ENS 42959
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
19:36 Nov 2, 2006 | |
| Title | High Pressure Safety Injection (Hpsi) Pumps Alignment Blocks Improperly Installed |
| Event Description | At 1436 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.46398e-4 months <br /> on November 2, 2006, with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that less than 100% of the required Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) flow was available per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2.D. Therefore, TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered.
Each High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump (one in each ECCS train) is designed with alignment blocks in its mounting, which ensures pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced by the pump upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. These alignment blocks ( 2 per pump) were discovered to be improperly installed, or missing altogether. In this condition, the HPSI pump could potentially be rendered inoperable upon initiation of sump recirculation. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(3)(v)(D) as an unanalyzed condition, and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident, respectively. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
EN # 42959 reported on November 2, 2006 that both Emergency Core Cooling System Trains were inoperable. The reason for that determination involved the observation that the alignment blocks [keys] associated with the mounting of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps were either incorrectly installed or were missing. The alignment keys were believed to be necessary to ensure appropriate HPSI pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. The condition was reported as an unanalyzed condition and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Subsequently, further evaluation of the HPSI pump mounting configuration determined that the alignment keys are not required for pump operability. Therefore, there was no unanalyzed condition and no condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO(Cameron) notified. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Palisades  Michigan (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.43 h-0.0179 days <br />-0.00256 weeks <br />-5.89014e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Dan Malone 19:10 Nov 2, 2006 |
| NRC Officer: | John Mackinnon |
| Last Updated: | Nov 10, 2006 |
| 42959 - NRC Website | |
Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Not Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Hot Standby (0 %) |
| After | Hot Standby (0 %) |
Palisades with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 553112021-06-16T19:50:00016 June 2021 19:50:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves Inoperable ENS 526472017-03-29T19:08:00029 March 2017 19:08:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis ENS 518202016-03-24T06:11:00024 March 2016 06:11:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Control Room Ventilation Declared Inoperable ENS 495162013-11-07T20:52:0007 November 2013 20:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Hot Short Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment ENS 492762013-08-13T15:02:00013 August 2013 15:02:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Control Room Ventilation Filtration Trains Declared Inoperable ENS 473222011-09-26T10:02:00026 September 2011 10:02:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Appendix R Equipment May Not Have Been Available ENS 463022010-10-01T17:25:0001 October 2010 17:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Appendix R Non-Compliance Issue Identified ENS 446452008-11-07T19:41:0007 November 2008 19:41:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Load Calulations for Edg Were Incorrect ENS 429632006-11-04T21:30:0004 November 2006 21:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Auxiliary Feedwater Not Aligned Properly in Startup Mode ENS 429592006-11-02T19:36:0002 November 2006 19:36:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition High Pressure Safety Injection (Hpsi) Pumps Alignment Blocks Improperly Installed ENS 423372006-02-14T21:00:00014 February 2006 21:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Appendix "R" Related Unanalyzed Condition 2021-06-16T19:50:00 | |