IR 05000072/1987001
| ML20236M822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000072, University of Utah |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1987 |
| From: | Chaney H, Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M794 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-072-87-01, 50-407-87-01, 50-407-87-1, 50-72-87-1, NUDOCS 8711130298 | |
| Download: ML20236M822 (7) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEA'R f,EGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV i NRC Inspection Report: 50-072/87-01 Licenses: R-25 50-407/87-01 R-126 Docket:
50-072 50-407 m .
j Y Licensee: University of Utah (UOU)
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 h
Facility Name: Nuclear Engineering Laboratory (NE'L) -
s Inspection e.t: University of Utah, Herriil Engineering Building (MEB),
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah Inspection Conducted: October 8-9, 1987 i
. Inspector: 'f- t^ 7 li f 6 h'7 H. Chaney, liadiation Specf alist, Facilities Date Radiological Protection Section ;
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r1 . l Approved: CUrf TA A JLAA,CLL4 ufray, Chi e'f ? Facilitihs Radiological
]]lb D(ted Protection'Section i
Inspection Summary )
Inspection Conducted October 8-9, 1987 (Report 50-072/87-01 and 50-407/87-01)
l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the corrective actions regarding the violations and deviation identified in NRC Inspection
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j Report 50-072/86-01 and 50-407/86-01, and a review of deficiencies identified i during Reactor Safety Committee audit I Results: Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie I l
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9711130298 971110 !
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! I DETAILS Persons Contacted l i
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M. Sandquist, Reactor Supervisor
!a * E. Stephenson, Reactor Safety Committee Chairman-
- J. Schiager, UOU Radiation Safety ~ 0fficer (R50)
- C. Gansauge, Senior Reactor Operator 4 ^ S. Bennion, Senior Reactor Engineer N '
',. * Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 9, 198 m Open Items' Identified During This Inspection An open item is a matter that' requires further review and evaluation by the NRC inspector. Open items are~used to document, track, and ensure ;
adequate follow-up on. matters of concern to the NRC inspector. The following open items were identified: i Open Item Title See Paragraph I 407/8701-01 Start-up Count Rate Interlock /8701 02 Rod Withdrawal Interlock .
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, Licens_ee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings a- (Closed) Violation 407/8601-001: Identification and Transport of Radi_oactive Material - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-407/86-01 and involved.the licensee's failure to comply with NRC and Department of' Transportation (DOT) regulations concerning the identification, labeling, and transportation of radioactive material The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions contained in the response and annual report had been implemente This item is considered close i (Closed) Violation 072 and 407/8601-002: Radiological Surveys and l Contro1 of Licensed Materials - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection !
Report 50-072/86-01 and 50-407/86-01 and involved the licensee's failure !
to restrict transport and maintenance on reactor components to locations authorized by the Facility ~0perating License (R-126) and 10 CFR t Part 30.34(c). The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated !
October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions contained in the response and annual report had i been implemente This item is considered close i (0 pen) Violation 407/8601-003: Operator Requalification Program - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-407/86-01 and involved the ll:ensee's failure to fully implement the TRIGA reactor operator l
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i requalification progra The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions contained in the response and annual ;
-report had been. implemente The review indicated that the l_icensee had
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made improvenients in the requalification program; however, the licensee has not had any personnel successfully complete the operator licensing examination other than the Reactor Supervisor. Therefore, it was not ,
determined whether or not the requalification program has been fully '
implemented. This item will remain open pending further revie (Closed) Violation 407/8601-004: 10 CFR Part 50.59 Safety Review - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-407/86-01 and involved the licensee's failure to evaluate the radiological safety aspects of modifications to the TRIGA reactor coolant recirculating system which connects with the MEB potable water supply and sanitary drain system. The !
NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions contained in the response and annual report had been implemented. This item is considered close (Closed) Violation 407/8601-005: Filter System Installation and Testing -
This. item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-407/86-01 and involved the licensee's-failure to properly install and maintain a High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter system as required by the facility Technical Specifications (TSs). The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions contained in the response and annual report had been implemented. This item is considered close (Closed) Violation 072 and 407/8601-006: Securing Facilities and -
Equipment - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-072/86-01 l
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and 50-407/86-01, and involved the licensee's failure to properly secure, and maintain secure, components and keys to the reactor facility as required by the physical security plan (PSP). The NRC inspector verified that the NEL facility was secure during times it was not occupied by authorized personnel, the overhead crane was properly secured, and that keys to the NEL facility were in the possession of authorized personnel only. The licensee's actions appear satisfactory to prevent future violations. This item is considered close (0 pen) Violation 072 and 407/8601-007: Maintenance of Facility and Equipment - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-072/86-01 and 50-407/86-01, and involved the licensee's failure to properly maintain intrusion alarms for the NEL and the maintenance of viewing windows in the NE The NRC inspector determined that the view afforded by the windows in the NEL spaces adjacent to the AGN and TRIGA rooms were free from i obstruction. The licensee had submitted to the NRC a revision to the PSP
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which, among other matters, would eliminate the intrusion / radiation alarm '
enunciator in the RSO office, since this office is not occupied on a 24-hour basis. This item will remain open pending approval of the revision to the PSP by the NR i
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(Closed)' Violation 072/8601-008: Physical Security Plan Audit - This item )
was-discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-.072/86-01 and involved the j licensee's failure to perform biennial audit of the Nuclear Engineering i Laboratory PS The Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) had reviewed'the {
facility, updated, and approved a revision to'the PSP (Revision 2, dated j December 1, 1986) and submitted the revised PSP to the NRC for review and !
approval. This. item is considered close ' (Closed) Deviation 407/8601-009: Personnel Exposure Records - ihis item
.was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-407/86-01 and involved the licensee's failure to establish proper radiation exposure records for personnel associated with the TRIGA reactor operations. The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated October 29, 1986, and the 1986 TRIGA reactor Annual Report, and verified that corrective actions icontained in the response and annual report had been implemented. This item is considered close (Closed) Violation 072/8301-001: Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance - This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-072/83-01 and involved the licensee's failure to perform certain
. required annual reactor surveillance on the AGN-201 reactor. The licensee stated that the AGN-201 reactor will not be repaired and decommissioning will be pursued. Since the surveillance referenced in this violation. require reactor operation, there is no reason to pursue this violation. The licensee is performing surveillance that will ensure the safety.and integrity of the reactor during long-term shutdown pending NRC approval of a decommissioning plan. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item 407/8301-001: Reactor Facility Operating Manual Update
- This item was discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-407/83-01 and 50-407/86-01, and involved the operating manual containing out-of-date information concerning assigned responsibilities and emergency phone numbers. The NRC inspector verified that the licensee had implemented a review program for the operating manual and that the manual was being updated. This item is considered close . Program Areas Inspected The following program areas were inspected. These program areas and inspection procedures are identified in NRC Manual Chapter 2500. Unless otherwise noted, the inspection was completed and revealed no violations, deviations, unresolved items, or open items. Notations after a specific inspection item are used to identify the following: I = item not inspected or only partially inspected; V = violation; D = deviation; i U = unresolved item; and 0 = open ite _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Procedure Inspection Requirements 40750 ' Class II Research and Test Reactors Operations Procedure 02.01 - Initial Interview 02.02 - Initial Walkthrough or Site Tour 02.03 - Records Review - I 02.04 - Observations - I i
81431 Fixed Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance 02.01 - Use and Storage - I 02.02 - Detection and Surveillance - I 02.03 - Access Control 02.04 - Response - I ,
02.05 - Testing and Maintenance - I 90713 Review of Periodic and Special Reports 02.01 - Report Content 02.02 - Verify Test Results - I 02.03 - Ascertain Adequacy of Corrective Actions - I !
02.04 - Determine Classification of Report Contents - I 02.05 - Document Review and Closeout - 0, see paragraph 5 ;
, 5. Special Reports The licensee reported to the NRC on July 3, 1987, that a RSC audit identified three problem areas concerning the TRIGA license R-126 TSs and
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subsequent remedial action ] Scram Channel settings - The licensee reported that the TRIGA reactor was operated with only 2 out of 3 scram channels operable, and that only 1 out of 2 required channel settings was below the TS 3. limit of 120 percent of full power (100 kilowatts). One channel 1 (high log-channel) was set at 150 percent and the other (percent :l power channel) was set at 115 percent full power. The reason for the i problem was that a third channel (linear power channel) which was set l at 100 percent of full power was rerouted from the reactor console to I i
the new rod drive computer console and was thus not available'for ,
! scramming the reactor. The licensee revised the TRIGA start-up i i
checkoff list to indicate the scram limit for the high log-channel (120 percent).
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This matter would normally be considered a violatinn of the facility i TSs. However, the licensee's actions in identification, taking i prompt remedial measures, notifying the NRC, and instituting C long-term corrective measures to prevent a recurrence met the l 1-
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criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (1987)
for a licensee-identified violation, and no enforcement action or follow-up action is required. This item is considered close b. Start-up Count Rate Interlock (SCRI) - Due to the location of heavy
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water (0 20) reflector tanks in the TRIGA core, there is a background source of neutrons that prevents the verification of TS 4.3.2(2),
which states that the SCRI will prevent start-up of the reactor when no neutron source is in the core. The licensee has requested an NRC interpretation as to the need for such verification when visual verification that the neutron source and heavy water reflectors are installed appears to be a viable alternative, a licensee has revised the TRIGA preliminary checkoff list for reactor start-up to include verification of the location of the heavy water tanks and neutron sourc This mecter would normally be considered to be a violation of the facility TSs. However, the licensee's actions in identification, taking prompt remedial measures, notifying the NRC, and instituting long-term corrective measures to prevent a recurrence met the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (1987)
for a licensee-identified violation. This item will be considered an open item pending NRC Headquarters Project Manager action on the licensee's request for TS relief (407/8701-001).
c. Control Rod Interlock The RSC also identified that since the time of original licensing of l
the TRIGA reactor, TS 4.3.2(2) has not been met in that no
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preoperational verification of the Control Rod Interlock mechanism l has ever been performed. The purpose of this requirement is to
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prevent driving two control rods at one tim The licensee determined that the TRIGA control console is wired so that it is impossible to drive two control rods at the same time since the selector switch allows only selection of one rod at a time to be driven, so compliance is engineered into the system. The licensee does not know of any specific rod control interlock incorporated into the system other than the selector switc The RSC determine that further operation of the reactor would not pose any unreviewed safety questio This matter would normally be considered to be a violation of the facility TS However, the licensee's actions in identification, taking prompt remedial measures, notifying the NRC, and instituting long-term corrective measures to prevent a recurrence met the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (1987)
for a licensee-identified violation. This item will be considered an open item pending NRC Headquarters Project Manager action on the licensee's request for a TS amendment (407/8701-002).
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5. Exit Interview'
The'.NRC inspector met with' the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on' October 9, 1987, and summarized the scope and_ findings of the inspection as presented in this repor l
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