On 11/3/2006 at
1834 hours0.0212 days <br />0.509 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.97837e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that, with the Plant in Mode 2, both trains of
Auxiliary Feedwater were not in the required pump automatic start configuration. One pump was operating and performing the heat removal function. Both
Auxiliary Feedwater train pump controls were immediately placed into the Automatic configuration. It was determined that the pump start controls had been placed in Manual on 11/1/2006 at about
2152 hours0.0249 days <br />0.598 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.18836e-4 months <br />. Upon discovery, it was believed that the
Auxiliary Feedwater heat removal function was satisfied because one train was operating and had been in operation since before
2152 hours0.0249 days <br />0.598 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.18836e-4 months <br /> on 11/1/2006.
Subsequently, on 11/4/2006 at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> it was determined that, with the pump controls in manual, coincident with a postulated Loss of Offsite Power and an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal, the operating Auxiliary Feedwater pump would trip and neither train pump would automatically start.
This situation would constitute a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to mitigate the consequences of a Loss Of Offsite Power event and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)D.
Had such an event occurred, the Operators would have restored Auxiliary Feedwater flow in accordance with station procedures.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
