ENS 42318
ENS Event | |
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01:50 Feb 7, 2006 | |
Title | Unanalyzed Condition - Non-Conforming Fire Barriers |
Event Description | Event: Field inspections have discovered several instances of non-conformance with acceptance criteria for fire barriers. The non-conformance has been conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of the affected penetrations below the required three hours.
At 2050 hours0.0237 days <br />0.569 hours <br />0.00339 weeks <br />7.80025e-4 months <br /> on 2-6-06 the Operations Shift Manager conservatively declared the all Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barrier penetration seals 'inoperable' pending further inspection. Initial Safety Significance: Per NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.4, loss of fire barrier separation of Appendix R trains is an unanalyzed condition. Some Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barriers provide train separation between Appendix R safe shutdown trains. At this time, no specific Appendix R train separation penetrations have been discovered to be non-conforming. The reportability determination is based on the decision to conservatively declare the penetrations inoperable. Implementation of hourly fire watches in the affected areas reduces the potential for a significant fire to develop in those areas. Corrective Actions: Operations entered Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5 and established an hourly firewatch in the affected areas. Further inspections continue. Evaluation of inspection findings and repairs will follow. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: Event: At 1549 on 2-7-06 Oconee Nuclear Station reported that field inspections had discovered instances of non-conformance with a Duke Energy installation specification for fire barrier penetrations in walls and floors. The non-conformance was conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of affected penetrations below the required three hours. Reportability was based on the conservative declaration that the penetrations were inoperable. Following additional inspections and review of the as-found conditions, Oconee has determined that the as-found conditions still provided a three hour fire barrier so the fire barrier penetrations were actually operable. Oconee has concluded that the event is not reportable and hereby retracts the ENS notification. Corrective Action(s): Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired to restore compliance with Duke Energy specifications. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Carolyn Evans). |
Where | |
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Oconee South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+13.98 h0.583 days <br />0.0832 weeks <br />0.0191 months <br />) | |
Opened: | R.P. Todd 15:49 Feb 7, 2006 |
NRC Officer: | Joe O'Hara |
Last Updated: | Mar 27, 2006 |
42318 - NRC Website | |
Unit 1 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 3 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 506402014-11-25T17:12:00025 November 2014 17:12:00
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