ENS 44109
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
17:52 Mar 31, 2008 | |
| Title | Automatic Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip During Maintenance Activities |
| Event Description | Event: At 1352 hours0.0156 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.14436e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes.
In an apparently unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br />. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.77599e-4 months <br />. Initial Safety Significance: There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable until the Lee gas turbine was aligned. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event. Corrective Action(s): Investigations are in progress as to the cause of the Reactor Trip and the KHU 1 lock out. Alignment of KHU 2 to the underground is currently on hold, pending evaluation of the problem which led to the KHU 1 lockout. All control rods fully inserted with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting a portion of the original report identified under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on the following: Event: UPDATE: At 1352 hours0.0156 days <br />0.376 hours <br />0.00224 weeks <br />5.14436e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes. In an unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br />. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker, ACB-1, failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed KHU 1 and the Overhead Power Path from service due to the failed ACB. Because KHU 1 was the unit aligned to the Underground Power Path, Operations declared that path inoperable also. This condition was initially reported as making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours0.0176 days <br />0.422 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.77599e-4 months <br />. In this alignment, the Lee gas turbine provides the on-site emergency power function. A design feature allows a KHU to automatically align to the Underground Path when the unit originally aligned to that path has been locked out, the overhead path is locked out and an emergency start signal exists. Keowee Operations confirmed that during the lockout event the required lockout signals were present on KHU 1 such that KHU 2 would have aligned to the Underground Power Path if an emergency start demand had occurred. As a result, the Underground Power Path remained available during this event and there was no loss of safety function. Therefore the portion of the event related to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is RETRACTED. The Underground Power Path was administratively inoperable because a surveillance (SR 3.8.1.3) to verify operability of KHU 2 to the underground path, required per TS 3.8.1 Condition C.1, could not be performed. The surveillance procedure utilizes a normal start signal, which was inhibited by the lockout on the overhead path. The surveillance procedure does not include provisions for using an emergency start signal. At 1906 hours0.0221 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.25233e-4 months <br />, after the overhead lockout had been reset, KHU 2 successfully completed an Operability test aligned to the Underground Power Path. Investigation determined that the failure of ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, was due to a terminal strip sliding link in the trip circuit being in an intermediate position. It was damaged during repair so the entire sliding link block was replaced. The unit was successfully tested connected to each power path and was declared Operable on 4-1-08 at approximately 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />. At 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> on 4-1-08 the standby bus was disconnected from Lee. Initial Safety Significance: There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed the Overhead Power Path from service. The Lee gas turbine was aligned to energize the standby bus. Operations and Engineering subsequently confirmed that on-site emergency power remained available via KHU 2 and the Underground Power Path. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event. Corrective Action(s): Investigation as to the cause of the Reactor Trip continues. Unit 2 is now on-line at low power and is in the process of returning to full power. ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, terminal strip sliding link has been repaired/replaced; both KHUs have been tested and declared operable; the Lee gas turbine has been secured. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Evans). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Oconee  South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.68 h-0.0283 days <br />-0.00405 weeks <br />-9.31464e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Richard Todd 17:11 Mar 31, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Apr 2, 2008 |
| 44109 - NRC Website | |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | A/R |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Hot Standby (0 %) |
Oconee with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 558882022-05-07T03:10:0007 May 2022 03:10:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Automatic Actuation of Emergency Feedwater ENS 557502022-02-22T03:07:00022 February 2022 03:07:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip ENS 558002022-02-13T21:25:00013 February 2022 21:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Emergency Feedwater System Actuation ENS 557332022-02-05T08:57:0005 February 2022 08:57:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration Unusual Event Declared Due to Visual Observation of Smoke and Multiple Fire Alarms in the West Penetration Room ENS 556382021-12-10T05:49:00010 December 2021 05:49:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Automatic Reactor Trip ENS 556122021-11-27T10:19:00027 November 2021 10:19:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Automatic Actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System ENS 546612020-04-11T01:25:00011 April 2020 01:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip ENS 536772018-10-19T04:00:00019 October 2018 04:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Turbine Steam Seal Header Pressure Malfunction ENS 533292018-04-13T06:27:00013 April 2018 06:27:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip Following Main Feedwater Control Problem ENS 528702017-07-24T20:38:00024 July 2017 20:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Load Rejection ENS 517702016-03-06T20:20:0006 March 2016 20:20:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration Emergency Declaration Due to Fire/Explosion in the Main Transformer ENS 512682015-07-27T13:56:00027 July 2015 13:56:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Valid Actuation of Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System During Startup ENS 507812015-01-31T19:31:00031 January 2015 19:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Manual Rps Actuation Due to Oscillations in the Feedwater System ENS 494712013-10-24T09:53:00024 October 2013 09:53:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip from Full Power Due to Feedwater System Oscillations ENS 461592010-08-07T18:51:0007 August 2010 18:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Manual Reactor Trip After Reactor Coolant Pumps High Vibration ENS 450882009-05-22T00:15:00022 May 2009 00:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Rps Actuation (Reactor Trip) Due to Generator Phase Differential Lockout ENS 446382008-11-07T13:34:0007 November 2008 13:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Automatic Reactor Trip ENS 441092008-03-31T17:52:00031 March 2008 17:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Automatic Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip During Maintenance Activities ENS 431692007-02-15T21:54:00015 February 2007 21:54:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Trip ENS 425762006-05-15T14:59:00015 May 2006 14:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Momentary Loss of Dhr Due to Automatic Actuation of the Keowee Emergency Power Supply ENS 424932006-04-12T17:35:00012 April 2006 17:35:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Unit 2 Experienced an Automatic Reactor Trip Following the Loss of the "2B2" Reactor Coolant Pump ENS 419662005-08-31T18:28:00031 August 2005 18:28:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation - ECCS Discharge Unit 3 Experienced an Automatic Reactor Trip During Routine Testing ENS 405482004-02-26T16:51:00026 February 2004 16:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation Rps Actuation While Critical 2022-05-07T03:10:00 | |