IR 05000223/2003024

Insp Repts 50-321/85-09 & 50-366/85-09 on 850223-0324. Violation Noted:Failure to Establish Procedures as Required Per Tech Spec 6.8.1 & Failure to Correct Reactor Vessel Temp & Pressure Curves for Fluence

ML20127F277
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, University of Lowell
Issue date:	04/18/1985
From:	Brooks C, Panciera V, Rayholmes P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127F234	List: IR 05000223/2003024 ML20127F229 ML20127F257
References
50-321-85-09, 50-321-85-9, 50-366-85-09, 50-366-85-9, NUDOCS 8505200380
Download: ML20127F277 (6)

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Report Nos.: 50-321/85-09 and 50-366/85-09 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 1 Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: OPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 23 - March 24, 1985 Inspectors: d Peter Holmes- ay ~5enior m

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b jffW U to Signed Residengnfct'or,BrownsFerry Approved by: ,__ n . f _/j a / 2 . anctTrit','ChTeT, Project Section fB __/

Vate// igne f_ d Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This inspection involved 144 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification compitance, operator performance, overall plant opera-tions, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practicts, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, and surveillance activitie Results: Of the areas inscected, 3 violations were identified; (failure to establish procedures as required per Technical Specification 6.8. paragraph 7; failure to correct Reactor Vessel Temperature and Pressure Curves for fluence, paragraph 7; and failure to implement and maintain procedures, paragraph 9).

8505200380 850422 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000321 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS Persons contacted Licensee Employees

• H. C. Nix, Site General Manager l T. Greene, Deputy Site General Manager

• J. A. Bets 111. Operations Manager (Acting)

*T. Seitz, Maintenance Manager C. T. Jones, Engineering Manager R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager l

• P. E. Fornel, Site 0. A. Manager

5. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance Other Ifcensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

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• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspectfon scope and findings w9re summarized on March 1 and March 21, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the. inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Unresolved Items Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspectio . PlantTours(Units 1and2)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection interval to verify that monitoring equipment ' was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that approortate radiation controls were properly esta-blished, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-

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tions, pipe hangers and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshift The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). Valve end breakers / switch lineups and equipment conditions are randomly verified both locally and in the control roo During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible areas of the Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactor Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout records. The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspectors conducted random of f-hours inspection during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . TechnicalSpecificationCompliance(Units 1and2)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operations (LCOs) and results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch post-tions, and review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LCO action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they happene Surveillance Procedures and Records The inspector conducted an annual review of the surveillance of safety-related systems and components to verify that surveillances are conducted in accordance with procedures which are technically adequate and properly approved and that the surveillances are performed within the required intervals as defined in Technical Specification The following discrepancies were found during this review:

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l (1) Table 4.2.11 of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications requires a calibration of the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Secondary Position Indicator Recorder every 18 months. HNP-1-3820 "SRV Position Primary and Secondary Indicators Functional Test and Calibration" is intended to cover this requirement and Section H references HPN-1-5260 for the detailed recorder calibration procedur HNP-1-5260 "L&N Speedomax W Calibration" does not include calibration data for the SRV recorder. A licensee representative stated that a revision to HNP-1-3820 is in progress to correct  !

this deficienc l (2) Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.9.A.2.d requires sampling diesel fuel for viscosity, water and sediment every 92 days. HNP-7611

"011 Sampling Program" is intended to cover this requiremen HNP-7611 references HNP-7032 for the detailed water and sediment l test procedure, however no procedure is referenced for the detailed viscosity testing and no procedure is contained in HNP-761 A licensee representative stated that HNP-7080

" Viscosity of Diesel Fuel 011" is used to determine the viscosity and acknowledged that this procedure should be explicitly referenced in HNP-761 (3) Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.6.0 and 4.6.E require various reactor coolant system temperatures be compared and permanently recorded prior to recirculation pump starts. No procedure could be found which explicitly requires permanent recording of the temperatures prior to pump starts and no permanent record of these temperatures could be found for several recirculation pump starts conducted on Unit 1, February 22,1985 (records having a 5 year retention period could, however, be found).

(4) Unit 1 Technical Specification 4.6.A and Unit 2 Technical Specifi-cation 4.4.6.1.1. require that reactor coolant system temperature i and pressure be verified to be within limits every 30 minutes during heatups and cooldowns. No procedure could be found which requires that these checks be performed during reactor plant '

normal startups and no record could be found indicating that these checks were performed during a plant heatup conducted on Unit 1 February 19, 198 (5) Unit 2 Technical Specification 4.4.6.1.2 requires that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure be determined to be to the right of the criticality limit of Figure 3.4.6.1-2 within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of control rods to bring the reactor critical. Although HNP-2-1001 Step C.14 requires shell tempera-ture to be greater than 140*F (the limit from Figure 3.4.6.1-2)

the procedure does not place a 15 minute restriction on this check and as a result, this temperature was checked a full 30-minutes prior to rod withdrawal in Unit 2, December 27, 198 l l

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The last 3 discrepancies (items 3, 4 and 5) shall be identified as a violation of Technical Specifications 6.8.1.c, failure to establish written procedures for surveillance requirements (321, 366/85-09-01). Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.6.B establishes the pressure / tempera-ture limits for hydrostatic tests of the reactor vessel, for non-nuclear heatup and cooldown and for critical operations. This is done by reference to curves 3.6-2, 3.6-3 and 3.6- These curves are to be corrected (temperature shifted) for neutron bombardment of the beltline region of the reactor vessel by curve 3.6- Initially, the feedwater nozzle curves are more limiting but with time at power the reactor vessel beltline curve becomes the most limiting. No procedure was in place to use or correct these curve The licensee performed the necessary calculations and determined that the reactor vessel beltline curve was indeed the limiting curve. The inspector reviewed the last four reactor startups and found that no violation of the curve had occurred. The failure to have a procedure implemented which provided instruction to use the curves per Technical Specification 3.6.B and the failure to correct these curves for fluence is a violation (321/85-09-02).

8. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organiza-tion of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and badging was proper, and procedures were followe Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriat Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and that the pubite health and safety were of utmost consideration. The following LERs are considered closed:

Unit 1: 85-09*, 85-14*, 85-07*

Unit 2: 85-06*

• In-depth review performe The review of LERs Unit 1, 85-09 and 85-14 and Unit 2, 85-06 showed that Technical Specifications were violated in each of these with the some root cause personnel erro I

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In 321/85-09, an operations person hanging clearance tags on the wrong Traveling Incore Probe (TIP) switches disabled primary containment isolation capability for the TIP ball valves. The clearance was properly made out so the error was in the hanging of the tags not the making out of the clearanc ..

In 321/85-14, the cause of this event is personna')serror. , The surveillance computer tracking sheet (shows the dates between wt.ich th proceduFe must be performed) had been signed off indicating that Odp trgesdure had been performe Thus, I&C personnel thought the procedure @ad been performed since the sign off section of the. tracking > dest. was ccepleted. However, .

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the person who signed off the-procedure on the,Gacking, sheet realized that

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he had inadvertently signed off the.;2rong procedua.s, and ne put a single '

line thru the completion date for MLP-1-341k This line was eneast to denote

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that the procedure had not been. performed;s hoQever, the lidalwas very fine N in comparison to the size ct the sign off. There fore, ' the line. was overlooked, and other I&C pere,onnel were not aware thaC the prat.edure had not been performed until Febr' u ary 4,1985, one week latnet( i

.s In 366/85-06, an engineering' error in the application of head correction to differential pressure transmitters resulted in the RCICssteam line isolation :- d set point was not in accordance with Technical Specific 4t,fon y These three examples of personiiei orror resulting in nonconfoN3nce with Technical Specifications are listed as a violation (321, 366/85-09-u3)'. '

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