IR 05000003/2008009
| ML083190276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2008 |
| From: | Ray Lorson Decommissioning Branch I |
| To: | Joseph E Pollock Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2009-0094, FOIA/PA-2016-0148 IR-08-001, IR-08-009 | |
| Download: ML083190276 (17) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 14, 2008
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION REPORT 05000003/2008009 AND 07200051/2008001, INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Dear Mr. Pollock:
On October 1, 2008, the NRC completed an inspection of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pre-operational activities and the loading of spent fuel into the ISFSI facility. The inspection period began on June 24, 2008. The findings of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Anthony Vitale and members of your staff during an exit meeting on October 1, 2008. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.
The inspection reviewed activities associated with the preparation, movement and placement of spent fuel from the Indian Point Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the ISFSI facility. The inspection included field observations, examination of procedures and documents, and interviews with personnel. Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were identified.
In accordance with Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
2 We appreciate your cooperation with us during this inspection.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Raymond Lorson, Chief Decommissioning Branch Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000003/2008009 and 07200051/2008001 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
Senior Vice President, Entergy Nuclear Operations Vice President, Operations, Entergy Nuclear Operations Vice President, Oversight, Entergy Nuclear Operations Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Operations Senior Vice President and COO, Entergy Nuclear Operations Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations Manager, Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Operations C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of Buchanan J. G. Testa, Mayor, City of Peekskill R. Albanese, Four County Coordinator S. Lousteau, Treasury Department, Entergy Services, Inc.
Chairman, Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly Chairman, Committee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions M. Slobodien, Director, Emergency Planning P. Eddy, NYS Department of Public Service Assemblywoman Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly T. Seckerson, County Clerk, Westchester County Board of Legislators A. Spano, Westchester County Executive R. Bondi, Putnam County Executive C. Vanderhoef, Rockland County Executive E. A. Diana, Orange County Executive T. Judson, Central NY Citizens Awareness Network M. Elie, Citizens Awareness Network D. Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned Scientists Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project M. Mariotte, Nuclear Information & Resources Service F. Zalcman, Pace Law School, Energy Project L. Puglisi, Supervisor, Town of Cortlandt Congressman John Hall Congresswoman Nita Lowey Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton Senator Charles Schumer
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IR 5000003/2008009 and 07200051/2008001; 06/24/2008 - 10/01/2008; Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit 1; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) NRC Dry Run and Loading Entergy selected the Holtec International HI-STORM 100 Cask System for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 1. The HI-STORM 100 Cask System is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No.
1014, Amendment 4. The NRC inspection, conducted by six NRC radiological and engineering specialist inspectors, reviewed Entergys preparation for and conduct of the transfer of spent fuel from the Indian Point Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the ISFSI. The portions of the IPEC Unit 1 pre-operational testing that were identical to the activities previously inspected during the IPEC Unit 2 pre-operational testing and initial loading campaign, completed on February 22, 2008, were not inspected during the Unit 1 dry run.
The inspectors reviewed equipment performance, program controls and documentation, and personnel performance to assess Entergys compliance with the Holtec International Certificate of Compliance, Technical Specifications, and 10 CFR Part 72 requirements. Specific inspection areas included: testing of the fuel handling building crane, security and radiological controls, quality assurance, worker training, reactor engineering, and spent fuel handling activities.
Within the scope of this inspection, no violations of NRC requirements were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Facility Activities Preparations for loading the remaining spent fuel from the Indian Point Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) to the Holtec International Dry Cask Storage System (DCSS) were initiated by Entergy during this inspection period. Upon completion of the pre-operational testing activities, on July 3, 2008, Entergy began the transfer of Indian Point Unit 1 spent fuel to the onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).
Entergy started initial loading of the first Unit 1 multi-purpose canister (MPC) on July 9, 2008.
The loaded MPC was placed on the ISFSI pad on July 21, 2008. Four additional MPCs were loaded during this initial campaign.
1. Preoperational Test Program
a. Inspection Scope
(60854)
The Certificate of Compliance (CoC) for the Holtec International HI-STORM 100 Cask System required Entergy to conduct pre-operational testing (i.e. dry runs) to demonstrate the loading, closure, and transfer of the cask system prior to the first loading of spent fuel assemblies. The NRC conducted onsite inspections between June 30 and July 3, 2008, to observe Entergys demonstration of the activities required by the CoC.
The inspection consisted of field observations, interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and a review of Entergys documentation. The portions of the pre-operational testing that were identical to the activities previously observed during the IPEC Unit 2 dry run and initial loading campaign completed earlier this year were not demonstrated during the Unit 1 dry run. These activities included the MPC welding, draining, moisture removal, and helium backfilling, as well as operation of the supplemental cooling system, transfer of the MPC from the HI-TRAC to the HI-Storm overpack, placement of the HI-STORM at the ISFSI pad, and unloading of a cask. Only the aspects of the process unique to Unit 1 were included in the dry run.
The work packages for the dry run activities were reviewed. The work packages contained the applicable procedures associated with the scope of the dry run activities.
In addition, condition reports related to dry cask storage system components and equipment were reviewed to ensure that issues were adequately dispositioned prior to commencement of dry run activities. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
During the period of June 30 to July 3, 2008, the inspectors observed the movement of the HI-TRAC on air pads into the Unit 1 fuel handling building (FHB) with a front loader with an attachment to secure on to the HI-TRAC, placement of the HI-TRAC into the cask loading pool, loading of a dummy fuel assembly into an MPC storage cell, lifting the HI-TRAC out of the cask loading pool and placing it in the cask placement stand, placing the lid on the MPC, dismantling a portion of the cask placement stand, moving the HI-TRAC out of the Unit 1 handling building, and using the vertical cask transporter (VCT)to lift the HI-TRAC and transport it to the Unit 2 Fuel Services Building. Movement of the HI-TRAC to and from the cask loading pool was performed in a deliberate manner in strict compliance with designated heavy load paths.
During the dry run, the inspectors noted that the crane operator was not as familiar with the FHB crane electronic restrictions to prevent accidental dual movement of the crane as expected. Entergy reviewed proper operation of the pendant control with the crane operators and signal men during pre-job briefs prior to the initial loading.
The inspectors attended a pre-job brief for personnel involved with the dry run activities.
The briefing covered key aspects of the evolutions, including: procedural adherence expectations, industrial and radiological safety, peer checking, three-way communications, and a detailed overview of the tasks to be performed. Radiological conditions were simulated and appropriate measures implemented to provide a degree of realism during the performance of the dry run. Entergy issued neutron dosimetry to workers and posted affected areas with simulated radiological postings in order to prepare workers for the potential radiological conditions associated with the transfer of spent fuel. A foreign material exclusion zone was set up around the cask loading pool and was monitored by designated personnel.
c. Conclusions
Entergy demonstrated the ability to safely move the HI-TRAC into and out of the Unit 1 FHB. Confirmation that the MPC fuel storage cells were capable of accepting spent fuel assemblies was successfully demonstrated. Individuals were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and able to perform their assigned functions.
2. Review of Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
(60856 and 60857)
The inspectors evaluated Entergys compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.48. The inspection consisted of interviews with knowledgeable personnel and review of license documentation. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Entergy was required, as specified in 10 CFR 72.212(b)(1)(ii), to register the use of each cask with the NRC within 30 days of using that cask to store spent fuel. Entergy provided this registration to the NRC in letters dated August 20 and September 25, 2008, which included information on each of the five casks.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
A written evaluation is required per 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)(I), prior to use, to establish that the conditions of the CoC have been met. Entergy documented its written evaluation to confirm the ISFSI was within the licensed scope in the Indian Point Unit 1, 10 CFR 72.212 report. Based on the review of the 10 CFR 72.212 report, the inspectors determined Entergys evaluation contained a sufficient level of detail to reach the stated conclusions.
Entergy performed written evaluations which confirmed that the conditions set forth in the CoC were met, and the requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 were met. Applicable reactor site parameters, such as fire, explosions, tornados, wind-generated missile impacts, seismic qualification, lightning, flooding, and temperature, were evaluated for acceptability with the bounding values specified in the HI-STORM 100 Cask System Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
Entergy performed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of the construction and operation of the ISFSI and plant interfaces to demonstrate that changes to plant Technical Specifications, or a license amendment were not required and that ISFSI-related work activities would not impact safe operation of Indian Point Unit 1. No safety concerns were identified.
The inspectors reviewed selected referenced records and procedure changes related to the security, emergency preparedness, training, health physics and quality assurance programs. The inspectors interviewed knowledgeable personnel to confirm that they were knowledgeable of the impact of ISFSI-related activities. The inspectors reviewed the emergency plan, quality assurance program, radiological safety program, and training program, and determined their effectiveness were not decreased by ISFSI activities.
c. Conclusions
Entergys 10 CFR 72.212 report and 10 CFR 50.59 ISFSI-related safety evaluation were determined to be adequate.
3. Fuel Characterization and Verification
a. Inspection Scope
(60854)
The CoC for the HI-STORM 100 cask system specifies the parameters that must be met in order to allow spent fuel to be stored at the ISFSI. The inspectors evaluated Entergys programs to verify that the 160 spent fuel assemblies remaining in the Unit 1 SFP met the applicable requirements of the CoC. The inspection consisted of interviews with knowledgeable personnel and review of licensee documentation. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys process for verifying fuel assemblies for placement into dry cask storage. The inspectors reviewed various documents associated with the qualification, characterization, and selection of fuel assemblies for storage at the ISFSI.
For the Unit 1 campaign Entergy placed the remaining 160 spent fuel assemblies stored in the west fuel pool in dry cask storage. Technical Specifications require that selected fuel assemblies be visually inspected, independently identified, be free of cladding defects, and be within specified limits for such parameters as fuel enrichment, burn-up, and decay heat output. The inspectors determined Entergys procedures ensured the proper characterization of loaded fuel to meet the requirements of the CoC. The Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies have a shroud over the entire length that prevented visual inspection of the assemblies. Therefore, Entergy classified the fuel assemblies as damaged and placed all fuel assemblies in damaged fuel cans. The inspectors discussed the fuel selection process with knowledgeable personnel and determined that individuals were knowledgeable of the Technical Specification requirements. For the initial MPC, the inspectors viewed the monitors as the selected fuel assemblies were placed in the MPC. The inspectors verified that the serial numbers were legible and matched the loading plan Entergy had prepared.
c. Conclusions
Entergy had developed a program to ensure the proper selection and characterization of fuel assemblies for dry cask storage in accordance with approved procedures. Entergy documentation supported the proper characterization of the first 32 fuel assemblies to be loaded and was in compliance with design parameters specified in the CoC.
5. Heavy Loads Program
a. Inspection Scope
(60854)
Entergy was required to demonstrate the adequacy of their heavy loads program pertaining to the movement of the HI-TRAC and MPC from the cask loading pool to the cask placement stand in the Unit 1 fuel handling building (FHB). The inspection consisted of field observations, interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and reviews of Entergy documentation. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The Indian Point FHB crane is a 75 ton crane that was installed in the FHB in 1962. The 75 ton FHB crane is a bridge and trolley design that is not single failure proof as defined by NUREG-0612. Entergy submitted an amendment request to make changes to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to reflect the use of the non-single failure proof FHB crane main hoist for dry cask storage component lifting and handling operations. A review by the NRC of crane design, maintenance, and operational history was performed as part of the license amendment request that was issued May 8, 2008. The inspectors reviewed Entergys documentation in support of this amendment. This amendment also allowed Entergy to use the 75 ton HI-TRAC 100D version IP1 transfer cask. An impact limiter was employed on the floor of the cask load pool to limit the potential cask damage in the event of a cask drop. The entire travel path of the heavy load in the FHB was over concrete floors directly on bed rock or engineered fill.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation related to the replacement of all crane bridge rail tie-down bolting and the trolley-to-end truck bolting that was identified as a result of Entergys engineering review prior to the dry cask loading campaign. The inspectors reviewed the documentation on the crane load test performed on March 6, 2007, as well as, the inspections performed on the crane by the crane vendor prior to and after the load test. The load test was 125% of the 75 ton rated crane load.
To ensure that the crane could not travel over areas of the SFP where spent fuel was stored, Entergy designated restricted load paths when handling heavy loads.
Additionally, Entergy set limit switches to limit the movement of heavy loads beyond the cask loading pool and placement stand, thus preventing the movement of loads over areas of the west pool SFP containing stored assemblies.
The inspectors observed personnel performing visual inspections and pre-operational checks of the FHB crane and associated lifting devices in accordance with approved procedures prior to lifting and movement of the HI-TRAC.
Over the course of the dry run, the inspectors observed all the movement pathways of a HI-TRAC. The inspectors determined pre-lift job briefings were thorough and emphasized safety aspects of handling heavy loads; individual responsibilities were clearly communicated during pre-job briefings; crane operators, spotters and members of the lifting team were knowledgeable of their responsibilities; and movements of heavy loads were performed in a deliberate and safe manner. The inspectors noted that effective communication was maintained between the load director, crane operator and members of the lifting team while lifts were in progress. Entergy established positive controls to keep non-essential personnel away from the work area to minimize distractions of the lift team.
c. Conclusions
Entergys heavy loads lifting program and procedures were adequate to ensure the proper handling of heavy loads. Entergys documentation complied with the Holtec CoC and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
8. Training and Qualifications
a. Inspection Scope
(60854)
Entergys training program was reviewed to verify that appropriate training requirements were identified for dry cask storage (DCS) tasks and that personnel were qualified to perform dry cask storage related activities. Entergys training program was reviewed to verify that the required elements described in 10 CFR 72 Subpart I were incorporated into the dry cask storage training program. The inspection consisted of a review of Entergy documentation, interviews with knowledgeable personnel, and field observations.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors interviewed the training instructor regarding the training and qualification of personnel performing DCS activities, focusing on personnel added to the DCS team since the Unit 2 campaign and new tasks specific for the Unit 1 campaign. Training modules covered activities in the areas of DCS Overview; Vertical Cask Transporter; Handling, Inspection and Storage; Loading Preparation and Fuel Loading; MPC Processing, Downloading and Transport; and Unloading. The inspectors reviewed selected records from the training qualification list to verify that individuals observed in the field were qualified for tasks they performed.
Radiation Protection (RP) technicians demonstrated familiarity with the expected dose rates while performing mock surveys around the MPC, HI-STORM, and HI-TRAC during all dry run demonstration phases of loading. The inspectors observed simulated radiological conditions and postings based on expected conditions during the actual process. The inspectors also observed RP personnel performing initial baseline contamination surveys, and monitoring during fuel loading, transfer of HI-TRAC to cask placement stand, and movement of the HI-TRAC out of the Unit 1 FHB.
c. Conclusions
Entergy implemented appropriate training modules for the various tasks and licensee personnel were adequately trained to safely conduct ISFSI activities.
9. Initial Loading of the ISFSI
a. Inspection Scope
(60855)
The inspectors observed the loading of spent fuel into the first MPC on July 9, 2008.
The inspection consisted of field observations, a review of license documentation, and interviews with knowledgeable personnel.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed the first loading of Unit 1 spent fuel into an MPC on July 9, 2008. The pre-job brief was conducted with the same thoroughness observed at several other pre-job briefings. During the loading of spent fuel, the inspectors observed that there were two people on hand confirming that the selected fuel assemblies were being loaded into the proper MPC location. The inspectors also reviewed the MPC loading documentation to confirm that the selected fuel assemblies, which were previously characterized for loading, met the Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors observed that the fuel transfer forms were independently witnessed by a second individual during loading of the spent fuel assemblies into the MPC; documentation was accurate and completed in accordance with approved procedures; fuel was loaded into damaged fuel cans in the MPC; the drain tube was installed on the MPC lid, and the lid was placed on the MPC.
While Entergy was processing the second cask, the vent port cap would not seal after the helium backfill. The cap was re-torqued and became stuck. While trying to remove the cap, the cap head was deformed. Holtec approved the work to cut off the deformed cap and generated the documentation for changing the FSAR to cover this activity. A helium purge was introduced to ensure no oxidizing atmosphere was introduced into the MPC. After cutting off the cap and checking the vent port tube, a new vent port cap was installed, torque tested, removed to check for thread damage, and then reinstalled. The vent cover plate was then welded in place. The inspectors reviewed the FSAR change and cap removal documentation and determined the new vent port cap was properly installed.
No significant ALARA concerns were identified. Entergys collective dose estimate for the first Unit 1 MPC was 0.366 rem and the actual dose received was 0.436 rem.
Additional dose was received due to some additional decontamination necessary for the MPC and a problem with installing the hoses for the forced helium dehydration skid. On September 22, 2008, Entergy reported that the collective doses received by site personnel for the loading and storage of the last four MPCs were 0.412, 0.300, 0.268, and 0.278 rem.
d. Conclusions
Entergy properly characterized Unit 1 spent fuel loaded into the MPC. The MPC was properly sealed, tested, surveyed, and inspected, and met the requirements of the CoC.
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Anthony Vitale and other Entergy personnel at the end of the inspection on October 1, 2008.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Dave Ashby, Instructor Mechanical, Rotation
Chuck Bristol, Maintenance Specialist
- Pat Conroy, NSA Director
Michael Donegan, Floor Coordinator, ABS Consulting
Michael Dries, Senior System Engineer
- Chris English, Unit 1 Superintendent
Ramon Escaba, DCS Team Member
Jose Flores, DCS Team Member
- Mel Garofalo, QA Supervisor
Floyd Gumble, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
Bob Hansler, Supervisor - Reactor Engineering
William Henries, Senior Consultant, ABS Consulting
Frank Inzirillo, Manager, Quality Assurance
- John Janicki, Dry Cask Storage - Dry Fuel Storage Superintendent
Richard Jones, DCS Team Supervisor
Richard Miller, Programs and Procedures Administrator
Becky Martin, Senior Emergency Planner
- Don Mayer, Director, Unit 1
John McCann, Unit 1 Project Licensing
William Meyer, Supervisor - Dry Storage Cask
Richard Motko, Senior Engineer
Ian Ramcharitar, DCS Team Member
- Ann Stewart, Licensing
Robin Tamburi, Radiation Protection/ALARA
Chris Tippin, Senior Lead Engineer
- Tony Vitale, General Manager, Plant Operations
Bob Walpole, Manager, Licensing
Robert Williams, DCS Team Member
- Dan Wilson, Chemistry Superintendent
Michael Zeoli, Outage Manager
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
60854 Preoperational Testing of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
60855 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
60856 Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations
60857 Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CFR 72.48 Screening/Evaluation No. 883, Rev. 0, dated 07/31/2008
ABS Consulting Report 1613782-R-001 Rev.0, March 2007, Proof Test Summary Report of
Indian Point Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building Crane
Amendment No. 4 to CoC No. 1014 for the Holtec International HI-STORM 100 Cask System
Amendment No. 53, dated May 9, 2008, Regarding Use of a Non-Single Failure Proof Crane for
Spent Fuel Cask Handling Operations
to NL-07-033, Safety Analysis Regarding Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building 75 Ton
Crane
to NL-07-033, Marked up Unit 1 FSAR Pages for License Amendment Request
Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building Crane
to NL-07-033, Commitments
Component Completion Record No. 75, Holtec International, dated 08/07/2008
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Response to NRC Bulletin 96-02, dated
07/12/1996
Entergy 0-RP-IU-402, Rev. 0, Use of the Eberline RMS II Radiation Monitoring Systems
Entergy 1-DCS-014-GEN, Rev.3, Unit 1 Fuel Movement, 05/29/2008
Entergy 1-DCS-028-GEN, Rev. 2, Unit 1 MPC Loading & Sealing Operations Procedure, dated
06/27/2008
Entergy 1-DCS-030-GEN Rev.0, IP1 Fuel Selection For Dry Cask Storage
Entergy 2-DCS-009-GEN, Rev. 1 MPC Transfer and HI-STORM Movement
Entergy 2-DCS-009-GEN, Rev. 1, MPC Transfer and HI-STORM Movement
Entergy 2-DCS-023-GEN, Rev. 6, Forced Helium Dehydrator (FHD) System Operations,
03/07/2008
Entergy EN-MA-119, Rev. 5, Material Handling Program, 12/17/2007
Entergy Nuclear 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Form, EN-LI-101-ATT-9.1, Rev. 4
Entergy Nuclear 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report Site Specific Appendix E Rev. 1
Entergy Nuclear License Amendment Request, NL-07-033, dated 02/22/2007
Holtec International Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, Appendix A, Technical Specifications
for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System
Holtec International Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, Appendix B, Approved Contents and
Design Features for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System
Letter from Entergy to NRC, reply to NRC RAI #1 dated 10/03/2007
Letter from NRC to Entergy, RAI #1 dated 09/07/2007, RAI to LAR dated 02/22/2007
Reply to NRC RAI #2 from Entergy dated 02/27/2008
Safety Evaluation Report Docket No. 72-1014, Holtec International, HI-STORM 100 Cask
System, Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, Amendment No. 4
Specification No. MP-5830, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Furnishing and
Delivering One Fuel Handling Building Bridge Crane, dated 07/11/1958
Supplier Manufacturing Deviation Report (SMDR) No. 1755, Rev. 0, dated 07/31/2008
Unit 1 Fuel Movement, Table 1 MPC Fuel Loading Verification for First Cask
Whiting Services, Inc. Crane Inspection Report Post Load Test, dated 03/14/2007
Whiting Services, Inc. Crane Inspection Report, Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building, dated 04/11/2008
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
CoC Certificate of Compliance
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DCS Dry Cask Storage
DCSS Dry Cask Storage System
FHB Fuel Handling Building
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
MPC Multi-Purpose Canister
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
QA Quality Assurance
RP Radiation Protection
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SER Safety Evaluation Report
SFP Spent Fuel Pool
VCT Vertical Cask Transporter
Attachment