IR 05000219/1985016

Physical Security Insp Rept 50-219/85-16 on 850514.Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures Re Personnel Access Requirements & to Rept Incident According to NRC Reporting Requirements.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790,73.21 & 9.5)

ML20126F344
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	06/10/1985
From:	Dunlap J, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126F263	List: IR 05000219/1985016 ML20126F260 ML20126F270
References
50-219-85-16, NUDOCS 8506170443
Download: ML20126F344 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CUTEISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-16 Docket N License N DPR-16 Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation

_1_00 interpace Parkway Parsippany, New York 07054 Facility Name: Uyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Forked River, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: May 14, 1985 Inspector: [1 . / o [

JackM.Dunlap,Pnysij41 date Security inspector ,

Approved by: [I s, m - /

R.R.~Ke/ mig, Chief,bafeguards date Section .

Inspection May Summary:

14, 1985 Special, unannounced physical security inspection on (Ins 3ection Report h /85-16) of an event involving lost security 14, 1985.badges w'lich came to the attention of licer.sce management on February

_ Areas Inspected: Access control-personnel. The inspection involved a total of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> onsite by one region-based inspecto i Results:

Two apparent violations involving personnel access requirements and one apparent the even violation of NRC reporting requirements were identified related to

B506170443 850610 PDR G ADOCK 05000219 PDR

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DETAILS Key Persons Contacted

• P. B. Fiedler, Vice President / Director, Oyster Creek

• J. J. Burton, Deputy Director, Oyster Creek

• B. Hohman, Licensing Engineer D. Long, Supervisor, Security

• J. F. Wechselberger, Resident Inspector, HRC

• Present at the exit intervie The inspector also interviewed various members of the security forc . 30703-Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on May 14, 1985, the inspector met with licensee representatives to review the purpose of the inspection and to present the findings. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspecto . Background The licensee advised the resident inspector on February 13, 1985, that processing of a plant employee's thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) for January, 1985, revealed a radiation exposure in excess of the individual's self reading dosimeter record for the same period. il hen the licensee .

investigated the high exposure, it was determined that the employee lost his TLD, photo ID badge, and key card on January 16, 1985, in the area of the fuel pool cooling pumps (a high radiation area) in the plant and did not retrieve them until about three days later. He also did not report the loss of his TLD to the radcon department or the loss of his photo ID badge and key card to the security department in accordance with plant procedures. The resident inspector was made aware of the loss of the security badges on February 14, 198 On May 14, 1985, an NRC region based security inspector interviewed Oyster Creek security department personnel and obtained the details of the event as documented in this repor . MC 81070 - Access Control (Personnel)

On January 16, 1985, at about 4:30 p.m., a regular plant employee, who had lost his TLD, photo ID badge, and key card within the plant earlier in the day, exited the plant's protected area (PA). His method of exit through the PA exit turnstile is unknown, since his key card, needed to activate the turnstile, was not in his possession at the time. He did not report the loss of the TLD, photo ID badge, or key card to anyone, either during the day or upon leaving the plant. The employee returned to the plant about midnight on January 18, 1985, with another regular plant employe .

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He requested his employee badge (with key card attached) and, when it could not be located by the security officer (badging clerk), he was '

processed into the plant as a visitor, utilizing the other employee as an escort. According to a plant security supervisor, the security officer apparently assumed that the badge had been misplaced in the badge rac The two employees entered the plant PA and, after arriving at their work station, informed their foreman of the lost items. The foreman advised

~the escort to look for the items in the area where they were believed to 1 ave been lost. The employee with the visitor's badge remained with the toreman while the search took place. The lost items were found and returned to the employee to whom they were originally issued. The employee then returned to the north gate without his escort and clocked out of the PA through the turnstile at 1:23 a.m., January 19, 1985. He returned the visitor badge to the badge clerk and then re-entered the PA at 1:25 a.m. thro::gh the turnstil Employees whose badge cannot be located in the badge rack, as described above, are issued a visitor badge to expedite their access to the site, utilizing another employee as an escort. Licensee procedures (such as Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Procedure Nos. 1101 and 1114)

provide instructions on the badging and escorting of visitors and on recordkeeping requirements associated with the process. Employees are not visitors, yet th3y are subject to the same access restrictions when it is necessary to issue them temporary badges. The inspector determined, for example, that the following restrictions would apply to an employee being issued a visitor badge:

. Approval ot a GPU Systems Supervisor responsible for the area to be visited must be obtained, since site protection officers do not have authority to grant access to visitor . Visitors must be escorted at all times while within the protected are . When visitors are turned over to another escort, the new escort must read and sign the visitor registration form that must accompany each visito CFR 73.55(b)(3) requires a nuclear power reactor licensee to have a management system which provides for implementation and enforcement of security procedures. For Oyster Creek, this management system is described in the Oyster Creek Physical Security Plan and implemented through Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station Procedure THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS a.790(d)

INF0FEATIO" AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLAN _ .-- -

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THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS 2 790(d)

INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT IS IN E!!?IONALLY LEFI BLANL Additionally, the foreman did not properly instruct the employee regarding his responsibility to report the lost items, nor did the foreman report the incident himself. The training of supervisory personnel in this responsibility is an inspector follow-up item. (50-219/85-16-02)

The employee stated during an interview conducted by the licensee on February 15, 1985, that he believed he lost the items at about 10:30 while working around the fuel pool cooling pumps. He exited the PA at approximately 4:30 p.m. the same day. During the elapsed six hours, he did not display his photo ID badge, as required by the security plan, and neither he nor any other employee reported this fact to the licensee. The coverage of employee security responsibilities in the licensee's general employee training program will be reviewed in a future inspection and is an inspector follow-up item. (50-219/85-16-03)

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DISRl0SilRE,ITi5 INTENil0NALLY LEFT BLAN . MC81038 - Records and Reports THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATI0ri AND IS NOT FOR PUBLE DISCl0SURE,IT15 INTEmiiONAItY LEFT BLAN _ . . . _ _ _ _