IR 05000313/2016301
| ML16273A055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/2016 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Richard Anderson Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2016301 | |
| Download: ML16273A055 (19) | |
Text
ember 28, 2016
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000313/2016301
Dear Mr. Anderson:
On September 1, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an initial operator license examination at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The enclosed report documents the examination results and licensing decisions. The preliminary examination results were discussed on August 26, 2016, with Mr. D. Perkins, Senior Operations Manager, and other members of your staff. A telephonic exit meeting was conducted on September 16, 2016, with Mr. Perkins, who was provided the NRC licensing decisions.
The examination included the evaluation of nine applicants for reactor operator licenses, four applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and four applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses. The license examiners determined that twelve of the seventeen applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued. There were three post-examination comments submitted by your staff.
Enclosure 1 contains details of this report and Enclosure 2 summarizes post-examination comment resolution.
No findings were identified during this examination.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51
Enclosures:
1. Examination Report 05000313/2016301 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information 2. NRC Post-Examination Comment Resolution 3. Simulator Fidelity Report
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000313 License: DPR-51 Report: 05000313/2016301 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 1448 SR 333 Location:
Russellville, AR 72802-0967 Dates: August 22 through September 16, 2016 Inspectors: T. Farina, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer C. Osterholtz, Senior Operations Engineer M. Hayes, Operations Engineer S. Hedger, Operations Engineer M. Kennard, Operations Engineer C. Steely, Operations Engineer Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy Chief, Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 1
SUMMARY
ER 05000313/2016301; 08/22/2016 - 09/16/2016; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Initial
Operator Licensing Examination Report.
NRC examiners evaluated the competency of nine applicants for reactor operator licenses, four applicants for instant senior reactor operator licenses, and four applicants for upgrade senior reactor operator licenses at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1.
The licensee developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10. The written examination was administered by the licensee on September 1, 2016. NRC examiners administered the operating tests on August 22-27, 2016.
The examiners determined that twelve of the seventeen applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)
.1 License Applications
a. Scope
NRC examiners reviewed all license applications submitted to ensure each applicant satisfied relevant license eligibility requirements. Examiners also audited three of the license applications in detail to confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Examination Development
a. Scope
NRC examiners reviewed integrated examination outlines and draft examinations submitted by the licensee against the requirements of NUREG-1021. The NRC examination team conducted an on-site validation of the operating tests.
b. Findings
NRC examiners provided outline, draft examination, and post-validation comments to the licensee. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution prior to examination administration.
NRC examiners determined the written examinations and operating tests initially submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.
.3 Operator Knowledge and Performance
a. Scope
On September 1, 2016, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all 17 applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis and post-examination comments to the NRC on September 6, 2016.
The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating tests to all applicants on August 22-27, 2016.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Twelve of 17 applicants passed the written examination and all parts of the operating test. Four applicants failed the written examination only, and one applicant failed both the written examination and administrative job performance measures (JPMs). The final written examinations and post-examination analysis and comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system under the accession numbers noted in the attachment.
The examination team noted six generic weaknesses associated with applicant performance on the administrative JPM, simulator JPM, in-plant JPM, and dynamic scenario sections of the operating tests. Specifically:
1. Three applicants demonstrated a weakness in lowering the pressurizer quench tank down to a specific level by transferring water to the clean waste receiving tank. The applicants all secured the associated transfer pump at the desired level; however, they delayed isolating the two quench tank drain valves, causing quench tank level to continue lowering to the low level alarm setpoint due to a difference in elevations between the two tanks and a 4.7 psig Nitrogen over-pressure in the quench tank.
2. Seven applicants demonstrated a weakness implementing the stations work hour fitness-for-duty guidance. Given a work history of five operators, many applicants incorrectly stated that one of the operators failed to satisfy the requirement to have a minimum 34-hour break in a 9-day period and was, therefore, ineligible to stand an emergent watch. In actuality, the applicant had one full day off in between two day-shift watches, which equated to at least a 35-hour break, satisfying the 34-hour requirement.
3. When purging the main generator with CO2 following a station blackout, several operators failed to use the designated rack of 15 CO2 bottles, which is labeled Reserved for Unit 1 EOP [Emergency Operating Procedure]
Requirements, and instead used an identical rack of 15 CO2 bottles which is intended for normal daily use, not EOPs. Procedure 1106.002, Section 15.0, Generator Hydrogen System, fails to specify which bank should be used, constituting a missed opportunity to prevent operator error.
4. Three out of four crews unnecessarily tripped the reactor on a continuous rod withdrawal malfunction, which could have been mitigated by proper implementation of Alarm Response Procedure ACA 1203.003, Section 9, Control Rod Drive Malfunction Actions. Two of the crews failed to properly implement the MAJI sequence of operator actions, which directs the crew to verify the diamond panel in MANUAL, set the GROUP-AUXIL switch to AUXIL, set SPEED SELECTOR switch to JOG, and place manual command switch in INSERT for three seconds. These two crews failed to stop rod motion, and manually tripped the reactor. One crew properly stopped all rod motion, but misinterpreted plant indications to mean that rod motion was continuing and tripped the reactor as well.
5. Several crews demonstrated a weak understanding of generator hydrogen temperature control valve CV-4018 controller operation. This controller is reverse acting, meaning that it generates a 0 percent signal to open the valve and a 100 percent signal to fully close the valve. Some believed that a 100 percent signal indicated open, and several applicants misunderstood this controller to indicate actual position, when it only indicates demanded position.
Actual valve position can only be verified locally. One crew tripped the turbine instead of taking manual control of the controller, which would have mitigated the malfunction.
6. Three crews demonstrated weaknesses implementing the steam generator tube rupture procedure. Errors included tripping the reactor out of sequence, initiating emergency feedwater instead of auxiliary feedwater, unnecessary delays establishing a plant cooldown, and a failure to control steam header pressure to prevent unnecessary cycling of the bad steam generator atmospheric dump valve.
Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility training manager for evaluation and determination of appropriate remedial training.
.4 Simulation Facility Performance
a. Scope
The NRC examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during examination validation and administration.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. However, two simulator-related issues occurred during examination administration that warrant discussion.
1. The simulator control software includes an administrative trainee action monitor program which logs simulator switch manipulations during the course of a scenario.
During nine scenarios, this log was flooded due to noisy analog inputs on control boards C03/C04, causing it to exceed its capacity. The trainee action monitor log can accommodate a maximum of 1,000 entries in a scenario, but the noisy analog inputs caused multiple log entries per second which filled the log to capacity prior to scenario completion. This program had no impact on simulator performance or fidelity, but it resulted in an incomplete record of applicant actions for the scenarios which were affected. The licensee initiated simulator deficiency report DR16-0120 to address the issue.
2. During one administration of JPM S-6, Transfer Buses from the Unit Aux
Transformer to a Startup Transformer, an applicant was required to open breaker H-14 on 6900V bus H1 to correct a condition where the bus was aligned to two power sources simultaneously. The applicant correctly identified that breaker H-14 failed to open automatically after the H-15 Synchronize switch was taken to off, and attempted to manually open breaker H-14 twice. Both attempts appeared to be a full turn of the handswitch, but the breaker remained closed on the control board. Therefore the applicant correctly implemented step 8.4.6.A.1 of Procedure OP-1107.001, and manually reopened breaker H-15 from the startup transformer #1 to ensure that bus H1 remained energized from only one source.
Post-scenario, the examiner reviewed available simulator data with the licensee to determine what actions were captured by the machine. The trainee action monitor log records all manipulations which are performed on the simulator. The trainee action monitor log clearly showed that component C10 152-14/CS (breaker H-14 control switch) was taken to Trip multiple times and returned to normal. The simulator did not pick up this action, however, and continued to display the breaker as closed. The licensee believes that the issue may be related to a difference in scan operating speeds between the simulator operating system (10 Hz) and the simulator subroutine that controls large breaker logic (2 Hz). The licensee initiated simulator deficiency reports DR16-0122 and DR16-0123 to address the issue.
.5 Examination Security
a. Scope
The NRC examiners reviewed examination security for examination development during both the on-site preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49 and NUREG-1021. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
The chief examiner presented the preliminary examination results to Mr. D. Perkins, Senior Operations Manager, and other members of the staff on August 26, 2016. A telephonic exit was conducted on September 16, 2016, between Mr. T. Farina, Chief Examiner, and Mr. Perkins.
The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination as proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- R. Martin, Operations Training Superintendent
- B. Possage, Examination Writer
- J. Cork, Examination Writer
NRC Personnel
- B. Tindell, Senior Resident Inspector