IR 05000313/1978012

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IE Inspec Rept 50-313/78-12 & 50-368/78-20 on 780710-14 & 25-28 During Which 3 Items of Noncompliance Were Noted:No Audits Conducted Since 770728 Under Src,No Demonstration of Nonsupervised Circuits,Unplugged Rod Warmer
ML20147C585
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/10/1978
From: Kelly D, Madsen G, Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20147C548 List:
References
50-313-78-12, 50-368-78-20, NUDOCS 7810130053
Download: ML20147C585 (12)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEM:NY

REGION IV

Report Nos. 50-313/78-12 50-368/78-20 Docket Nos. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 50-368 Construction Permit No. CPPR-89/

License No. NPF-6 Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Unit Nos.1 and 2 Inspection At: AND Site, Russellville, Arkansas and AP&L Corporate Offices, Little Rock, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: July 10-14 and 25-28, 1978 i

Inspectors:

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F. Westerman, Reactor Inspector P//c [7 B_

Date x nna S/l]t Rhof7F E.' K'elley, Reacttfpnspec r D6te'

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li. W. Dickerson, Reactor Inspector

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/ . L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and G

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Nuclear Support Branch ,

Approved By: [ 4V ac#m 8do/77 ~

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G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Date ..f'

Nuclear Support Branch

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f-2-Inspection Summary Inspection on July 10-14 ' and 25-28, ~ 1978 ~ (Report No. ' 50-313/78-l?) .

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Areas Inspected: Routine, Unannounced inspection of procurement, review and audit, and plant operations. The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on-site by one NRC inspecto Resul ts: Within the three areas inspected, three infractions were identified relating to SRC audits, fire protection irstrumentation surveil-lance and control of weld electrodes (DETAILS, paragraphs 13,14 and 11).

Inspection on ~ July'10-14 and' 25-28, '1978 (Report' No. ' 50-368/78-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection involving the review of test program status, follow up on IE Bulletins and Circulars, review of Construction Deficiency Reports, items preparatory to operating license issuance, witness of initial fuel load and management meeting. The .

inspection involved 63 inspector-hours on-site by three NRC inspector Resul ts: Within the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were Tdentified. One apparent deviation from commitments to the NRC was identified relative to fire protection (DETAILS, paragraph 3).

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-3-DETAILS Persons Contacted Arkansas Power & Light Company Emp_loyees J. W. Anderson, AND Plant Manager L. Alexander, QC Engineer J. R. Anderson, Assistant Production Startup Supervisor B. A. Baker, ANO-2 Operations Supervisor R. L. Bata, QA Engineer T. N. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer E. C. Ewing, Production Startup Supervisor D. R. Hamblin, QC Engineer T. Holcomb, Scheduler P. Jones, Maintenance Supervisor G. H. Miller, Assistant AN0 Plant Manager S. Petsel, Licensing Engineer J. Robertson, ANO-1 Operations Supervisor S. M. Strasner, QC Engineer B. A. Tenvilliger, Supervisor Plant Operations D. Trimble, Training Coordinator CE Employees R. Ahrens, Startup Engineer L. Arnold, Startup Engineering Group Leader Inspection Follow Up on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (Inspection Report 50-368/77-20): Qualification of Refueling Machine and Crane Operator Fifty-eight maintenance personnel have received documented training on lifting equipment. Qualification and training on the refueling machine has been completed and documented for 14 licensed operator Seven non-licensed operators have also received training under supervision of a licensed operato . Fire Doors (Unit 2)

The inspector identified during this inspection that fire doors were not being maintained closed. These doors included 274, 266, 269, 278, 260, 261, 259, 251 and 262. In the licensee's reply to NRR (letter dated 5/17/77) which provided a comparison of AND-2 Fire Protection to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, the licensee stated that, " Fire doors are normally closed." The licensee's failure to maintain fire doors closed is considered a deviation to previous commitmen f

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4. Initial Fuel Load'(Unit 2) Scope The inspector verified conformance to licensee requirements by selective review of applicable Technical Specification require-ments.

l The inspector verified conformance to administrative and procedural requirements by observations in the following areas:

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Communications between control room and the refuel level

- Crew operations and staffing

- Proper revision of procedure in place

- Maintenance of counts and inverse multiplication plots

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Baron concentration

- Surveillance of monitoring equipment

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Shift turnover

- Control of personnel access

- Refueling status boards

- Discussions with personnel on loading stations

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Shift schedules The inspector reviewed the fuel loading procedure to verify the following:

- Master copy was being assembled

- Proper control of procedure changes

- Test deficiencies

- Data sheet legibility, traceability and permanence The inspector reviewed the control room log for the 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> preceding fuel loading, Inspection Findings (1) The inspector found that the fuel loading was proceeding in a safe and efficient manne (2) The inspector did identify that compliance with the fire protection Technical Specifications as an unresolved ite It is the licensee's intention to request relief from a portion of these specifications for approximately 45 day ! These Technical Specification (TS) requirements include TS 4.3.3.8, 4.7.10.2.C, 4.7.10.3.C.2 and 4.7.10.1.2. ; (Unresolved Iterr 7820-1).

(3) No items of noncco.e siance or deviations were identifie !

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-5 5. Fuel Load License Conditions '(Unit 2) Excore Nuclear Instrumentation The inspector verified that the excore nuclear instrumentation hadbeeninstalled(SWR 3014). Difficulty had been experienced in that there was not sufficient clearance between the detectors and detector well. This problem was resolved by enlarging the diameter of the detector well by use of a reaming tool .

l Preoperational Test 2.600.12A "Special Test of Boration/ Dilution System The inspector verified satisfactory completion of Preoperational Test 2.600.12A. Completion of this test had been delayed pending installation of the seal ring around the reactor vesse Conduit Fire ~ Barriers The inspector verified completion of the installation of fire barriers. The resolution of questions concerning the installation of the fire barriers at the end of conduits rather than at wall penetration is to be completed by Mode 2.

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6. Operator Training (Unit 2)

The inspector followed up on the licensee's July 5,1978 letter to NRR, Operator Licensing Branch, regarding the plant's response to April 20,1978 Operator Licensing Branch. The specific items verified by the inspector are as follows:

Emergency Plan OP 2202.36 Determining Magnitude of Release, Rev. O, was issued May 27, 197 A four hour training session was provided for each prospective operato Fuel Handling i

Additional hands-on fuel handling training has been completed. Each i licensed operator has completed at least one transfer of the dumrny fuel element from the upender into the vessel and back.

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Control Systems l

Training sessions of approximately two hours duration have been con-ducted for each licensed operator relating to the S+eam Dump and Bypass Control System and the Feedwater Control Syste _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Safeguards Actuation Emergency Procedure OP 2202.08, Revision 0, Inadvertent Safety Injection Actuation, has been writte CPC/COLSS/ Computer OP 2105.01, Permanent Change 2, has been discussed. This change delineates the department responsible for changing addressable constants and establishes administrative controls required to maintain the validity of the addressable constant The inputs for letdown flow and steam geiserator blowdown flow are being changed to analog input No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Follow Up on NRR Site Visit, July 6-8, 1977 (Unit 2)

During the site visit by NRR/ DSS on July 6-8, 1977, it was determined that a method of level detection in the Service Water Pump bays was necessary. The applicant, through various discussions with NRR/ DSS, agreed to provide an alternate to the installation of class IE level detection. Letters of agreement with the Corps of Engineers providing telephone and two-way radio communication with the Corps at the Dardanelle Dam plus plant procedures were agreed upon for the following conditions:

1 Deliberate reservoir drawdown below the 335 foot leve Notification within 10 minutes if an uncontrolled drawdown below the 335 foot level occur A surveillance procedure for ensuring telephone and radio communicatio The inspector reviewed the applicant's response, which consisted of the following:

Procedure 1203.02, 7/7/78, which discusses a deliberate drawdown of the reservoi Procedure 1202.24,9/20/77, which discusses a loss of the Dardanelle Da Standing Order #31, 7/78, which requires monthly connunication check with the Corps of Engineer No discrepancies were noted. This item is close . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __

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-7-8. Cable Separation and Cable Tray Covers'(Unit 2)

This item is a remaining construction item. Due to the last minute pulling of cables, it was not until recently that an adequate quantity of cable tray covers could be inspecte The inspector examined areas of the plant with an applicant represen-tative. The inspector noted, during the inspection, work in progress in congested areas where barriers and coatings were being installe The two most congested areas, cable spreading room and the hallway l just outside, were the areas of closest examination. Also examined was room 2091 which contains both red and green safety trains. No discrepancies were noted. This item is close . Follow Up on Construction Deficiency Reports (Unit 2)

On June 2,1978, tae applicant reported a possible significant deficiency as defined by 10 C'R 50.55(e) to RIV. The report concerned problems encountered with valves manufactured by EPG. The following is a list-i ing of the valve types and the problems encountered.

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Efcomatic - Actuated Ball Valves -

- 90V DC motors supplied instead of 125V DC motor One valve failed seismic testing in the Triaxial Mod Valves failed to fully close.

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- Insufficient Environment Test Dat Cast iron trip stop faile Matryx Air Actuated Ball Valves -

- No seismic Test Dat The applicant responded in writing on the following dates:

June 21, 1978 - Motor operated valve trip stop failur June 30, 1978 - Matryx Air Actuated Ball Valves seismic qualificatio Jene 30, 1978 - Efcomatic - Actuated Ball Valves seismic qualificatio July 7,1978 - Efcomatic - Actuated Ball Valves failure to fully clos June 16,1978 - Efcomatic - Actuated Ball Valves 90V DC motor supplied for 125V DC servic June 8, 1978 - Motor operated Ball Valves failure of extension stem _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - -

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The inspector reviewed the applicant's responses and reviewed the records of the applicant's corrective actions. Of the above possible significant deficiencies, all but two were considered reportable after evaluation. The two that were not considered reportable were: (1) the failed trip stop rotor operated ball valve; and (2) the seismic qualification data for the Matryx Air Actuated Ball valv This item is close . Emeraency Diesel Generator Differential Relay Seismic Qualification (Unit 2)

This item resulted from discussion between the applicant and itRR relative to the seismic qualification of certain instrumentation associated with the diesel generator. It was detemined that the differential relays did not meet the 1974 Revision of IEEE 32 flew relays were ordered. The applicant issued Design Change Package (OCP) f682 to perfom the work necessary to change the relay The inspector reviewed the Material Receiving Report (MRR #76668)

which contained the documentation of the seismic qualificatio The inspector also reviewed the DCP which indicated that the subject relays had been changed. ilo discrepancies were identified. This item is closed l

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11. Review of Plant Operations (Unit 1) Scope of Inspection

i The inspector reviewed the following shif t logs and operating l logs for completeness and staff review:

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Station tiSS and tog (3/29/78 Safeguard - 6/27/78)

Auxiliary Log (3/28/78 - 7/25/78)

. ESAS Log (3/28/78 - 7/25/78)

. Standing Orders

. Jumper Bypass Log

. Trouble Reports The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas, including observations (as appropriate) of the following:

. Monitoring Instrumentation

. Radiation Controls

. Plant Housekeeping

. Fluid Leaks

. Piping Vibrations

. Pipe Hanger / Seismic Restraint

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. . Selected Valve Position and Equipment Control Switches

. Lockout Tags

. Lighted Annunciators

. Plant Tours

. Control Room Manning Inspection Findings (1) The inspector identified one apparent item of noncom-pliance during the tour of accessible areas. The inspector found a Bechtel Weld Rod Warn,ar (Number 145) containing E-7018 weld rod unplugged (coid) on the 314 foor level of the reactor building near the demineralizer. The find-ing of the uncontrolled weld rod and warmer is contrary to the requirements of Bechtel Procedure WFMC-1, " Welding Filler Material Control Procedure Specification," paragraph 4.3.4. Paragraph 4.3.4 requires in part that, ". . .

Pc-table rod warmer shall be checked out and into the rod room on a daily basis. During use, portable rod warmers shall be continuously heated. . . . Unused electrodes shall be returned to the rod storage area at the end of each shift or destroyed." A check with the Bechtel Weld Rod Room indicated that rod warmer number 145 had not been returned to the room for some time. An attempt was made to locate records for the warmer when it was issued but these could not be immediately located. The licensee was informed that failure to properly control the warmer and the weld rod was considered an infractio (2) The inspector noticed that numerous channels of system heat tracing were alarmed and could not be cleared by the operator. A discussion with a representative of the licensee indicated that the systems were alarming on high alarm. He l indicated that action would be taken to initiate work on

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the systems to resolve the proble (3) The inspector noticed that numerous indicating lights were out on various electrical panels throughout the plan The licensee indicated these would be replaced and that I their program for replacement would emphasized.

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The inspector had no additional questions in this are . Procurement (Unit 1)

The inspector's review of this area was based on procedures applicable to Units No.1 and No. 2 and the inspection of implementation was based on review of eight Unit No.1 and No. 2 procurement packages of safety related component _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _

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The inspector verified that procurement documents used were properly approved and contained quality control inspection and record requirements. In addition, the inspector verified for those components or materials which had been delivered that:

documentary evidence was available to support conformance to procurement requirements; they were inspected upon delivery and were handled in accordance with measures established for control and separation of nonconforming material, parts and components; and they were supplied by an approved vendo No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Review and Audits (Unit 1)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's program of review and audits conducted by the Plant Safety Comittee and the Safety Review Comittee. Included were reviews and audits required by the Technical Specifications to be complete The records reviewed by the inspector were as follows:

PSC Minutes, 5/19/77 - 4/27/78 SRC Minutes, 6/13/77 - 4/10/78 SRC Audits of 1/19-20/77 and 7/26-28/77 During this review, it was established that no audit of facility activities relative to the results of all actions taken to correct deficiencies occuring in facility equipment, structures, systems or method of operation that affect nuclear safety had been conducted by the Safety Review Comittee since July 28,1977 (the next scheduled audit is for July 19-20,1978). This is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.5.2.8.C which requires that this audit be conducted at least once per six month perio This matter had been discussed in an SRC meeting on June 1,1978 but acceptable corrective action had not been proposed or completed at the time of the inspection. The inspector informed the licensee that failure to conduct the audit at the frequency required was considered an infractio During the review of SRC minutes, it was es tablished that the review of proposed Technical Specification cht.nges recorded on August 26, 1977 and October 31, 1977 as minutes of SRC meetings were actually a l polling of the members of the SRC which resulted in their concurrence with the proposed TS changes. This matter was discussed with the licensee relative to whether this constituted a meeting or constituted a quorum as specified in TS 6.5.2.5 and 6.5.2.6, respectively. This matter is considered an unresolved item pending approval of changes to the Unit No.1 TS which would clarify this matte _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ -

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_11 Additionally, during the review of the PSC minutes it was estab-lished that the review of procedures and changes to procedures were being conducted by routing of Special Meeting Review Sheets which l polled the members with respect to their concurrence to the procedures or changes to a procedure. In this matter, procedures .

and/or changes to procedures are thus approved. These review sheets are then made a part of n.n actual meeting. In some cases the procedures / changes are approved more than the maximum required time of 14 days prior to an actual meeting of the PSC. This matter was also discussed with the licensee and will remain an unresolved item pending approval of changes to the Unit No.1 TS which would clarify this matte The inspector had no additional questions in this are .

1 Fire Protection (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 30, issued March 3,1978, to the Unit No.1 Facility Operating License imposed new fire protection system requirement The licensee is allowed to complete system surveillance requirements within the first surveillance interval. In follow-up to the issuance of these Technical Specifications (TS), the inspector found that the 31 day operability requirements for non-supervised circuits (TS 4.19.3)

had not been conducted. The licensee was informed that this was an apparent item of noncomplianc . Exit Meeting

'o An exit meeting was conducted on July 14, 1978 with Mr. J. Anderson and other members of the plant staff. An exit meeting was conducted on July 27 with Mr. H. Miller and other members of the plant staf The inspectors discussed the scope of the inspection and summarized the inspection findings which are detailed in this repor . Management Meeting A management meeting was conducted with corporate members of the AP&L staff following the conclusion of this inspection. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the general status of the IE inspections on-site and implementation of the IE Revised Inspection Program (On-SiteResidentInspector).

Meeting Attendance

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AP&L Personnel Present W. Cavanaugh III, Executive Director of Generation and Construction D. A. Rueter, Director of Technical and Environmental Services D. R. Sikes, Director of Operations

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Nuclear Regulatory Comission G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, RIV T. F. Westerman, Principal Inspector - ANO, Units 1 and 2 v, . m ,5

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