12:35 Mar 17, 2019
En Revision Imported Date 4/24/2019
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
At 0735 CDT on March 17, 2019, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was isolated due to a water-side leak from the HPCI Gland Seal Condenser. Unit 3 declared the HPCI system Inoperable and entered Technical Specification LCO 3.5.1 Condition C with required actions to verify the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system is Operable, and to restore the HPCI system to Operable status within 14 days. All other Unit 3 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) remain Operable.
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This is also reportable as a 60-day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(V)(D).
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS Event Number 53942, made on March 17, 2019, is being retracted.
NRC Notification 53942 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) were met when the licensee discovered an event, that at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
At 0735 CDT, on March 17, 2019, during the performance of a routine surveillance, a momentary pressure transient of 844 psig from the Feedwater system was introduced into the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system discharge and suction piping that ruptured the seal on the gland seal condenser and flooded the U3 HPCI Room. Unit 3 HPCI was declared inoperable due to isolation of the waterside of the HPCl system.
On April 11, 2019, a Past Operability Evaluation was completed which determined that the HPCI System remained operable. The evaluation of the potential pressure transient and room flooding concluded that the HPCI System could have performed its specified safety function of vessel injection throughout the time that the gland seal was ruptured. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report 149973.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
|Browns Ferry |
Alabama (NRC Region 2)
|10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident|
|LER:||look for an ler...|
|Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.58 h|
14:10 Mar 17, 2019
|NRC Officer:||Donald Norwood|
|Last Updated:||Apr 23, 2019|
|53942 - NRC Website|