IR 05000244/2006003

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IR 05000244-06-03; Constellation Energy; on 04/01/2006 Through 06/30/2006; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
ML061940453
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/13/2006
From: Brian Mcdermott
Reactor Projects Branch 1
To: Korsnick M
Constellation Energy Group, Ginna
References
IR-06-003
Download: ML061940453 (38)


Text

uly 13, 2006

SUBJECT:

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

Dear Mrs. Korsnick:

On June 30, 2006, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your R. E. Ginna facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 8, 2006, with Mr. David Holm and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/ Samuel Hansell Signed For/

Brian J. McDermott, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000244/2006003 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000244/2006-003; 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006; R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional specialists. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

iv

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Ginna began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at essentially full power for the entire report period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample, Systems)

a. Inspection Scope

Using Ginna Procedure A-54.4.2, Hot Weather Seasonal Readiness Walkdown, and the Ginna Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as a reference, during the weeks of May 29 and June 5, the inspectors reviewed Ginnas preparations for hot weather by walking down plant areas. As part of the walkdown, local area temperatures were checked as well as the operability of ventilation and air conditioning cooling systems to ensure that the plant was prepared to handle warm weather conditions.

Areas of focus were the north end of the intermediate building where the auxiliary feedwater and control rod drive cabinets are located, and the standby auxiliary feedwater pump room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of plant systems to verify operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment in the opposite train was either inoperable, undergoing surveillance testing, or potentially degraded.

The inspectors used plant Technical Specifications (TS), Ginna operating procedures, plant piping and instrument drawings (P&ID), and the UFSAR as guidance for conducting partial system walkdowns. The inspection reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material conditions and general housekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The inspectors also verified that operations personnel were following plant TS.

The following plant system alignments were reviewed:

  • During the week of May 15, 2006, the inspectors completed a walkdown of the C standby auxiliary feedwater (SAFW) train. This risk-significant system was examined because during the week, surveillance testing was conducted on the D SAFW and the A AFW pumps. The C SAFW train is an important backup means for supplying water to the steam generators in the event of a high energy line break or other event that disables the preferred auxiliary feedwater system.
  • On June 9, 2006, the inspectors completed a walkdown of the A emergency diesel generator (EDG) when the B EDG was out of service for scheduled maintenance. This system was examined because it provides backup emergency power to vital class 1E equipment and was the sole source for backup alternating current power while the B EDG was not available.
  • On June 13, 2006, the inspectors completed a walkdown of the A residual heat removal (RHR) train when the B RHR train was unavailable during a quarterly surveillance. This system was examined because it provides a key function in the event of a need for recirculation to provide plant cooling.
  • During the week of June 19, 2006, the inspectors completed a walkdown of the A train of the Safety Injection (SI) system. At the time of the walkdown, operability of the B SI pump was under review by Ginna personnel because an oil sample taken from the thrust bearing on the B SI pump revealed a high water content.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

c. Inspection Scope

Using the Ginna Fire Protection Program documents as a guide, the inspectors performed walkdowns of the following fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The material condition of fire protection systems, equipment and features, and the material condition of fire barriers were also inspected against industry standards. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. The following plant areas were inspected:

  • Intermediate Building Sub-basement, Fire Zone IB-0
  • Control Room, Fire Zone CR
  • Charging Pump Room, Fire Zone CHG
  • Intermediate Building South Lower Level, Fire Zone IBS-1
  • Intermediate Building South Mid Level, Fire Zone IBS-2
  • Intermediate Building South Upper Level, Fire Zone IBS-3
  • Diesel Generator Room, Fire Area EDG1A
  • Diesel Generator Room, Fire Area EDG1B
  • Screenhouse, Fire Area, Fire Zones SH-2 and SH-3
  • Screenhouse, Fire Area, Fire Zone SH-1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample, external flooding)

a. Inspection Scope

To evaluate Ginnas external flood protection measures, the inspectors reviewed the Ginna UFSAR, plant procedures ER-SC.1, Adverse Weather Plan, and ER-SC.2, High Water Flood Plan, plant drawings, and completed the following activities:

  • Walked down the external perimeter of the Ginna protected area, paying close attention to the condition of the stone revetment on the north end of the site
  • Verified that the discharge point of Deer Creek was not obstructed with debris that could cause the creek to back up during periods of increased rainfall
  • Inspected the screenhouse, the EDG enclosures, the control room air handling room, and the portable flood barriers stored in the auxiliary building
  • Interviewed engineers responsible for structures and flood protection

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On June 6, 2006, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator scenario.

The test observed was scenario ECA0.0-02, Loss of all AC. Prior to the observation, the inspectors reviewed the procedures and critical tasks associated with the scenario, and walked down the expected operator responses in the simulator. During the scenario, the inspectors observed the operators performance, and observed the post-evaluation critique. The inspectors also reviewed and verified compliance with Ginna procedure OTG-2.2, Simulator Examination Instructions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated Ginnas work practices and follow-up corrective actions for selected system, structure, or component (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of Ginnas maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed Ginnas extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of Ginnas corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed Ginnas problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Ginna had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Ginna procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and Ginnas corrective actions that were taken or planned, to verify whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate.

The following issues were reviewed:

  • Leaks in the Auxiliary and Intermediate Building roofs have been identified in several condition reports. The inspectors observed current roof conditions and reviewed the actions taken under the Ginna structure monitoring program to address the leaks.
  • Deposits, including boric acid, have accumulated on the wall behind the ventilation system RHR fan coolers and in the RHR sub-basement. The deposits appear to be from a minor spent fuel pool weir gate leak and ground water in-leakage. The inspectors conducted interviews to evaluate the actions taking place to address these conditions. The inspectors also reviewed maintenance identification tags, condition reports, and work orders to verify the adequacy of previous corrective actions.
  • Failures of Appendix R radio batteries were reviewed to determine if an appropriate program was in place to ensure maintenance for and timely replacement of batteries. The inspector interviewed Ginna personnel responsible for the program to evaluate the adequacy of licensee actions. A search of the corrective action program did not indicate a significant failure rate existed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Ginnas maintenance risk assessments required by paragraph a(4) of 10 CFR 50.65. This inspection included discussions with control room operators and scheduling department personnel regarding the use of Ginnas online risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation and daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain reasonable assurance that actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration.

Additionally, the inspectors verified that Ginnas risk management actions, for both planned and/or emergent work, were consistent with those described in procedure IP-PSH-2, "Integrated Work Schedule Risk Management." Risk assessments for the following out-of-service systems, structures, and/ or components were reviewed:

  • Planned maintenance on an air conditioning system for the A and B batterry rooms (April 17, 2006)
  • Planned maintenance on the fire barrier and electrical cables located in the B diesel generator vault (May 30- June 2, 2006)
  • (May 30 - June 6, 2006)
  • (June 9, 2006)
  • Troubleshooting and Repair of A EDG Lube Oil Heater Failure
  • (June 25-27, 2006)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-routine Evolutions and Events

m. Inspection Scope

For the non-routine event described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant records, the UFSAR, station procedures and plant drawings to determine what occurred, assess operator response to the event, and to determine if the response was in accordance with plant procedures.

On May 8, 2006, during routine weekly surveillance of the spent fuel pool (SFP) leakoff collection system, leakage was observed from the telltale drain. The inspectors followed the plant response to this apparent indication of leakage from the SFP liner. The actual source was determined to be from the SFP weir gate into the refueling slot and subsequently through a known leakage path into the SFP leakage collection system.

Plant efforts to drain the refueling slot and long term corrective actions were reviewed and evaluated by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations to verify that the operability of systems important to safety was properly established, that the affected components or systems remained capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that no unrecognized increase in plant or public risk occurred. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations to determine if system operability was properly justified in accordance with IP-CAP-1.1, Technical Evaluation for Current Operability and Past Operability Determination Worksheet:

  • Condition Report (CR) 2006-001770, Small Packing Leak on V-965D (Loop B Hot Leg Sample Valve) when Open
  • CR 2006-001860, SWP D Motor has Minor Vapor Coming from Upper Bearing Housings
  • CR 2006-002193, Containment Recirc Fan C High Vibration Alarm Received When Containment Recirc Fan Started
  • CR 2006-002287, Fire Damper in B Diesel Generator Vault Found Open
  • CR 2006-002376, Package Discrepancy for Grease Added to OP/850A (RHR Pump Suction from Containment Sump B)
  • CR 2006-002517, B Safety Injection Pump Lube Oil Analysis

h. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant change request (PCR) 2005-0045, "Addition of Valve Leakage Telltale on the TDAFW and MDAFW Pumps, which was installed in December 2005. The modification installed telltale drains to the service water supply lines on both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump. These drains create a leak-off path that provides visual indication of service water suction isolation valve seat leakage. This modification was part of the changes recommended to prevent recurrence documented in CR 2005-3540, Trend of SW Intrusion Into AFW System, which identified repeated intrusions of service water into the auxiliary feedwater system. The review consisted of examining the modification in the field, reviewing requisite operating procedures, assessing the associated 50.59 screen, and reviewing applicable system drawings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of post-maintenance testing activities in the field to determine whether the tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of each test by comparing the test methodology to the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the test acceptance criteria to verify that the tested components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and technical specification requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. The following post-maintenance testing activities were reviewed:

  • PT-3Q, Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Test (Valve 860 Only) to retest after Work Order (WO) 20404503, Swap out 860C with the Rebuilt 860B (April 19, 2006)
  • PT-32A, Reactor Trip Breaker Testing - A Train after repairs to Bypass Trip Breaker (May 12, 2006)
  • WO 20505091, Perform EQ Lubrication and Cover Gasket Replacement on AB Sump Level Switches LS-2042 and LS-2043" (May 17, 2006)
  • PT-33A, Spent Fuel Pool Pump A to retest after WO 20505285, Perform Electrical Tests on SFP Pump A (May 31, 2006)
  • WO 20503697, Install New Intake Heaters in the Lakewater Intake Structure for the C and D Circulating Water Intake Heaters per PCR 2000-0014 Rev. 3" (June 14, 2006)
  • PT-31, Charging Pump Inservice Test (June 23, 2006)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the performance and/or reviewed test data for the following five surveillance tests that are associated with selected risk-significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to verify that TS were followed, and that acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors also verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met.

  • S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions (June 1, 2006)
  • PT-2.9, Check Valve and Manual Valve Exercising Quarterly Surveillance
  • (June 14, 2006)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary plant modifications to determine whether the temporary change adversely affected system or support system availability, or adversely affected a function important to plant safety. The inspectors reviewed the associated system design bases, including the UFSAR and TS, and assessed the adequacy of the safety determination screening and evaluation. The inspectors also assessed configuration control of the temporary change by reviewing selected drawings and procedures to verify whether appropriate updates had been made. The inspectors compared the actual installation with the temporary modification documents to determine whether the implemented change was consistent with the approved documented modification. The inspectors reviewed the post-installation test results to verify whether the actual impact of the temporary change had been adequately demonstrated by the test. The temporary modifications were reviewed by the inspectors to verify they were installed in conformance with the instructions contained in procedure IP-DES-3, Temporary Modifications.

  • 2005-0017, Non-Safety SWS 2" Copper Pipe Adapter Leak Seal and Restraint for Line Spec 125-1"
  • 2006-0005, Installation of Personnel Protection on the Electrical Bus Bars for the B Diesel Generator

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

(71114.02 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of Ginnas Alert and Notification System (ANS). During this inspection, the inspector interviewed system engineers and Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff responsible for implementation of the ANS testing and maintenance. The inspector verified that Ginna personnel were maintaining a current database for holders of tone alert radios within the emergency planning zone. Condition reports (CRs) pertaining to the ANS were reviewed for causes, trends, and corrective actions. The inspector reviewed Ginnas original ANS design report to ensure compliance with those commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02. Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Augmentation

a. Inspection Scope

An on-site review of Ginnas ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying the ERO were conducted. The inspector assessed the state of readiness of key staff for timely facility activation by reviewing records from quarterly call-in drills during 2005 and 2006. The inspector reviewed procedures and CRs associated with the ERO notification system and drills. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for testing the ERO augmentation process. The inspector compared qualification requirements to the training records for a sample of ERO members. The inspector verified that a recent reduction in force did not preclude Ginna from adequately responding to an event. The inspector also verified that the EP department staff were receiving required training as specified in the emergency plan. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03.

Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

Prior to this inspection, the NRC had received and acknowledged recent changes made to the NERP and implementing procedures. These changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), which Ginna had determined did not result in a decrease in effectiveness to the NERP and concluded that the changes continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. During this on-site inspection, the inspector conducted a sampling review of the changes that could potentially result in a decrease in effectiveness. This review does not constitute an approval of the changes and, as such, the changes are subject to future NRC inspection. The inspector sampled associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews for recent changes that were made. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 4. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed self-assessments and audit reports from 2004, 2005, and 2006, to assess Ginnas ability to evaluate their performance and programs. The inspector reviewed CRs initiated by Ginna from drills, self-assessments, and audits. The inspector assessed the significance of the issues, determined if repeat problems were occurring, and evaluated the effectiveness of corrective actions. A list of the CRs reviewed is attached to this report. This inspection was conducted according to NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 05. Planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14)and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On June 6, 2006, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator scenario that included a limited test of the Ginna emergency response plan. Scenario ECA00-02, Loss of all AC, was observed. During the exercise, the crew successfully classified the event in a timely manner, and the drill was counted as a success in the Ginna Drill/Exercise Performance performance indicator

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material Control Program (71122.03 - 10 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed radiological environmental monitoring work activities, radioactive material control activities, and practices and procedure implementation during observations and tours of the facilities. The inspector also examined procedures, records, and other program documents to evaluate the effectiveness of Ginnas controls relative to these inspection areas. This inspection activity represents the completion of ten

(10) samples relative to this inspection area (i.e., inspection procedure sections 02.01 thru 02.04) in complete fulfillment of the biennial inspection requirements.

Inspection Planning and In-Office Inspection (02.01.a thru d) (1 Sample)

The inspector reviewed the 2004 and the 2005 Annual Environmental Monitoring Reports and Ginna assessment results to verify that the REMP was implemented as required by Technical Specifications (TS) and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The inspector examined the report for changes to the ODCM with respect to environmental monitoring, commitments in terms of sampling locations, monitoring and measurement frequencies, land use census, interlaboratory comparison program, and analysis of data. The inspector also reviewed the ODCM to identify environmental monitoring stations, Ginna self-assessments, audits, and interlaboratory comparison program results. In addition, the inspector examined the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for information regarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological monitoring instrumentation.

Onsite Inspection (02.02.a thru I) (6 Samples)

The inspector walked down all twelve of the air sampling stations and at least ten percent of the thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) monitoring stations to determine whether they were located as described in the ODCM and to determine the equipment material condition. The inspector also observed the exchange of air particulate and air iodine filters at the air sampling stations and the collection of drinking water pathway indicator and control water samples (i.e., continuous composite samplers). Based on Ginnas sampling schedule, there was no opportunity to observe the collection and preparation of other environmental samples (i.e., green leafy vegetables, sediment).

The inspector observed the sampling locations for milk, discharge canal, and groundwater monitoring wells. The inspector selectively verified that environmental sampling was representative of the release pathways as specified in the ODCM and that selected sampling techniques were in accordance with procedures. The review of meteorological instrumentation is covered in Section 4OA2.2.

The inspector reviewed each event documented in the Annual Environmental Monitoring Report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost TLD, or anomalous measurement for the cause and corrective actions. The inspector conducted a review of Ginnas assessment of any positive sample results (i.e., licensed radioactive material detected above the lower limits of detection (LLDs)), of which there were no occurrences in 2004 or 2005. There was one significant change made by Ginna to the ODCM as the result of changes to the land use census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection: one of the two milk sample locations had ceased operations in October 2005. The inspector reviewed the calibration and maintenance documentation for eight of the air sampler stations, including gas volume meters.

Ginna used the services of the James A. Fitzpatrick Environmental Laboratory (offsite vendor) for the measurement of all environmental samples during calendar year 2004.

In 2005, Ginna changed offsite analytical labs to Constellation Energy Fort Smallwood Environmental Laboratory. The inspector verified that the appropriate detection sensitivities with respect to TS/ODCM were utilized for counting samples (i.e., the samples met the TS/ODCM required LLDs); also, the inspector reviewed the results of the laboratorys quality control program including the interlaboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of environmental sample analyses. The inspector examined Ginnas quality control evaluation of the interlaboratory comparison program and the corrective actions for any deficiencies. Also, the inspector evaluated a recent Quality Assurance audit of the program and its results to determine whether Ginna met the TS/ODCM requirements.

Unrestricted release of material from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)(02.03.a thru e) (2 Samples)

The inspector observed the two locations where Ginna monitored potentially contaminated material leaving the RCA, and inspected the methods used for control, survey, and release from these areas. The inspector observed the performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use to verify that the work was performed in accordance with plant procedures. The inspector also verified that the radiation monitoring instrumentation was appropriate for the radiation types present and was calibrated with appropriate radiation sources. The inspector reviewed Ginnas criteria for the survey and release of potentially contaminated material and verified that there was guidance on how to respond to an alarm which indicated the presence of licensed radioactive material.

The inspector evaluated Ginnas equipment to ensure that the radiation detection sensitivities were consistent with the NRC guidance contained in Inspection and Enforcement Circular 81-07 and IE Information Notice 85-92 for surface contamination and HPPOS-221 for volumetrically contaminated material.

Identification and Resolution of Problems (02.04.a thru c) (1 Sample)

The inspector reviewed Ginnas audit related to the radiological environmental monitoring program performed since the last inspection and determined that identified problems were entered into the corrective action program (AR) for resolution. The inspector examined corrective action reports affecting environmental sampling and sample analysis. The inspector interviewed staff and reviewed documents to determine if the problem identification and resolution activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and risk.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

1. Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone (71151- 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed data for the EP PIs which are:

(1) Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP);
(2) ERO Drill Participation; and
(3) Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability. The inspector reviewed supporting documentation from drills and tests in the third, and fourth quarters of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 to verify the accuracy of the reported data. The review of these PIs was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria used for the review were 10 CFR 50.9 and NEI 99-02, Revision 2, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Mitigating Systems Cornerstone (71151 - 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

Using the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2, the inspectors verified the completeness and accuracy of the performance data for reactor coolant system (RCS)activity and leakage for the period of May 2004 through March 2006. The inspectors reviewed licensee records of values obtained for RCS activity and leakage and compared the highest monthly values to those reported for the applicable month.

Additionally, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze an RCS sample and observed operations personnel conduct an RCS leakage calculation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the Ginna corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing paper copies or electronic versions of each condition report (CAR) , attending daily screening meetings, and accessing Ginnas computerized database.

2. Semi-Annual Review (71152 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

In order to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed a listing of Condition Reports (CRs) initiated from December 2005, through mid-May 2006. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed trend reports, Quality Performance Assessment Reports, an Issues Assessment Tri-Annual Report - 3rd Trimester 2005, and discussed trends and potential trends with appropriate station personnel. Although several trends or potential trends were identified by the inspectors, plant personnel were aware of these and had initiated corrective actions as necessary.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. Identification and Resolution of Problems - Public Radiation Safety (71122.03)

c. Inspection Scope

The inspector selected two issues and related condition reports (CRs) identified in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for review under this scope.

The issues were associated with the following:

  • Meteorological monitoring equipment. The inspector reviewed seven CRs generated on May 8, 2006, as well as 19 other related open CRs generated previously. The inspector also identified three additional equipment problems during examination of the meteorological instruments. Ginna generated a new CR on May 11 to address these three new equipment problems and another new CR to address inclusion of acceptance criteria consistent with Safety Guide 23 in the weekly reviews of meteorological monitoring data. While local meteorological instrument and equipment issues were noted, the inspector also noted that the plant computer was providing current meteorological data and was available to operators. Ginna personnel stated they intended to review the overall number and scope of identified meteorological monitoring equipment issues to determine whether additional corrective actions may be necessary to assure continued adequate data availability in the future (documented in
  • CR 2006-00210, Adverse Trend in Meteorological Instrumentation, dated May 16, 2006).
  • Lab quality control cross check result outside acceptance criteria (CR 2005-3291, July 13, 2005). The inspector reviewed Ginnas analysis and evaluation of the circumstances for this issue, as well as the conclusion that it was an isolated occurrence.

The documented reports for the issues were reviewed by the inspector to determine whether the full extents of the issues were identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. (71152 - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

b.

Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The corrective action in progress to increase the reliability of the line is appropriate. This project is being given prioritization and oversight commensurate to its significance.

5.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

Positive Legacy Ground Water Sample Identified

a. Inspection Scope

In April 2006, a Constellation team conducting a review of paperwork associated with ground water samples taken at Ginna identified that one sample, taken as part of a due diligence review of Ginna in preparation for sale of the plant to Constellation Energy, tested positive for tritium. Although the sample, which was taken in 2003, had a higher level of tritium when compared to other groundwater samples, it was below the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) limit for tritium in ground water, and apparently because it was below the limit, it was not reported to site management at the time.

A sample taken at the same time in 2003, in an adjacent well, which is drilled significantly deeper, believed to be below the ground water table and into the bedrock water supply, also showed a positive result, which was about one-fourth the level of the ground water sample. This second sample should not have any tritium except long-term geologic levels as it is not expected to be groundwater but very old water welling up from the deep aquifer.

Ginna had taken samples from the ground water well in question numerous times before this sample, and 23 times since the positive sample was taken with no detectable activity from tritium. Based on these facts, Ginna concluded that the actual sample of concern was most likely contaminated in some way either during the obtaining of the sample or the analysis, likely through improper cleaning of the sample equipment, or cross contamination in some way in the laboratory that conducted the analysis for the due diligence study. The inspectors reviewed Ginnas response and considered the actions to be appropriate. The measured levels of activity were not reportable to the NRC.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

1. Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of

Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk

a. Inspection Scope

The objective of TI 2515/165, "Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk," was to gather information to support the assessment of nuclear power plant operational readiness of offsite power systems and impact on plant risk. The inspector evaluated Ginna procedures against the specific offsite power, risk assessment, and system grid reliability requirements of TI 2515/165. The inspector also discussed the attributes with Ginna personnel.

The information gathered while completing this TI was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation on April 3, 2006.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 5, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Holm and other members of the Ginna staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked Ginna personnel whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. Proprietary information was examined during this inspection, but it is not specifically discussed in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-identified Violations

None.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Adams Manager of Operations

D. Blankenship Manager, Radiation Protection

E. Groh Assistant Operations Manager (Shift)

D. Holm Plant Manager

S. Kennedy Emergency Preparedness Manager

M. Korsnick Vice President, Ginna

B. Randall Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager

W. Thomson Chemistry Supervisor

R. Whalen Manager Nuclear Engineering Services

J. Yoe Scheduling Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Opened and Closed

None.

Closed

None.

Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED