IR 05000313/2009006

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IR 05000313-09-006 and 05000368-09-006, on 01/19/2009-02/20/2009, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems
ML090930276
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/2009
From: Werner G E
NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/PSB-2
To: Mitchell T G
Entergy Operations
References
Download: ML090930276 (25)


Text

April 3, 2009

Mr. Timothy Vice President Operations Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc. 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802-0967

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2009006 AND 05000368/2009006

Dear Mr. Mitchell:

On February 20, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on February 20, 2009, with Brad Berryman, General Manager Operations, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The International Atomic Energy Agency conducted an Operational Safety Review Team Evaluation at Arkansas Nuclear One from June 15 through July 2, 2008. The Operational Safety Review Team's review included an evaluation of your corrective action program which is documented in a report (ADAMS Accession Number ML083440148) which is accessible from the NRC Web-site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Nuclear Regulatory Commission personnel closely monitored the team's activities and deemed it appropriate to assess a 50 percent credit for the baseline problem identification and resolution inspection in accordance with the guidance provided in Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program-Operations Phase," Section 08.05.

Based on the samples selected for review, the team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, was effective. The inspectors determined that Arkansas Nuclear One staff had a low threshold for identifying problems and issues were prioritized and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. Corrective actions were typically implemented in a timely manner and addressed the identified causes of problems. Lessons learned from industry operating experience were reviewed and usually applied when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were critical with Entergy Operations, Inc. - 2 -

appropriate actions recommended; however, there were several examples where licensee management did not evaluate the validity of the recommendations and closed out the item without taking any actions.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, one licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 East Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Arkansas Nuclear One , Units 1 and 2, facility. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Larry T. Ricketson for Gregory E. Werner, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-313; 50-368 Licenses: DPR-51; NPF-6

Enclosure:

Inspection Reports 05000313/2009006 and 05000368/2009006

w/Attachments:

1. Supplemental Information 2. Information Request Senior Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc. P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Entergy Operations, Inc. - 3 -

Senior Vice President & Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Vice President, Oversight Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Manager, Licensing Entergy Operations, Inc. Arkansas Nuclear One 1448 SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Associate General Counsel Entergy Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing Entergy Operations, Inc. P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Chief, Radiation Control Section Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 Section Chief, Division of Health Emergency Management Section Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 David E. Maxwell, Director Arkansas Department of Emergency Management Bldg. 9501 Camp Joseph T. Robinson North Little Rock, AR 72199

Entergy Operations, Inc. - 4 -

Pope County Judge Pope County Courthouse 100 West Main Street Russellville, AR 72801 Entergy Operations, Inc. - 5 -

Electronic distribution by RIV: Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov) Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov) DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov) DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov) DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Alfred.Sanchez@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Jeffrey.Josey@nrc.gov) Branch Chief, DRP/E (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (George.Replogle@nrc.gov) ANO Site Secretary (Vicki.High@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov) Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

K. S. Fuller, RC OEMail Resource Senior Enforcement Specialist (Mark.Haire@nrc.gov) Only inspection reports to the following: DRS STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)

OEDO RIV Coordinator, Primary (Shawn.Williams@nrc.gov) OEDO RIV Coordinador, Backup (Eugene.Guthrie@nrc.gov)

ROPreports

File located: SUNSI Rev Compl. x Yes No ADAMS x Yes No Reviewer Initials JFD Publicly Avail x Yes No Sensitive Yes x No Sens. Type Initials JFD RIV: RI:DRP/E RI/DRP/E SRI/DRS/PSB2 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRP/E Z. Bailey J. Josey J. Drake G. Werner J. Clark

/RA/ /RA/ /RA//RA//RA/ 4/3/09 4/3/09 4/3/09 4/3/09 4/2/09 C:DRS/PSB2 G. Werner

/RA/ 4/3/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 50-313 and 50-368 License: DPR 51 and NPF 6 Report: 05000313/2009006 and 05000368/2009006 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Location: Junction of Hwy. 64W and Hwy. 333 South Russellville, Arkansas Dates: January 19 to February 20, 2009 Team Leader: James F. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector Inspector:

Accompanied by: Jeffery Josey, Resident Inspector, Plant Support Branch E Zachary Bailey, Reactor Inspector, Plant Support Branch E Approved By:

Gregory E. Werner, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000313/2009006 and 05000368/2009006; 01/19/2009-02/20/2009; Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, "Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."

This inspection was performed by one regional inspector and one resident inspector. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process". Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG 1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000. Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspectors reviewed approximately 300 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The inspectors reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively identified, evaluated, and prioritized corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors concluded that the licensee implemented timely, effective corrective actions.

With minor exceptions, the licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self-identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective corrective actions.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

The inspectors evaluated one licensee-identified violation of very low safety significance. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the corrective action program. This violation and condition report numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures describing Arkansas Nuclear One's corrective action program. The licensee identified problems for evaluation and resolution by initiating condition reports in their condition reporting system. The inspectors evaluated the methods for assigning and tracking issues to ensure that issues were screened for operability and reportability, prioritized for evaluation and resolution in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance, and tracked to identify adverse trends and repetitive issues. In addition, the inspectors interviewed plant staff and management to determine their understanding of and involvement with the corrective action program.

The inspectors reviewed approximately 300 condition reports including associated root, apparent, and direct cause evaluations, from the approximately 14,000 condition reports that were issued between March 2007 and February 2009, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's efforts in identifying and establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, operability determinations, work requests, self-assessments results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. The inspectors attended the licensee's Condition Review Group screening committee meetings and Corrective Action Review Board meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes. The inspectors' review included verifying that the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences. The inspectors assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems. The inspectors conducted interviews with plant personnel to identify other processes that may exist where problems may be identified and addressed outside the corrective action program.

The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that addressed past NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective actions addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that corrective actions were still appropriate and timely.

The inspectors considered risk insights from the NRC's and Arkansas Nuclear One's risk analyses to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The corrective action review was expanded to five years for evaluation of the Unit 1 120 Vac vital power system and fire protection systems and administrative controls. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of these systems and the plant to assess whether problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.

(2) Assessments
(a) Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification The inspectors determined that licensee personnel were effective at identifying conditions adverse to quality and entering them into the corrective action program in accordance with station procedures and NRC requirements. The inspectors determined that licensee personnel were usually identifying problems at a low threshold; although, there were nine examples identified where condition reports were not promptly initiated when warranted. For example, the inspectors identified that condition reports had not been initiated for the tripping of the primary pump or auto starting of the secondary pump during operations or maintenance for the component cooling water and the control rod drive cooling pumps on several occasions where plant operations had not been impacted. The inspectors also identified that contrary to licensee management's expectation, condition reports were not initiated on several occasions when multiple barriers in the tagout process failed.
(b) Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that, in general, licensee personnel appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Condition reports were screened for operability and reportability, categorized by significance (A through D), and assigned to a department for evaluation and resolution. The Condition Review Group appropriately considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, and adverse trends in their reviews.

During their review, the inspectors identified four condition reports where the licensee had failed to appropriately recognize and classify repetitive component performance issues as repeat conditions in a timely manner. These associated issues were not coded as repeat conditions in the corrective action program and as a result, this affected the station's ability to trend issues and raise station awareness. For example, the inspectors noted that the reactor building spray Pump B suction pressure transmitter (PT-2428) had a history of indicating lower than actual pressure. Specifically, this pressure transmitter had an 18-month calibration periodicity, and during every scheduled calibration from 2000 to 2007, the as-found reading had been out-of-tolerance low. Additionally, on two occasions during this time, Transmitter PT-2428 had required corrective maintenance between calibrations due to low readings. The inspectors determined that this transmitter was only used to perform in-service testing of the pump, and had been properly calibrated prior to use. Subsequently, the station identified this issue as repetitive and the transmitter was replaced in November 2008 to correct the problem. The inspectors found that the cause analyses reviewed were thorough and appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors determined that the reviews conducted by the Corrective Action Review Board were detailed and ensured that corrective actions addressed the identified causes. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the Corrective Action Review Board identified appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

(c) Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program The inspectors determined that the licensee usually developed appropriate corrective actions to address problems. However, the inspectors did identify several exceptions that included: one condition report where the corrective action was not implemented in a timely manner, one condition report had two corrective actions that lacked specific actions to address the contributing causes, and two condition reports where the causes were attributed to ineffective communications, for which the licensee has been taking extensive actions to correct. Specifically:
  • The licensee failed to implement a corrective action to ensure that a solenoid valve design that had been determined to be inadequate in January 2006 was controlled and not issued for use or installation. The correct design solenoid valve was purchased and entered into the warehouse with the identical part number as the incorrect design. The incorrect valve design was not deleted from the stock, nor were any administrative holds placed on the parts to prevent issuance. As a result, the incorrect design solenoid valve was issued and installed in the plant. This issue is addressed in Section

4OA7 as a licensee identified violation.

  • The licensee identified in Condition Report ANO-2-2007-313 that, "Policy guidance/management expectations were not well defined or understood as it relates to when a procedure would be required to perform a task or when skill-of the-craft can be used." The licensee's corrective action added a step in Procedure COPD-001, "Operations, Expectations, and Standards", (Rev 030) referencing EN-WM-100, "Work Request Generation, Screening, and Classification", for the definition of "Skill of the Craft." The team considered this corrective action inadequate since the definition of skill of the craft in Procedure EN-WM-100, "Work Request Generation, Screening, and Classification", is the same now as it was when the incident occurred and there was no documentation of additional training regarding management expectations pertaining to the use of skill-of the-craft. The only action was to reference Procedure EN-WM-100, "Work Request Generation, Screening, and Classification", in Procedure COPD-001, "Operations, Expectations, and Standards". Since Procedure COPD-001, "Operations, Expectations, and Standards", is an administrative procedure, it is not required to be reviewed or referenced prior to or during work.
  • The licensee identified in Condition Report ANO-2-2007-313 (FIN 05000368/2007003-04, AComplete Loss of Component Cooling Water Flow During Maintenance Operations,@) that, "Written Communications PJB [pre-job brief] Form is too Generic." The corrective action was, "Establish guidance in COPD-001 for pre-job brief that will trigger additional rigor in evaluating high risk significant activities." The inspectors found that no additional guidance was inserted into the COPD-001, "Operations, Expectations, and Standards", pre-brief checklist. Only in the main body of COPD-001, "Operations, Expectations, and Standards", was additional guidance provided, but the procedure is marked as administrative, so it is not required to be reviewed prior to a pre-job brief.
  • In Condition Report ANO-2-2007-0313, (FIN 05000368/2007003-04, AComplete Loss of Component Cooling Water Flow During Maintenance Operations

@), the licensee identified that the system engineer had changed the scope of the job and not effectively communicated this information to the operations and maintenance personnel on the subsequent shifts. The licensee also identified that although the System Engineer was aware of increased leak rates from the heat exchanger due to the removal of the tube plugs, this information was not communicated to operations and maintenance personnel as a potential concern. This resulted in a loss of component cooling water and an unplanned manual trip of the reactor plant.

  • In Condition Report ANO-2-2008-1634, which detailed a fuel oil day tank overflow, the licensee determined that there had been a missed opportunity to prevent this event, which dealt with inadequate communications. Specifically, the licensee determined that instrumentation and controls technicians attempted to communicate to the control room operators that the fuel oil day tank level transmitters were to be isolated. However, this communication was determined to be ineffective and, as a result, contributed to the event occurrence. This resulted in the fuel oil transfer pump auto starting and overflowing the fuel oil day tank and spilling fuel oil to the environment.

.3 Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self-assessments. The inspectors reviewed 12 operating experience notifications to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for relevance to the facility. The inspectors then examined whether the licensee had entered these items into their corrective action program and assigned actions to address the issues. The inspectors reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating experience.
(2) Assessment The inspectors found that operating experience information was appropriately considered for applicability, and corrective and preventive actions were taken as needed. Site operating experience coordinators screened issues from various sources for applicability and initiated condition reports for additional reviews and corrective actions as necessary. Operating experience information has been integrated into routine activities, such as pre-job briefs, procedures, and training material. The inspectors noted several positive examples in which plant personnel considered operating experience information in addition to material provided by the operating experience program. However, in a few cases the inspectors found that site-specific operating experience was not effectively utilized because operating experience reviews were not required to be completed for lower significance (Cat C and D) condition reports.
(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample population of 20 out of 80 audits and self-assessments, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, corrective action program trend reports, quality assurance audits, departmental self-assessments, and assessments conducted by independent organizations. A specific list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report. These reviews were performed to determine if problems identified through these assessments were entered into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether corrective actions were initiated to address identified deficiencies. The effectiveness of the audits and assessments was evaluated by comparing audit and self-assessment results against self-revealing and NRC identified findings and observations made during the inspection.
(2) Assessment The inspectors observed that, overall, audits and self-assessments were critical and, in most cases, appropriate actions were taken to address identified issues. However, in some cases, the inspectors found that management failed to evaluate the validity of the recommendations/observations made for issues identified during assessments. For example, the inspectors noted that in Condition Report ANO-C-2008-1311, quality assurance personnel indicated a concern with potential inadequate oversight of contractor personnel. After management review and evaluation, this condition report was closed based on the determination that the level and type of supervision being used for contract workers was sufficient and in line with standard industry practices. Subsequently, the inspectors noted that Condition Report ANO-C-2008-2565, written several months later, identified inadequate oversight of contractor personnel as a contributing cause for continuing problems with fire watches and control of combustible materials. The inspectors noted that the basis for this determination was that contract supervisors were not as familiar with station procedures and processes as compared to licensee supervisors.

.(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope A limited assessment of the licensee's safety culture was conducted during this inspection based on the significant assessment of the status of the safety-conscious work environment that was performed as part of the Operational Safety Review Team evaluation with no issues of significance being identified. The inspector did not conduct interviews
(2) Assessment The inspectors noted from discussions with plant personnel, that the staff were aware of the importance of a strong safety conscious work environment and a willingness to raise safety issues. None of the plant employees had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised or knew of anyone who had been retaliated against for raising issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and engineering action request program. The threshold for entering concerns in the Employees' Concern Program was appropriate and the program administrator willing accepted not only safety concerns but also other work place concerns. Additionally, the resident inspectors had not identified any concerns of a safety conscious work environment. The licensee periodically monitored the safety conscious work environment and the results were consistent with the NRC observations. Based on these reviews and interviews, the inspectors concluded there was a safety conscious work environment.
(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On February 20, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Brad Berryman, General Manager Operations, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was retained by the inspectors nor was any included in this report.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited violation.

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, "Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or components," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to control materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation. These measures shall include, as appropriate, procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and notification to affected organizations. Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee failed to ensure that a solenoid valve design that had been determined to be inadequate in January 2006 was controlled and not issued for use or installation. This resulted in a subsequent failure of decay heat cooler 'A' bypass valve (CV-1433) because of the inadequate solenoid valve. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the condition did not result in the actual loss of any component, train, or system. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as condition reports ANO-1-2008-2525, ANO-1-2008-2578 and ANO-1-2008-2625.

ATTACHMENTS:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

B. Berryman, General Manager Operations, Acting Site Vice President
D. James, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
P. Williams, Manager, Design Engineering
R. Eichenberger, Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessments
M. Chisum, Manager, Planning, Scheduling, and Outages
R. Dodds, Manager, Maintenance
C. Reasoner, Director, Engineering
J. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance
E. Blackano, Supervisor, Components
J. Sigle, Assistant Manager, Operations
P. Higgins, Supervisor, Training
F. Van Buskiak, Licensing Specialist
D. Moore, Manager, Radiation Protection
R. Schiede, Licensing Specialist
D. Bice, Acting Manager, Licensing

NRC personnel

T. Pruett, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety
J. Clark, Branch Chief, E, Division of Reactor Projects
A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector, Arkansas Nuclear One

Attachment 1

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

Closed

None

Discussed

None

Attachment 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

NUMBER TITLE REVISION
COPD-001 Operations Expectations and Standards 30 and 35
COPD-002 ANO Operations Concerns Program 9
EN-AD-102 Procedure Adherence and Level of Use
4
EN-AD-102 Procedure Adherence and Level of Use 4
EN-HU-101 Human Performance Program 6
EN-HU-102 Human Performance Tools 4
EN-HU-103 Human Performance Error Reviews
EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process 13
EN-LI-104 Self-Assessment and Benchmarking Process 4
EN-LI-118 Root Cause Analysis Process 9
EN-LI-119 Apparent Cause Evaluation Process 8
EN-LI-121 Entergy Trending Process 7
EN-LI-122 Common Cause Analysis Process 1
EN-OE-100 Operating Experience Program 5
EN-OP-104 Operability Determinations 3
EN-OP-115 Conduct of Operations 6
EN-WM-100 Work Request (WR) Generation, Screening and Classification
EN-WM-102 Work Implementation and Closeout 2
OM-123 Working Hour Limits 2
OP-1000.006 Procedure Control 58 and 61
OP-1000.024 Control of Maintenance 53
OP-1000.028 Control of Temporary Alterations 25
OP-1104.006 Spent Fuel Cooling System 43
Attachment 1
OP-2104.006 Fuel Pool Systems 36
OP-2104.028 Component Cooling Water System Operation 24 and 37
OP-2306.005 Maintenance Surveillance on Unit 2 Emergency Diesel 2K-4
OP-6030.005 Control of Modification Work 7
Attachment 1 Condition Reports
ANO-1-2004-00980
ANO-1-2008-2631
ANO-C-2007-0414
ANO-1-2004-01637
ANO-1-2008-2632
ANO-C-2007-00648
ANO-1-2005-02225
ANO-1-2008-2640
ANO-C-2007-00672
ANO-1-2005-03075
ANO-1-2008-2642
ANO-C-2007-00691
ANO-1-2006-0004
ANO-1-2008-2644
ANO-C-2007-0890
ANO-1-2006-1474
ANO-2-2003-0467
ANO-C-2007-0961
ANO-1-2006-00877
ANO-2-2003-1598
ANO-C-2007-0931
ANO-1-2006-01122
ANO-2-2004-00065
ANO-C-2007-1060
ANO-1-2006-01399
ANO-2-2005-02192
ANO-C-2007-1106
ANO-1-2007-00002
ANO-2-2006-00737
ANO-C-2007-1112
ANO-1-2007-00959
ANO-2-2006-01598
ANO-C-2007-1144
ANO-1-2007-01451
ANO-2-2006-01698
ANO-C-2007-1172
ANO-1-2007-01133
ANO-2-2006-02168
ANO-C-2007-1175
ANO-1-2007-01277
ANO-2-2006-02444
ANO-C-2007-1190
ANO-1-2007-01343
ANO-2-2007-00298
ANO-C-2007-1207
ANO-1-2007-01686
ANO-2-2007-00313
ANO-C-2007-1234
ANO-1-2007-01693
ANO-2-2007-00419
ANO-C-2007-1237
ANO-1-2007-01781
ANO-2-2007-00718 ANO -C-2007-1284
ANO-1-2007-02271
ANO-2-2007-01016
ANO-C-2007-1256
ANO-1-2008-00085
ANO-2-2007-01073
ANO-C-2007-01261
ANO-1-2008-0183
ANO-2-2007-01512
ANO-C-2007-1262
ANO-1-2008-0383
ANO-2-2007-1528
ANO-C-2007-1339
ANO-1-2008-0452
ANO-2-2007-1663
ANO-C-2007-1340
ANO-1-2008-0498
ANO-2-2007-1693
ANO-C-2007-01562
ANO-1-2008-0508
ANO-2-2008-0191
ANO-C-2007-1359
ANO-1-2008-0510
ANO-2-2008-00295
ANO-C-2007-01452
ANO-1-2008-0513
ANO-2-2008-0414
ANO-C-2007-1696
ANO-1-2008-0635
ANO-2-2008-0417
ANO-C-2007-01719
ANO-1-2008-0791
ANO-2-2008-0467
ANO-C-2007-01745
ANO-1-2008-0958
ANO-2-2008-0534
ANO-C-2007-1901
ANO-1-2008-1308
ANO-2-2008-0548
ANO-C-2008-00083
ANO-1-2008-1310
ANO-2-2008-0595
ANO-C-2008-0174
ANO-1-2008-1327
ANO-2-2008-0672
ANO-C-2008-00501
ANO-1-2008-1329
ANO-2-2008-00791
ANO-C-2008-0506
ANO-1-2008-1337
ANO-2-2008-00798
ANO-C-2008-00523
ANO-1-2008-1342
ANO-2-2008-0813
ANO-C-2008-00827
ANO-1-2008-1359
ANO-2-2008-0859
ANO-C-2008-0873
ANO-1-2008-1368
ANO-2-2008-0862
ANO-C-2008-01114
ANO-1-2008-1412
ANO-2-2008-0865
ANO-C-2008-1140
ANO-1-2008-1738
ANO-2-2008-0915
ANO-C-2008-01244
ANO-1-2008-1739
ANO-2-2008-0928
ANO-C-2006-1043
ANO-1-2008-1742
ANO-2-2008-0931
ANO-C-2006-1151
ANO-1-2008-1754
ANO-2-2008-1061
ANO-C-2006-1154
ANO-1-2008-1758
ANO-2-2008-1068
ANO-C-2006-1189
ANO-1-2008-1771
ANO-2-2008-1071
ANO-C-2006-1472
ANO-1-2008-1772
ANO-2-2008-1072
ANO-C-2006-1480
Attachment 1
ANO-1-2008-1780
ANO-2-2008-1078
ANO-C-2008-1311
ANO-1-2008-01787
ANO-2-2008-01117
ANO-C-2008-1435
ANO-1-2008-1793
ANO-2-2008-1214
ANO-C-2008-01436
ANO-1-2008-1880
ANO-2-2008-1215
ANO-C-2008-01482
ANO-1-2008-1902
ANO-2-2008-1218
ANO-C-2008-1536
ANO-1-2008-1965
ANO-2-2008-1220
ANO-C-2008-1606
ANO-1-2008-1998
ANO-2-2008-1223
ANO-C-2008-1694
ANO-1-2008-2091
ANO-2-2008-1226
ANO-C-2008-1727
ANO-1-2008-2101
ANO-2-2008-1237
ANO-C-2008-1954
ANO-1-2008-2130
ANO-2-2008-1242
ANO-C-2008-1962
ANO-1-2008-2135
ANO-2-2008-1245
ANO-C-2008-1973
ANO-1-2008-2149
ANO-2-2008-1253
ANO-C-2008-1977
ANO-1-2008-2251
ANO-2-2008-1258
ANO-C-2008-2003
ANO-1-2008-2153
ANO-2-2008-1261
ANO-C-2008-2016
ANO-1-2008-2214
ANO-2-2008-1264
ANO-C-2008-02103
ANO-1-2008-2216
ANO-2-2008-1271
ANO-C-2008-02112
ANO-1-2008-2217
ANO-2-2008-1274
ANO-C-2008-02115
ANO-1-2008-2221
ANO-2-2008-1278
ANO-C-2008-02203
ANO-1-2008-2223
ANO-2-2008-1282
ANO-C-2008-02209
ANO-1-2008-2227
ANO-2-2008-1287
ANO-C-2008-02217
ANO-1-2008-2231
ANO-2-2008-1289
ANO-C-2008-02221
ANO-1-2008-2233
ANO-2-2008-1290
ANO-C-2008-02230
ANO-1-2008-2245
ANO-2-2008-1293
ANO-C-2008-02233
ANO-1-2008-2315
ANO-2-2008-1311
ANO-C-2009-02239
ANO-1-2008-2319
ANO-2-2008-1312
ANO-C-2009-02263
ANO-1-2008-2491
ANO-2-2008-1316
ANO-C-2009-02279
ANO-1-2008-2493
ANO-2-2008-1325
ANO-C-2008-02369
ANO-1-2008-2494
ANO-2-2008-1350
ANO-C-2008-02410
ANO-1-2008-2495
ANO-2-2008-1423
ANO-C-2008-02503
ANO-1-2008-2500
ANO-2-2008-1464
ANO-C-2008-02565
ANO-1-2008-2502
ANO-2-2008-1597
ANO-C-2009-0050
ANO-1-2008-2508
ANO-2-2008-01634
ANO-C-2009-0073
ANO-1-2008-2510
ANO-2-2008-1687
ANO-C-2009-0087
ANO-1-2008-2513
ANO-2-2008-01692
ANO-C-2009-0093
ANO-1-2008-2515
ANO-2-2008-01728
ANO-C-2009-0103
ANO-1-2008-2518
ANO-2-2008-01735
ANO-C-2009-0111
ANO-1-2008-2523
ANO-2-2008-01737
ANO-C-2009-0122
ANO-1-2008-2524
ANO-2-2008-01742
ANO-C-2009-0293
ANO-1-2008-2525
ANO-2-2008-01746
ANO-C-2009-0338
ANO-1-2008-2531
ANO-2-2008-02081
LO-ALO-2006-0001
ANO-1-2008-2568
ANO-2-2008-2185
LO-ALO-2006-0015
ANO-1-2008-2572
ANO-2-2008-2542
LO-ALO-2006-0077
ANO-1-2008-2578
ANO-C-2006-1016
LO-ALO-2007-0002
ANO-1-2008-2625
ANO-C-2006-01678
LO-ALO-2007-0183
ANO-1-2008-2626
ANO-C-2006-1908
HQN-2005-0240
ANO-1-2008-2627
ANO-C-2007-00110
ANO-1-2008-2629
ANO-C-2007-0235
Attachment 1 Work Orders
00030725
0048034
0097729
0101553
0106687
00110914
0112657
00113452
0115323
28155
0136344
00150346
0151157
00156003
0166086
00166576
50246939
51031145 Miscellaneous Approved
OM-123 Attachment 9.1, "Authorizations for exceeding working hour limits"
Licensee Event Report 50-368/2008-001-00, "Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications"
Licensee Event Report 50-368/2008-002-00, "Manual Reactor trip"
Safeguards Event Report 50-313/2008-S0 1 -00, 50-368/2008-S0 1 -00, "Suspension of Safeguards Measures during a Non-Radiological Emergency" Licensee Event Report 50-313/2008-SO2-00, 50-368/2008-SO2-00 " Electronic Files Containing Safeguards Information Not Properly Marked, Stored, or Controlled"
Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-10-2008-ANO-1, "Maintenance"
Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-03-2007-ANO-1, "ANO Corrective Actions" Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-04-2008-ANO-1, "Engineering, Design Control"
Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-12-2007-ANO-1, "ANO Operations Focus Review" Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-3-2007-ANO-1, ANO Corrective Actions Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-1-2007-ANO-1 Quality Assurance Audit for the Fitness for Duty/PADS Program Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-2-2008-ANO-1 Quality Assurance Audit of the Chemistry Program Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-6-2007-ANO-1 ANO Environmental Monitoring Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-11-2008-ANO-1 ANO Materials, Purchasing, and Contracts Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-12-2007-ANO-1 Operations Focus Review
Attachment 1 Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-14-2007-ANO-1 ANO Radiation Protection Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-14-2007-ANO-2 ANO Radiation Protection Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-15-2007-ANO-1 ANO Radioactive Waste
Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-16-2007-ANO-1 Security Quality Assurance Audit Report
QA-19-2008-ANO-1 Training
Surveillance Report,
QS-2007-ANO-003 Engineering Audit (QA-4-2006-ANO-1) Follow-up Surveillance Report,
QS-2007-ANO-009 Engineering Audit (QA-8-2007-ANO-1) Follow-up Surveillance Report,
QS-2007-ANO-011 Follow-up of Performance Deficiency
CR-ANO-2007-0549 on Records Vault Fire Suppression System
LO-ALO-2006-00104
CA 00035, ANO Fire Protection Program Assessment
LO-ALO-2007-0183
CA-71, Management of Training Processes and Resources in the Maintenance and Technical Training Attachment 2
Information Request November 05, 2008 Arkansas Nuclear One
Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Document Request (IP 71152; Inspection Report
05000313; 368/2009006)
To the extent possible, please provide the information in electronic media.
The agency's text editing software is MS Word, Excel, Power Point, and Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.
However, we have document viewing capability for Corel WordPerfect 10, Presentations, and Quattro Pro.
The inspectors will get updated lists et cetera during the first day onsite (January 26, 2009).
Please provide the following by December 21, 2008, to Jim Drake by posting to CERTREC, e-mail or to:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Jim Drake Region
IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400
Arlington,
TX 76011
Note: For requested summary lists, please include a description of problem, significance level, status, initiation date, and owner organization.
1. A complete copy of all Condition Reports (CRs) related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period, including any evaluations.
2. Summary list of all CRs that were generated since January 1, 2007.
3. List of all CRs that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller issues for the period
4. Summary list of all CRs that were up-graded or down-graded during the period
5. List of root-cause analyses completed during the period
6. List of root-cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period
7. List of all apparent cause analysis completed during the period
8. List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program during the period
9. List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees during the period
Attachment 2 10. Copy of quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed during the period
11. Summary list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during the period but which were not completed
2. Copy of corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (Do not include INPO assessments)
13. Copy of corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization
14. Copy of current revisions of governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:

a.

Condition reporting b.
Corrective Action Program c.
Root Cause Evaluation/Determination

d.

Operator work arounds e.
Work requests f.
Temporary modifications g.

Procedure

change requests h.

Deficiency reporting and resolution
I.
Operating experience evaluation j.
Safety culture policy/procedures k.
Employee Concerns Program
15. List of external events and operating experience (OE) evaluated for applicability at Arkansas Nuclear One during the period
16. Copy of CRs or other actions generated for each of the items below during the period:

a.

Part 21 Reports

b.

NRC Information Notices and Bulletins c.
LERs issued by Arkansas Nuclear One (also include a copy of the LERs) d.
NCVs and Violations issued to Arkansas Nuclear One
17. Copy of security event logs during the period
18. Copy of radiation protection event logs during the period
19. Copy of current system health reports or similar information
20. Copy of current predictive maintenance summary reports or similar information
21. Copy of corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
Attachment 2 22. List of risk significant components and systems
23. List of corrective actions closed to other programs, such as maintenance action requests/work orders, engineering requests, etc.
24. List of degraded conditions and nonconformances under Generic Letter 91-18, which were not corrected in the last outage
25. Lists of operator work arounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened or closed during the period
26. Copy of CRs associated with adverse trends in human performance, equipment, processes, procedures, or programs during the period