IR 05000309/1985099

SALP Rept 50-309/85-99 for Jul 1984 - Oct 1985.Meeting Scheduled for 860220 at Site to Discuss Assessment

ML20198H885
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	01/24/1986
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198H869	List: IR 05000309/1985099 ML20198H864
References
50-309-85-99, NUDOCS 8601310119
Download: ML20198H885 (44)

Text

. .

!

l I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fNISSION I REGION I SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT 50-309/85-99

. MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION l

ASSESSMENT PERIOD: JULY 1, 1984 - OCTOBER 31, 1985 BOARD MEETING DATE: DECEMBER 20, 1985 0601310119 060124 I'DR ADOCK 0000 9 E

. .

SUMMARY..................................... T2-1 TAB LE 3 - VIO LATION SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T3-1 TABLE 4 - LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA.......................... T4-1 TABLE 5 - LER SYN 0PSIS................................................ TS-1 TABLE 6 - UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAMS AND FORCED OUTAGES............... T6-1 TABLE 7 - SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES............................. T7-1

. .

I. INTRODUCTION Purpose and Overview The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based on this infor-matio SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes used to

, ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for allocating

'

NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee's man-agement to promote quality and safe plant operatio A NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on December 20, 1985 to review the collection of performance observations and data to assess the licensee's performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Hanual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance". A summary of the guidance and performance criteria is provided in Section II of this repor This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety per-formance at the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station for the sixteen month period of July 1,1984 through October 31, 198 SALP Board Members Chairman R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Feactor Projects (DRP)

Board Members S. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety E. Butcher, Chief, Technical Specification Coordination Branch, NRR E. C. Wentinger, Chief, Projects Bran:h No. 3, DRP J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch, DRSS T. Elsasser, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3C, DRP C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector P. Sears, Licensing Project Manager, NRR L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS W. Kane, Deputy Director, Division cf Reactor Projects (DRP)

A. Thadani, PWR Project Directorate No. 8, Division of Licensing, NRR Other At'.tendees D. Vito, Senior Emergency Specialist, DRSS M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim Station T. Martin, Performance Appraisal Section, IE J. White, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS

__ _ _ . . _ .

. .

C. Background Licensee Activities At the beginning of the assessment period the facility was at ap-proximately 40 percent power and increasing load following the cycle 8 refueling outage. On August 8,1984, the plant lowered power to 80 percent to recover from a dropped Control Element Assembly (CEA).

The plant returned to 100 percent power the same da During September and October power was reduced three times in order to perform maintenance or routine surveillance. One of the main-tenance items was repairs to the Heater Drain Tank Level control valve (HD-A-180). This was a recurring problem during this cycl The plant tripped from 100 percent power on November 3, 1984 because of low steam generator leve The cause of the low level signal was a secondary system pressure spike and subsequent shrink in steam generator level. On November 4, during the plant startup, an operator opened the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV) isolation valve while the MFRV had a full open signal. Steam Generator #3 overfilled, cooling down the cold leg, causing a Variable Overpower Trip. On November 5, during the subsequent plant startup, operators noted that the turbine governor valves were opened further than necessary for the power leve An investigation revealed that the disc for #1 turbine stop valve had become separated from the operating arm. This explained the cause of the secondary pressure spike on November 3. The plant was taken off the line on November 6 to repair #1 turbine stop valve. The plant returned to power on November ,

Twice in November the plant tripped from approxiamtely 100% power, first on low steam generator level and then one day later on low suction pressure to the turbine driven feedwater pump. Both trips were attributed to failures of the main feedwater pump recirculation valve. Later that month (November 20), power was reduced to make repairs on a Feedwater heate .

During the months of January and February, 1985, the plant reduced power to 80 percent nine times for chloride intrusion problems with the main condenser. During the winter months the plant is more susceptible to seawater leaks in the condenser due to a temperature ,

induced resonance. Three of those reductions in power were to gain access to a waterbox for eddy current testing of the condenser tube The other six reductions in power were to search for leaky tubes in the waterboxes of the main condenser. The plant also reduced power to 47 percent on January 15 to repair a hydraulic leak on A Moisture Separator Reheater valve. Maintenance was also performed on Feedwater Heater E-11A on February 8. Power was increased to 100 percent on February 1 :

,- , ,

_ __ _

. .

The plant reduced power five times between March 8 and April 9 to perform maintenance on the Heater Drain Tank level control valve (HD-A-180) and for inspection and maintenance of the main condenser waterboxes. On March 10, the plant was manually tripped when the main condenser experienced high differential pressure between the two sets of waterboxes. The high differential pressure was a result of inadequate circulating water flow while returning A waterbox to servic On April 30, power was reduced to 95 percent power in order to re-place three blown main generator exciter fuses. On the same day, while working on the steam powered feedwater pump control circuit, a technician caused an inadvertant low pressure signal which caused a plant tri A plant startup was conducted on May 1 and the plant returned to 100 percent power on May 2. The plant was taken off the line on May 4 so the main generator exciter diodes could be re-placed. Power was returned to 100 percent on May 9 following a delay for chloride cleanup. On May 10, power was reduced to 55 percent to remove the steam driven feedwater pump from service and place the two electric driven feedwater pump in service. Power was returned to 97 percent (maximum power using electric driven feed-water pump) on May 11. Loose parts from a heater drain pump were found in the steam driven feed pump (which required repair). On June 8, plant power was reduced to 56 percent to return the steam driven feedwater pump to service. Plant power returned to 100 per-cent on June On June 21, the turbine governor valves reached 100 percent open and cold leg temperature coastdown operations began.On July 1, a technician caused an inadvertant trip while calibrating #3 Steam Generator Feed Flow recorder by accidentally generating a loss of flow signal. The plant was phased on line on July 2 and plant power reached a maximum of 93 percent power in coastdown on July The plant was shut down on August 16, 1985, for Cycle 8/9 refuelin Major work accomplished during this outage included replacement of the main condenser, replacement of the generator stator, replacement of a reactor coolant pump motor as well as implementation of a Special Functional Testing program and repairs to the primary com-ponent cooling water piping. The reactor was taken critical on October 22, 1985 at the conclusion of the outag On October 23, the plant tripped from 4 percent power due to low level in #3 steam generator. Feedwater flow was in manual control at the time of the trip because of leakage past the feedwater regu-lating bypass valve. The plant was returned to power for testing the main generator and then shutdown on October 24 for maintenance on #2 Reactor Coolant Pump. The reactor was taken critical on October 25 and tripped later that same day because of an inadvertant closure of an excess flow check valve. The plant was manually l

l i

l

\

. .

I

tripped again on October 26 when another excess flow check valve shut. The cause of these two events was insufficient torque of the excess flow check valve rupture discs. The plant was taken critical again on October 27 and was at approximately 80 percent power at the end of the assessment perio During this SALP period the unit availability factor was 84.7 per-cent with a capacity factor of 79.7 percen . Inspection Activities One NRC senior resident inspector was assigned to the site during the entire assessment period. A second resident inspector was as-signed to the site in mid-August 198 The total number of inspection hours for the sixteen month period was 4663 as summarized in Tables 1 and 2. This corresponds to 3497 hours0.0405 days <br />0.971 hours <br />0.00578 weeks <br />0.00133 months <br /> on an annualized basis. Contributing to this total were two team inspections. The first was a Post Accident Sampling inspection involving 5 inspectors and 160 inspection hours, conducted in Octo-ber, 1984. The second was an NRC Headquarters sponsored Performance Appraisal Team (PAT) inspection conducted in May - June, 1985. This inspection was performed by 10 NRC inspectors involving 871 inspec-tion hours. The objective of the PAT inspection was to evaluate the management control systems that support licensed activitie Two special inspections were conducted to establish the circumstances surrounding the loss of low steam generator pressure protectio A NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection team also witnessed the emergency exercises on September 19, 1984 and June 22, 198 In this period nine violations were issued including one proposed Severity level II violatio Tabulation of violations and inspec-tion activities are attached in the Tables section of this repor _ . . - _ _ -

. .

I CRITERIA Licensee performance is assessed in sectional functional areas depending on whether the facility is in operation or shutdown. Each functional area nor-mally represents areas significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal programmatic area The following evaluation criteria were used to assess each functional are . Management involvement and control issues from a safety standpoin . Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoin . Responsiveness to NRC initiative . Enforcement histor . Reporting and analysis of reportable event . Staffing (including management). Training effectiveness and qualificatio Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated was classified into one of three performance catagorie The definitions of

these performance catagories are:

Catagory Reduced NRC attention may be appropriat Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety is being achieve Catanory NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuc-lear safety; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective so that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieve Catagory 3. Both NRC ar.d licensee attention should be increased. Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained, or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieve The SALP Board also assessed each functional area to compare the licensee's performance during the last quarter of the assessment period to that during the entire period in order to determine the recent trend for each functional

. area. The trend catagories used by the SALP Board are as follows:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ----

. . . . -_ . .. - - - ., - - - - . - .-.

'

. .

Improving:

Licensee performance has generally improved over the last quarter '

of the current SALP assessment perio Consistent: Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over the last quarter of the current SALP assessment period. -

,

Declining: Licensee performance has generally declined over the last quarter

'

of the current SALP assessment period.

,

,

il

,

I i

i i

F

4

!

I,

!

!

,

, ---.o --v.-- - --_ , - - . . _ , - , v,,, -- v-,-- , _,, , , . .. . .. ,. ~, -

. .

III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS Overall Facility Evaluation Increased attention of plant management has significantly improved the performance of several areas. This is due, in part, to management's approach to problem resolution. An inquisitive, resolution oriented attitude is being fostered throughout the organization. Corrective ac-tion on identified deficiencies has been effective in preventing small problems from growing into larger problems. Responsiveness by licensee management to observed violations has been exemplary. Daily activities are closely monitored, assistance from the Plant Engineering Department is used to resolve anomalies observed during equipm ot operation and the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) keeps itself informed of a variety of plant activitie Planning and coordination among the various departments has been enhanced during the morning managers meetings. Com-munication between all levels of staffing at the plant has been improve Of the eight automatic and two (preventive) manual plant trips, two were caused by operations personnel error, four by maintenance personnel error, and four were the result of component failur Training Evaluation Training effectiveness is assessed in each functional area by direct ob-

,

servation. The licensee has a strong commitment to training as is evi-denced by good licensed operator examination results, license training for Nuclear Safety Engineers, screening of candidates by a Qualifications Review Board, comprehensive refueling modifications training and the use of the site specific simulator for non-routine evolution practic Training support for other personnel is good. Auxiliary operator train-ing provides theoretical background information as well as job specific information. Fire brigade training utilizes onsite simulated drills and

, actual fire fighting offisite. Maintenance training is frequent and

'

covers pertinent topics. Some improvements are needed in health physics and chemistry technician training and corrective action has been initi-ated. However, the overall result is effective training for all personne C. Quality Assurance Evaluation Management oversight of quality activities is apparent in the morning manager's meeting and aggressive PORC review activitie Quality Assur-ance is integrated into daily activities through early repair order re-view and normal audit and surveillance functions. The Quality Assurance function needs to expand to provide more meaningful audits through cri-tical self-evaluation. Radiation Protection, Maintenance and Licensing show consistent performance in SALP ratings at the Category 2 level; however, an aggressive programmatic quality assurance review in these areas should be able to identify areas for improvemen , _

. .

8 Facility Performance Functional Area Last Period This Period Recent Trend (July 1, 1983 (July 1, 1984 June 30, 1984) October 31, 1985) Plant Operations 3 2 Improving Radiological Controls 2 2 Consistent Maintenance 2 2 Consistent Surveillance 2 1 Improving Fire Protection and 2 1 Consistent Housekeeping Emergency Preparedness 1 1 Consistent Security and Safeguards 1 1 Consistent Refueling 1 2 Improving Licensing Activities 2 2 Consistent

. .

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS Plant Operations (41%, 1927 hours0.0223 days <br />0.535 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.332235e-4 months <br />)

This assessment finds that licensee performance throughouc this SALP period has been one of improvement. Direct management involvement in plant operations through daily managers meetings, improved operations turnover practices, aggressive Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

reviews and relatively few operations personnel errors are indications of that improvemen Plant management has implemented a morning managers meeting to review plant operations for the preceding day and plan for upcoming events with focused attention on safe plant operations. The operations turnover re-port is used as an agenda for these meetings. All of the site depart- ,

ments are represented. Integration of operations, maintenance, surveil-lance and support organizations is planned during these meetings. De-ficiencies identified during shift turnovers are addressed and assign-ments are made for followup action. Meeting minutes are kept and widely distributed shortly after the meeting to keep personnel informed on plant activitie Followup action, with deadlines, is assigned to specific individuals. All personnel are encouraged to report confusing /off-normal indications so that corrective action can be assigned and future problems can be avoide Management involvement in daily plant operations was also evident in a number of changes throughout the plant which by themselves are not sig-nificant but collectively have had a positive effect on plant operation Shift turnovers are now conducted by the oncoming Plant Shift Supervisor and the Shift Operating Supervisor prior to the individual watch stations conducting their turnovers. The result is an operating crew that is cognizant of all activities for their shift instead of just their watch-station. The professional attitude of the control room was enhanced by a change to the dress code for supervisory personnel. General access to the control roon has been altered to reduce distractions of the operator A processing area for work request and taggin.g orders is now ,

in use. Corporate managers have frequent contact with the plant and they participate in a variety of plant meetings and monitoring activities such as plant tours. During special evolutions, corporate staff supplements the plant's shif t efforts by assigning personnel to the site. Plant En-gineering Department is represented at daily managers meetings and is routinely involved in planned corrective actio The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) provides an aggressive re-view of plant activitie Meeting agendas are distributed well in ad-vance of the meetings and closely followed. The PORG keeps informed of special plant evolutions by requesting presentations by key personnel during informational meetings. PORC discussions are lively and open and well documented in the meeting minute _

.

__ .

. .

All personnel are encouraged to identify problems so that they can be resolved. The licensee uses Plant Information Reports (PIR) and Unusual Occurrence Reports (UOR) for problem identification, evaluation, correc-tive action followup and resolution. PIRs and UORs are tracked and closed out and are used to keep plant personnel aware of observed prob-lems. Additionally, the morning managers meeting solicits the help of all personnel through their meeting minutes when unexplained indications or events take place for which additional information is needed for resolutio Licensed Operator training ic considered a strength at Maine Yanke Contributing factors include: nine of eleven staff members in the Train-ing Department hold Senior Reactor Operator licenses, the use of a Training and Qualification Review Board which oversees candidate perfor-mance, and comprehensive training for plant modifications. During this assessment period, four of four Reactor Operators and four of four Senior Reactor Operators passed license examinations. The Training Department becomes involved in plant problems through the use of the plant specific simulator to assist in analyzing equipment problems in the plant. The quality of the Annual License Operator Requalification Program is good; however, a mechanism for ensuring participation and timely completion of quizzes is needed. Overall, the plant operators are well trained as evidenced by their high level of performance throughout this evaluation perio The licensee's corrective action for chloride control has been timely and thorough. During the winter months when cold temperatures aggravated main condenser tube leakage, the plant reduced power and conducted eddy current testing of the condenser to identify and plug the tubes which

_ were leaking. This corrective action was in addition to the planned

replacement of the main condenser during the September 1985 refueling outage. Modifications were made to the condenser leak detection system to improve the plant's ability to quickly locate the problen waterbo The plant has begun a plant wide valve labeling program which should eliminate ambiguity in manual valve operations. The plant has also completed a handwheel painting program designed to distinguish between containment isolation valves and emergency core cooling systems valve Pride in the plant was enhanced by major cleaning and restoring efferts which has resulted in an improvement in plant appearance and a reduction in the radiation levels throughout the plan The area of containment integrity presented some problems to the licensee this cycle including: failure to tag shut a local handwheel during maintenance; lack of administrative controls for containment coolers, vent and drain valves, and the interpretation given to remotely operated containment isolation valves. The licensee has submitted a proposed change to Technical Specifications to allow the use of manual valve iso-lation for maintenance. Additionally, the licensee installed modifica-tions to piping and valving during the outage to enhance containment i

..

a .

boundary valve testing and to simplify the containment boundaries for the primary sampling system. Even though the licensee has taken action in this area, continued vigilance is required to prevent recurrence of similar problem One Operations Area problem is the volume of administrative reviews that are assigned to the Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) prior to the refueling outag The detailed review of procedures and plant modifications are best performed by someone with the level of experience that the PSS pos-sesses. However, the time involved with these reviews impacts on the ability of the PSS to monitor and direct plant activitie The assign-ment of an additional assistant to the Operations Department head has helped the situation but numerous reviews are time sensitive. Better coordination of procedures reviews, plant modifications and system test-ing is needed to prevent future problems in this are Of the eight automatic and two manual (preventive) plant trips during this period, two were the result of operations personnel error; one was a variable overpower trip resulting from excessive feedwater flow to a steam generator; and the other was during the return of the circulating water system to operation which caused high differential pressure across the main condenser. Additionally, the feedwater system was a source of problems during this SALP period. Two trips were attributed to personnel error during feedwater system maintenance associated with the feed pump recirculation valve controller. Anomalies in the recirculation control and heater drain tank control systems could have resulted in several plant trips had the operators not taken manual control during these situations. The potential exists for the feedwater system malfunctions to challenge plant safety systems. Emphasis is needed in this area to resolve feedwater issue The plant experienced a number of power reductions this cycle. The two prime contributors were support of chloride leak reduction in the main condenser and feedwater pump shifting because of problems in the feed-water control systems. Planned reductions were in accordance with man-agement's corrective action plan. Unplanned reductions were quickly fol-lowed by corrective maintenance. In each case, management was involved in resolving the cause of proble In the previous SALP evaluation, several problems were noted in the operations area. In all cases, the licensee has initiated corrective action to resolve these deficiencies. The licensee effectively resolved chloride intrusion issues both during the cycle with eddy current in-spection and tube plugging and in the long term with the replacement of the main condenser. Temporary guidance that had the capability to cir-cumvent the review and approval process has been eliminated. The prob-lems observed in Source Range Instrumentation have been corrected during the recent outage. With the exception of pre-outage procedure / test re-views conducted by the PSS, operational support activities have enhanced the operator's ability to focus his attention on his watchstanding re-sponsibilitie .

. .

Management involvement in daily plant operations and the overall coordi-nation ;f the various departments throughout this SALP period has focused attention on safe plant operations. As problems are identified, correc-tive action responsibilities are assigned and tracked. As a result, cor-rective action is timely and thorough. Coordination among onsite de-partments has improved. The effect of these actions has been a signifi-cant improvement in the Operations are Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Improvin Board Recommendations:

,

Licensee Continue strong management oversight of daily plant activitie NRC Non _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

B. Radiological Controls (9%, 432 hours0.005 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.142857e-4 weeks <br />1.64376e-4 months <br />)

Day-to-day review of ongoing activities was provided by resident inspec-tor There were six inspections performed in the area of Radiological Controls during the assessment period by Radiation Specialists. The in-spections performed during the period examined several program areas in-cluding Radiation Protection, Transportation and Independent Measurement A special announced inspection of the licensee's post-accident sampling system was also conducted during the perio The reviews of routine operations, planning and preparation for the 1985 refueling outage and outage radiation protection activities indicated management attention is directed at maintaining an effective radiation protection program. The organization and staffing of the licensee's radiation protection organization provided effective control of radiation protection activities. Staffing is adequate with no routine use of over-time to staff positions. Man-rem expended during the twelve month period from November 1984 through October 1985 was 668 man-rem. This is an im-provement compared with Maine Yankee's 883 man rem expended during calen-dar year 198 Training and qualification programs were adequate to support normal oper-ations and the outage. Weaknesses noted in the radiation worker training program for training individuals working or frequenting restricted areas were promptly correcte An adequately defined program for training and qualification of outage personnel was conducted prior to and early in the outage. Training and qualification programs for contractor radiologi-cal controls technicians contributed to good personnel performance and adherence to procedures during the outag Documentation of radiation protection activities was complete, well main-tained and available including routine and special radiological surveil-lance records. Dosimetry records were particularly well organized. A major effort was made in the reduction of radiation areas which resulted in opening over half of the 40,000 sq. ft. of formerly radiation con-trolled areas for general use. The requirements for protective clothing have similarly been reduced. Some weaknesses were noted in the airborne sampling program, personnel contamination control, and sorting of low-level waste. The licensee has initiated corrective action on these finding A special inspection of the licensee's post-accident sampling system (PASS) was conducted to assess the operability of the system, and to as-sure that all of the requirements identified in NUREG-0737 were met. One violation was identified. This violation indicated problems in obtaining representative samples for effluents and monitoring of the containment atmosphere. Additional areas for improvement identified by this inspec-tion were the analytical capability for on-site chloride and boron analy-sis, training of personnel in post-accident sampling and additional veri-fication of calculational methods. The licensee needs to assure that design requirements are incorporated in the final design and that train-ing in modifications is accomplished for all necessary personne . .

The licensee also had several events involving personnel in areas for which they were not authorized due to a lack of radiation work permits (RWP) and with personnel not having the proper protection required by an RWP. The cause of these events was attributed to personnel erro These events were reviewed by management and strong corrective actions were taken. The effect of these incidents could have been significant, however no overexposures occurred. The potential exists for events of this nature to have serious consequences. Contributing factors for these events appear to be 1) Health Physics Technician coverage of numerous simultaneous jobs during the outage and 2) training of personnel in strict compliance with RWP requirement Even though the licensee has taken action in these areas, additional attention is warranted to prevent recurrenc One inspection of the transportation program area was conducted by a Radiation Specialist during this assessment period. Review of the or-ganization structure showed all positions were adequately identified with appropriate authorities and responsibilitie Staffing was adequate as indicated by limited backlog and overtime. Training and retraining pro-grams were defined and implemented for the licensee's transportation staf One inspection of the Independent Measurements Program area was conducted by a Radiation Specialist. This inspection reviewed routine quality control of analytical measurements and performance of radiological an-alyses of split effluent samples. Good agreement of sample analyses in-dicated the ability of the licensee to achieve and maintain adequate methods of analyses. Reviews of staffing and organization structure showed all positions were identified, authorities and responsibilities well defined, and adequate staff was available. Reviews of procedures in this program showed procedures were complete, well maintained and availabl The licensee nas addressed weaknesses noted in the last SALP evaluation through restructuring of the Radiation Protection Organization and in-creased management attentio The restructuring of the Radiation Pre-tection Organization eliminated one level of management resulting in closer communication between Health Physics Technicians and managemen An Assistant to the Technical Support Department Head position was created to allow in-depth review of problems and better coordination of activitie Increased management attention has been evidenced by prompt and thorough corrective actio The licensee has implemented an effective Radiation Protection Progra The program is well defined and the training and qualifications of the staff is adequat Recent cleaning efforts have reduced the size of the radiation controlled areas. Notwithstanding the overall adequate per-formance, some problems still exist in personnel compliance with RWP requirements as noted above, and efforts to eliminate such occurrences should continue. In addition, the PASS inspection identified deficien-

- - _ - - .. - - _- . .

. .

15 cies in obtaining representative samples for effluents, monitoring of containment atmosphere, and several weaknesses in the analytical process and calculational method Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Consisten Board Recommendation:

Licensee Conduct a critical self-evaluation of the Radiological Controls area to identify areas for improvement.

i NRC

, Conduct an inspection of Yankee Corporate Quality Assurance to evaluate effectiveness of the radiological controls audit program.

.

r t

, ,- , , . - , . - - . , . , , - - - - - , . . , , - - - - . - -

. .

16 Maintenance (9%, 412 hours0.00477 days <br />0.114 hours <br />6.812169e-4 weeks <br />1.56766e-4 months <br />)

During this assessment period four routine regional inspections and fre-quent Resident inspector reviews were conducted in the Maintenance are The licensee has a comprehensive preventive maintenance program for both safety related and non-safety related equipment. Maintenance is involved in a quarterly review of Discrepancy Reports (DRs) and Repair Orders (R0s) for repetitive equipment failures. The preventive maintenance program was modified as a result of these reviews. Additionally, the licensee's program for maintenance of Limitorque valves has provided for an increase in the reliability of these valve There is frequent man-agement involvement in routine maintenance activitie Quality Control of maintenance activities is apparen The Quality Assurance Department reviews Repair Orders for proper system classification prior to wor Hold points are effectively utilized. Coordination of maintenance acti-vities and plant conditions is conducted during the morning managers raeetin The training program for the maintenance staff is effective. The fre-quency of training sessions, the subjects taught, the use of site speci-fic simulator demonstrations and the selection of instructors who are experienced ' chnicians contribute favorably to the program. The main-tenance department is a small organization that uses contractors to sup-plement the work force during outage Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) control appears to be a weaknes A number of problems were identified in this area including; evaluations of test equipment which is less than foar times the accuracy of the equipment being calibrated, logging of test equipment use and evaluations of the validity of calibrations that used M&TE which were later dis-covered out of 1 9 eranc Followup inspection in this area after lic-ensee corrective action found similar problem Ccntinued licensee at-tention in this area is warrante Four plant trips were attributed to maintenance; two because of personnel errors during the performance of maintenance on the feedwater control circuits and two others as a result of incorrect torque values for excess flow check valve rupture discs. As discussed in the Operations Section of this report, more work is needed to resolve feedwater problems that impact plant operations. Additionally, the failure to specify the cor-rect torque values for the excess flow rupture disc combined with the delay for implementing a program for vendor technical manual control indicates a need for further licensee attentio The maintenance program incorporates strong preventive maintenance with frequent management attention to G7rrective maintenance. The morning managers meeting has helped prioritize maintenance activities and reduce the backlog of maintenance actions noted in the last SALP evaluatio Quality control activities are an integral part of repair activitie .. .- . - -_. ..

. .

l l

f 17

The licensee's coordinated program of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) main-tenance and testing is exemplary. Through this program, the licensee has been able to trend performance of each RTB and identify degradation in performance long before the breaker exceeds the acceptance criteri . Additionally, the program has been able to identify problems with RTB's through receipt inspections and provide feedback to the breaker manufac-

,

ture Deficiencies noted during this evaluation period include control over i measuring and test equipment, and the contribution of maintenance errors

!

to plant trip Conclusions:

Rating: Category Trend: Consisten Board Recommendations:

'

Licensee Conduct a critical self-evaluation of the maintenance area to identify areas for improvement. Resolve feedwater problems which have potential to challenge safety systems.

,

NRC i

None.

l l

.

e t

,

, . , _ _ __ ,- _ , ,__-.---.-.,v ~ - - - - - - - + - - - v -

w"'--" "---"-P-- * '

. .

D. Surveillance (11%, 522 hours0.00604 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.630952e-4 weeks <br />1.98621e-4 months <br />)

The resident inspector examined surveillance activities as part of the routine inspection progra Inspections were conducted of containment leak rate testing, post refueling startup testing, and the inservice inspection program. Surveillance was also reviewed during the Perfor-mance Appraisal Team (PAT) inspectio The licensee has adequately addressed and resolved issues previously identified in the previous SALP Report in the Inservice Inspection (ISI)

progra Personnel assigned to perform ISI during the refueling outage were knowledgeable of the procedures and NDE methods and staffing levels were adequat The Inservice Test program incorporates the use of vi-bration tests, ultrasonic tests, and system flow tests for equipment reliability monitoring. These data are used to trend equipment perform-ance has also been used to diagnose equipment problems prior to failure The Maine Yankee Plant Management has demonstrated their commitment to identifying and correcting equipment deficiencies before they become a problem or a challenge to safety systems. Two examples of this commit-ment are steam generator eddy current testing and RTD response time testing. Eddy current inspections were conducted on #2 steam generator during the refueling outage as required by Technical Specification Because of defects found in the vertical strap region, the licensee ex-

~

panded their inspection to include all three steam generators. The addi-tional eddy current testing expended considerable licensee resources and resulted in testing more than four times the number of steam generator tubes required by Technical Specifications. The outcome was a better understanding of the observed indications. The expanded testing under-taken voluntarily by the licensee demonstrated a high concern for steam generator integrit The licensee has also implemented a surveillance program for RTD response time testing which is beyond Technical Specification requirements. Based on test results, improvements were made during the outage by cleaning RTD wells. Additionally, the lessons learned from the retest of modified systems (corrective action for violation noted in the Refueling Section)

were integrated into routine surveillance testin The inspectors have noted the involvement of QA/QC personnel in surveil-lance activities throughout the assessment period. During periods of increased work activity the licensee has supplemented the QA/QC staff with contract personnel. However, a weakness was identified in the limited scope of the 1983 and 1984 audits of Technical Specification surveillances. The licensee was aware of this weakness and significant improvements in the scope and performance of the 1985 audit conducted in August were note .. .-. - __ __ _

.

- . . - . . -- _ .

. .

Other weaknesses noted in this area included the failure to incorporate acceptance criteria into procedures consistent with established require-ments and inconsistent recording of as found test data. Surveillance procedures are currently being reviewed and revised to correct these weaknesse Generally, the surveillance program is well implemented in that personnel are knowledgeable, surveillances are performed in the required periodicity and procedures are strictly followed. This area is improving due to the expanded audits and procedure review t Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Improvin Board Recommendation:

Licensee Non NRC None.

,

l ts

- . _ . . _ . - _ _ . . . , _ . . _ _ . _ , _ _ , _ - , ._. -.--. . .

E. Fire Protection and Housekeeping (8%, 364 hours0.00421 days <br />0.101 hours <br />6.018518e-4 weeks <br />1.38502e-4 months <br />)

Inspection activity in this area is based on routine Resident Inspector observations and the Appendix R Inspection which was conducted during this cycl The Fire Protection Program at Maine Yankee is well defined and imple-mented by station procedures. Increased awareness of personnel to fire protection standards was noted throughout the SALP period. Corrective action for identified problems was timely. The Appendix R Inspection Report noted one violation involving an inadequate fire protection bar-rier between two trains of shutdown equipment. The licensee implemented prompt corrective actio Problems with fire barrier and personnel knowledge and responsiveness to Technical Specification requirements noted in the last SALP evaluation have been correcte Fire Brigade Training includes hands on training under actual fire con-ditions offsite in addition to simulated drills onsite. Training of contractor personnel in preparation for fire watch duties during the refueling outage was comprehensiv Routine Inspections noted good performance in this are A Fire Protection Coordinator is located onsite and participates in man-agement meetings to incorporate fire prevention into plant schedule Plant and corporate managers provide frequent walkdowns of the plant and incorporate housekeeping as well as fire prevention observations. The Fire Protection Coordinator is assigned corrective action responsibility for their observations. This increased management attention has enhanced the Fire Protection Progra Plant housekerping has steadily improved during this SALP cycle. Contri-buting to this effort has been the reduction of radiological controlled area After thorough cleaning, contamination levels were reduced to allow unrestricted access to a number of areas. The licensee expects to continue to reduce radiologically controlled areas through cleanin Different areas of the plant are assigned to various departments as cleaning areas; this personal assignment has increased the vigilance of those responsible for their area to maintain the high standards expecte A storage review was conducted by the licensee which identified numerous areas needing improvements. As a result, many locations are no longer cluttered with seldom used equipmen The licensee continues to implement an effective Fire Protection Progra Personnel are knowledgeable of Fire Protection requirements; routine tours of the plant are conducted by upper level management. Training for Fire Brigade members is effective as was training for contractor personnel. The licensee continues to make improvements in plant house-keepin . .

Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Consistent Board Recommendation:

Licensee Non NRC Non l

. .

,

F. Emergency Preparedness (9%, 399 hours0.00462 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.597222e-4 weeks <br />1.518195e-4 months <br />)

During this assessment period, one routine unannounced inspection was conducted and two full scale exercises were observed. An inspection on February 4-8, 1985, of critical areas in emergency preparedness indicated a high level of upper-level management involvement in controlling and assuring quality. This was supported by (1) the licensee's audits which -

were found to be complete, timely and thorough (2) a complete and well maintained recordkeeping system and (3) emergency procedures which are well stated, controlled, and explici Changes to the Emergency Plan (EP) and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) receive timely, thorough, and technically sound reviews. The Plant Operations Review Committee also maintains direct involvement in program changes and ap-proves revisions to the EP and EPIP The licensee's responses to previously identified items resolved two outstanding notices of violatio All open items were adequately ad-dressed with the exception of two aspects of the meteorological program which are still under review. Audits also indicated that the licensee's corrective actions were effective and timel The licensee conducted a full scale emergency exercise on September 19, 1984, and another full scale exercise on June 22, 1985. The licensee's execution and participation in both of the exercises demonstrated thorough planning and a strong commitment to emergency preparedaess. Examples of thoroughly planned activities observed by NRC team members included timely staff briefings in each emergency response facility and demon-stration by emergency personnel of familiarity with emergency duties and use of EPIPs. Each NRC team determined that within the scope and limi-tations of both scenarios, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of tne publi In addition, violations and discrepancies observed in 1984 did not recur during the 1985 exercis A training and qualification program exists for the major portion of emergency response staff. The training program was not entirely imple-mented since practical training provided to personnel identified as Emergency Coordinators had not begun. In general, training of emergency personnel was demonstrated during the two emergency exercises and was shown to be effectiv The licensee provides for continuity of the emergency preparedness func-tion through the assignment of one full time emergency response coor-dinator located in Augusta. Additional corporate personnel are effec-tively used to support ongoing emergency preparedness activitie The licensee continues to implement a sound Emergency Preparedness Pro-gra No significant deficiencies were identified during the previous SALP. Management involvement continues to be evident and corrective action war effectiv . .

Conclusion Rating: Category Trend: Consisten Board Recomendations Licensee Non NRC Reduce drill observation inspection and increase routine inspectio . - _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ ___ .__ ___ ._ . __ ___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

!

t e Security and Safeguards (3%, 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />)

This evaluation is based on two routine, unannounced inspections cen-ducted by a region-based inspector and routine resident inspections con-ducted throughout the perio *

i Corporate management involvement in the security program remained evident, as indicated by the continued assignment of a corporate security manager to the site, by efforts to improve the efficiency of the security force,

'

and by requiring outage contractors to submit their access control plan outlining access eligibility criteria. Supervision, staffing and train-ing of the security force for the conduct of routine activities was adequat i Review of security program audits revealed that program records were coniplete, well maintained, and readily available, but identified facets of the program that were not covered by the audits. The overlocked areas included protection of se.feguards information and reporting of security

'

events. The licensee responded to this deficiency by modifying an up-

'

coming audit checklist to includo one of the deficient areas and sched-

.

uling the remaining area for a subsequent audi The licensee was very responsive to an NRC identified item concerning security guard requalification examinations. The corrective action was  !

prompt and thorough and indicative of management's commitment to a qual- .

ity program. Additionally, corrective action for another minor violation '

was similarly effectiv The licensee's performance in the security area has been consistent dur-

.

'

ing this cycle as evidenced by corrective actionr. which were prompt and thorough. The licensee's security plan was well implemented by the con-tract guard force and management oversite was effective.

,

conclusio Rating: Category >

Trend: Consisten Board Recommendation:

Licensee Non NRC Non !

- . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ - , - .__ , _ . _ .

_ _ _ __ - - . -- - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_

.

. .

l

25 Refueling and Outage Management (10%, 487 hours0.00564 days <br />0.135 hours <br />8.052249e-4 weeks <br />1.853035e-4 months <br />)

The Cycle 8/9 refueling outage (August 17 - October 24, 1985) was con-ducted during this SALP period. Five NRC inspections were conducted by region-based inspectors in addition to the Resident Inspector's routine inspection and the followup inspection of Special Functional Testing re-sulting from the loss of low Steam Generator Pressure protection during Cycle 8 operations. Areas reviewed included Integrated Leak Rate Testing, Welding, In-service Inspection, Radiological Controls during outage,

' Special Functional Testing, Modification and Surveillance, and routine outage activitie The Performance Appraisal Team reviewed the Design

Change area which is included in this sectio '

Outage coordination is assigned to the Maintenance Department Head with high level attention of both senior corporate and site management placed on scheduling, planning and control of activities. The total number of '

.

onsite contractors is limited to ensure proper coordination of activi- -

ties and the shifts are staggered to reduce the impact of shift turnover Daily planning meetings are used to coordinate activities, establish priorities and track critical path work. The Plant Manager, Assistant Plant Manager and the Outage Manager are all heavily involved in all i

phases of plant outages. The overall effect is a responsive outage organizatio The licensee also reassigned three licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) to outage control business. Two were used to coordinate various jobs, thereby relieving the onshift crew of the responsibility of coor-dinating the contractor's activities. The third SR0 was used to coordi-nate the tagging of systems on day shift. This allowed the onshift crew to concentrate on performing plant evolutions. Additional licensed and non-licensed personnel were used to coordinate and track job progress, thereby separating the conduct of the outage from plant evolution Human Factors modifications to the main control board and seismic anchor-ing of the control room ceiling were identified as work that had the potential for disrupting the operators' ability to monitor plant condi-tions during the outage. These jobs were carefully analyzed and addi-tional controls were placed on these jobs, such as limiting the work-force, controlling access to the control room, repositioning critical indications, scheduling some work during backshifts and removing noisy equipment from the control room. These measures served to limit the impact of these major modifications on the control room watchstander Other major jobs accomplished during the outage were plant refueling, replacement of the main condenser, replacement of the main generator stator and replacement of Number 2 Reactor Coolant Pum Some unantici-pated jobs included repairs to circulating water pumps and repairs to primary cooling water piping. The licensee also initiated an RTD response time testing program during the outage which was beyond the Technical Specification Requirement _ _ _ _ _ _

_

.

During this assessment period, a Level II Violation and Civil Penalty was issued for the failure to have Steam Generator Low Pressure Protec-tion for most of Cycle 8. The causes of this event were the lack of specific requirements in plant procedures to reposition root valves after testing, inadequate design review and inadequate retesting after a system modification. Procedural inadequacies were identified in test procedures involving a number of departments during testing. Design reviews and post modification testing were conducted as a result of this violation. The corrective action for this violation was extensive and directly impacted the schedule of the outage. It is an indication of the resolve of the licensee to prevent future problems in this area. The NRC was involved in evaluating the adequacy of the licensee's corrective action. Incor-poration of the lessons learned from the Special Functional Testing Pro-gram and Design Reviews will help prevent future problem In the Design Change area, the NRC found strengths in the establishment of a consolidated design change program between the site and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, and the program for closeout of Engineering Design Change Requests (EDCR). Weaknesses noted included the poor con-trol of design information in the conceptual design stage and isolated problems with a hanger installation and some problems in drawing contro Recent changes in this area appear to have corrected these problem Refueling outages continue to be well planned and coordinated. Critical jobs are assigned dedicated project coordinators. Additional management personnel are reassigned to track outage work. This allows the plant operators to concentrate on refueling evolutions. The events which led to the Level II violation originated during the last SALP period. Minor problems noted in the last SALP Report included violations in the control of modifications that had no relation 'o this violation. The plant Operation Review Committee (PORC), through review of modification pack-ages for the outage, determined that requirements for retesting modified systems needed to be upgraded. As a result, the plant was revising im-plementing instructions incorporating these new criteria when the Level II Violation was identified. The corrective action implemented as a re-sult of this Level II violation will further enhance those retest re-quirements already dictated by POR Conclusion:

Rating: Category Trend: Improvin Board Recommendation:

Licensee Non NRC Non . .

I. Licensing Activities The assessment of licensee performance was based on the licensing actions listed in Table 7 of this repor The licensee's management demonstrated active participation in licensing activities and kept abreast of current and anticipated licensing action In general, submittals reflected good quality and proper management con-tro Two examples of quality submittals were the Thermal Shield In-spection and Repair, and the Effluent Reduction Submittal of 10 CFR 50 Appendix I. During the review of Item II.B.3.2. of NUREG-0737, " Post Accident Sampling Modification", there was consistant evidence of prior planning and assignment of priorities. During this SALP period, much licensing time was consumed by the Auxiliary Feedwater Limiting Condition for Operation issue. This issue has been ongoing for several years and should have been resolved last yea The licensee's staff has demonstrated technical understanding of issues involving licensing action For the majority of licensing actions, the submittals were technically sound, thorough, and well reference The licensee's responsiveness appears to vary widely on different tech-nical issues. For example, the submittal concerning the Technical Speci-fication change on snubbers was significantly delayed by the licensee; the resubmittal concerning Technical Specifications for Limiting Overti.:.a is approximately 4 months overdue because of staffing limitations; and, the " Steam Tube Surveillance" submittals, were not complete in the origi-nal form and as a consequence, time was lost unnecessarily. Other actions such as Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equip-ment, Detailed Control Room Design Review and Main Steam Line Break Report were timel Training and qualification of the Licensing Staff are considered a strength. Personnel from licensing are rotated into positions at the plant during refueling to supplement the plant staff and provide valuable expertise for the staf The licensee's management has demonstrated active participation in lic-ensing activities. Although problems with the timeliness of submittals continue to be noted from the previous SALP report through this evalu-ation, the licensee's submittals, in general, are technically sound and of good qualit Conclusions:

Rating: Category Trend: Consisten t a .

Soard Recomendation:

Licensee Non NRC Non ,

f

. ,, .

.,.,,4

- _ .

. .

V. S_pporting Data and Summaries Investigations, Petitions and Summaries During this assessment period 3 allegations were received. One concern-ing welding practicos and two concerning radiological controls for res-pirator us All three allegations were found to be unsubstantiated by the Senior Resident Inspecto Escalated Enforcement Actions Civil Penalties Proposed $80,000 civil penalty for the failure to have Steam Genera-tor Low Pre 3sure protection during Cycle 8 operation was issued October 29, 198 . Actions Per. ding / Resolved None Or.iers None Management Conferences On September 14, 1984 at Maine Yankee, a management meeting was held to present the rt:sults of the Systematic Assessment of L1 ensee Performance

. (SALP) for the assessment period 7/1/83 through 6/30/8 On September 9, 1985, an enforcement conference was held at the NRC Re-gion I Office in King of Prussia to discuss the failure to have Steam Generator Low Pressure protectio _. -

- _- _ . - -.-. - .- - . _

- . . .. ..

. .

T-1-1 i

!

TABLE 1

,

INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

INSPECTION INSPECTION REPORT N HOURS AREAS INSPECTED

,

84-11 336 Appendix R 84-16 75 Routine, Resident 84-17 160 Post-accident sampling system, post accident effluent monitoring, radiation monitoring and in plant radio-iodine measurements 84-18 68 Quality Assurance Program-84-19 67 Design change and modification program and maintenance

84-20 30 Security 84-21 164 Emergency Preparedness 84-22 171 Routine, Resident 84-23 151 Routine, Resident i

84-24 26 Nonradiological chemical program

84-25 46 Degraded Grid Voltage procedures

84-26 35 Radiation Protection

84-27 120 Routine, Resident 85-01 135 Routine, Resident

$ 85-02 38 In-Service Inspection Program and Welding i 85-03 66 Emergency Preparedness l

85-04 30 Transportation activities 85-05 33 Materials procurement, receipt, storage and handling 85-06 137 Routine, Resident 85-07 60 Cycle 8 post refueling startup testing a

!

-- , - _ - .- ~. ,-. . . , . .

, .

T-1-2 INSPECTION INSPECTION REPORT N HOURS AREAS INSPECTED 85-08 ---

Operator Licensing Examinations 85-09 147 Routine, Resident 85-10 68 Document control and corrective action program 85-11 34 Security 85-12 142 Emergency Preparedness 85-13 ---

Operator Licensing Examinations 85-14 149 Routine Resident 85-15 871 Performance Appraisal 85-16 115 Routine, Resident 85-17 33 Alara, pre-outage 85-18 127 Integrated Leak Rate Testing 85-19 82 Circumstances surrounding mispositioned root valves for steam generator pressure transmitters 85-20 290 Refueling, Resident 85-21 66 Radiological chemical measurements program 85-22 30 Welding and eddy current testing

, 85-23 31 Inservice Inspection Program 85-24 28 Security l 85-25 ---

NRC and licensee management meeting report 85-26 38 Outage health physics 85-27 15 Circumstances surrounding inoperable Channel A low i SG pressure trip for RPS 85-28 160 Corrective actions taken for RPS channel A low SG pressure trip deficiency 85-29 102 Fuel load verification, startup testing, surveillance, and calibration of maintenance and test equipment 85-30 187 Routine, Resident

I

.

T-2-1 l TABLE 2 INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION HOURS % OF TIME Plant Operations ..................... 1927 41 Radiological Controls ..................... 432 9 Maintenance ..................... 412 9 Surveillance ..................... 522 11 Fire Protection ..................... 364 8 Emergency Preparedness ..................... 399 9 Security and Safeguards ..................... 120 3 Refueling ..................... 487 10 Licensing Activities ..................... NA NA

• Total 4663 100%

• Allocations of inspection hours vs. Functional Areas are approximations based upon inspection report dat .. . _ -._ . .

- .

T-3-1 TABLE 3 VIOLATIONS (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)

MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION l Number and severity Level of Violations

,

Severity Level Severity Level I

'

Severity Level II 1 Severity Level III Severity Level IV 6

.

Severity Level V 2 TOTAL 9 Violations vs. Functional Area Severity Levels FUNCTIONAL AREAS I II III IV . Plant Operations Radiological Controls 4 Maintenance 1 Surveillance Fire Protection 1 Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards 1 Refueling 1 Licensing Activities Totals 1 6 2*

• 0ne Level V violation was issued for deficiences in the area of Quality Assuranc . .-. - . . _

-- _

- . . - . . . , - , . . ,

__ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .- . . _ _ . _ ,

,. .

I T-3-2 Inspection Inspection Number Dates Subject Requirements Severity 84-11 10/22-26/84 Redundant trains of safe shut- 10 CFR 50 IV down equipment located in App. R

reactor MCC rooms did not have required fire protection provided.

'

84-17 10/9-12/84 Installation for effluent NUREG-0737 IV monitoring of particles and II.F.1-2 radiciodine was insufficient to provide representative samples. High range radiation monitors in containment were not environmentally qualifie /13-17/84 Failure to audit results of V actions taken to correct

.

deficiencie /27-31/84 Failure to adhere to the Train- Physical IV ing and Qualification Pla Security Plan 84-22 10/4-11/12/84 Failure to monitor containment IV atmosphere for leakage by a sys-tem sensitive to radioactivit /10-14/84 Transport of licensed material 10 CFR IV without copies of drawings and 71.12 documents referenced in the (c)(1)

certificate of complianc /12-15/85 Failure to conduct a complete 10 CFR IV

.

quality control program on two 20.311

!

radioactive waste shipment (d)(3)

85-05 2/11-15/85 Failure to limit access in App. B-XIII V warehouse and perform preventive maintenance on items stored in warehouse.

. 85-19 8/8-16/85 Three of four channels for the II and RPS low SG pressure trip and

,

85-27 9/3-4/85 feedwater trip system were in-operable because root valves in the sensing lines were close The fourth channel of the RPS low SG pressure trip was in-eperable due to a design erro . .

.- . - . -- --- -. - - -.. . _ _ _

- .- .

. .

T-4-1 TABLE 4 TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA MAINE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 Area Number /Cause Code Total Plant Operations 3/A 1/B 4/D 1/E 2/X 11 Radiological Controls 0 Maintenance 5/A 1/B 1/D 7 Surveillance 1/A 3/E 4 Fire Protection 1/A 2/B 3 Emergency Preparedness 0 Security and Safeguards 0 Refueling 2/B 1/0 3 Licensing Activities 0 Total 28 Cause Codes Personnel Error............. 10 Design / Man./Const./ Install... 6 External Cause............... 0 Defective Procedures......... 6 Component Failure............ 4 Other........................ 2

,- .

T-5-1 TABLE 5 LER SYN 0PSIS (7/1/84 - 10/31/85)

LER NO. SUPNARY DESCRIPTION 84-08 Loss of Load reactor trip during plant startu Startup Rate trip during startup, and manual trip because post trip review had not been completed prior to startu Four high energy line break isolation valves would not clos Cracked shunt trip paddles in reactor trip breaker Loss of radiation sensitive reactor coolant leak detection method required by T Unsealed cable penetration in control roo Fire protection deficiencie Reactor trip due to turbine stop valve failur _16 Two plant trips caused by Feedwater system malfunction Reactor trip on variable overpower resulting from overfeeding S/ Partially open containment integrity valv Out of service ECCS valve handwheel was not locked open as required by Manual reactor trip on high condenser differential pressur Unit trip due to personnel error when replacing suction pressure indi-cator on the turbine-driven. main feed pum Startup rate trip during reactor shutdown due to electronic nois Lack of administrative controls on vent and drain valves on primary com-ponent cooling piping required for containment integrit Common mode failure of air supply piping for primary component cooling water temperature control valves to each diesel engin Plant trip while repairing a feedwater flow recorder due to personnel erro Valve stem failures on hydrogen analyzer isolation valve _-._-.-

,, ,.

l T-5-2 LER NO. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION  ;

85-09 Steam generator pressure sensing line root valves not fully ope RPS channel design erro ECCS. train inadvertent activation during shutdow *

85-12 Fire system sprinklers isolated without required fire watc Enviornmental Qualification of Rosemont transmitter ,

85-14 Type A test failure due to integration of Type C tes SIAS "A" train actuation during shutdow Plant trip on low steam generator level 85-17 Automatic and manual plant trip caused by spurious Excess flow Check Valve closure _

e . .

T-6-1 TABLE 6 REACTOR SHUTDOWNS Date Power Level Cause 10/6/84 100% Orderly shutdown to repair packing leak on CH-48 (charging header isolation).

11/3/84 83% Reactor Trip - #1 turbine stop valve caused secondary side pressure spike, and low S/G 1evel trip. Cause was component failur /4/84 15% Reactor Trip - feed flow was excessive resulting in a variable overpower trip. Cause was operator erro /6/84 80% Orderly shutdown to repair #1 turbine stop valv This repair was the result of the trip on 11/3/8 /10/84 99% Reactor Trip - turbine driven main feedwater pump valve failed to open causing low S/G level tri Cause was component failur /11/84 100% Reactor Trip - turbine driven main feedwater pump recirculation valve failed open resulting in Reactor Tri Cause was component failur /10/85 80% Manual Trip - operators tripped the plant because of an administrative limit on condenser differential pressur Cause was personnel error while altering circulating water valve lineu /30/85 95% Reactor Trip - loss of load trip due to personnel error during maintenanc /4/85 100% Orderly shutdown to replace main generator exciter *

diode /1/85 95% Reactor Trip - turbine trip due to maintenance per-sonnel erro /16/85 73% Refueling Outag /23/85 4% Reactor Trip - low S/G level trip. Because of fail-ures in the feedwater regulating circuit, operators were controlling S/G level in manual for extended period Cause was component failur /24/85 20% Orderly shutdown - removal of #2 reactor coolant pump anti-rotation devic .-- - .-. - _ . - .- _ . _ - . _ -

,

,

T-6-2 Date Power Level Cause 10/25/85 25% Reactor Trip - variable overpower trip caused by

1. 1 S/G excess flow check valve inadvertent closin Cause was improper maintenanc /26/85 30% Manual Trip - #3 S/G excess flow check valve shu Operators tripped plant. Cause was improper main-tenanc <

.

~ ,

T-7-1 TABLE 7 SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES 1. NRR SITE VISITS October 30-31, 1984 Management Meeting November 9, 1984 SALP Meeting With Licensee January 16-17, 1985 RETS Meeting March 13-14, 1985 Final RETS Meeting June 7-8, 1985 Plant Familiarization September 18-19, 1985 Concrete Block Wall Inspection 2. SCHEDULED EXTENSIONS GRANTED None 3. RELIEFS GRANTED None 4. EXCEPTIONS GRANTED Exception granted for compliance to a certain requirement of subsection III. of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 concerning separation in the Reactor Containment Incore Instrumentation Area & Lower Pressurizer Cubicl . LICENSE AMENDMENTS ISSUED License Amendment No. 79 Technical Specifications (TS) Modification con-cerning Manning of Shift and License Event Reporting License Amendment No. 80 TS Modification to Ensure Containment Integrity License Amendment No. 81 TS Modification Concerning Operational Safety Instrumentation, Control Systems, and Accident Monitoring Systems License Amendment No. 82 TS Modification Concerning Reactor Containment Integrity License Amendment No. 83 TS Changes concerning Modifications to add a Variable Setpoint to the Low Temperature Over-pressure Protection System

___-. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ -

- ,

T-7-2 License Amendment No. 84 TS Changes to require more extensive inspection of Steam Generator Tubes in Critical Areas License Amendment No. 85 TS Changes to Reflect Power Distributions, In-sertion Limits, Peaking Factors, and other characteristics for Cycle 9 Fuel Reloa . EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISSUED l

None ORDERS ISSUED None Licensing Actions Completed Seismic & Other Qualifications on 8" Ven/ Purge Valve 52173 Emergency Exercise Exemption Request 54431 Appendix I Tech. Spec. Implement Review 07752 Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electric Equipment 42490 Seismic Qualification of AFW System 48582 Fire Protection 48582 I

Appendix J Tech. Spec. Change 48632 Detailed Control Room Design Review Program 51173 2nd ISI Interval 52011 Control of Heavy Loads 52241 Post Trip Review Program Description and Procedures 522770 !

Preventive Maintenance Program Reactor Trip Breakers 52130 Fire Protection-Extra Exemption Requests 53408 Revised Definition of Containment Integrity 53449 Tech. Specs. Covered By Generic Letter 83-36 and 83-37 (0737) 54543 Thermal Shield Inspection and Repair 54958

- _ _ _ _ _ _

c

, . . o T-7-3 LTOP 54959 Neutron Source Data for Flux Reduction Verification 55044 Cask In Spent Fuel Pool 55092 Proposed Change 105 55296 Power Supplies For Safe Shutdown 56099 CEA Ejection Analysis 56775 Revised Confirmatory Order 56818

~Backfit Determination for AFWS Turbine Driven Pump 58016 Backfit Determination - Testing Frequency of Auto Initiation Logic 58017 Emergency Feedwater Pump Cycle 9 Core Performance Tech Spec