ENS 53365
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
20:31 Apr 26, 2018 | |
| Title | Inadvertent Injection of High Pressure Core Spray |
| Event Description | River Bend Station experienced an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) at 1531 [CDT] on 4/26/2018 while operating at 100 percent power.
During replacement of Level Transmitter B21-LTN081C 'Reactor Vessel Low Water Level 1', Main Control Room received an inadvertent initiation and injection of High Pressure Core Spray. The HPCS injection valve was open for approximately 40 seconds before the operators manually closed the valve. Feedwater Level Control responded per design and maintained Reactor Water Level nominal values. The Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) also automatically started in response to the actuation signal. The DG did not automatically connect to the Division 3 switchgear since there was not a low voltage condition on the bus. The manual closure of the injection isolation valve caused the system to be incapable of responding to an automatic actuation signal. The manual override of the injection isolation valve was reset approximately 16 minutes after the event, restoring the system to its standby condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that caused ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] discharge to RCS [Reactor Coolant System] and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that caused the loss of function of the HPCS System. The Senior NRC Resident inspector has been notified. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
River Bend  Louisiana (NRC Region 4) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.68 h-0.07 days <br />-0.01 weeks <br />-0.0023 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Mike Branscum 18:50 Apr 26, 2018 |
| NRC Officer: | Bethany Cecere |
| Last Updated: | Apr 26, 2018 |
| 53365 - NRC Website | |
Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |