IR 05000289/1999004

Insp Rept 50-289/99-04 on 990606-0717.Noncited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20211A442
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/19/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211A433	List: IR 05000289/1999004 ML20211A426
References
50-289-99-04, NUDOCS 9908240051
Download: ML20211A442 (27)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Docket N License N DPR-50 Report N Licensee: GPU Nuclear,Inc. (GPUN)

Facility: Three Mile Island Station, Unit 1 Location: P. O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057 Dates: June 6,1999 through July 17,1999 inspectors: Wayne L. Schmidt, Senior Resident inspector Craig W. Smith, Resident inspector Keith Young, Reactor Engineer, DRS John Richmond, Resident inspector Approved by: Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects i

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9908240051 990819 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G PDR

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Report No. 50-289/99-04 This integrated inspection included aspects of licencee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection supplemented by a regional fire protection specialis GPU Nuclear (GPUN) operated Three Mile Island Unit 1 (TMI) safely at 100 percent power throughout the inspection perio Operations in general, the plant electrical system responded as designed to the loss of the B auxiliary transformer. The A emergency diesel generator automatically fast started and loaded within 10 seconds ns designed. Operators responded appropriately to the annunciated alarms. (Section 01.1)

Operators responded appropriately to a sustained low system grid voltage conditio Additionally, the operators were not aware that one of the meter indications, referenced in the abnormal operating procedure for monitoring system grid voltage, provided an erroneous reading. (Section 01.2)

The reactor operators properly responded to the loss of the B vital 120 voit bus. Risk

' documents appropriately addressed the added risk for a reactor trip and engineered safety actuation if the attemate power supply was lost. ~ (Section 01.3) .

GPUN identified four human performance errors involving plant operators. While none had any safety significance, they represented a declining trend in operator performance. GPUN entered the events into its corrective action program and initiated a root cause evaluation. (Section O4.1)

Maintenance The receipt of new fuel was well controlled and coordinated by Maintenance and Operation The maintenance supervisor provided good oversight of the evoiution. The procedural guidance was well written. (Section M1.1)

GPUN properly conducted and documented the post-maintenance testing (PMT) on several maintenance activities that were reviewed. A minor issue was identified where supervisors could be more attentive to dating entries that changed PMT requirements prior to the testing being performed. (Section M1.2)

GPUN identified in Ma,1999 that the 2B emergency feedwater (EFW) pump outboard bearing

~ had failed and, due to the failure, the 2B EFW pump was out of service for longer than the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The NRC found that GPUN could not have reasonably predicted the failure of the bearing prior to its actual failure and therefore is exercising enforcement discretion to not cite this TS violation due to special circumstance (Section M8.2) (NCV 50-289/99-04-01)

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' Exec. Summary (cont'd)

Engineerina GPUN took appropriate actions with a justification for continued operation to ensure that the reactor building air coolers could perform their design function under design basis accdont conditions, with degraded air flows, by establishing lower than design cooling water temperature limits. (Section E2.1) 1 GPUN took appropriate corrective action following discovery of a condition outside the design basis for control room habitability. A flow balancing damper upstream of the air intake damper to the control building emergency ventilation system failed shut and, as a result, a positive pressure could not be maintained in the control room. This failure to maintain design control of the facility is being treated as's Non-Cited Violation. (Section E8.1) (NCV 50-289/99-04-02)

GPUN took appropriate corrective action following discovery of an open flood path between the turbine building and the control building. The open flood path was contrary to the design basis t

- of the facility which requires, in part, that all flood paths are sealed. This failure to maintain design control of the facility is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. (Section E8.2) (NCV 50-289/99-04-03)

Plant Suncort

~ The licensee established good administrative controls for hot-work activities. The hot-work activities were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and the associated hot-work permits.- Proper controls of combustible materials were in place. Good control of hot-work activities, impairments, and transient combustibles were evident. (Section F1.1)

Fire protection' equipment conditions and housekeeping in the observed areas were goo Roving fire watches were knowledgeable of station procedures for reporting fires, fire watch duties, and responding to fires.- Eight hour emerge.ncy light operation and illumination pattems were good. (Section F2.1)

Fire penetration seals were in good condition and the "as-built" condition met the test criteria outlined in the vendor's test report for operational performance. (Section F2.2)

The fire main loop was in good repair, and capable of providing the necessary water supply for fire fighting needs at the facility. The fire pumps were well-maintained and ready for servic (Sections F2.3 and F2.4)

l The incipient fire detection system could provide improved detection capabilities for the eight fire zones it monitors in the control building. The licensee had appropriate compensatory measures in place for the system in the' event that it failed or was removed from service for surveillance purposes. (Sechon F2.5)-

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Fire protection procedures met the requirements for fire protection program implementation, l contained sufficient detail, 'and were technically sound (Section F3.1) i

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Performance by the fire brigade team during a fire drill was very good. All expectations of the l fire drill were met. (Section F4.1) I The training program complied with NRC requirements for preparing fire brigade members to combat fires. Fire rigade members reviewed were current on all required training and annual physical examinations. (Section F5.1)

The fire protection quality assurance audits appropriately reviewed fire protection program attributes and compliance with program requirements. The fire protection audit findings were appropriately addressed and timely corrective actions had been taken for identified deficiencie (Section F7.1)

The inspector concluded that appropriate compensatory actions were in place for reviewed areas where the Thermo-Lag had not been upgraded. The inspector also concluded that the as-installed configuration of the Mecatiss wrap in fire zone AB-FZ-3 was consistent with the installation drawing. Engineering packages to upgrade five barriers in fire zones AB-FZ-5, AB-FZ-7, and FH-FZ-2 had been completed. No evidence was found that indicated that the licensee would not meet the intent of the confirmatory letter. Additionally, the inspector concluded that the licensee's instituted database to control and track Thermo-Lag mitigation efforts was a valuable tool. (Section F8.1)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1i

. TABLE OF CONTE NTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

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l . Operations . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 LO1 Conduct of 0perations . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

'4 01.1: Trip of B Auxiliary Transformer and Automatic Start of A Emergency Dietal Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

~ 01.2 '. Operator Response to Low System Grid Voltage . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ~

01.3 Loss of B Vital Atomating Current Bus due to B Inverter Failure. . . . . 3 i 02 . Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 )

04- Operator Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 04.1 Operator Human Performance Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 II . M aintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M1 Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M1.1 Receipt of New Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 M1.2. Review of Post-Maintenance Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M8 ' . Miscellaneous Maintenance issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M8.1 (CLOSED) Licensee Event Report 99-002-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M8.2 ~ (CLOSED) Escalated Enforcement item 99-03-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 lil' Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

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E Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E2.1 (UPDATE) Unresolved item 99-03-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issucs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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E8.1 - (CLOSED) Licensee Event Report 99-003-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

~ E8.2 (CLOSED) Licensee Event Report 99-005-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 IV. ' Plant Support . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 F1- Control of Fire Protection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 F1,1 Fire Risk Evolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 F Facility Tour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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F2.2 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11  ;

' F2.3 Fire Main Loop Flow Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 i F2.4 . Fire Pump Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 F2.5 incipient Fire Detection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 i F3- Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 F Fire Protection Procedure Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 F4.1 - Fire Brigade Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 14 i

'F5- Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16  !

F Fire Brigade Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 v

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l F7' Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 F Audits and Surveillances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 F Thermo-Lag Corrective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 V. Management Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 X1 Exit Meeting Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 LIST OF ACRONYM S U SED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 l

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status GPU Nuclear Inc. (GPUN) operated Three Mile Island Unit 1 (TMI) at 100 percent power throughout the inspectlon period.-

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- 1. Operations 01: Conduct of Operations (71707)

The shift operating crews ' performed routine activities well and responded properly to annunciated alarms. Operator response to three events involving transients on the

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plant's electrical distribution system are detailed belo .1 Trio of B Auxiliary Transformer and A'utomatic Start of A Emeroency Diesel Generator lnspection Scope i

The inspectors observed operator response to a trip of the B auxiliary transformer and I

automatic start and loading of the A emergency diesel generator (EDG) on the D 4160 volt emergency safeguards electrical bus, Observations and Findings

! On June 26, with the unit operating at 100% power, the B auxiliary transformer tripped due to a defective fault pressure relay. The trip of the B auxiliary transformer resulted in .

fast transfer of two reactor coolant pumps and one balance of plant 4160 volt buss to the remaining A auxiliary transformer. All fast transfers and the automatic start of the EDG occurred as per plant design.. During the fast transfer and repowering of the D emergency safeguards bus, GPUN identified that the A secondary services river pump did not trip as designed when loads were shed from the D emergency safeguards bus and the C condensate booster pump did not fast transfer and continue to operate on the

' A auxiliary transformer. Operators responded well to the transient and to the two minor anomalies that resulted. In general, the plant responded as designed with the A EDG l fast starting and loading within 10 seconds.

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GPUN entered the event into its corrective action program (CAP T199-0516). Planned actions include: root cause analysis of the failed fault pressure relay, replacement of both auxiliary transformer fault pressure relays in the upcoming refueling outage, review l , of preventive maintenance recommendations for the relays, and evaluation of the cause for the two pumps not responding as designe The plant continued to operate at 100 percent power throughout the event with the A EDO supplying the D emergency safeguards bus independent of an offsite power

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souice; The faulty relay was replaced and the plant was restored to a normal electrical ,

L line-up in approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. GPUN made the appropriate 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report to the l

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2 Conclusions in general, the plant electrical system responded as designed to fne loss of the B auxiliary transformer. The A EDG automatically fast started and loaded within 10 seconds as designed. Operators responded appropriately to the annunciated alarm .2 ~ Qgerator Response to Low System Grid Voltaae a.- Inspection Scope The inspectors observed control room operator response to a sustained low system grid '

voltage conditio Observations and Findings I

On July 6 with the unit operating at 100 percent power, GPUN experienced a sustained low voltage condition on the off-site power transmission system. The low grid voltage resulted from unusually high system demand c'oe to abnormally high outdoor temperatures. Control room operators appropriately entered the low system grid voltage abnormal operating procedure (AP 1203-41) when the grid voltage reached 23 kilovolts (Kv). The inspector observed actions in the control room following entry into the abnormal operating procedure. Plant management and system engineering responded immediately to the control room to assess the situation. The system engineer provided l

sound technical advice to the operating crew as turbine generator operating limits were approached due to the large reactive load being carried by the generator to stabilize the grid voltag The inspectors questioned whether the guidance provided in the abnormal operating procedure AP 1203-41 directed the control room operators to reduce loads unnecessarily thereby distracting the control room operators. GPUN indicated they would review the AP 1203-41 guidance on when to reduce balance of plant loads in response to a sustained degraded system grid voltag I AP 1203-41 called for monitoring system bus voltage on the plant computer and on meters installed on control room panel SS-1. The inspectors identified that one of the meter indications on panel SS-1 provided an erroneous indication of system grid voltag The control room operators relied only on the plant computer indication of system grid

. voltage and did not monitor bus voltage using the SS-1 panel indications and were not aware of the erroneous reading. Engineering was aware of the erroneous readirig but had not provided direction to Operations on the use of this meter in AP 1203-4 Following the inspectors questioning, a caution tag was attached to the erroneous meter indicatio ; Conclusions Operators responded appropriately to a sustained low system grid voltage conditio l Additionally, the operators were not aware that one of the meter indications, referenced !

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in the abnormal operating procedure for monitoring system grid voltage, provided an erroneous readin .3 1.ggtpf B Vital Alternatina Current Bus due to B Inverter Failur Inspection Scope On July 16 the B inverter was lost following its retum from a maintenance condition. The inspector reviewed the actions taken to restore power to the B 120 volt vital bus, the

associated alarm response, and emergency electrical procedures and the risk document used to support the maintenance activities and the subsequent work on the B inverter following the failur Observations and Findings The operators responded well to the indications of a loss of the B 120 volt vital bus. The depowering of this bus caused the expected partial actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), engineered safety actuation (ESAS), and heat sink protection systems (HSPS).

Operators appropriately used the alarm response procedures to ensure that all proper actions took place and then aligned the B 120 volt vital bus to the attemate A regulating transforme Operators and plant management were appropriately concemed that aligning the B 120 volt vital bus to the A regulating transformer increased the risk that a loss of the A 4160 volt or 480 voit vital busses would have caused a reactor scram and ESAS actuatio While this attemate power alignment is not prohibited by the Technical Specifications (TS), since it will result in a conservative safety system actuation, GPUN imposed a 72-hour administrative time period to track the retum of the B inverte The risk document for the maintenance condition was sufficiently detailed and well written. It provided adequate information to ensure that operators understood the risk of having the B vital bus powered from the A regulating transforme c.- Conclusions The reactor operators properly responded to the loss of the B 120 volt vital bus. Risk documents appropriately addressed the added risk for a reactor trip and ESAS actuation if the altomate power supply was los Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment (Tl 2515/141)

The staff conducted an abbreviated review of Year 2000 (Y2K) activities and documentation using Temporary Instruction 2515/141, " Review of Year 2000 (Y2K)

Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants." lhe review addressed aspects of Y2K management, planning, documentation, implementation planning, initial assessment, detailed assessment, remediation activities, Y2K testing and validation, I

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notification activities, and contingency planning. The reviewers used NEl/NUSMG 97-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness," and NEl/NUSMG 98-07, " Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning," as the primary references for this revie The results of this review were combined with the results of other reviews in a summary report that was issued on July 20,199 Operator Knowledge and Performance (71707)

04.1 Ooerator Human Performance Errors 4 GPUN identified four instances of operator human performance errors during this 4 inspection period. On June 23, GPUN discovered the valve line-up used to repressurize the core flood tanks on June 21 had not been properly restored. Two valves upstream of the core flood tank nitrogen isolation valves were found out of their required shut position. On June 29, a control room operator, distracted by ongoing control rod drive troubleshooting efforts, inadvertently left the deborating demineralizer in service for two hours instead of the 45 minutes requested by Chemistry. On July 4, the high pressure i nitrogen system was inadvertently left in service for 15 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> following repressurization of the core flood tanks. The procedural guidance was to secure the high pressure system and line-up the low pressure nitrogen system upon completion of ;

the repressurization activities. On July 6, the feed tank to the miscellaneous waste i evaporator was overfilled resulting in a spill of contaminated water in the miscellaneous j waste evaporator roo l i

Although these operator errors were not individually safety significant, these errors ~ ;

represented a declining trend in operator performance. GPUN entered the events into its corrective action program (CAPS T1999-0505,0521,0542, 0546) and initiated a root cause effort through its human performance review board to better understand the !

underlying causes of the event II. Maintenance  !

M1 Conduct of Maintenance (62707)

Technicians conducted observed maintenance activities well. Good planning and setup allowed cleaning and significant improvement in air flows in the reactor building emergency cooler M1.1 Receiot of New Fuel Inspection Scope The inspectors observed GPUN maintenance activities involving the receipt of new fuel for the upcoming refueling outage.

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5 Observatons and Findinos

~ The inspectors observed maintenance activities that occurred over a six week period to receive 72 new fuel assemblies and transport them from their shipping containers to the spent fuel pcol. The inspectom found the procedural guidance to be well written. The maintenance supervisor in charge of the evolution was knowledgeable of the activities being performed and provided good direction to the work crew. The receipt inspection of the new fuel assemblies was thorough.- Nuclear Engineering provided good oversight of the evolution and ensured proper documentation was maintained. There was good coordination between Maintenance and Operations while transporting the new fuel assemblies from the shipping container to the new fuel elevator in the spent fuel poo Conclusions The receipt of new fuel was well controlled and coordinated by Maintenance and Operations.' The maintenance supervisor provided good oversight of the evolution. The

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procedural guidance was well writte M1.2 Review of Post-Maintenance Testino Inspection Scooe The inspectors reviewed completed post-maintenance testing (PMT) records for several maintenance activities conducted on the decay heat removal systems during a May 1999 system outag . Observations and Findinos The inspectors reviewed the PMT records for several maintenance activities and found they were properly conducted and documented. However, the inspectors identified several instances where, prior to conducting the PMT, maintenance supervisors made changes to the PMT requirements listed in a maintenance package without indicating the

, date the changes were made. This was a minor administrative erro Conclusions GPUN properly conducted and documented the PMT on several maintenance activities that were reviewed. A minor issue was identified where supervisors could be more attentive to dating entries that changed PMT requirements prior to the testing being performe i i

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'MS= ; Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (62707,92903) .

. M8.1 J (CLOSED) Licensee Event Reoort 99-002-00: Potential Failure of Multiole Containment Monitorina System Containment Isolation Valves due to Inaooropriate Use of Vendor Information i

- The inspectors reviewed the information provided by GPUN in Licensee Event Report (LER) 99-002-00 which discussed the circumstances surrounding the potential failure of

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• multiple containment monitoring system containment isolation valves On February 12, 1999, GPUN identified a condition in which three containment post accident sampling system containment isolation valves exceeded their local leak rate testing limits.- This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of tha safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The condition resulted from the valve packing being adjusted beyond the limits specified in the vendor technical manual. The valves were subsequently repaired and a local leak rate test satisfactorily performed. The inspectors i verified, through in-plant review and interviews with GPUN staff, the assigned corrective '

actions listed in the LER were appropriat M8.2 (CLOSED) Escalated Enforcement item 99-03-01 and Licensee Event Report 99-004-00: 2B Emeroency Feedwater Pumo Unknowinalv inoperable for Gr== tar Than the Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time As discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-289/99-03, GPUN identified in May 1999 that the 2B emergency feedwater pump (EFW) pump outboard bearing had failed. GPUN took appropriate actions to repair the pump and to ensure that similar failures had not occurred on the other two EFW pump The inspectors, through in-plant review, found that GPUN's LER 99-004-00 on this event

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provided accurate information and assigned appropriate corrective actions. However,

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GPUN and the NRC determined that the 2B EFW pump was unavailable to perform its safety function, due to the failed bearing, for longer than the TS allowed out of service I time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 2B EFW pump was inoperable from the time of the last automatic actuation start test on March 27,1999, or earlier, until the time of discovery of the failed

. bearing on May 10,199 l The NRC staff considered this TS violation for escalated enforcement in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy and found that GPUN could not have reasonably predicted the failure of the 2B EFW pump bearing prior to its actual failure. Specifically, the i inservice testing (IST) program was appropriate and did not identify high vibrations on

' the pump bearing during the most recent test run in February 1999, or during any previous test runs. The pump performed properly during the July 1997 loss of offsite power event and during the Fall 1997 outage full flow surveillance testing. Further, the

. cause for the pump bearing failure was found to be a loose oil disk set screw. The last maintenance invoiving this set screw was conducted in May 1989. This is not indicative of GPUN's current performance in the conduct of maintenance activities. GPUN identified the failed bearing during routine preventive maintenance to change the pump bearing oi f i ..

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In accordance with Section Vll.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and in consultation with the Regional Administrator, NRC Region 1, and the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion to not cite this Severity Level lli violation of TS 3.4.1.1 due to the special circumstances outlined above. (NCV 50-289/99-04 01)

lli, Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment (37551,92903)

E2.1 (UPDATE) Unresolved item 99-03-02: Reactor Buildina Coolina Unit Airflow Deoradation Insoection Scope The inspectors continued to review GPUN's actions to address the degradation in the air flows on the three safety related air coolers located in the reactor building, as discussed in NRC inspection Repoit 50-289/99-0 Observations and Findinas GPUN engineering prepared a proper justification for continued operation (JCO) i following the Plant Review Group (PRG) meeting that was conducted on June 4,199 At that PRG meeting, GPUN used actual high speed flow data to determine through analysis if the cooler would produce the designed flow rate in their safety related slow ]

speed operation. The JCO approved by the PRG provided sufficient technical detail 1 based on a calculated slow speed flow rate to ensure that the coolers would perform !

their design function of removing heat from the reactor building during a design basis !

accident. To account for the degraded air flow, reactor river water and reactor building j spray water temperature limits, below the limiting values assumed in the design !

calculations, were specified and imposed as temporary operating limit GPUN prepared a detailed plan and conducted hot water cleaning of the two sets of normal cooling coils in each of the three reactor building air coolers. Following the cleaning, GPUN conducted air flow measurements at slow speed operations and I determined that the B and C fans were restored to above their design flow rates. The A fan flow rate remained below the design value, but was acceptable to support continued .

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operation based on the JCO restrictions on river water temperature. The design called for any one of the fans to function following an accident to limit the reactor building temperature and pressur On July 8, in response to a degraded flow condition on the A reactor building fan cooler, GPUN cleaned the rotating and stationary fan blades. Previous observations of the j reactor building fan coolers showed an unusual build-up of boron deposits on the A fa No similar deposits were seen on the B or C fans. Flow measurements taken during previous reactor building entries showed the A fan to have a lower volumetric flow rate j than the other two fans.- Based on flow rate measurements taken after cleaning the A l fan blades, GPUN determined the A fan flow rate had improved but still was not above the 25,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) required to be considered operable. On June 16, -

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GPUN changed the JCO, based on additional calculations, to make the A fan operable but degraded and removed the temporary river water and reactor building spray water temperature limits, Conclusion GPUN took appropriate actions with a JCO to ensure that the reactor building air coolers could perform their design function under design basis accident conditions, with

. degraded air flows, by establishing lower than design cooling water temperature limit E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)-

E (CLOSEDLLicensee Event Reoort 99-003-00: Discoverv of a Condition Outside the UFSAR Desian Basis for Control Room Habitability The inspectors reviewed the information provided by GPUN in LER 99-003-00 which discussed the circumstances surrounding a condition outside the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) design basis for control room habitability. On March 10,1999, GPUN identified a manual flow balancing damper in the outside air supply duct for the control building emergency ventilation system (CBEVS) failed shut. The flow balancing damper is located 2 feet upstream of the air intake control damper, AH-D-39. When the flow balancing damper failed shut, a negative pressure was experienced in the control i room. This condition was contrary to the UFSAR design basis description for the system j which requires, in part, that the control room be maintained at a positive pressure "with or without single failure of Outside Air Intake Damper (OAI) AH-D-39."

l GPUN took immediate corrective actions to clamp open the failed flow balancing damper !

and satisfactorily tested the control building envelope to verify a positive pressure could be established. In the LER, GPUN committed to implementing long term corrective ;

actions to inspect the CBEVS to verify its physical condition and to review the system's l compliance with its design requirements. A supplement to the LER will be submitted to l describe any required system' modifications. The inspectors verified, through in-plant !

review and interviews with GPUN staff, the assigned corrective actions were appropriat I The inability of the CBEVS to maintain the control room at a positive pressure with a single failure of AH-D-39 was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion lil, Design Control. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),

consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is addressed in the GPUN's correction action program (CAP T1999-0235). (NCV 50-289/99-04-02)

E8.2 {.Q.LQ3f.Ql.Ligg.ongely.p.at.Beoort 99-005-00: Open Flood Path Between Turbine Building and Control Building

' The inspectors reviewed the information provided by GPUN in LER 99-005-00 which discussed the circumstances surrounding an open flood path between the turbine 1 building and the control building. On May 13,1999, GPUN identified that two plant modifications made in 1983 and 1990 created an open flood path from the turbine

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I building to the control building through secondary sample lab drain system. This condrtion was contrary to UFSAR design basis description which requires, in part, that all potential flood paths are sealed.-

GPUN took immediate corrective actions to revise the flood emergency procedure to provide direction to the operators to seal the drains. Long-term corrective actions planned inclue1e permanent plant modifications to seal floor drains that have no function during norma! operation, a review of previous modifications to the drain system for similar condf,lons, and a comprehensive walk-down of the plant to ensure openings above the prehable maximum flood level are sealed. The inspectors verified, through in-plant review ard 5terviews with GPUN staff, the assigned corrective actions were appropriat The existence of an open flood path between the turbine building and the control building was a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion lil, Design Control. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is addressed in the GPUN's correction action program (CAP T1999-0417), (NCV 50-289/99-04-03)

IV. Plant Support I

F1 ' Control of Fire Protection Activities (64704) i

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F Fire Risk Evolutions j Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed GPUN's administrative processes for controlling and evaluating i fire hazards, including limiting the interaction of combustible and flammable materials l with ignition sources. This review was conducted to verify that adequate guidance and proper authorization requirements existed for identifying and limiting fire ris '! Observations and Findinas i The inspector reviewed samples of log activity for hot-work control permits, fire system impairments, and control of transient combustibles per procedures 1410-Y-26, " Control of Hot Work," Revision 26, procedure 1104-45A, " Fire Protection System impairment

- Control," Revision 15, and procedure 1035, " Control of Transient Combustibles,"

Revision 28. The inspector found that the administrative process for controlling ignition sources included the use of a permit system for authorization to perform hot-work activities. .The authorization to perform the task was granted by the work group

- supervisor overseeing the job task. Prior to authorizing the hot-work activity, fire protection personnel appropriately inspected the hot-work area to identify potential fire pivien problems and to ensure that appropriate fire watches were provided. The inspector found that the hot-work procedure was properly implemented in the field and that the guidelines in the hot-work permits were being followed Review of the hot-work, impairment, and transient combustible database logs revealed no disc epancie l

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The inspector determined that the administrative process provided a good review of hot-work activity and appropriate guidance to identify any potential interaction of combustible and flammable materials with ignition source Conclusions The inspector concluded that good administrative controls were established for hot-work activities. The hot-work activities were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and the associated hot-work permits. Proper controls of combustible materials were in place. Good control of hot-work activities, impairments, and transient combustibles were eviden F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment (64704)

F2.1 Facility Tour Inspection Scope The inspector toured TMI and inspected fire suppression and detection systems and components. The inspector also inspected the material condition of fire fighting equipment, emergency lighting unit operation, fire door latching, and roving fire watch dutie Observations and Findings The inspector found that the fire protection equipment material condition was good and that combustible fire-loading was properly maintained in those areas inspected. Fire brigade members' pro!ective clothing and gear were found in good condition and well -

organized in the site fire brigade locker and the fire brigade van. The inspector reviewed previous surveillance reports and witnessed a surveillance of the fire brigade van to inventory the staged fire protection equipment and identified no discrepancies. The inspectors determined that housekeeping in areas containing safety-related and non-safety-related equipment was good. Proper combustible material control was observe The inspector verified that the fire suppression system pressure was adequate. The fire hoses inspected did not exhibit any cracks or fraying and all observed nozzles were properly rate The inspector found that gauges on fire equipment including some fire extinguishers and carbon dioxide systems registered in their appropriate ranges. The licensee had procedures in place to perform surveillance testing of the halon system, which was located in the air intake tunnel. The inspector verified that all observed fire extinguishers were current with monthly surveillance. The inspector noted appropriate smoke detection, fire detection, and alarm panels were installed throughout observed areas at the site. The inspector observed that fire doors properly latched closed. There were no instances observed where access to fire suppression devices was restricted by any materials or equipmen :

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The ' inspector observed that the roving fire watch toured appropriate areas of the plant in a timely manner, looked for appropriate indications of fires, failed equipment, and looked for obstructions of fire protection equipment during the tour. The roving fire watch was knowledgeable regarding the station policy on reporting fires, the roving fire watch duties, and responding to fires. The inspector determined that the roving fire watch was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities regarding TMI's fire protection progra The inspector found that recent actions by the licensee had been implemented to improve the effectiveness and operation of eight hour emergency lights for j access / egress routes of safety-related equipment areas. The licensee demonstrated emergency light operability and illumination pattems on approximately fifteen selected emergency lights during the plant tour. All emergency lights properly illuminated when l the test button was depressed.'

The inspector performed a detailed walkdown of the fire suppression and detection systems in the relay room. This area was identified as risk significant in the Individual Plant Examination of Extemal Events (IPEEE). The inspector compared the installed configuration of the suppression and detection systems with their associated drawings and procedures and found no discrepancies. Appropriate surveillances were prescribed for the fire suppression and detection systems to verify operabilit Conclusions j The inspector concluded that fire protection equipment conditions and housekeeping in the observed areas of the plant were good. The licensee maintained good control of combustible materials. Roving fire watch personnel were knowledgeable of station

- procedures for reporting fires, roving fire watch duties, and responding to fires. Eight hour emergency light operation was goo ' F Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed selected penetration seals to determine the adequacy of installation and testin I Observations and Findings The impector found that the licensee performed visual inspections of 10% of penetration l seals every 24 months to' ensure that required barriers were not degraded and remained !

operable. F>e barrier penetration seals 549,552, and 721 located in TMI's EDG rooms I were sampled for review. The inspector found that the selected penetration seals were in good condition and that they were installed comparable to that described in Brand j Industrial Services, Inc. (BISCO) fire test report number 748-14. The inspector reviewed this report, which documented the fire barrier penetration seal acceptance tests. This

, test included destructive examinations demonstrating that the fire barrier penetrations i

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had withstood the fire endurance test without the passage of flame for a period of time equivalent to the barrier fire resistance ratin Conclusions The inspector concluded that the sampled fire barrier penetration seals were in good condition and that the installed configuration of the seals was comparable to that described in BISCO test report number 748-14.

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F Fire Main Looo Flow Testina Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed recent test results of the yard hydrant loop flow tests for TMl to determine if degradation of the system had occurred. The inspector also performed a q

walkdown of the yard hydrant loop to determine material condition of the hydrants and -

post indicator valve Observations and Findings  ;

The inspector found no evidence of deterioration or blockage of the fire mains based on loop flow test results. The inspector noted loop flow tests resulted in flow coefficients i above the acceptable minimum. In addition, the fire protection surveillance recorded several years of flow coefficients from previous tests to establish trending data. The inspector verified that no degradation to loop flow had occurred over the last several years. The inspector found that the yard hydrant loop component's material condition was good, Qonclusions Based on the test results reviewed, test data trends, and observation of the condition of the hydrants and post indicator valves, the inspector concluded that the fire main loop was in good material condition and capable of providing the necessary water supply for fire fighting needs at the facilit F Fire Pumo Testina Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed test data for the past two years to assess the performance of the fire pumps. The inspector also inspected the material condition of the installed fire ;

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The inspector found that operating data recorded for the three fire pumps during tests were within their acceptance criteria. The inspector also found that test data showed i

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consistent performance for pumps and driver The inspector walked down the installed equipment including the three fire pumps and Jockey pump and identified no discrepancies. The water supply valves were open and the pumps were ready for operatio . Conclusions Based on the observed conditions of the equipment and the review of the test data, the inspector determined that the site fire pumps are well-maintained and ready for servic !

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F2.5 - Inciolent Fire Detection System Inspection Scone The inspector reviewed the incipient fire detection system to determine its operational status and to determine if appropriate procedures were in place to implement

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coriipensatory actions in the ' event a failure of the system occurre Observations and Findinas The incipient fire detection system had recently been installed to improve the fire detection capabilities within eight fire zones of the control building. The system consists

. of two sampling heads in each fire zone and microprocessor controlled detection panel The sampling heads were interfaced to detectors that are mounted in centrally located panels located away from the areas that they monitor. The system provided alarms for the various areas it monitors to the control roo.m. This new system could be very sensitive to smoke particles and detect fires in their very early stage Through discussions with the licensee, walkdown of the system and review of the fire protection implementing procedure, the inspector found that there had been one failure of the incipient fire detection system. The licensee stated that the failure was attributed to technician error during adjustments of the systems sensitivity. During walkdown of the system, the inspectors noted that the system was monitoring air samples for the appropriate fire zones and no system discrepancies were evident. The inspector also

- found that the licensee had appropriate procedures in place to provide compensatory measures in the event the system fails or the system is removed from service for surveillance purposes. The compensatory measures included instituting a fire watch fo the areas the system monitors. The inspector found this acceptabl i

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14 Conclusions The inspector concluded that the incipient fire detection system could provide improved detection capabilities for the eight fire zones it monitored in the control building. The inspector also concluded that the licensee had appropriate compensatory measures in place for the system in the event that it failed or was removed from service for surveillance purpose F3 Fire Protection Procedures and Documentation (64704)

F3.1 Fire Protection Procedure Review a. Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed fire protection procedures to determine if they provided sufficient detail and were technically sound. The inspector also reviewed changes made to these I procedures during the past few years, Observations and Findinas l l

The inspector found that the fire protection procedures govemed all facets of the fire protection program. This included the operational fire protection program, fire protection training and qualifications, fire protection maintenance and surveillance testing, fire emergency preparedness, fire protection inspections and audits, control of combustible materials, fire watches, fire drills, and actions for inoperable fire protection equipmen The inspector found that the procedures provided sufficient detail and were technically sound for implementing the fire protection program at the site. The inspector also found that recent changes to the fire protection procedures did not 3mpact the program as it is stated in the UFSA Conclusions The inspector concluded that fire protection procedures were acceptable for fire protection program implementation, contained sufficient detail, and were technically sound. The inspector also concluded that recent changes to fire protection procedures did not impact the licensing basis of the fire protection progra F4- Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance (64704)

F Fire Briaade Drills Insoection Scope ,

l The inspector observed a fire drill to evaluate the effectiveness of the fire brigade and their understanding of fire attack strategies. The drill was conducted to demonstrate the following:

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effectiveness of fire alarm response, timeliness of department notification;

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response of fire brigade, time required to initiate fire attack or mitigation;

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' ability to assess the fire properly;

understanding of the fire attack strategy;

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awareness of vital equipment in the area;

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ability of each member to physically perform required tasks;

effective communication between fire brigade members; and

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awareness of additional hazards in the fire are Observations and Findings The inspector observed a fire drill on June 9,1999. A fuel oil fire was simulated in the A EDG roo The inspector determined, based on drill observations and post-drill discussions with responding brigade members, that the performance and knowledge of the drill participants were very good. This determination was based on the following observations of the fire brigade:

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dressed quickly and appropriately;

appropriately checked operation of their fire fighting gear;

assessed the fire and chose appropriate suppressant types to extinguish the fire;

demonstrated good command and control;

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demonstrated good team work;

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communicated effectively with their breathing apparatus in place;

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appropriately simulated sacering help from the local fire department after assessing the fire; and

'* secured the simulated fire in a timely manne The inspector found the quality of the critique following the drill to be good; in that, it l provided constructive feedback to the fire brigade regarding performance. The inspector i noted that each member of the fire brigade team was allowed to provide constructive comments to the team leader and supervision regarding fire brigade performanc Additionally, the inspector noted that this fire drill was also used as a training vehicle to increase the effectiveness of the fire brigad The inspector found that TMl fire fighters were well coordinated with seven local fire !

. departments in the event they are needed at the site to support fire fighting activities. An example of such coordination included annual joint training activities to ensure fire l

fighting strategies at the' site were understoo l Conclusions The inspector determined that the fire brigade performance during a drill was very goo All expectations of the fire drill were met. Coordination activities with local community

' fire departments to ensure proper understanding of fire fighting strategies at the site were goo =

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F5 . - Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification (64704)

F5/l ~ Fire Briande Training Insoection Scope

- The inspector reviewed the training program requirements and the training provided for fire brigade members to verify that members had completed all required training for qualification and dut ' b; Observations and Findings The inspector verified that several fire brigade members randomly selected for review had successfully completed the required training courses, drills, respirator training and passed their annual medical physicals. Review of the qualified fire watch list revealed no deficiencies. The inspector noted the licensee had instituted a database that would automatically remove an individual from the qualified list if that individual's training or medical physicallapse The inspector found that initial and continuing training programs appropriately emphasized potential fire hazards and precautionary measures, supported brigade member readiness, and complied with NRC requirements and the TMI licensing basi The inspector also found that the training department had appropriately modified training courses through coordination with engineering to ensure proper and effective trainire of the fire brigade, Conclusions l

The inspector concluded that the training program complied with NRC requirements for preparing fire brigade members to combat fires. Fire brigade members reviewed were .

current on all required training and annual physical examination .F7 Quality Assurance in Fire Protection Activities (64704)

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- F Audits and Surveillances

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a. ' Inspection Scope 1 The inspector reviewed recent quality assurance audit reports and assessments completed to satisfy UFSAR requirement .

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b. - Obsentations and Findings

=The inspector reviewed recent quality assurance audit report number S-TMI-97-09, "TMl !

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Fire Protection Program," January 27,1998, audit report number S-TMI-98-12, "TMI Fire Protection," October 20,1998, several quality assurance safety assessments, and !

assessment number R-1920-99-002, " Assessment of the TMI-1 Fire Protection

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Program," June 3,1999, conducted by TMI's Independent Onsite Safety Review Group 1 (IOSRG). The inspector verified that audits adequately evaluated the effectiveness of fire protection measures, equipment, program implementation, and problem identification and resolutio The inspector determined that these documents demonstrated good problem identification and clearly communicated the findings in the reports. The inspectors noted that the audit scopes, findings, and observations were good and met the requirements of i the program. The inspector verified that proper revisions and actions were taken to 1 effectively resolve any identified deficiencies. Corrective actions were found to be implemented for resolving these deficiencies in a timely manner.

' ' Conclusions The inspector concluded that the fire protection quality assurance audits, safety assessments, and the IOSRG assessment appropriately reviewed fire protection program attributes and compliance with program requirements. The inspector also concluded that the fire protection audit arid assessment findings were appropriately addressed and timely corrective actions were taken for identified deficiencie l

F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection issues (64704)

F8.1 Thermo-Laa Corrective Actions Inspection Scope i On April 27,1998, the NRC sent a " consent to confirmatory order" letter to the licensee to confirm the November 23,1997, commitment to complete final implementation of !

Thermo-Lag corrective actions by December 31,1999. By letter to the NRC, dated December 31,1996, and supplemented by letters dated September 8,1997, December 30,1997, May 21,1998, October 14,1998, November 25,1998, and December 23,1998, the licensee submitted a request for an exemption from the j requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2, to the extent that they require the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated nonsafety-related circuits necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown in a fire barrier having a 1-hour fire endurance rating. After review of the request for exemption, the NRC granted exemptions for several fire areas. However, exemption requests were denied for fire areas AB-FZ-3, AB-FZ-5, AB-FZ-7, and FH-FZ-2. The inspector reviewed portions of the licensee's Thermo-Lag mitigation program for the fire areas in which their exemption request was denied to determine if the intent of the confirmatory letter would be me Observations and Findinas Through discussions with the licensee and touring the fire zones where Thermo-Lag was present, the inspector found that the licensee had completed upgrades to approximately 900 linear feet of cable raceway from a total of approximately 1200 feet requiring upgrad ; o .. , 7

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I The inspector reviewed fire areas in which exemption requests were denied because no automatic suppression and no automatic detection were provided in fire zones AB-FZ-3, l AB-FZ-5, and AB-FZ-7. Additionally, the exemption for fire zone FH-FZ-2 was denied because it had automatic suppression, but was not provided with automatic detectio The inspector verified that the licensee had instituted appropriate compensatory actions for these areas and that those actions would remain in place until completion of the l Thermo-Lag mitigation efforts. The compensatory actions consisted of a roving hourly fire watch and met the guidance provided in Information Notice 97-48, " Inadequate or l- Inappropriate Interim Fire Protection Compensatory Measures." The inspector found this acceptable.

l in a letter to the NRC dated June 2,1999, the licensee stated that the fire barriers in fire zone AB-FZ-3 had been upgraded. The inspector verified that the Thermo-Lag fire barriers in fire zone AB-FZ-3 had been upgraded by wrapping the Thermo-Lag with Mecatiss to achieve the intended 1-hour rating. The inspector reviewed the as-installed configuration of two upgraded fire barriers in fire zone AB-FZ-3 with their drawing configuration and found no discrepancies. The inspector did not review the as-installed configuration with the test configuration.

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The inspector found that in the remaining fire zones (AB-FZ-5, AB-FZ-7, and FH-FZ-2),

the licensee had completed engineering packages to upgrade the fire barriers with Mecatiss to achieve the 1-hour rating of the barriers. The modifications were planned to !

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occur during Fall 1999 refueling outag The inspector also found that the licensee had instituted a database to control and track their Thermo-Lag mitigation efforts for the affected fire areas. The inspector found that - l l the database offered information on existing Thermo-Lag installations in the fire areas, !

Mecatiss installation requirements, and fire tests that bound the as-installed Mecatiss i configurations. The database also provided digitized pictures of the areas needing l upgrades. The inspector found this database to be a valuable tool for controlling and !

tracking the licensee's Thermo-Lag mitigation efforts.~  !

c. Conclusions

' The inspector concluded that appropriate compensatory actions were in place for reviewed areas where the Thermo-Lag had not been upgraded. The inspector also concluded that the as-installed configuration of the Mecatiss wrap in fire zone AB-FZ-3 was consistent with the installation drawing. Engineering packages to upgrade five ,

barriers in fire zones AB-FZ-5, AB-FZ-7, and FH-FZ-2 had been completed. No l

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evidence was found that indicated that the licensee would not meet the intent of the confirmatory letter. Additionally, the inspector concluded that the licensee's instituted i

database to control and track Thermo-Lag mitigation efforts was a valuable too I i

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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the fire protection inspection results to members of licensee management at an exit meeting on July 21,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not indicate that any material reviewed during the inspection should be considered as proprietary informatio Following completion of the inspection period, the resident inspectors conducted an exit meeting with GPUN managers on July 21,1999. GPUN staff comments conceming the issues in this report were documented in the applicable report sections. No proprietary information was included.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED iP37551 Onsite Engineering IP62707 Maintenance Observation IP64704 Fire Protection Program IP71707 Plant Operations IP92903 Engineering Followup Tl2515/141 Review of Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened / Closed:

99-04-01 NCV 2B Emergency Feedwater Pump Unknowingly inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time (Section M8.2)

99-04-02 NCV Discovery of a Condition Outside the UFSAR Design Basis for Control Room Habitability (Section E8.1)

99-04-03 NCV Open Flood Path Between Turbine Building and Control Building (Section E8.2)

Closed-99-03-01 eel 2B Emergency Feedwater Pump Unknowingly inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time (Section M8.2)

99-002-00 LER Potential Failure of Multiple Containment Monitoring System Containment isolation Vaivs:: (CM-V-1,2,3, and 4) Due to inappropriate Use of Vendor Information (Section MS.1)

99-003-00 LER Discovery of a Condition Outside the UFSAR Design Basis for Control Room Habitability (Section E8.1)

99-004-00 LER 2B Emergency Feedwater Pump Unknowingly inoperable for Greater Than the Technical Specification Allowed Out of Service Time (Section M8.2)

99-005-05 LER Open Flood Path Between Turbine Building and Control Building (Section E8.2)

Discussed:

99-03-02 URI Reactor Building Cooling Unit Airflow Degradation (Section E2.1)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED BISCO Brand Industrial Services, In CAP Corrective Action Process CBEVS Control Building Emergency Ventilation System cfm cubic feet per minute CFR Code of Federal Regulations EDG Emergency Diesel Generator eel Escalated Enforcement item EFW Emergency Feedwater ESAS Engineered Safety Actuation System GPUN GPU Nuclear, In HSPS Heat Sink Protection System >

IOSRG Independent Onsite Safety Review Group lPEEE Individual Plant Evaluation of External Events IR Inspection Report IST Inservice Test JCO Justification for Continued Operation Kv Kilovolts LER Licensee Event Report NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OAl Outside Air intake PDR Public Document Room PMT Post-Maintenance Test PRG Plant Review Group RPS Reactor Protection System TMI Three Mile Island-Unit 1 TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report URI Unresolved item Y2K Year 2000 i

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