ENS 40617
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
15:26 Mar 28, 2004 | |
| Title | Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for 25 Minutes |
| Event Description | At approximately 1343 hours0.0155 days <br />0.373 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.110115e-4 months <br /> on March 27, 2004, during a routine hand - rotation check of the "C" high pressure safety injection pump (HPSI), it was discovered the pump shaft was exhibiting some binding. At the time, the "C" HPSI pump was in service as the "B" Train HPSI pump. The "C" HPSI pump was declared inoperable and Condition A of LCO 3.5.2 was entered. This LCO condition requires restoration of the inoperable safety injection train within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. At that time, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. The "A" HPSI pump was out of service due to a previously discovered condition of minor leakage observed near two of the casing bolts. The H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, HPSI system has three safety injection pumps. The "A" HPSI pump is the normal Train "A" pump, the "C" pump is the normal Train "B" pump, and the "B" pump is capable of serving as either the Train "A" or the Train "B" pump in the place of the "A" or "C" HPSI pump. At the time of discovery of the binding in the "C" HPSI pump, the "B" HPSI pump was in service as the Train "A" HPSI pump. It was determined that the "A" pump could be restored to operable status and placed back in service to restore two Trains of HPSI. In order to do so, the "B" HPSI pump was removed from service as the Train "A" pump and placed in service as the Train "B" pump. Therefore, at 1026 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.90393e-4 months <br /> on March 28, 2004, for approximately 25 minutes, during the process of placing the "B" HPSI pump in service on Train "B," which was necessary to allow the "A" HPSI pump to be returned to service, there was no HPSI pump automatically available to provide HPSI to the Reactor Coolant System, if an accident were to occur. Therefore, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An additional 8-hour reporting criterion associated with the plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) has also been identified due to the inoperability of the HPSI system. It was known prior to the switching the "B" HPSI pump to Train "B" that this would cause inoperability of both trains of HPSI. It was also known that LCO 3.0.3 would be entered due to this circumstance. This situation was not avoidable, based on the sequence of events. The time in this condition was minimized, the operators were fully aware of plant conditions, and no other system inoperabilities were known of that would have complicated the situation. Both trains of HPSI are operable, although the "C" HPSI pump remains inoperable and out-of-service, pending investigation and repair.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Robinson  South Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000261/LER-2004-001 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.43 h-0.0179 days <br />-0.00256 weeks <br />-5.89014e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Curtis Castell 15:00 Mar 28, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Mike Ripley |
| Last Updated: | Mar 28, 2004 |
| 40617 - NRC Website | |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Robinson with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 521742016-08-11T19:05:00011 August 2016 19:05:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Robinson Dam Tainter Gates Unanalyzed Condition ENS 518642016-04-13T18:30:00013 April 2016 18:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition ENS 507782015-01-29T00:57:00029 January 2015 00:57:00 Other Unspec Reqmnt, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Safety System Will Not Function as Required ENS 477482012-03-16T08:00:00016 March 2012 08:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to an Unqualified System ENS 480112011-05-04T17:25:0004 May 2011 17:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Refueling Water Storage Tank Connected to Non-Seismically Qualified System ENS 463172010-10-07T17:15:0007 October 2010 17:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Feedwater Isolation Inadvertently Disabled ENS 460452010-06-24T18:34:00024 June 2010 18:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Instrument Buses 3 and 8 Failed Causing Closure of Rhr Valves ENS 406172004-03-28T15:26:00028 March 2004 15:26:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Both Trains of High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable for 25 Minutes 2016-08-11T19:05:00 | |
Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ENS_40617&oldid=428645"