Emergency Notification System

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[RSS - Reactor Events]

10-05-2019

Region 1 3 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 5 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 0 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 3 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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[list]

by company

AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 0 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 2 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 1 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 0 [Constellation events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 3 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 0 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 3 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 1 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 1 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Exelon 4 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 1 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Luminant 1 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 0 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 1 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 0 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 0 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 3 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 3 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 0 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 0 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
Électricité de France 0 [Électricité de France events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 1 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 1 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Big Rock Point 0 Consumers Power [Big Rock Point events] [RSS]
Braidwood 2 Exelon [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 3 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 1 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Exelon [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 0 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 1 Exelon [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 1 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Exelon [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 1 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 1 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Cook 2 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 1 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Exelon [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Farley 2 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 3 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 0 Exelon [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Exelon [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Exelon [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 0 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 1 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 0 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Exelon [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 0 Exelon [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Exelon [Limerick events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 0 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 0 Exelon [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 0 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 0 Exelon [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 1 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 1 Exelon [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania State University 0 [Pennsylvania State University events] [RSS]
Perry 0 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 0 Entergy [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Point Beach 0 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 0 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 0 Exelon [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
River Bend 0 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 0 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 0 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
South Texas 0 STP Nuclear Operating Company [South Texas events] [RSS]
Summer 0 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Surry 0 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 0 Exelon [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 PGE [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 0 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Vogtle 1 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Waterford 0 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 0 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Yankee Rowe 0 [Yankee Rowe events] [RSS]
Zion 0 Exelon [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

B&W-L-LP 0 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CE 0 [CE events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 0 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 0 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 0 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 0 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5433718 October 2019 02:28:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Reactor Coolant SystemAt 1951 (EDT) on October 17, 2019, fretting indications on the reactor coolant system pressure boundary piping (pressurizer spray line) were identified. This condition does not appear to meet original construction code, ANSI B31.1, 1967 Edition thru summer 1971 Addenda. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

This condition will be corrected prior to the plant entering Mode 4.
ENS 5433316 October 2019 14:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2On October 16, 2019, at 0829 (EDT), an individual was transported for treatment to an offsite facility to address a personal medical issue. Due to the nature of the medical condition, only a partial survey could be completed prior to transport. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no radiological contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
ENS 5433216 October 2019 10:22:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Reactor Water Cleanup
Reactor Building Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On August 20, 2019, at approximately 1133 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced an unexpected loss of the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS). This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Trains A, B, and C and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train A. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The cause of the RPS MG Set trip was dirty potentiometer windings on an Over Voltage Relay. The dirt prevented the potentiometer's wiper from contacting its windings, resulting in erratic setpoint values. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 1542603, 1542608, and 1542569.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5433015 October 2019 19:14:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1High Pressure Coolant InjectionOn 10/15/19 at 1210 (EDT) Peach Bottom discovered a degraded spring hanger (23DBN-H39) associated with Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The hanger is located downstream of MO-3-23-14 HPCI Steam Supply Valve before the HO-3-23-4513 Turbine Stop Valve. A review of the piping and support design analysis were performed and concluded the U3 HPCI turbine inlet nozzle would potentially exceed its allowable stresses. Following Engineering review, U3 HPCI was declared inoperable at 1743 (EDT).

This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432915 October 2019 19:10:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorAt time 0911 (CDT), Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RUK-2325/2327 (MAIN STEAM LINE 2-01/2-03 RADIATION

MONITOR) was removed from service for planned maintenance. Compensatory measures were in place prior to removing the monitor from service to assure adequate monitoring capability available to implement the CPNPP emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL (Main Steam Line) 2-01 and MSL 2-03. With this radiation monitor non-functional, with compensatory measures in place, and the monitor NOT expected to be returned to service within 72 hours, the condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is negligible safety significance to the current condition with respect to the public health and safety perspective. Corrective actions are being pursued to complete maintenance and restore 2-RUK-2325/2327 to functional status.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432812 October 2019 15:54:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4One unopened can of beer was discovered in a break room refrigerator within the plant's Protected Area. The individual that brought in the can of beer was identified. That individual is a Pacific Gas and Electric employee but does not normally work at Diablo Canyon. That individual was brought in to support work during the Unit 2 refueling outage. When questioned, the individual stated that the can of beer had been brought in to give to another person to see if that person liked that brand of beer (the beer was apparently from a small specialty brewery). A behavioral observation was performed on the individual who brought in the can of beer. There was no indication of alcohol use by the individual. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended pending further investigation.
ENS 5432511 October 2019 14:22:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1At 1300 EDT, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1. Technical Specification Action 3.1.4.C (Restore Control Element Assembly (CEA) alignment) was entered on 10/11/2019 at 1100 EDT, with a Required Action to reduce thermal power to less than 70 percent Rated Thermal Power and restore CEA alignment within 2 hours. This Required Action was not completed within the Completion Time; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

At 1345 EDT, CEA alignment was restored and Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Control Element Assembly Alignment) was met. Reactor Power is being stabilized.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432210 October 2019 12:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1122 EDT, on October 10, 2019, Duke Energy initiated voluntary notification of North Carolina State and local officials per the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07, 'Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document,' due to release of tritiated water in excess of 100 gallons.

On October 8, 2019, at approximately 1300 EDT, Brunswick plant personnel drilling as part of an ongoing site project, damaged a storm drain discharge line. The resulting leak was isolated and water around the impacted area was sampled for gamma emitters and tritium. No gamma emitters were detected. The tritium concentration was below the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water limit of 20,000 pCi/L. The leak has been stopped and excavation and repair efforts are in progress. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432010 October 2019 02:17:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 2340 CDT, on October 09, 2019, a site contractor was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical emergency, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii).

Following the individual being transported offsite, but prior to the individual arriving at the offsite medical facility, the individual was confirmed to not be contaminated. This occurred at approximately 2350 CDT, on October 09, 2019.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543189 October 2019 12:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2Emergency Diesel Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
At 1023 EDT, on October 9, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems occurred. The reason for the Emergency Diesel Generator auto-start was the loss of power to the 4160V 1E electrical bus 2AA02 due to a fault at an offsite electrical switchyard. The Emergency Diesel Generator started and energized the 4160V safety bus, and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems automatically started as designed when the undervoltage condition on the safety bus was detected.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified."
ENS 543125 October 2019 16:29:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4At 0850 CDT, on 10/5/2019, the control room was notified of a personnel injury in the Unit 1 containment building. The individual was considered potentially contaminated since a complete frisk could not be performed prior to transport to a local hospital. At 1234 CDT, a radiological survey determined that the individual and their clothing had trace amounts of activity that was easily removed. The employee did not sustain any life threatening injuries.

This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). Additionally, at 1135 CDT contact was made with the Arkansas Department of Health about transport of the potentially contaminated individual. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of an offsite agency.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543094 October 2019 15:45:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4On March 3, 2019, during overhaul activities of the medium voltage power (Magne-blast) circuit breakers, three General Electric Hitachi (GEH) Stationary Primary Contact Fingers Q0114C5382P002 were identified as having contact surfaces with a finish that was rough and unlike the typically smooth finish provided on electrical contact surfaces. These Stationary Primary Contact Fingers are the primary current carrying device for the circuit breaker.

On October 1, 2019, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) completed an evaluation of a deviation, and concluded the condition represented a defect under 10 CFR 21. On October 4, 2019, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, was notified of a defect of GEH Stationary Primary Contact Fingers which met the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 21.21. There are no medium voltage power (Magne-blast) circuit breakers with stationary primary contact fingers impacted by this condition installed in the plant. APS concluded this condition, if installed, could result in the breaker failing to perform its safety function and thus could create a substantial safety hazard.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed."
ENS 543072 October 2019 11:50:00CatawbaNRC Region 2On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543021 October 2019 07:05:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Intermediate Range Monitor
Automatic ScramOn 10/1/2019, at 0307 CDT, Unit 2 was conducting a normal reactor startup and received a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram. The reactor was critical in MODE 2 at the Point of Adding Heat. Operators began withdrawing Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation per procedure. When the operator depressed the SRM Drive Out pushbutton to withdraw the last two SRMs (C and D), an unexpected full Reactor Scram was received. Annunciator indication in the Main Control Room indicated a Neutron Monitoring Scram. The Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) D, E, F, H and G all indicated Upscale High High. There were no Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Containment Isolation System actuations. All other systems functioned as designed.

The cause of the Reactor Scram is still under investigation. This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5430030 September 2019 10:28:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Reactor Building Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

On July 31, 2019, at approximately 1650 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1 experienced a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 isolation during performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(A), Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-140/142 Calibration and Functional Test. The Group 6 isolation caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem B. Unit 1 H2O2 Analyzer and Drywell Radiation Monitor CAM, 1-RM-90-256, were declared Inoperable and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5 Condition B was entered. All affected safety systems responded as expected. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. This condition was the result of two cleared fuses in the alarm logic. The apparent cause is a ground fault on the A6 Open Drain Input/Output Module. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Acton Program as Condition Report 1537358.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5429930 September 2019 01:22:00FermiNRC Region 3Secondary containment
HVAC
On September 29, 2019 at 2228 EDT, during a planned swap of Reactor Building HVAC trains, the exhaust fan discharge damper for the train being removed from service failed to close when the train was shutdown, which resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure not being met for approximately 2 minutes and 15 seconds. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.1 inches of water gauge (positive).

Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by restarting the train of RBHVAC. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 2235 EDT. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5429325 September 2019 15:30:00FermiNRC Region 3High Pressure Coolant Injection
Service water
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
At 1203 EDT, on September 25, 2019, during a Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) pump and valve surveillance test, the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Temperature Control Valve was found to be approximately 80 percent open rather than in its required full open position during fail safe testing. The Division 2 EESW system is required to support operability of the Division 2 EECW system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. An investigation is underway into the cause of the failure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

The licensee is in 72-hour shutdown action statement.
ENS 5429225 September 2019 08:26:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4High Pressure Core Spray
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
At 2338 PDT on September 24, 2019, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was declared inoperable due to a leak on DSA-PCV-2C (2 inch Diesel Starting Air Pressure Control Valve). With one of two air headers isolated and being drained for maintenance, this leak caused the remaining starting air header for HPCS-GEN-DG3 (HPCS Diesel Generator) to lower to less than the operability limit.

Upon declaring the HPCS system inoperable, TS 3.5.1 Action B was entered. In accordance with Action B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. Action B provides a 14 day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were operable during this event. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia. The leak was isolated and starting air header pressure restored to the HPCS diesel generator at 0104 PDT on September 25, 2019, and all associated Technical Specifications were exited.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5429124 September 2019 15:02:00CookNRC Region 3On September 24, 2019, at 0930 EDT, a non-licensed employee contract supervisor had a confirmed positive test result for illegal drugs during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5428923 September 2019 14:15:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1106 CDT Braidwood Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to lowering steam generator water levels following closure of the 1B steam generator feed water regulating valve.

The cause of the 1B steam generator feedwater regulating valve failing closed is unknown at this time and is under investigation.

Both trains of auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels.

All systems responded as expected with the exception of intermediate range nuclear instrument N-36 which was identified as being undercompensated following the reactor trip. Both source range nuclear instruments were manually energized in accordance with station procedures. Steam generator power operated relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as designed in response to the secondary transient due to the reactor trip. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by offsite power with the diesel generators in stand by and all safety systems available. There is no impact to Unit 2. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4 hour notification, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, 8 hour notification.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5428721 September 2019 10:28:00FarleyNRC Region 2Auxiliary Feedwater
Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramAt 0800 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent (power), the reactor was manually tripped due to elevated vibration indication on the 2C reactor coolant pump exceeding annunciator response procedure trip criteria. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto actuated as expected following the manual reactor trip.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed via the use of AFW and subsequent steaming of the steam generators to the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b(2)(iv)(B). In addition, this event report is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR50.72(B)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

Farley reported that there was no increase in containment unidentified leakage or fluctuations with RCP seal flow during this event.
ENS 5428418 September 2019 13:42:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 0750 CDT, on September 18, 2019, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) experienced an unplanned loss of the Integrated Computer System (ICS) to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The loss of ICS resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability to the STPEGS EOF for greater than 90 minutes. Assessment capability has been verified to be available in the Unit 2 Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. ICS was restored to the EOF at 0932 CDT on September 18, 2019.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5428317 September 2019 14:08:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1Event of Public Interest performed to notify State and Local agencies for emergency vehicle response required due to an on-site non-work related illness. The individual was unresponsive and was unable to be resuscitated due to the medical issue. The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Responding to the site were emergency medical services, fire, and police.

The licensee notified Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency, Cumberland County Emergency Management Agency, Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency, York County Emergency Management Agency, and Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5428116 September 2019 14:35:00ClintonNRC Region 3Reactor Water CleanupOn 9/16/19 at 0817 CDT, the Division 1 and Division 2 reactor water cleanup (RT) system differential flow instrumentation was declared inoperable due to failing downscale caused by flashing in the sensing lines that occurred during reactor cooldown for refueling outage C1R19. The Division 1 and Division 2 RT differential flow instrumentation were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Conditions D and E which require restoring at least one division of instruments to operable status within one hour. This condition renders the leakage detection system incapable of performing its safety function, thus it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

In response to the above, system alignment was changed to increase subcooling to restore indication. Division 1 and 2 Division RT differential flow instrumentation were declared operable at 0852 on 9/16/19.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5427813 September 2019 12:23:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0427 CDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1334 EDT FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427713 September 2019 12:21:00Watts BarNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1341 EDT FROM DEAN BAKER TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427613 September 2019 11:57:00SequoyahNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 09/16/2019 AT 1148 EDT FROM SCOTT THOMAS TO BRIAN LIN VIA PHONE * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427212 September 2019 03:25:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Radiation monitor RU-140 (#2 Steam Generator Main Steam Line radiation monitor) experienced a communication failure on both ports A and B. The RU-140 monitor is off line and non-functional at this time. At least one channel of RU-140 is required to perform a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) dose assessment. This represents an unplanned loss of radiological assessment capability for the inability to perform dose assessments that require the radiation monitor. The ability to make emergency classifications from other radiological data collection methods such as field sampling remains available. Actions have been initiated to restore the radiation monitor.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5427112 September 2019 00:49:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Primary containmentOn September 11, 2019 at 1719 CDT, plant personnel identified a condition in which the 208 foot elevation inner primary containment airlock door was not in its fully seated and latched position while the 208 foot elevation outer primary containment airlock door was opened. The 208 foot elevation outer containment airlock door was subsequently closed by the individual exiting the area. The time that both 208 foot elevation containment airlock doors were not in their fully seated and latched positions was less than 1 minute. Following this occurrence, maintenance personnel inspected the 208 foot elevation inner containment airlock door and re-positioned this door to its fully seated and latched position. There was no radioactive release as a result of this event.

This condition requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5426811 September 2019 17:58:00OconeeNRC Region 2A non-licensed contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5426611 September 2019 03:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Remote shutdownA lightning strike occurred at approximately 1502 CDT on 09/10/2019, and a resulting power surge damaged some of the security door card reader system equipment. However, this did not affect access to plant areas for personnel who were already within protected area. At 1830 on 09/10/2019, it was discovered that some of the oncoming night shift personnel could not access particular areas that required the use of security card readers. Extent of condition check at 1934 on 09/10/2019 determined that access to 1A and 3A Electric Board Rooms, which contain remote shutdown panels and Fire Safe Shutdown equipment. was prohibited for the night shift personnel. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Access was restored to all plant areas at 2106 on 9/10/2019. No plant

events occurred during the time frame that the 1A & 3A Electric Board Rooms inaccessible that would have required access to these areas.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542637 September 2019 15:53:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3Main Turbine
Reactor Protection System
At 1309 EDT on September 7, 2019, with the unit in Mode 1 at approximately 95 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during main turbine valve testing. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the turbine bypass valves discharging steam to the main condenser. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The cause of the reactor protection system actuation is under evaluation.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 542627 September 2019 12:01:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2Reactor Coolant SystemOn September 09, 2019 at 0824 EDT, with St. Lucie Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Low Reactor Coolant System Flow due to a trip of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. The cause of the loss of the 1A1 reactor coolant pump is currently under investigation.

St. Lucie Unit 2 was unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by main feed water and the main condenser using the turbine steam bypass valves.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 542576 September 2019 02:47:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 2115 CDT on 9/5/2019, an inside containment test connection and inoperable outside containment isolation valve were discovered to be open for a containment air sample penetration. This resulted in the containment penetration not being isolated. The inside containment test connection was closed at 2322 CDT on 9/5/2019.

This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
ENS 542565 September 2019 16:53:00CatawbaNRC Region 2This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability.

A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system occurred on 4/28/19. Filtration capability was not impacted by this condition. Maintenance subsequently repaired the condition and the TSC ventilation system was returned to service on 5/1/19. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility."
ENS 542531 September 2019 17:44:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2A hurricane warning is in effect for St. Lucie County including the plant site. A hurricane warning was confirmed with the State Watch Office at 1717 EDT. As a matter of procedure, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant entered an Unusual Event classification for the hurricane warning. State and local officials have been notified by the licensee.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee.

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(i) due to the Notice of Unusual Event and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the offsite notification."
ENS 542521 September 2019 00:09:00Watts BarNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramWhile operating at 100 percent power, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped at 2055 EDT on August 31, 2019 due to loss of steam generator #2 level control. The trip was not complex. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems, including Auxiliary Feedwater, actuated as designed. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Auxiliary Feedwater and the Steam Dump System.

Unit 2 is not affected. The cause of the loss of steam generator water level control is being investigated. The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5424428 August 2019 19:10:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Core Spray
High Pressure Core Spray
Primary containment
On Wednesday, August 28, 2019, at 1316 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced a power loss to the Control Room High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Instrumentation Panel due to an internal inverter failure. The power loss caused the loss of the HPCS System (a single train system). The minimum flow valve (a Primary Containment Isolation Valve) for HPCS opened due to this power loss as well. This valve was manually closed in response to this, and the outboard isolation requirement for the associated penetration (which) is closed (for the) system remained intact throughout this event.

No other accident mitigation systems were affected by this event. The cause of this event is under investigation at this time. The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified.

This Condition is an 8-hour reportable condition as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
ENS 5424227 August 2019 02:34:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Auxiliary Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
At 0109 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a dropped rod causing a negative rate trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) and steam dump systems. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5424126 August 2019 16:41:00CookNRC Region 3A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during pre-access testing. The employee's access to the plant was denied.
ENS 5423925 August 2019 15:51:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3Feedwater
Standby Gas Treatment System
Reactor Building Ventilation
Automatic ScramOn August 25, 2019, at 1102 (CDT), Quad Cities Unit 1 experienced an automatic scram from 100 percent power. All rods fully inserted and there were no complications. The trip was initiated from a main generator ground fault relay. Troubleshooting of the fault is in progress. All systems responded as designed. There were no systems inoperable and no TS (Technical Specification) action statements were in progress prior to the Reactor Scram. Reactor water level dropped below the Group 2 and Group 3 Reactor Water Level Isolation set-points as expected, and recovered via the Feedwater system. Standby Gas Treatment System auto started and Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation occurred as expected. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3.

Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Unit 2 was not affected.
ENS 5423723 August 2019 00:33:00HatchNRC Region 2High Pressure Coolant InjectionAt 2234 (EDT), on 08/22/2019, while Unit (2) was at approximately 100 percent power in MODE 1, it was discovered that Unit 2 HPCI was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Initial evaluation is that it is a power supply issue. The system had no indications, followed by smoke from behind the circuitry, and then indications returning. This is associated with a 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation.
ENS 5423422 August 2019 12:49:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) regarding an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal.

On June 27, 2019, at 0130 hours Pacific Daylight Time (PDT), with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent power, the U2 4-kV Vital Bus F was automatically transferred from its auxiliary power to its startup power due to an invalid loss of bus voltage signal. The cause of the invalid signal was due to a test jumper that was inadvertently left in place during surveillance testing. As a result, one auxiliary saltwater pump started and two containment fan cooler units started in slow speed. At 1245 PDT, Vital Bus F was transferred back from startup power to auxiliary power which is the normal plant operating configuration. This event was entered into the Diablo Canyon Power Plant corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.

The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
ENS 5423320 August 2019 20:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5423220 August 2019 18:28:00CooperNRC Region 4At 0939 CDT, on 8/19/19, the National Weather Service reported to Cooper Nuclear Station that the National Warning System (NAWAS) Radio would neither transmit nor receive. The system has been intermittently available since then, but never declared fully functional. The backup notification system has been verified to be available throughout this period. Additional information from the National Weather Service received 8/20/19 at 1414 determined that the Shubert Tower transmitter is non-functional and would not be repaired until 8/21/19. The transmission outage is conservatively assumed to have begun at the first notification on 8/19/19 at 0939. The Shubert Tower transmitter activates the (EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM) EAS/Tone Alert Radios used for public notification. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) when the primary notification system is or will be unavailable for greater than 24 hours with the backup system available. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed."
ENS 5422919 August 2019 14:46:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3Auxiliary Feedwater
Feedwater
At 0924 EDT, on August 19, 2019, it was discovered that both trains of the Auxiliary Feedwater System were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The door separating the two steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms was inadvertently left open during maintenance activities for more than an hour. The door was immediately closed upon discovery, restoring operability to the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The non-safety grade Motor-Driven Feedwater Pump remained operable during this time; additionally, the beyond-design basis diesel-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump also remained available. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5422416 August 2019 15:05:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Steam Generator
Automatic ScramAt 0821 MST, on August 16, 2019, a main turbine trip occurred followed by a loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 control room then received reactor protection system alarms for low departure from nucleate boiling ratio and an automatic reactor trip occurred. Following the reactor trip, auxiliary feedwater was manually started to maintain steam generator levels. A Main Steam Isolation Signal was manually initiated as directed by the Emergency Operating Procedures. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Prior to the reactor trip, Unit 2 was operating normally at 100 percent power.

No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or challenged operator response. All control element assemblies fully inserted into the core and no emergency classification was required per the PVNGS Emergency Plan. The cause of the reactor trip is under investigation. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the Unit 2 reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric steam dump valves.

Units 1 and 3 were unaffected by this event.
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