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02:56 Jan 19, 2017
Both Secondary Containment Airlock Doors Open Simultaneously
This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock [airlock] and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately five seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 126.96.36.199.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 188.8.131.52. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room has remained less than -0.25 in. H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Notified R3DO (McCraw).
Illinois (NRC Region 3)
|10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material|
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
|Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.28 h-0.095 days <br />-0.0136 weeks <br />-0.00312 months <br />)|
00:39 Jan 19, 2017
|NRC Officer:||Donald Norwood|
|Last Updated:||Jan 19, 2017|
|52496 - NRC Website|
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