IR 05000293/1988003

Insp Rept 50-293/88-03 on 880125-29.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Followup & Corrective Actions Re Previously Identified Open Items in Area of Matls/ Component Integrity & Plant Mods & Test Procedures

ML20148B603
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/02/1988
From:	Marilyn Evans, Gray E, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148B569	List: IR 05000293/1988003 ML20148B563
References
50-293-88-03, 50-293-88-3, NUDOCS 8803220041
Download: ML20148B603 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /88-03 Docket N License N DPR-35 Lic.ensee: Boston Edison Company

_800 Boylston Street Bor, ton, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts Ir.spection Cor. ducted: January 25-29, 1988 Inspectors: W- 3 !PN M. Evans, Operations En91neer date

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/, ~ _3 ~ 2/8O II.H. Gray, Senior 3dTtorEngineer date ApproY6d by: _/ f ,d/* 88

,J _ Strosnider, Chief, Materials and date Processes Section Ing ection Summary: Inspection on January 25-29, 1988 (Report N _-293/88-03]

Areas Inspected: A routine announced inspection was conducted to review the licensee's followup and corrective actions related to several previously identified open items in the area of materials / component integrity and plant modificatiens and test procedure In addition, the Power Ascension Test Program and the licensee's plans for oversight and assessment of Power Ascen-sion Activities were reviewe R_e_s_ul t s : No violations were identified. The Power Ascension Test Program was determined to be in the developmental stages and not ready for inspection. An un-esolved iteo (88-0;-01) was icentified where the possibility of fatigue (; racking on 1" drain lines on the RHR lines had not been fully evaluate PDR ADOCK 0500 G

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. g l 1.0 Persons Contacted (Boston Edison Company)

M. Akhtar, Group Leader, Modifications Management

• J. Alexander, OPS' Manager '

W. Armstrong, Staff Asst. to Senior H. Balfour, Operations Training Group Leader R. Barrett, Plant Manager

• R; Bird, Senior V.P. - Nuclear

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'- *N.'Brosee, MSM T.; Burns, Materials Enginee'r (B.T.)

P. Cafferella, Nuclear Engineering Department W. Clancy, Technical Section - Systems Group

*N. Desmond,2 Quality Contrul (0QC)

• F. Famular, Quality Assurance (QAD)

• P. Hamilton, Compliance Group Leader

• K. Highfill, Station Director G. James, Senior Hechanical Engineer (N00)

• E. Kraft, Plant Support Manager

• Ledgett, Director, Special Projects R. Mattos, RHR Systems Engineer (NOD)

P. Moraites,. Acting Maintenance Supt.

4 *K. Nicholas, Technical Section

• L. Schmeling, Special Asst. to Senior A. Shiever, Senior Nuclear Training Specialist

• C. Stephenson, Senior Compliance Engineer

• L; Wittenberger, Rad. Ops. Support Group Leader

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S. Wollman, Asst. Chief Operating Engineer

• E. Ziemianski, Nuclear Training Manager Other NRC Personnel

• T. Kim, Resident Inspector

*J.- Lyash, Resident Inspector

• C, Warren, Senior Resident Inspector

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• Indicates attendance at 88-03 exit meeting on January 29, 1988.

2.0 Followup on Outstanding Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/86-01-01) Crack in the 1" test line by

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socket weld to the RHR line near the M.0. 1001-68B check valv A crack was identified by visual observation at the toe of a socket weld in the 1" test line noted above during a brief outage on January 4,198 The leakage from this crack was quantified to be 0.07 gallon per minuta

, and was noted as a step change in unidentified drywell leakage that i

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occurred during December 1985. The inspector reviewed the following documentation of the crack type (fatigue) and corrective actions take F&MR 86-005, documents failure ESR 86-02, root cause evaluation NED Memo 86-025, failure cause and corrective action MR 86-12, repair work including shortening of lines PDC 86-91, to add support to line The corrective actions were applied to one vertical test line at each of the RHR A and B lines by the respective No. 68 check valves. The NRC inspector examined the shortened and supported lines noting conformance to MR 86-12 and PDC 86-91. This item (86-01-01) is closed; however, a new item (88-03-01) concerning the analysis of susceptibility to fatigue cracking of the 1" drain lines from valves 33 and 68 on RHR lines A&B and associated Nondestructive Examination (NDE) is opened. These drain lines have a similar configuration to the leaking test line. Furthermore, they are in a non-isolable portion of the RHR syste (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (293/86-25-02). Licensee actions on Part 21 report of containment atmospheric valve bearing to shaft corrosio A March 1986 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) 10 CFR Part 21 report described the finding of corrosion of the stainless steel valve shaft in a containment atmospheric valve due to galvanic coupling to the graphite bearing, bronze key and carbon steel valve body. This corrosion resulted in the v"c --' e+ -04a; when the air was re.?oved from the operato The Pilgrim plant has eight 8" atmospheric vent and purge valves, of the same type addressed in the PECo Pcrt 21 report, two each on the inlet and outlet to the drywell and suppression pool. The plant initiated engineer-ing review and inspection of these valves by Engineering Service Request (ESR)87-590. The valves are shown on Drawing M119A3, Revision E1. The NRC inspector reviewed this drawing, ESR 87-590, and the results of the engineering review and plant inspection of valve 5044A. Valve 5044A was determined to be subject to the maximum moisture and temperature condi-tions, such that it is most susceptible to corrosion of the eight valve This valve was disassembled for examination of the shaft and bearings which were four.d free of corrosion and pittin Valves 5042A and B were visually inspected and cycled to check for corrosion and bindin This engineering review concluded that the Pilgrim plant containment atmos-pheric valves are not experiencing corrosion similar to that reported by PEC Surveillance testing of these valves is provided on a quarterly basis during plant operation noted in the Plant Master Surveillance Tracking Program. Testing is provided by Procedure 8.7.4.3 which includes cycling the valves and recording the stroke time for comparison to past values and

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maximum stroke time Test reports for valve cy; ling on January 27, 1987 and January 26, 1988 were reviewed by the inspector. Valves 5035A and 5035B were cycled and observed on January 27, 1988 by the inspector to change position without binding when actuated. Valve 50428 was not tested on January 26, 1988 as it was in the closed position during PDC-86-051 for electrical work. This valve had been previously tested during the Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) of October 1987 and found to be working properly at that tim The inspector concluded that the Part 21 concern of possible binding of containment atmospheric valves by corrosion products had been reviewed with applicable testing and examinations to establish the problem to not currently exist in the Pilgrfm plant valve The surveillance program provides for quarterly actuation of these valves to provide for trending of the stroke tima (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (293/86-29-02). Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system instrument line crackin During August 1986, five cracked welds were identified in RHR Loop A instrument line socket weldt of 1/2" and 3/4" diameter carbon steel pipin Metallurgical examination of three cracked welds and one uncracked weld determined the cracking to be fatigue initiated at the toe of the socket weld on the pipe. The metallurgical report (#14085.34 pJ(B)-139) dated March 1987 was followed by the Root Cause Evaluation of Cracked Walds Report dated July 15, 1987. This report concluded the cause of the fatigue to be water hammer and flow induced vibration caused primarily by system venting problems. Seven short term and two long term corrective actions including operating procedure revision to identify specific vent actua-tion, operator training, vibration sensing and improvement of access to vent lines'were identifie Tracking of these items to completion is summarized in the BECO office memorandum "Corrective Actions in Response to Inspection Report 86-41, Item 3.B.4" dated August 7, 1987. The inspector reviewed the above documentation of the failure identificatio7, root cause analysis and corrective actions taken or in progress. Field observations were made of the repaired and nonaffected instrument piping on both the A and B RHR loops. Prouedural revision and training of plant operators in the procedural revisions were noted to be complete. The revised procedures include 2.2.86, 8.5.2.2, 8.5.2.1 and ARP-904R. The remaining corrective actions listed below were incomplete but are being tracked by the licensee. The vibration measurements are intended to be made during periods where the plant is entering modes such as shutdown cooling vhere vibration of the RHR instrumentation lines is most severe to identify if changes in instrument line geometry or supports is necessar ,

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RHRI.S Pressure Switch, ESR 87-531 RHRI.S Vibration Monitoring (Temporary)

RHRI.S Pressure Gauge Replacement (ESR 87-588)

RHRI.L Vent Location Review for Accessibility RHR1.L RHR Discharge Pressure Indicator in Control Room The_ inspector concluded that completion of the short term, "ST," action items as being tracked by the licensee will provide significant reduction of the potential for additional RHR instrumentation line fatigue failure The action items "LT" are scheduled for completion prior to the end of refuel outage number eight (RF0 #8).

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (293/86-29-05). Core spray valves M01400-4A and 4B, excess motor operator thrust. These gate valves are in the core spray Loop A and B test return lines. The cap screws holding the motor operator on the valve body were subject to loosening and the valve yoke was overstressed as tie motor torque exceeded the torque required to

, close the valve. The cause of the problem was a revision of the valve type from ci globe valve to a gate valve type on valves 4A and 4B while

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using the original motor operators.

l The inspector observed the new valve yokes and new reduced torque motor operators as installed on both valves. The documentation applicable a to these changes was reviewed. This documentation includes the Field Revision Notice (FRN) 87-34-04 providing for valve motor and spring pack replacement and Plant Design Change (PDC) 87-34 providing for replacement of the valve yokes. The Maintenance Requests MR 87-14-28 and MR 87-14-27 provide for valve yoke spring pack and motor replacements including post replacement MOVATS testing for valves M01400-4A and 4 The installation of valve yokes with increased load capacity, motor operators with torque capacity applicable to that required for valve operation and confirmatory MOVATS testing provide adequate corrective

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/87-37-01). Surface pitting corrosion of

RHR piping near weld G8-10-F12 NCR 87-310 describes the presence of pitting on the outside surface of the RHR inlet piping for the RHR "A" heat exchanger near weld GB-10-F12 The disposition of NCR 87-318 provides specific instructions for removal of pitting, measurement of remaining pipe wall thickness and overley of

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the pipe as restoration in areas where the minimum required wall thickness

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was found to be insufficien The work to restore the pipe surface to an acceptable condition was conducted per Maintenance Request MR87-10-180 including a second NCR 87-452 issued on September 2, 1987. A root cause analysis (NED 87-834) confirmed that the pitting was caused by a localized corrosive environment confined to the piping adjacent to the "A" RHR heat exchanger inlet nozzle. No evidence of corrosion existed on the RHR "B" loop or remaining portions of the RHR "A" piping. Laboratory analysis established the "corrosive agent" to be high purity water. The source of this water was a leak in the RHR heat exchanger flange that wetted insu-lation on the RHR piping. The NRC inspector observed the RHR A loop on January 29, 1988 noting the absence of leaks. The above documentation was reviewed and compared to ASME Code requirements. The final nondestructive testing of repaired areas included surface examination, ultrasonic testing to establish pipe wall thickness and radiography. No violations were identified. This item is close (0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (50-293/87-25-01). As a result of the large number of significant plant modifications and procedure changes, an inspection of training given to licensed operators on major modifications and procedure changes affecting plant operations will be performed prior to restar During NRC Inspection 50-293/87-51, the inspector reviewed the modifica-tion training presented to the licensed operators and identified specific concerns regarding the effectiveness of this trainin During the current inspection, the inspector began a review of the licensee's response to those concern The inspector discussed the licensee's corrective actions with licensee training representatives. A portion of the correct!ve action involved the conduct, prior to plant restart, of a one-day formal classroom review for each operating crew of the modification training previously presente The first operating crew received this review training during this inspectio The inspector attended approximately one hour of the training. Modifications for the Standby Gas Treatment System and Backup N Supply were reviewe No additional concerns were identified by the inspecto This item will remain open pending completion of the one-day review training for all operators and further review of the licensee's corrective actio (0 pen) Violation (50-293/87-33-01). Licensee f ailure to adequately review Plant Design Change (PDC) 86-70 and Temporary Procedure (TP)87-128 for the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) resulted in a procedure that did not verify the design of the system. The revised TP 87-128 and the completed procedure results were reviewed and found acceptable during NRC Inspection 50-293/87-41.

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The inspector disc"< sed with a licensee representative the corrective actions taken to date regarding this violation and found them to be acceptable. In addition, the licensee representative stated that addi-tional corrective actions will be taken including an evaluation of the results of the independent review of all preoperational tests prepared during RF0 No. 7 which was conducted by a special three man review team in response to the violation. This item will remain open pending completion and review of the licensee's additional corrective action .0 New Items for Followup (0 pen) Unresolved Item (293/88-03-01), Fatigue Analysis ar.d NDE of Drain Lines on the High and Low Pressure Sides of RHR Lines A and B near Valves 33, 68, 28 and 29. During review of Item 293/86-01-01, Fatigue Failure of Vent Line (1") on the RHR B line by check valve 1001-688, the inspector noted that a written engineering analysis of the potential for fatigue of nearby drain lines had not been performed and surface Nondestructive Exa-mination (NDE) such as penetrant examination to detect the presence of fatigue cracking had not been initiate This item is open pending evaluation of susceptibility of the above drain lines on RHR A and B to fatigue and completion of NDE of areas most susceptible to fatigue crack initiatio .0 Power Ascension Test Program The purpose of this inspection was to determine the adequacy of the licensee's Power Ascension Test Program for restart following RF0 No The licensee plans to use a combination of existing station procedures and new Temporary Procedures (TPs) for the testing to be conducte Eleven TPs and two major revisions to surveillance procedures for HPCI and RCIC cold quick starts are needed. As of this inspection, only 5 of these 13 procedures have been approved and issued. The inspector discussed several aspects of the Power Ascension Test Program including the procedure status with licensee representatives during this inspectio Based on these discussions, the inspector noted that the licensee is still in the process of developing and formalizing this program. Therefore, a future inspection will be conducted to assess the licensee power ascension program when finalized, to assure compliance with regulatory requirements and licensee commitment .0 Oversight and Assessment of Power Ascension 5.1 Purpose The licensee submitted a description of a management process for oversight and assessment of Power Ascension activities following RF0 No. 7 to the USNRC for information and review per BECo Letter No.87-163 on October 15, 1987. The purpose of this inspection was to review various details of this progra _ __ _ __

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5.2 Discussion The inspector reviewed the following aspects of the licensee's plan for oversight and assessment of Power Ascension activities:

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Responsibilities and duties of Oversight and Assessment Team member Selection process for peer evaluators; responsibilities and duties of peer evaluator Guidelines for followup and feedback of lessons learned including immediacy of feedback as well as lines of communication Development of Performance Standards for all discipline Training on Performance Standards and guidelines for followup and feedback of lessons learne Performance evaluations by the Oversight and Assessment Team peer evaluator The inspector interviewed three peer evaluators and one member of the Oversight and Assessment Team to discuss their roles on the oversight and assessment of Power Ascension. In addition, the inspector discussed the training program for oversight and 1ssess-ment of Power Ascension with a representative of the training department. On January 29, 1988, the inspector witnessed a dry run of the Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Test. (PNPS, Procedure No. 2.4.143). The operations crew currently in requali-fication training performed the test whiie performance evaluations were conducted by four peer evaluator .3 Findings The inspector was satisfied with the programmatic aspects of the licensee's plan for oversight and assessment of Power Ascension activitie However, the inspector identified two concerns follow-ing observation of the dry run for the Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Test, The first concern was the lack of formality in communications during the test, while the second concern involved the apparent inef fectiveness of certain peer evaluators in performing their evaluating function These concerns were discussed with an appropriate licensee representativ The representative acknowledged the inspector's concern .

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6.0 Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on January 29, 1988. The purpose, ,

scope and findings of the inspection were summariled and discussed. At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors.

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