ENS 48842
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
05:40 Mar 22, 2013 | |
| Title | Momentary Inner and Outer Reactor Building Access Doors Open Simultaneously |
| Event Description | During performance of surveillance OSP-CONT-M102, secondary containment had been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A had been entered.
Operations personnel performing the surveillance were holding the inner door open and testing the outer door interlock. When the individual presented his badge to the badge reader and attempted to open the outer door, the door opened. Per the surveillance contingency actions, the individual immediately shut the door. Momentarily, both the inner and outer reactor building access doors were open. The surveillance was completed with no further issues. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.A was exited and secondary containment was declared operable. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. No safety system actuations or isolations occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: During subsequent evaluation for reportability, guidance in NUREG-1022 was reviewed. NUREG-1022 provides that removal of a system or part of a system from service as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function) is generally not reportable. In the case of this event, the secondary containment system was removed from service as part of a planned surveillance test. TS Action 3.6.4.1.A was entered as directed by the governing surveillance procedure in anticipation of the airlock interlock testing which, by the very nature of the test, could result in both doors in a given airlock being open simultaneously. The event described above should not have been reported in consideration of the guidance provided in NUREG-1022 and did not constitute a reportable event as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Columbia Generating Station  Washington (NRC Region 4) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.5 h0.0208 days <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Chris Laws 06:10 Mar 22, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | Vince Klco |
| Last Updated: | Mar 25, 2013 |
| 48842 - NRC Website | |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |