IR 05000237/2018012
| ML18127B694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/2018 |
| From: | Jeffers M NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2018012 | |
| Download: ML18127B694 (15) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2018012 AND 05000249/2018012
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 23, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Baseline Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Washko, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified one issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very-low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined a violation associated with this issue. Because the licensee initiated a condition report to address this issue, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the subject inspection report.
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark Jeffers, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249;72-037 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Enclosure:
IR 05000237/2018012; 05000249/2018012 cc: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance Team Inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station,
Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
NRC-identified findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Ensure that Thermal Overload Relays are Sized Properly for Throttling Motor Operated Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Finding None IP 71111.21M NCV 05000249/2018012-01 Closed The team identified a finding having very-low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
Design Control. Specifically, Dresden had not verified that thermal overload relays on Unit 3 safety-related motor operated valves 3-1301-3, 3-1501-21A & 21B, 3-1501-18A & 18B, 3-1501-38A & 38B, 3-3-2301-10, 3-1501-3A & 3B, were properly sized to support the design function of repetitive jogging and throttling the valves in response to design basis transients or accidents.
Additional Tracking Items None
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program -
Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors selected the components listed below based, primarily, on the system approach. The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes; permanent modifications; operating experience; and previously identified inspection issues:
Component ===
- (1) Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Cooler Fan (2-5747)a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Environmental qualification classification d) Protection against flooding e) Control logic design f) Protection against seismic events g) Operations monitoring of area temperatures h) Maintenance effectiveness i) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications j) Translation of vendor specifications k) Appendix J total leakage summation l) Locked valve program implementation
- (2) Unit 2 Station Blackout (Diesel Generator 2)a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Maintenance effectiveness d) Protection against external events e) Translation and incorporation of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.155 requirements f) Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history g) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications h) Mechanical design calculationsfuel oil consumption, starting air capacity, and cooling requirements i) Surveillance testing and recent test results j) Electrical calculations
- (3) 120 VDC Bus 2A-1 a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Protection against flooding d) Protection against a seismic event e) Maintenance effectiveness f) Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history g) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications h) Bus loading and voltage calculations i) Inverter and bus capacity design j) Overcurrent protection and coordination k) Inverter and constant voltage transformer overcurrent capability l) Protective device selection and settings m) Inverter operation and alarm response procedures n) Surveillance testing
- (4) Battery Chargers (2 and 2A)a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Protection against flooding d) Protection against a seismic event e) Maintenance effectiveness f) Component health, corrective maintenance, and corrective action history g) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications h) Bus loading and voltage i) Inverter and bus capacity j) Overcurrent protection and coordination k) Inverter and constant volt transformer overcurrent capability l) Protective device selection and settings m) Inverter operation and alarm response procedure n) Surveillance testing
- (5) 345kV/4.28kV Reserve Auxiliary Transformer a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Protection against flooding d) Protection against a seismic event e) Maintenance effectiveness f) System health reports g) Component health, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history h) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications i) Bus loading and voltage design j) Inverter and bus capacity k) Surveillance testing l) Overcurrent protection and coordination m) Protective device selection and settings n) Inverter operation and alarm response procedure o) Load tap changer testing and calibration p) Load tap charger design and supporting calculation review q) Electrical calculations Load flow and voltage drop Motor control center contactor temperature effects and environmental equipment Degraded and loss of voltage protection Protective relay and breaker settings and coordination Short circuit and overload capacity and capability analysis Emergency diesel generator dynamic calculations
Component Large Early Release Frequency (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 HPCI Stop Check Valve (2-2301-74)a) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown)b) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures c) Maintenance effectiveness d) Component health, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history e) Consistency between station documentation (e.g., procedures) and vendor specifications f) Surveillance and Inservice Testing procedures, acceptance criteria, and results
Permanent Modification (4 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 404969; Motor Operated Valve 2-3906 to be Changed to a Manually Operated Valve;
- (3) EC 380281; Unit 2 and Unit 3 Safety-Related Motor Control Center Bucket Replacement Project; and
- (4) EC 331064; Replacement of the 125 VDC Battery Charger #2.
Operating Experience (3 Samples)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2005-30, Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design;
- (2) RIS 2011-12R1, Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages.
- (3) WCAP-17308-NP, Treatment of Diesel Generator (DG) Technical Specification Frequency and Voltage Tolerances.
Review of Previously Identified Inspection Issues
- (1) NCV 05000237/2015007-01; 05000249/2015007-01, Procedure Revisions Resulted in Isolation Condenser Unable to Meet Design Basis
- (2) NCV 05000237/2015007-02; 05000249/2015007-02, EDG Usable Fuel Calculations Failed to Consider Appropriate EDG Frequency Variations
- (3) NCV 05000237/2013007-01; 05000249/2013007-01; Adequate Voltage not Assured for EDG Air Start Solenoid Valve
- (4) NCV 05000237/2013007-02; 05000249/2013007-02, Non-conservative Sizing Calculation for Target Rock SRV Air Accumulators
- (5) NCV 05000237/2013007-03; 05000249/2013007-03, Failure to Ensure Functionality of HPCI Steam Supply Valve during an ATWS
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Ensure that Thermal Overload Relays are Sized Properly for Throttling Motor Operated Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Finding None IP 71111.21M NCV 05000249/2018012-01 Closed
Introduction:
The team identified a finding having very-low significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, Dresden had not verified that thermal overload relays (TOLs) on Unit 3 safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs) 3-1301-3, 3-1501-21A and 21B, 3-1501-18A & 18B, 3-1501-38A & 38B, 3-3-2301-10, 3-1501-3A & 3B, were properly sized to support the design function of repetitive jogging and throttling the valves in response to design basis transients or accidents.
Description:
The team noted that the Unit 3 safety-related MOVs 3-1301-3, 3-1501-21A &
21B, 3-1501-18A & 18B, 3-1501-38A & 38B, 3-3-2301-10, 3-1501-3A & 3B had design functions of repetitive jogging and/or throttling during a design basis event. The licensee sized the TOLs for the MOVs in accordance with Exelon Design Standard NES-EIC-10.02 but did not recognize that in Section 6.0, Note 2, that this procedure does not cover throttling valves, which have unique thermal overload performance requirements. It states that as a minimum, throttling valves must be able perform the required number of jogging operations without tripping the TOL. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) GL 89-10 Supplement 1 Question 21 states that the TOL should be set as to allow the MOV to perform its safety function and to be re-positioned if inadvertently operated. Additionally, Question 15 states that the licensee should review design basis information for each MOV in the program to identify whether, when and how often the MOV must be opened or closed. As a result, the licensees sizing calculations only addressed the requirement that the MOV must have the capability to recover from a mis-positioned MOV, hence a two stroke capability, but did not address any additionally jogging/throttling requirements for the above MOVs. This design deficiency is also applicable to Unit 2 MOVs that have jogging/throttling functions during a Design Bases Accident.
Operations have guidance in DOP 0040-01, Station MOV Operations, Section F.4, to limit to a maximum of five starts within one minute followed by a minimum 30-minute cooling off time, but if they do not exceed 5 starts in a minute, the cooldown period does not apply. Licensee Task Training Module 1LTS001 Section V.A.2.b states that it is very easy to exceed 5 starts while trying to fine tune the parameters of a system. Therefore, the maximum of five starts within one minute is a precautionary limit, but the MOV could be operated more than five starts as long as they are spaced out over a period of time and dont exceed five starts in any one minute period. Thus the procedure is inadequate in providing adequate protection for the MOVs during jogging/throttling operations. Limitorque provided guidance in a September 30, 1994 letter that states that for the standard motor design and thermal capabilities of MOVs supplied by Limitorque would allow 10 consecutive starts for 3-phase AC motors before a cooling period is required before subsequent restarting.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has actions for Engineering to
- (1) evaluate the guidance in DOP 0040-01 to assure that the jogging/throttling MOV operations does not challenge the TOLs and
Corrective Action Reference: AR 04117052
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the licensees failure to ensure that the TOLs on numerous safety-related MOVs were properly sized to support the design function of repetitive jogging and throttling of the MOVs in response to design basis events was a performance deficiency since it was reasonable for the licensee to have foreseen and prevent and was associated with a regulatory requirement.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the finding was more-than-minor because the failure to assure the TOLs were properly sized and periodically tested could have affected the capability of the MOVs to respond to the initiating events.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems.
Cross-cutting Aspect: None identified.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, as of March 20, 2018, measures had not been established to verify and ensure that TOLs for safety-related MOVs that have a jogging/throttling design function would not inadvertently trip and adversely affect MOV operation when responding to design basis events.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a NCV with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.
On April 4, 2018, the inspectors presented the final inspection results during the exit meeting to Mr. Washko, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
- AR 01544149; Unit 2 125 VDC Battery Cell 21 Debris in Cell; 08/07/2013
- AR 01490540; Work Order Needed to Replace 125 VDC Distribution Panel Breakers;
03/21/2013
- OP-DR-102-106; Operator Response Time Program at Dresden; Revision 9
- OP-AA-102-106; Operator Response Time Program; Revision 4
- MA-AB-725-114; PM ON Merlin Gerin G26 Type SF6 4KV Breakers; Revision 11
- NES-EIC-10.02; Standard for TOL Element Selection for MOVs; Revision 0;
- DES 7300-05; Maint and Surveillance of EQ and SR 480V MCC; Revision 34
- MA-DR-725-113; Inspect & Maint of GE 4KV Magne-Blast Breakers; Revision 8
- DOP 0040-01; Station MOV Operations; Revision 39
- TID-E/I&C-02; TOL Selection for MOVS; Revision 0
- ER-AA-410-1000; Air Operated Valve Categorization; Revision 3
- DEOP 0500-04; Containment Venting; Revision 17
- DEOP 0200-01; Primary Containment Control; Revision 13
- DOP 6620-06; Powering Unit 345 kV Buses via the SBO DG 3; Revision 23
- DGA 12; Loss of Offsite Power; Revision 78
- DGA 13; Loss of 125 VDC Battery Chargers with Simultaneous Loss of Auxiliary Electrical
Power; Revision 21
- TL 7002.04; Reinhausen LTC Type RMV-II; Revision. 0
- TID-E/I&C-02; TOL Relay Element Selection for MOVs; Revision 0
- NES-MS-06.6; MOV Valve Factors; Revision 1
- NES-EIC-10.02; Standard for TOL Selection for MOVs; Revision 0
- 1276061-05; OPEX Eval - RIS 2011-12R1 ; 02/22/2012
- RS-06-036; 60 Day Response to NRC GL 2006-02; 04/03/2006
- RS-07-002; Request for RAI Regarding GL 2006-02; 01/31/2007
- SQUG; Equipment Class #15; Revision 2A
- Nutherm - 480V MCC Bucket Replacement; 01/17/2008
- 6683; Nutherm Baseline Test of Contactors; Revision 1
- Validation Package TSA 3; 06/04/2013
- Validation Package TSA 5; 06/04/2013
- Validation Package TSA 6; 06/04/2013
- Validation Package TSA 32; 06/15/2016
- Validation Package TCA 16; 06/03/2013
- EC 331064; Replacement of the 125 VDC Battery Charger #2; Revision 0
- EC 0000405449; Reconfigure the 2/3 EDG HVAC Dampers and Related Items to Fail Open on
a Loss of Instrument Air; Revision 0
- EC 382146, Replacement of Instrument Power Inverter 111 (1IP05E) and Connection to
Division 11 Constant Voltage Transformer (CVT) (1IP01E)
- EC 3200281; U2/3 SR 480V MCC Bucket Replacement; Revision 007
- EC 381954; Addendum to add LTC Max Travel Time Req; Revision 0
- DR-MISC-39; Time Sensitive Operator Actions - PRA Model Revision DR213A; Revision 1
- DR-MISC-39; Time Sensitive Operator Actions - PRA Model Revision DR213A; Revision 2
- OPTIMA2-TR051DR-ATWS; ATWS Analysis for the Introduction of SVEA-96 Optima Fuel at
Dresden Units 2 & 3; Revision 0
- Unit 2 125 VDC Main Battery Modified Performance Test; Emergency Drywell Makeup with the
Portable Diesel Fire Pump; Revision 4
- Unit 2 125 VDC Main Station Battery Service Test; Revision 25
- DRE03-0025; Baseline Calculation for 125 VDC ELMS-DC Conversion to DCSDM; Revision 0
- DRE04-0019 ; U3 - Auxiliary Power Analysis; Revision 7
- 8982-17-19-2; U3 - Second Level UV Relay Setpoint; Revision 4
- DAN 903-8C4; 4KV Bus 33-1 Degraded Voltage Surv; Revision 15
- 004-E-032; Units 2&3 TOL Review; Revision 2
- DR-019-E-002; 4KV Bus 23-1/33-1 & 24-1/34-1 Coordination; Revision 3A
- DRE13-0001 ; Validation of TOL Relay Sizes during a DV; Revision 0
- DRE05-0081; U3 MCC Breaker Settings - Motors and MOVs; Revision 2
- DRE02-0034; U3 MOV AC Motor Terminal Voltage Calc; Revision 1
- 7317-43-19-1; SBO DG Loading Study; Revision 10
- 8982-17-19-3; Adequacy of MCC Contactor Circuits; Revision 2
- DR-CID-29; Instrument Air Supply Pressure Switch; Revision 0
- M-356; Diagram of Pressure Suppression Pipping
- M-49; Diagram of Standby Gas Treatment
- M-25; Diagram of Pressure Suppression Pipping
- ISI-203 Sheet 2; Inservice Inspection Class II High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
- 12-10-90780; General Arrangement Pneumatic or Hydraulic Cylinder Operated Limit Switch
Model 2fii Rubber Seat Butterfly Valve; Revision 1
- M-374; Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
- M-51; Diagram of High Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
- 12E-7829A; Chemistry Building Single Line Power Distribution; Revision A
- 12E-3377D; Schematic Diagram RAT32; Revision A
- 12E-6869D; Station Blackout - One Line Diagram ; Revision. D
- 12E-2301-3; 4KV Bus 23-1/34-1 and EDG 2 & 2/3; Revision AZ
- 12E-2301-1; Main Power Transformer and UAQ21 & RAT 22; Revision AS
- 12E-3301; Single Line Diagram; Revision AQ
- 262LN001-1; AC Distribution One Line Diagram; Revision 01
- P-445968 Sheet 1; Globe Non-Return Valve General Assembly Fig 6504y
- M-64; El 570-0
- 12e-2328; Single Line Diagram Emergency Power System
- M-974; Diagram of Diesel Generator Room Ventilation
- DOS 7000-16; Local Leak Rate Testing of Unit 2 (3) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
System Valves; Revision 04
- DOS 1600-24; Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger and RWCU Areas Primary Containment Vent and
Purge Isolation Valves Low Supply Air Pressure Switch Calibration; Revision 02
- Dos 7000-08; Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Isolation Valves; Revision 13
- Samg-2; RPV, Containment, And Radioactivity Release Control; Revision 03
- Dresden AOV Program Notebook
- Globe and Angle Non-Return (Stop-Check) Valves Cast Steel 300 Lb 720 Lb Wog
- IST-Dre-Bdoc-V-21; Dresden - Inservice Testing Bases Document; 11/01/2013
- 6" 2fii Dimensional Data for Commonwealth Edison Dresden Plant Tags 2(3)-1601-63
Commonwealth Edison Company P/O 00013597; 07/12/2000
- Dresden Evaluation 77019; 2(3)-1601-63 (A12), Actuators Associated with Containment Vent
And Purge Isolation Valves
- D2r25 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Total Leakage Summation: Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT)
Results
- D2r23 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Total Leakage Summation
- D2r24 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Total Leakage Summation: Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT)
Results
- Containment Purge and Vent Valves Operability and Radiological Consequences Of LOCA
While Purging (Tac 59864, 59865, 59866, 59867, 42580, 42581, 42608, 42574); 02/28/1986
- Issuance of Amendment TS Related To 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B (Tac Nos.
M94061, M94062, M94065, and M94066); 01/11/1996
- Issuance of Amendment TS - Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 And 3, One-Time
Extension of Containment Type A Leak Test Interval (Tac Nos. Mc1796 And Mc1797);
10/13/2004
- WO 01900549; D2 24m/Rfl TS Locked Valve Verification; 11/15/2017
- WO 01693190; D2 24m/Rfl TS Locked Valve Verification; 11/19/2015
- WO 01692488; D2 60m/2rfl TS LLRT Vlv 2301-74 HPCI Turbine Exhaust; 10/31/2017
- WO 01689814; D2 60m/2rfl TS LLRT Dbl Gasket Seal #1 Pen X-317a HPCI; 10/30/2017
- WO 01490361; D2 24m/Rfl TS Locked Valve Verification; 11/27/2013
- WO 01446522; D2 6rfl Pm Inspect HPCI TB Exhaust Stop Check Valve 2-2301-74;
01/06/2014
- WO 01779641-01; 24 Month TS 125vdc Station Main Battery Service Test; 02/26/2017
- WO 01288053; D2 60m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 2301-74 HPCI Turbine Exhaust ; 11/15/2013
- WO 01285919; D2 60m/Rfl TS LLRT Dbl Gsket Seal #1 Pen X-317a HPCI; 11/13/2013
- WO 01092205; D2 60m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 2301-74 HPCI Turbine Exhaust; 11/15/2009
- WO 01079228; D2 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Dbl Gsket Seal #1 Pen X-317a HPCI; 11/12/2009
- WO 00634204; D2 60m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 2301-74 HPCI Turbine Exhaust; 11/01/2007
- WO 04688222; D3 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 12/12/2017
- WO 01898265; D3 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63, Flanges; 11/08/2016
- WO 01883881; D2 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purge; 11/04/2017
- WO 01876935; D2 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63 & Flanges; 11/05/2017
- WO 01861958; D2 2y TS (IST) Verify Remote Cnmt Valve Position Indication; 11/17/2017
- WO 01803682; D3 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purge; 11/11/2016
- WO 01790593; D3 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 02/05/2015
- WO 01790563; D3 2y/Rfl IST Verify Remote Inaccess Vlv Position Ind; 11/16/2016
- WO 01768439; D3 24m/Rfl TS (IST) Verify Remote Valve Position Ind; 11/11/2016
- WO 01605461; D2 4rfl Replace Actuator and Accessories 2-1601-63; 11/23/2013
- WO 00597796; D3 4rfl Replace Actuator and Accessories 3-1601-63; 11/27/2012
- WO 00597795; D2 4rfl Replace Actuator and Accessories 2-1601-63; 11/09/2011
- WO 01491718; D3 30m TS Primary Containment Type B&C Leakage Rate Test Summary;
2/07/2012
- WO 01783881; OAP RFL COM Calibrate Auto LTC and 90 Relay; 03/17/2016
- WO 01411280; PM Inspection of TR32 LTC; 04/14/2012
- WO 01597351; UV and ECCS Integrated Functional Test; 10/14/2014
- WO 04701604; SBO EDG Surveillance Test; 12/28/2017
- WO 01451486; 4YR Inspection 4 KV Breaker; 07/21/2016
- WO 01783881; Calibrate RAT32 LTC and 90Relay; 03/17/2016
- WO 04688222; D3 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 12/12/2017
- WO 04645878; D3 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 09/17/2017
- WO 04606229; D3 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 05/31/2017
- WO 01898265; D3 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63, Flanges; 11/08/2016
- WO 01601281; D3r22 As Left LLRT 3-1601-24 Exceeds Admin Limit; 11/12/2014
- WO 01594654; D3 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24,63,2599-5a,5b & Flanges; 11/10/2014
- WO 01803682; D3 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purge; 11/11/2016
- WO 01597306; D3 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purge; 11/14/2014
- WO 04682173; D2 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 11/18/2017
- WO 04645879; D2 Qtr TS Valve Timing (IST); 09/05/2017
- WO 01861958; D2 2y TS (IST) Verify Remote Cnmt Valve Position Indication; 11/17/2017
- WO 01876935; D2 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63 & Flanges; 11/05/2017
- WO 01693785; D2 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63 & Flanges; 11/09/2015
- WO 01487548; D2 30m/Rfl TS LLRT Vlv 1601-24, 63 & Flanges; 11/17/2013
- WO 01883881; D2 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purge; 11/04/2017
- WO 01715266; D2 24m/Rfl TS AOV Accum Integrity Test Of Cont Vent & Purg; 11/17/2015
- WO 01654037; D3 24m TS Fp Hx & RWCU Areas Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv Ps Cal;
06/10/2015
- WO 01568220; D2 24m TS Fuel Pool Hx & RWCU Area Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv P;
2/02/2015
- WO 01341910; D2 24m TS Fuel Pool Hx & RWCU Area Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv P ;
08/22/2012
- WO 01805310; D2 24m TS Fuel Pool Hx & RWCU Area Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv P;
06/02/2017
- WO 01886574; D3 24m TS Fp Hx & RWCU Areas Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv Ps Cal;
11/27/2017
- WO 01418802; D3 24m TS Fp Hx & RWCU Areas Pri Cnmt Purge/Vent Vlv Ps Cal;
06/06/2013
Corrective Action Documents Generated as a Result of the Inspection
- AR 4111988; DBAI 2018: Typographical Error in Calculation DRES 15-0069; 03/06/2018
- AR 4111979; NRC DBAI 2018: OP-DR-102-106 does not Reference DGA-22; 03/06/2018
- AR 4111963; NRC DBAI 2018: OP-DR-102-106 Typographical Error Identified; 03/06/2018
- AR 4112266; NRC Identified SCO Bar Over Tool Location Improvement; 03/07/2018
- AR 4112716; 2018 DBAI: MOV Terminal Voltage Calculation Deficiencies; 03/08/2018
- AR 4112430; 2018 DBAI NRC Identified HSK Issues U3 RWCU Valve Gallery; 03/07/2018
- AR 4112429; 2018 DBAI NRC Identified HSK Issues U2 RWCU Valve Gallery; 03/07/2018
- AR 4112825; 2018 DBAI Identified EDG Trending Improvement Opportunity; 03/08/2018
- AR 4112847; 2018 DBAI HPCI System SR Electrical Equipment not in EQ Program;
03/08/2018
- AR 4113279; DBAI 2018: D3 RFL PM WO Testing RAT 32 LTC; 03/09/2018
- AR 4113277; DBAI 2018: 2014 Battery Mod Perf Test with Outdated Load Profile; 03/09/2018
- AR 4113898; NRC DBAI Question 44 SBO; 03/12/2018
- AR 4113952; DBAI 2018: Duplicate Maintenance Proc for 4kV Magna-Blast Cir Bkr;
03/12/2018
- AR 4112455; DBAI 2018: Create EPN for 125 VDC Dist. PNL #5 in SBO Building; 03/13/2018
- AR 4114080; DBAI 2018: Enhance Procedures for 125 VDC Battery Testing; 03/12/2018
- AR 4114488; DBAI 2018: Require Calculation for RAT32 LTC Control Power; 03/13/2018
- AR 4114932; DBAI 2018: DWG Discrepancy for 125 VDC Distr PNL 5 in SBO; 03/14/2018
- AR 4114942; Seismic Qualification Documentation for 125 VDC Dist Panel 5 (SBO);
03/14/2018
- AR 4115809; 2018 DBAI: ATD-0400 U2/3 EDG Jacket Water Cooler Revision; 03/16/2018
- AR 4115816; 2018 DBAI: Evaluate Revision to DRE15-0069 EDG Freq Calc; 03/16/2018
- AR 4116535; DBAI 2018: ATWS Actions Stated as TSAs vs TCAs; 03/19/2018
- AR 4117006; DBAI 2018: Determine Voltage to Test U3 SBO Crosstie Breaker; 03/20/2018
- AR 4117052; DBAI 2018: Clarify DOP0040-01 Operation of Throttling Valves; 03/20/2018
- AR 4117137; DBAI 2018: Evaluate Revision to EDG Surveillance Procedure; 03/20/2018
- AR 4117166; DBAI 2018: Maintenance Guidance When MOV Program Uses EPRI PPM;
03/20/2018
- AR 4117614; DBAI 2018; Test Inconsistency for CAT ID 10551 (DRE-69965); 03/21/2018
- AR 4117863; DBAI 2018: Review Design Inputs to MIDAS Calculation; 03/22/2018
- AR 4118009; DBAI 2018: TR32 & TR86 LTC PM Timing Test; 03/22/2018
- AR 4118067; DBAI 2018: Documentation Error in WO 1656485; 03/22/2018
- AR 4118085; 2018 DBAI: Multiple References for PS 2(3)1641-63; 03/22/2018
May 7, 2018
Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3NRC DESIGN BASES
ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2018012
AND 05000249/2018012
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 23, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial
Baseline Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station,
Units 2 and 3. On April 4, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection
with Mr. Washko, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this
inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified one issue that was evaluated under
the risk significance determination process as having very-low safety significance (Green). The
NRC has also determined a violation associated with this issue. Because the licensee initiated
a condition report to address this issue, the violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation
(NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in the
subject inspection report.
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within
days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the
NRC Resident Inspector at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
B. Hanson -2-
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, and Requests for
Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark Jeffers, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249;72-037
Enclosure:
IR 05000237/2018012; 05000249/2018012
cc: Distribution via ListServ
B. Hanson -3-
Letter to Bryan
SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3NRC DESIGN BASES
ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2018012
AND 05000249/2018012