This 60-day report, as allowed by
10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves which occurred during the most recent refueling outage at Fermi 2. On 3/18/2014, at approximately 1930 EST, shortly after transferring Division 2
Reactor Protection System (
RPS B) from the alternate to the normal power supply, Operations personnel noted that an unexpected half-scram occurred. Initial investigation found a fuse in an
RPS Power Distribution Panel had blown. Further investigation found that a power
contactor had failed causing the fuse to blow. The
contactor failure resulted in an invalid
half scram and actuations (closure) of Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard containment isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard containment isolation valves and the Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain
Sumps Inboard containment isolation valves. All valves operated as expected. Since containment isolation valves in more than one system were actuated by this failure, this event constitutes an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the system listed in paragraph
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) and is reportable under
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
