OP-1106.006 Emergency Feedwater Pump Operation 109

OP-2107.001 Electrical System Operations 130

Work Orders WO 92768, 258162, 263583, 435034, 438206, 438561, 445681,

448429, 485002, 486111, 486213, 488334, 489290, 511214,

20860, 529000, 532923, 52843383, 52857465

71153 Corrective Action CR-ANO- 1-2019-03439, 1-2019-03440

Documents

Procedures OP-1203.050 Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Emergencies 17

Work Orders WO 493512

37