IR 05000245/2017007

Millstone Power Station - Design Bases Assurance (Environmental Qualification Program) Inspection Report 05000336/2017007 and 05000423/2017007

ML17256A586
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	09/13/2017
From:	Dentel G T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Stoddard D G Dominion Energy
Dentel G T
References
IR 2017007
Download: ML17256A586 (19)

Text

September 13, 2017

Mr. Daniel Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Energy, Inc.

Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Blvd. Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE (ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION PROGRAM) INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2017007 AND 05000423/2017007

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On August 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Millstone Power Station (Millstone), Units 2 and 3. On August 31, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. John Daugherty, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance of the non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis of your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC, 20555-

0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423 License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000336/2017007 and 05000423/2017007

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY

IR 05000336/2017007 and 05000423/2017007; 07/31/2017 - 08/17/2017; Millstone Power Station; Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs). This report covers the Design Bases Assurance Inspection - Programs, conducted by a team of three U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors. The inspection team identified one non-cited violation, which was of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White,

Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspection team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, "Procedures," because Dominion did not implement procedures as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A.9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance," to properly maintain the environmental qualification of safety-related auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS. Specifically, Dominion failed to implement the recurring work event task and associated work order to ensure that these auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves were replaced prior to exceeding the qualified life of the solenoid coil and elastomer components. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 1076005, planned replacement of the solenoid valves, and calculated an alternate ambient temperature for use in determining the qualified life of the solenoid valves. Dominion re-performed the qualified life calculation using this revised ambient temperature and extended the qualified life to support operability. The inspection team determined that this issue was more than minor because it adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This issue is also similar to more-than-minor examples 3.j and 3.k presented in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." Specifically, this performance deficiency resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt as to the operability and reliability of the solenoid valves for both auxiliary feedwater regulating valves, and thus, both trains of auxiliary feedwater. As such, Dominion needed to conduct additional engineering evaluation to extend the service life of the solenoid valves, thus justifying that the valves would continue to perform their safety function. The inspection team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the reliability of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The inspection team determined that no cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current performance. (Section 1R21.2.b)

3

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R21 Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs)

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The inspection team assessed the implementation of Dominion's Environmental Qualification program, established to meet the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." The inspection team performed this inspection as outlined in NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21N, Attachment 1, "Environmental Qualification under 10 CFR 50.49 Programs, Processes, and Procedures." The inspection team reviewed safety-related equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events, non-safety-related components whose failure could prevent safety-related equipment from performing design functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment. The inspection team then determined which component's environment would be adversely affected by postulated post-accident environmental conditions (temperature, pressure, radiation level, or flood level) and reviewed information contained in Millstone's Probabilistic Risk Assessment and the NRC's Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model for Millstone to determine risk significant components that were also required to meet environmental qualification requirements. Additionally, the inspection team interviewed plant staff, reviewed design records, and discussed the environmental qualification program with the resident inspectors to assist in the selection of components. Finally, the inspection team ensured that different types of components were selected, including pump motors, motor-operated valves, solenoid valves, limit switches, and flow/level transmitters that were located both inside and outside of primary containment. Based on these reviews, the inspection team selected nine environmentally-qualified components and associated subcomponents (e.g., seals, cables, connectors, and lubricants) for inspection.

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team assessed Dominion's implementation of the environmental qualification program required by 10 CFR 50.49. The inspection team reviewed environmental qualification program-related procedures, component files, test records, equipment maintenance and operating history, maintenance and operating procedures, vendor documents, design documents, previously identified deficiencies, and design calculations. The inspection team also interviewed plant staff knowledgeable of the design, maintenance, and operation of the selected components. The review and associated interviews were performed to evaluate whether Dominion's staff properly maintained the equipment qualifications for electrical equipment important to safety through plant life (repair, replacement, modification, and plant life extension); established and maintained required 4 environmental qualification documentation records; and implemented an effective corrective action program to identify and correct environmental qualification-related deficiencies and evaluate environmental qualification-related industry operating experience. The inspection team also performed walkdowns (where accessible) of selected components to verify whether equipment was installed as described in Millstone's environmental qualification component documentation files, the environmental conditions were consistent with those assumed in the evaluations, equipment surrounding environmentally qualified component could fail in a manner that would prevent the component's safety function from being performed, and whether the components were installed in their tested configuration. The inspection team reviewed the following components and associated subcomponents:

Unit 2 'B' Containment Sump Outlet Header Isolation Motor Operated Valve (M22-CS-16.1B) Actuator, terminal block, cables, limit switches Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter to 'C' Reactor Protection System/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (M2PT-102C) Pressure transmitter, cables, splices, and penetration assembly 'A' Containment Air Recirculation Cooling Unit Fan Motor (M2F14AM) Fan motor, lubricant, and penetration assembly Enclosure Building Filtration System Fan Motor (M2-F25BM) Fan motor, splice, and cables #1 Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Regulating Solenoid (M22-FW-43AS) Solenoid valve, cables Unit 3 Power Operated Relief Valve (M33RCS*PCV455A) Solenoid, connector, conductor seal, gasket, cables Reactor Coolant System Resistance Temperature Detector to Loop 3 Delta- Temperature/Average Temperature Alarm, Indication, and Control Element (M33RCS*TE431A) Temperature detector, instrument cable, splice, and penetration assembly Charging and Reactor Plant Closed Cooling Water Area Electric Unit Heaters (M33HVR*UHE3A) Heater assembly, contactors, transformer, temperature control cutout, thermostat Main Steam Relief Valve 3MSS*RV23C Flow Element (M33SVV-FE29C) Flow element, qualified connecting cable, connector, and cable In addition to the inspection of the selected components, the inspection team performed general plant walkdowns to determine whether components located in areas susceptible 5 to a high energy line break were properly evaluated for operation in a harsh environment. The inspection team also reviewed procurement records and inspected a sample of replacement parts stored in the warehouse to verify environmentally qualified parts approved for installation in the plant were properly identified and controlled; and that storage time and environmental conditions did not adversely affect the components' qualified life or service life. Finally, the inspection team reviewed a sample of components that had been removed from the environmental qualification program to determine if Dominion had correctly determined that the components no longer were required to meet 10 CFR 50.49. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspection team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, "Procedures," because Dominion did not implement procedures as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A.9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance," to properly maintain the environmental qualification of safety-related auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS.

Description.

The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to provide feedwater to the steam generators following a loss of main feedwater, and to isolate the affected steam generator on a main steam line break or a high energy line break in the turbine building.

Each normally closed, air-operated auxiliary feedwater regulating valve (2-FW-43A and 2-FW-43B) is provided with a normally energized ASCO solenoid valve (2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS). This solenoid valve is required to de-energize to vent air from its regulating valve, allowing spring force to open the auxiliary feedwater regulating valve to perform its function. These solenoid valves are located in the turbine building, and as such, in a harsh environment in which they are expected to perform their post-accident function. These solenoid valves and associated subcomponents are therefore included in the scope of Millstone's environmental qualification program, and are subject to its requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.

In order to qualify the solenoid valves and associated subcomponents to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, ASCO tested the solenoid valves to provide assurance that they would perform their post-accident function when subjected to their most limiting harsh environment. Qualification of the valves was documented in qualification test report AQR-67368, "Qualification of ASCO NP-1 Solenoid Operated Valves for Safety Related Applications in Nuclear Power Stations." Dominion incorporated this information into their environmental qualification program as Equipment Qualification Record 114-01. Attachment B of Equipment Qualification Record 114-01 stated that the ASCO solenoid valves and coils must be replaced at intervals not to exceed the qualified life, and that the subcomponents with the most limiting service lives were the solenoid coil at 20.7 years, and the elastomer (ethylene propylene diene monomer) components at 21.4 years. The inspection team requested evidence that documented that Dominion had replaced these subcomponents within their qualified life period. Dominion was unable to provide this documentation, and their review of the work management program indicated that the solenoid valves in question (2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS) were last replaced on October 30, 1992, and October 21, 1992, respectively. The inspection team determined that the solenoid coils and elastomer subcomponents for both valves had exceeded their 6 qualified life, representing a non-conforming condition and reasonable doubt as to the ability of these solenoid valves to perform their function in their credited harsh environment. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 1076005 and evaluated the impact of the solenoid valves not being replaced within their required environmental qualification replacement period. The original qualified life of the solenoid valves was based on an ambient temperature of 100°F year-round, as documented in calculation EQQLACSO-0582-E2. Based on an engineering review of this information, as well as calibrated ambient temperature monitoring data taken in the associated environmental qualification zone in the 1999 - 2000 timeframe, Dominion calculated an alternate ambient temperature of 91.4°F for use in determining the qualified life of the solenoid valve components. Using this revised ambient temperature, Dominion extended the qualified life of the solenoid coil and the elastomer subcomponents to 26 years and 32.6 years, respectively, which extended the replacement dates to October 2018 for the solenoid coil and October 2024 for the elastomer subcomponents. Dominion revised station documentation to reflect that the installed auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves (2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS) were within their qualified service life. Dominion also concluded that the operability of the auxiliary feedwater valves was not impacted and that solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS would have been able to perform their safety function during a postulated accident or event. The inspection team reviewed this information and determined that Dominion's revised environmental qualification service life values to support operability were reasonable.

Dominion also initiated an apparent cause evaluation to evaluate the cause and develop associated corrective actions. Dominion procedure ER-AA-102, "Preventive Maintenance Program," establishes requirements and guidelines for development, implementation, and maintenance of the preventive maintenance program at Millstone to ensure plant equipment is maintained at a quality level to perform its intended function. Preventive maintenance activities are included in the recurring work event database maintained by the station's work management program. The inspection team noted that Millstone's work management program included a recurring work event to ensure that the solenoid valve (2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS) replacements were planned to occur prior to the end of qualified life. However, it was not clear why the solenoid valve replacements did not occur. The inspection team did note that in 2006, there were two open work orders associated with the recurring work event to perform solenoid replacement. On October 11, 2006, one of the work orders (53M20608835) was closed to the second work order (M2-05-00183). However, the second work order was inadvertently closed a few months later, without the task ever being performed.

Analysis.

The inspection team determined that the failure to replace safety-related solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS within the required environmental qualification frequency, as designated by the preventive maintenance recurring work event for the solenoid valves, was a performance deficiency. The inspection team determined that this issue was more than minor because it adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This issue is also similar to more-than-minor examples 3.j and 3.k presented in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." Specifically, this performance deficiency resulted in a condition where there 7 was reasonable doubt as to the operability and reliability of the solenoid valves for both auxiliary feedwater regulating valves, and thus, both trains of auxiliary feedwater. As such, Dominion needed to conduct additional engineering evaluation to extend the service life of the solenoid valves, thus justifying that the valves would continue to perform their safety function.

The inspection team evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," for the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power." The inspection team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the reliability of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. Specifically, the safety function of the auxiliary feedwater system was not lost based upon an engineering review which extended the qualified life of the solenoid coil and the elastomer subcomponents to 26 years and 32.6 years, respectively. This extended the replacement dates to October 2018 for the solenoid coil and October 2024 for the elastomer subcomponents. The inspection team determined that no cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current performance.

Enforcement.

Technical Specification 6.8.1, "Procedures," requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for activities described in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements."

Section 9 of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A includes procedures for performing maintenance, including replacement of parts that have a specific lifetime. Dominion procedure ER-AA-102, "Preventive Maintenance Program," Section 3.5, requires that the station perform all recurring work event tasks in accordance with the work management program, as well as monitor and track scheduled preventive maintenance tasks until completion. Contrary to the above, from May 2013 to August 17, 2017, Dominion failed to implement the recurring work event task and associated work order to ensure that auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS were replaced within their qualified life. Specifically, auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS were installed in October 1992, and should have been replaced or reevaluated prior to exceeding the qualified life of the solenoid coil and elastomer components. Because this issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and Dominion has taken corrective actions and entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 1076005, this finding is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000336/2017007-01, Failure to Replace Auxiliary Feedwater Solenoid Valves within the Required Frequency)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed a sample of problems that Dominion had previously identified and entered into the corrective action program. The inspection team reviewed a sample of these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. Additionally, the 8 inspection team evaluated whether deficiencies identified during the inspection were properly documented and evaluated in the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On August 31, 2017, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. John Daugherty, Site Vice President, and other members of the Dominion staff. The inspection team verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Dominion Personnel

J. Daugherty, Site Vice President

P. Anastas, Backup Environmental Qualification Program Coordinator

J. Armstrong, Fire Protection and FLEX Engineer

D. Bajumpaa, Engineer - Nuclear Safety Analysis

C. Baker, Stock Handler

B. Clezynski, Engineer - Instrumentation and Controls

J. Craffey, Principal Engineer

C. Cramer, Plant Equipment Operator

M. Farrell, Supervisor of Procurement Engineering Services

G. Filippides, Electrical Engineering Consultant

W. Gorman, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor

B. Hayes, Contractor

T. Hendy, Manager - License Renewal Programs

N. Jaycox, Environmental Qualification Program Owner

L. Kelly, Manager - Engineering Programs

S. Larrea, Special Projects Engineer

M. Long, Warehouse Supervisor

D. Milhalko, Engineering Intern

J. Patel, Building System Engineer

R. Patel, Electrical Engineer

J. Rigatti, Engineering Program Manager

E. Stanistreet, Engineer

NRC Personnel

L. McKown, Resident Inspector - Millstone

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened/Closed

05000336/2017007-01 NCV Failure to Replace Auxiliary Feedwater Solenoid Valves within the Required Frequency (Section 1R21.2.b)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations

97-EBF-01948-M2, EBFS Fans Static Pressure Requirements and Pressure Drop, Revision 00 98-ENG-02669-E2, Ampacities of Cables in Ladder Trays Filled Greater than 35%, with Covers, Revision 00 98-ENG-02678-E2, Cable Size Assessment for Class 1E Cables and Select Non-Class 1E Cables (4160 VAC, 480 VAC, 120 V Vital AC and 125 V DC), Revision 0, Addendums 1

and 2

Calculation 97-169, RBCCW MP2 Design Basis Flow Distribution, Revision 5 Calculation 97-169, RBCCW MP2 Design Basis Flow Distribution, Revision 5, Addendum A

Calculation EQQLASCO-02582-E2,

MP2-Qualified life of ASCO Solenoid Valves, Revision 3 Calculation T-02428S2, Millstone Unit 2 Turbine Building High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analysis, Revision 2

CN-EQT-06-40, Millstone (NEU) Charging Pump Motor (Shop Order 75F47155) Life Calculation, Revision 0 EQQLACSO-0582-E2, MP2 Qualified Life of ASCO Solenoid Valves, Revision 3

EQQLANCB-02602-E2, MP2 Qualified Life of Anaconda Cable, Revision 0

EQQLGMTR-02593-E2, MP2 Qualified Life of General Electric Motors, Revision 1 EQQLWMTR-02587-E2, MP2 Qualified Life of Westinghouse Motors, Revision 0, Addendum 2

Drawings

25203-26014 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Revision 48

203-24101, MP2 Containment & Aux Bldg -45'-6" Barrier Boundaries, Revision 4 25203-24103, MP2 Containment & Aux Bldg -25'-6" Barrier Boundaries, Revision 4

203-24105, MP2 Containment & Aux Bldg -5'-6" Barrier Boundaries, Revision 3

203-24107, MP2 Warehouse, Aux Bldg & Containment 14'-6" Barrier Boundaries, Revision 12 25203-24108, MP2 Warehouse, Aux Bldg & Containment Encl 14'-6" Map of Maps Boundaries, Revision 6 25203-24109, MP2 Warehouse, Aux Bldg & Containment 38'-6" Barrier Boundaries, Revision 8

203-26028, Sh. 1, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - Containment and Enclosure Building Ventilation, Revision 47 25203-28402, Sht. V22, Instrument Installation Detail for ASCO solenoid Valve Exhaust Port, Revision 2 25203-28500, Sht. 604B, Millstone Unit 2 Aux. Feedwater Flow Cont. Valve HV5279 (2-FW-43B) Loop Diagram, Revision 6 25203-30011, MP2 Emergency MCC B52 (22-2E) Facility Z1 Load Summary Aux Bldg 36'-6" (N3 19.5), Revision 10 25203-30011, MP2 Emergency MCC B52 (22-2E) Facility Z2 Load Summary Aux Bldg 36'-6" (F3 17.2), Revision 7 25203-32012, Sht. 21, Millstone Unit 2 Aux. Feedwater Flow Cont. Valve HV5276 (2-FW-43A) Loop Diagram, Revision 14 25203-32012, Sht. 44, Millstone Unit 2 Automatic Initiation for Aux. Feedwater Facility Z1, Revision 9 25212-20170, Sht. 1, Pressurizer Spray Safety & Relief Valve Piping, Revision 11 25212-27131, MP3 Plant Fire Radiation & Pressure Boundaries, 3'-6", Revision 11

212-27132, MP3 Plant Fire Radiation & Pressure Boundaries, 24'-6", Revision 30

212-27133, MP3 Plant Fire Radiation & Pressure Boundaries, 38'-6", Revision 14

7852-10000, Sh. 1, Feedthrough/Adapter Module Assembly Millstone NGS Unit 2

Equipment Qualification Records

EQR 102-0-1, Penetration Assembly, Revision 6

EQR 102-02, Penetration Assembly - Low Voltage Power, Revision 4

EQR 105C, Equipment Qualification Record for Raychem (TYCO) Splices-Nuclear Cable Products, Revision 8

EQR 106-01, Foxboro N-E10 Series Transmitters, Revision 6

EQR 107-01, Equipment Qualification Record for Kerite Model FR (HI-70) Insulation and FR (HC-711) Jacket Control Cable, Revision 5

EQR 110-01, Equipment Qualification Record for Anaconda Model EPR Insulation/CSPE Jacket Low Voltage Power Cable, Revision 6

EQR 113-01, RBCCW Pump Motors, Revision 6

EQR 113-06, Enclosure Building Filtration System Fan Motor, Revision 4

EQR 114-01, Equipment Qualification Record for ASCO Solenoid Valves, Revision 11

EQR 115-01, Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motors (F14AM, F14BM, and F14DM), Revision 8

EQR 115-4-1, CVCS Charging Pump Motors, Revision 4

EQR 122-01, Equipment Qualification Record for Marathon Terminal Block Model 300 Series (Old Design), Revision 3

EQR 122-03, Equipment Qualification Record for Limitorque Limit Switch & Torque Switch Model-Fibrite Material, Revision 6

EQR 122-05, Equipment Qualification Record for Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuator, Revision 5

EQR 132-0-1, Resistance Temperature Detector / Element, Revision 8

EQR 139-01, Equipment Qualification Record for Brand Rex XLPE Insulated Wire & Cable with Hypalon Jacketed Cable, Revision 3

EQR 146-03, Equipment Qualification Record for Target Rock Model 05F-001 PORV Solenoid Valves, Revision 3

EQR 151-01, Equipment Qualification Record for Conax Electric Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) Model N-11001-32, N-11001-33, N-110006-33, N-11098-09 and N-11121-03, Revision 4

EQR 152-02, Equipment Qualification Record for Marathon Terminal Block Model 300 Series (New Design), Revision 3

EQR 162-01, Firewall III / Pyrotrol III Chemically XLPE Insulation & Neoprene Jacket (KXL-760D), Revision 4

EQR 162-1-1, Equipment Qualification Record for Rockbestos 600V and 300V XLPE Control Cable, Model Firewall III, SISF, Revision 5

EQR 169-0-1, Equipment Qualification Record for Okonite-FMR, 1 KV Power Cable, Revision 4

EQR 191-1-2, Flow Switch - Fluid Components Inc., Revision 2

EQR 223-0-1, Equipment Qualification Record for Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV), Position Indicating Device Model

DS-C-72046 (3750014), Revision 5

EQR 231-0-1, Equipment Qualification Record for EGS/Patel Connector Model

880701,

913601, and

913602, Revision 7

EQR 235-0-1, Auxiliary Building CHS/CCP Area Heaters and Thermostats, Revision 9

EQR 251-01, UCI Tape Splice, Revision 0

EQR 255-01, Various Greases, Revision 7

EQR 260C, Form Wound Motor Rewinds including Motor Leads, Revision 3

Vendor Test Reports and Test Report Assessments

AQR-67368, Qualification of ASCO

NP-1 Solenoid Operated Valves for Safety Related Applications in Nuclear Power Stations

EEQ-TRA-102.12, Test Report Assessment of Conax Test Report

IPS-556.2, Revision A, including Determination of Qualified Life and

DBE 50°C Equivalent Life of Conax Low Voltage Power Adapter Module for Millstone Unit 2, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-106.0, Foxboro Test Report 83-6076, Revision A, QOAAC11 Qualification Test Report of N-E10 Series Transmitters for Class 1E Qualification, dated 08/23/1983

EEQ-TRA-110.0, Qualified Life Qualification Procedure on

FR-EP Insulated Wire and Cable and the Basis for Establishing Time& Temperature Conditions for Qualified Life Simulation -

1, June 1981

EEQ-TRA-110.3, Test Report Assessment of Franklin Final Report F-C4350-3, including the Determination of Qualified Life and

DBE 50°C Life of Anaconda Cables, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-113.0, Test Report Assessment of GE Report

GEK-42842, dated December 1978, Revision 1

EEQ-TRA-113.2, Test Report Assessment of GE Report EqDE-69-1186, Revision 0, dated November 1986, including Determination of Qualified Life for the

GE 25HP Fan Drive Motor for Millstone Power Station, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-114.0, EEQ TRA for ASCO SOVs Isomedix Test Report AQS21678/TR, Revision 2

EEQ-TRA-115.0, Test Report Assessment of Westinghouse Report

WCAP-7829, including the Determination of Qualified Life and

DBE 50°C Equivalent Life of the Westinghouse Fan Cooler Motor, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-115.4, Test Report Assessment of Westinghouse Report

WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-A05A, Revision 0, dated 11/85, including Determination of Qualified Life and

DBE 50°C

Equivalent Life of Westinghouse Large Pump Motors for Outside Containment Applications, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-151.1, Test Report Assessment of Conax Test Report

IPS 353.0, Revision A, including Determination of Qualified Life and

DBE 50°C Equivalent Life of Viton Header Plate to Nozzle O-Ring used in Conax Electric Penetration Assemblies, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-223.0, Westinghouse Qualification Test Report

WCAP-8687, Supp. 2-H09A, Garrett (PORV) Solenoid Operated pilot valve and Position Indication Devise (Environment and Seismic Testing, Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-235.0, EEQ TRA for Chromalox Heater System, Revision 1

EEQ-TRA-235.1, EEQ TRA for Chromalox Heater System (Wyle Test Report 55079R07), Revision 0

EEQ-TRA-260.0, Form Wound Continuous Duty Motor Re-Wind Qualification-Schulz Electric, Revision 0 Fan Equipment Test Report (F-25B Encl Bldg Filter System), dated 02/06/1995

TRA 83-6076, Test Report Assessment for Foxboro Series N-E10 Pressure Transmitters including the determination of qualified life, dated February 25, 1997

Procedures

CM-AA-EQ-10, Fleet EQ Program Description, Revision 2

CM-MP-EQ-100, Environmental Qualification Program Implementation, Revision 3 C-MP-797B, EQ/Safety Related ASCO Solenoid Valve or Coil Replacement and Testing, Revision 3

EOP 2525, Standard Post-Trip Actions, Revision 28

ER-AA-102, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 11

IC 2418J, Foxboro/Weed N-E11 and N-E13 Series Transmitters Installation, Calibration, and Servicing, Revision 7

MP 3760FA, Pressurizer PORV Maintenance, Revision 11

MS-AA-PTE-401-1004, Commercial Grade Dedication, Revision 7

MS-AA-SLD-701, Shelf Life Evaluation and Control, Revision 3

MS-AA-WHR-401, Receiving, Revision 10

MS-AA-WHR-405, Material Identification and Marking, Revision 1

MS-AA-WHS-131, Storage and Handling, Revision 7

MS-AA-WHS-132, Control of Shelf life Material, Revision 2

MS-AA-WHS-133, In-storage Maintenance of Items, Revision 4

MS-AA-WHS-136, Supply Chain Management Foreign Material Inspection and Intrusion Prevention, Revision 2

SP 2605I, Containment Closeout Inspection, Revision 8

SP-EE-076, Electrical Inspection Handbook, Volume III, Revision 7 U2 EN7, Unit 2 High Energy Line Break (HELB) Barrier Inspection, Revision 003

Miscellaneous

24.0012-006, Evaluation of MP2 Containment Chemical Spray, Revision 1 25203-ER-03-0028, MP2 Containment Risk Significant Valve Review, Revision 1

203-ER-97-0006, Operability Requirements for Motors, the Hydrogen Recombiners, and Containment Radiation monitors at MP2, dated 10/29/98 25203-MP2-SFR, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Safety Functional Requirements Manual, Revision 11 25212-ER-04-0024, Unit 3 (3R09) Temperature Readings on PORVs at NOP/NOT, Revision 0

90-day Shelf life look-ahead query and report for expired storage materials, dated 07/31/17

97CAR-01914M2, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System - Containment Cooling Requirements during Normal Plant Operations, Revision 0

ACE 019493, Missed PM on MP18CM Charging Pump Motor, Revision 0

ACE 019652, Monthly PM Missed on M33EGS*EGB Emergency Diesel, Revision 0

ACE 019882, EEQ Required Work May have Been Missed for Charging / RPCCW Area Heaters, Revision 0 Assessment PIR1062504, Environmental Qualification Program at Millstone Station Commercial Grade Dedication under W.O. 53102385853; Single Row Radial Bearing S/C M3376691 for [M33SWP*P3B], Westinghouse Motor, 215T Frame for the MCC and Rod Control Area Booster Pump, dated 03/14/2012 Commercial Grade Dedication under W.O. 53102497034; Single Row Radial Bearing S/C M3646131 [M33CCE*P1A]; Westinghouse Motor, 182T Frame for the A Charging Pump Cooling Pump, dated 10/29/2014 DCN

DM3-00-0013-03, Update

EQR 235-0-1, Parts, effective 01/28/2002 Design Change Notice

DM2-01-2054-98, EEQ Modification to Solenoid Valve 2-FW-43AS, Limit Switches ZS5276-CL and ZS5276-OP,

Design Change Notice

DCN-PD 2-154-81, MCC Sealant Original Install, Revision 0

Design Change Notice

DM2-01-0267-99, Update EEQ Specification

SP-EE-352, Revision 4 to Incorporate Revised Environmental Qualification Master List (EQML), dated March 4, 1999

EIC-93-215, Memo from M. Wadkins to B. Tuthill, Review of Okonite Cable Population at Millstone Station in Cat I Applications (Response to NRC

IN 92-81), dated 05/14/1993 Engineering Change Request

ECR 25203-ER-98-0010, MP2 Tables of Design Basis Requirements for Certain Safety-Related Air Operated Valves, Accumulators and Accumulator Check Valves, Revision 1 Engineering Technical Evaluation

CM-AA-ETE-101, Unit 2 High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door Upgrades, Revision 3 EPRI

NP-5652, Guidelines for Utilization of Commercial Grade Dedication Items in Nuclear Safety-Related Application, Revision 2

ETE-MP-2013-1032, Motor Vendor Discovered Several Discrepancies during the Performance of a Motor Overhaul and Rewind on Unit 2 'A' Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Pump Motor P11AM, Revision 0 F-C4969-1, Qualification Test of Class 1E Electric Cables in a Simulated Steam-Line-Break and Loss-of-Coolant Accident Environment, 07/1978 Grafoil Seal Report #708410, Fluid Components Inc., dated 02/20/1985 IEEE 242-2001, IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems LBDCR 15-MP3-008, Millstone Unit 3 Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 8

List of Equipment Qualification Work Orders, dated 04/01/2017 to 05/01/2017

List of Equipment Qualification Work Orders, dated 05/01/2017 to 05/31/2017 List of Equipment Qualification Work Orders, dated 06/01/2017 to 07/01/2017

M22-CS-16.1B, EQ Zone Map Information M2-EV-98-0104, Technical Evaluation for Revision of Charging System Functional Requirements for HELB and MSLB, Revision 00 M2-EV-98-0231, Technical Evaluation for the Basis of Weep Holes in Electrical Enclosures and Conduits under the Electrical Equipment Qualification Program at Millstone Unit 2, Revision 2

Memorandum

MP-2-6365, from Stephen E. Scace, Millstone Unit 2 Superintendent, I.E Information Notice 86-49, Age/Environment Induced Electrical Cables Failures (CR 0486-49) dated 10/30/86

Memorandum

MP-3-694, from J. O. Crockett, Millstone Unit 3 Superintendent, I.E Information Notice 86-49, Age/Environment Induced Electrical cables Failures (CR 0486-49) dated

10/14/86

Memorandum

MP-91-218, from Stephen E. Scace, Millstone Unit 2 Superintendent, NRC

IN 89-30 Supplement 1, High Temperatures at Nuclear Power Reactors,

NOA 9929, Revision

1, dated 3/11/91 Millstone Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 35

Millstone Unit 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 30

MP-2-6365 &

MP-3-694, Northeast Utilities response to NRC

IN 86-49, Age/Environment Induced Electrical Cable Failures, dated 10/14/1986

MP3-CD-1017, MEPL Determination - EEQ Area Temperature Monitoring System, dated 05/08/1996 NRC

IN 92-81, Potential Deficiency of Electrical Cables with Bonded Hypalon Jackets, dated 12/11/1992 Nuclear Utility Group

Memorandum on Effects of Increased Voltage on Qualified Life of Solenoid-Operated Valves, dated 6/11/90

QNU-MP3-504, EEQ Technical Specification Temperature Basis, Revision 0

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2

Runtime Query for Unit 2 Fans F25A & F25B, dated 08/14/17 S3-EV-98-0126, 3SIL-PT961, 3SIL-PT963, 3SIL-PT965, and 3SIL-PT967 Removal from EQML, Revision 0 SAR002395, Self-Assessment of the Dominion Environmental Qualification Programs at North Anna, Surry, and Millstone, dated November 21, 2013 Specification

SP-M2-CE-1007, Requirements for Surveillance, Inspection, Repair and Maintenance of Millstone Unit 2 HELB Barriers, Revision 1

SP-M2-EE-332, MP2 Environmental Conditions for Equipment Qualification, Revision 5

SP-M3-EE-333, MP3 Environmental Conditions for Equipment Qualification, Revision 9 Technical Evaluation M2-EV-06-0004, Millstone Unit 2, Ambient Temperature Monitoring Data for EEQ June 1999 through August 2000, Revision 0 Technical Evaluation M2-EV-98-0231, Basis for Weep Holes in Electrical Enclosures and Conduits under the Electrical Equipment Qualification (EEQ) Program at Millstone Unit 2, Revision 2 Technical Evaluation M2-EV-99-0002, Unit 2 High Energy Line Break (HELB) Barrier Opening Time Determination, Revision 3 Technical Evaluation M2-EV-99-0070, Hazard Barrier program and Seal Qualification, Revision 0 Technical Evaluation M3-EV-99-0064, Unit 3 Dual Train Protected (DTP) High Energy Line Break (HELB) Doors Allowable Impairment/Repair Time Determination, Revision 0

Condition Reports

(*Written as a result of this inspection) M2-99-0817 04-08649 04-09434

0309485

0450999

0452733

0458423

0473891

0489063

0511151

0511703

0512948

0513404

0514559

0516353

0517554

0533210

0533624

0546327

0550660

0551162

0553129

0553173

0562578

0562746

0563667

0563752

0565062

0571519

0577721

1024574

1037028

1056531

1065603

1074897*

1074901*

1075760*

1075941*

1075045*

1076005*

Surveillance and Modifications Acceptance Tests EEQ, 25.A - Transmitter Replacement,

WO 53M20501461, performed 04/09/2017 Millstone 2

PT-102C, Pressurizer Pressure Channel 'C' Calibration (WO 53102722608), performed 10/15/2015 Millstone 2

PT-102C, Pressurizer Pressure Channel 'C' Calibration (WO 53102889219), performed 04/09/2017 (post new transmitter installation,

WO 53M20501461)

MS-AA-WH-101, SCM Storage Area Weekly Temperature and Humidity Verification, Revision 7 performed, including spiral graphs: December 14, 2016 - January 4, 2017; January 4, 2017 - January 11, 2017; January 11, 2017 - January 18, 2017; January 18, 2017 -

January 25, 2017; January 25, 2017 - February 1, 2017; February 1, 2017 - February 8,

2017; February 8, 2017 - February 15, 2017; February 15, 2017 - February 22, 2017;

February 22, 2017 - March 1, 2017; May 24, 2017 - June 7, 2017; June 7, 2017 - June

14, 2017; June 14, 2017 - June 21, 2017; June 21, 2017 - June 28, 2017; June 28, 2017 - July 12, 2017; July 12, 2017 - July 19, 2017; July 19, 2017 - July 26, 2017.

MS-AA-WHS-131, Storage Area Checklists, performed 01/01/2016 - 08/01/2017

Vendor Manuals 25203-300-042, Installation Operation and Maintenance of 480 Volt Motor Control Centers (VM54-General Electric), Revision 1 Overload Heater Selection Tables, General Electric, Revision 1

Work Orders

53M20706137 53M30415090 53M20006630 53M20006659

53M20006666 53M20501461 53M30502979 53M30714105 53M20302341 53M20500179 53M20500183 53M20502081 53M20609419 53M20610337 53M20705986 53M20705988

53M30503401 53M30506294 53M30506295 53M20705988

53M30708222 53102231727 53102400831 53102427692

53102462663 53102489883 53102493381 53102557683 53102566517 53102643198 53102644463 53102674900 53102722608 53102726651 53102727922 53102730092

53102742412 53102745463 53102755222 53102790954

53102889180 53102889219 53102928620

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DRS Division of Reactor Safety IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission