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Category:Letter type:BSEP
MONTHYEARBSEP 19-0012, Submittal of 2018 Sea Turtle Annual Report2019-01-17017 January 2019 Submittal of 2018 Sea Turtle Annual Report BSEP 18-0052, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report - 20172018-05-10010 May 2018 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report - 2017 BSEP 18-0051, Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report - 20172018-04-26026 April 2018 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report - 2017 BSEP 18-0045, Request for License Amendment: Technical Specification 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, One-Time Extension of Main Fuel Oil Storage Tank Completion Time2018-04-25025 April 2018 Request for License Amendment: Technical Specification 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, One-Time Extension of Main Fuel Oil Storage Tank Completion Time BSEP 18-0054, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential.2018-04-24024 April 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential. BSEP 18-0048, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Examinations2018-04-11011 April 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Examinations BSEP 18-0044, Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzles N4A and N4D2018-04-11011 April 2018 Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzles N4A and N4D BSEP 18-0046, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information SRXB-RAI-2 Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2018-04-10010 April 2018 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information SRXB-RAI-2 Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 18-0047, Supplement to Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) for End of Interval Leakage Test2018-04-0505 April 2018 Supplement to Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) for End of Interval Leakage Test BSEP 18-0041, Request for License Amendment to Revise the Technical Specifications to Relocate the Pressure-Temperature Limit Curves to a Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2018-04-0404 April 2018 Request for License Amendment to Revise the Technical Specifications to Relocate the Pressure-Temperature Limit Curves to a Pressure and Temperature Limits Report BSEP 18-0043, Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzles N4A and N4D2018-03-31031 March 2018 Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzles N4A and N4D BSEP 18-0035, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2018-03-29029 March 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 18-0042, Cycle 22 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)2018-03-27027 March 2018 Cycle 22 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) BSEP 18-0040, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for End of Interval Leakage Test2018-03-23023 March 2018 Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for End of Interval Leakage Test BSEP 18-0039, Proposed In-Service Inspection Alternative for Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Nozzles N4A and N4D2018-03-19019 March 2018 Proposed In-Service Inspection Alternative for Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay - Nozzles N4A and N4D BSEP 18-0034, Corrected Affidavit Relating to the Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2018-03-16016 March 2018 Corrected Affidavit Relating to the Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 18-0032, Additional Testing Information Relating to the Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2018-03-14014 March 2018 Additional Testing Information Relating to the Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 18-0026, Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld Examination2018-03-0707 March 2018 Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld Examination BSEP 18-0014, Fifth 10-Year Inservice Testing Program Plan2018-02-19019 February 2018 Fifth 10-Year Inservice Testing Program Plan BSEP 18-0021, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion (CAC Nos. MF8864 and MF8865). Without Proprietary Enclosure2018-02-0505 February 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion (CAC Nos. MF8864 and MF8865). Without Proprietary Enclosure BSEP 18-0017, Revision to Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedure2018-01-30030 January 2018 Revision to Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedure BSEP 18-0015, Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Examinations2018-01-23023 January 2018 Inservice Inspection Program Proposed Alternative ISI-09 in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Circumferential Shell Weld Examinations BSEP 18-0013, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control2018-01-23023 January 2018 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control BSEP 18-0001, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-551, Revise Secondary Containment Surveillance Requirements2018-01-23023 January 2018 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-551, Revise Secondary Containment Surveillance Requirements BSEP 18-0012, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-208, Revision 0, Extension of Time to Reach Mode 2 in LCO 3.0.32018-01-23023 January 2018 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-208, Revision 0, Extension of Time to Reach Mode 2 in LCO 3.0.3 BSEP 18-0009, 2017 Sea Turtle Annual Report2018-01-15015 January 2018 2017 Sea Turtle Annual Report BSEP 17-0098, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components (Sscs) for Nuclear Power Reactors2018-01-10010 January 2018 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components (Sscs) for Nuclear Power Reactors BSEP 17-0119, Snubber Program Plan for Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program2018-01-10010 January 2018 Snubber Program Plan for Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program BSEP 17-0115, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control2018-01-0404 January 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control BSEP 17-0110, Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions2017-12-20020 December 2017 Seventh Six-Month Status Report in Response to June 6, 2013, Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions BSEP 17-0121, Post-Examination Documentation and Comments for Operator Retake Initial Examination2017-12-14014 December 2017 Post-Examination Documentation and Comments for Operator Retake Initial Examination BSEP 17-0120, Withdrawal of Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension..2017-12-12012 December 2017 Withdrawal of Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension.. BSEP 17-0118, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel..2017-12-0707 December 2017 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel.. BSEP 17-0117, Response to Request for Additional Information (Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Human Performance Branches) Regarding Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1 AC Sources..2017-12-0606 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information (Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Human Performance Branches) Regarding Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1 AC Sources.. BSEP 17-0116, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Risk- Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of ..2017-12-0404 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Risk- Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of .. BSEP 17-0104, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld Examination2017-11-29029 November 2017 Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) for Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld Examination BSEP 17-0111, Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension of Surveillance Requirements2017-11-28028 November 2017 Request for Risk-Informed Exigent License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension of Surveillance Requirements BSEP 17-0109, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Emergency License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times And.2017-11-24024 November 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Emergency License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times And. BSEP 17-0108, Request for Emergency License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension of Surveillance Requirements2017-11-22022 November 2017 Request for Emergency License Amendment - Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, One-Time Extension of Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Times and Suspension of Surveillance Requirements BSEP 17-0017, Submittal of Request for License Amendment for Performance-Based Fire Protection Alternative for Thermal Insulation Material2017-11-15015 November 2017 Submittal of Request for License Amendment for Performance-Based Fire Protection Alternative for Thermal Insulation Material BSEP 17-0100, Fifth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval2017-11-0202 November 2017 Fifth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval BSEP 17-0089, Updates to Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2017-11-0101 November 2017 Updates to Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 17-0093, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion2017-11-0101 November 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for License Amendment Regarding Core Flow Operating Range Expansion BSEP 17-0078, Request for License Amendment - DC Sources - Operating Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.52017-10-0303 October 2017 Request for License Amendment - DC Sources - Operating Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5 BSEP 17-0076, Registration for Use of General License Spent Fuel Casks2017-09-0606 September 2017 Registration for Use of General License Spent Fuel Casks BSEP 17-0081, Revision to Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures2017-09-0505 September 2017 Revision to Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures BSEP 17-0039, Submittal of Response to Inspection Report 05000324/2015404 and 05000325/2015404, Dated March 30, 2015, Inspection of Interim Cyber Security Milestones 1-7 and Target Set Requirements2017-08-15015 August 2017 Submittal of Response to Inspection Report 05000324/2015404 and 05000325/2015404, Dated March 30, 2015, Inspection of Interim Cyber Security Milestones 1-7 and Target Set Requirements BSEP 17-0071, ISFSI - Registration for Use of General License Spent Fuel Casks2017-08-15015 August 2017 ISFSI - Registration for Use of General License Spent Fuel Casks BSEP 17-0064, Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay on Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle N92017-07-10010 July 2017 Application of Dissimilar Metal Weld Full Structural Overlay on Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle N9 BSEP 17-0060, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control.2017-06-29029 June 2017 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control. 2019-01-17
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000324/LER-2017-0032017-08-0303 August 2017 1 OF 4, LER 17-003-00 for Brunswick, Unit 2, Regarding Setpoint Drift in Main Steam Line Safety/Relief Valves Results in Three Valves Inoperable, 05000325/LER-2017-0032017-08-0202 August 2017 Control Room Air Conditioning and Emergency Ventilation Systems Rendered Inoperable, LER 17-003-00 for Brunswick, Unit 1, Regarding Control Room Air Conditioning and Emergency Ventilation Systems Rendered Inoperable 05000324/LER-2017-0022017-06-12012 June 2017 Plant Mode Change with Primary Containment Inoperable, LER 17-002-00 for Brunswick, Unit 1, Regarding Foreign Material in Switch Results in Unplanned Automatic Start of Emergency Diesel Generators 05000324/LER-2017-0012017-05-18018 May 2017 Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3, LER 17-001-00 for Brunswick, Unit 2, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 05000324/LER-2016-0012016-08-0808 August 2016 Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Inoperability, LER 16-001-00 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, Regarding Mispositioned Valves Result in Residual Heat Removal Service Water System lnoperability 05000325/LER-2016-0032016-05-0202 May 2016 Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3, LER 16-003-00 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1 Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3 05000324/LER-2016-0022016-05-0202 May 2016 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to Failed Relay Coil, LER 16-002-00 for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Units 1 and 2, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 3 Inoperable Due to Failure to Auto-Start 05000325/LER-2016-0012016-04-0606 April 2016 Electriqal Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power, LER 16-001-00 for Brunswick, Unit 1, Regarding Electrical Bus Fault Results in Lockout of Startup Auxiliary Transformer and Loss of Offsite Power BSEP 15-0088, Special Report, Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report2015-10-22022 October 2015 Special Report, Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report ML1019404522008-06-0303 June 2008 10CFR50.75g File: AR00237296 Overflowed CST ML1019404542008-05-13013 May 2008 10CFR50.75g File: AR00272173 Thru Wall Leak in Cw Intake Pipe Was Found to Contain Tritium in the Groundwater Leaking Into the Pipe ML1019404562008-04-28028 April 2008 10CFR50.75g File: AR00242461 Routine Environmental Soil/Water Sampling Has Identified Low Levels of Tritium . BSEP 03-0023, LER 2002-02-00 from Brunswick, Unit 2 Regarding Remote Shutdown Panel Power Supply Inventer Design Deficiency2003-02-14014 February 2003 LER 2002-02-00 from Brunswick, Unit 2 Regarding Remote Shutdown Panel Power Supply Inventer Design Deficiency 2017-08-03
[Table view] |
Text
S DUKEBrunswick
~P.O. Box 10429 Nuclear Plant ENERGYSouthport, NC 28461 OCT 22 D1h Serial: BSEP 15-0088 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 Docket No. 50-325 Special Report - Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report In accordance with Technical Specification 5.6.6, "'Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report," for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., is submitting the enclosed Special Report associated with the Unit 1 Reactor Water Clean-Up System Valve Position Indication.
This document contains no regulatory commitments.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
Sincerely, Anneltte H. Pope Director - Organizational Effectiveness Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2
Enclosure:
Special Report - Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Aye, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWEN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 1 of 3 Enclosure Special Report -
Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 2 of 3
Background
On September 9, 2015, at 2103 hours0.0243 days <br />0.584 hours <br />0.00348 weeks <br />8.001915e-4 months <br />, with Brunswick Steam Eiectric Plant (BSEP) Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power, Unit 1 experienced a loss of electrical power to Motor Control Center 1 CB, resulting in a Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) Group 3 containment isolation. During this isolation, Unit 1 RWCU Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve 1-G31 -FO01 went fully closed as required, but displayed dual "Open-Closed" valve position indication in the Control Room. Full closure of 1-G31-F001 was verified by stroking the valve open and closed and noting an acceptable full stroke time in both the open and closed directions. Subsequent investigation determined the 1-G31-F001 "Open" position indication in the Control Room was operable while the 1-G31-F001 "Closed" position indication in the Control Room was inoperable. Valve 1-G31-F004 is the Unit 1 RWCU Inlet Outboard Isolation Valve in the same containment penetration as 1 -G31 -FO01. During the Group 3 containment isolation, 1-G31 -F004 went fully closed as required and the valve's "Open" and "Closed" position indications in the Control Room were operable.
In MODE 1, BSEP Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.3.1-1, "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation," Function 8 PCIV Position, requires two channels of Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for an un-isolated containment penetration flow path with two containment isolation valves. For the un-isolated containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31-F001 and 1-G31-F004, this requirement is satisfied by requiring one channel of position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for each of these two PCIVs. With the 1-G31-F001 "Closed" position indication in the Control Room inoperable, the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel is inoperable. The Required Action and Completion Time for Condition A of TS 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," requires the channel be restored to an operable status within 30 days. Given that BSEP Unit 1 is in MODE 1 and valve 1-G31 -FO01 and its limit switches are in the Unit 1 drywell, the valve and its limit switches cannot be accessed for repairs. Therefore, the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel was not restored to an operable status within 30 days. With the Required Action and Completion Time of Condition A not met, the Required Action and Completion Time of TS 3.3.3.1, Condition B, requires action be initiated immediately in accordance with TS 5.6.6. TS 5.6.6, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report,"
requires a report be submitted within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel to an operable status. This Special Report is submitted in accordance with the TS 5.6.6 requirement.
Cause of Inop~erability Initial investigation determined the cause of the inoperable 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel was a failure of a limit switch on the valve.
Preplanned Alternate Monitoring Method The TS Table 3.3.3.1 PAM instrumentation ensures there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess plant status and behavior following an accident. In the case of PCIV position, the important information is the isolation status of the associated containment penetration for verification of containment integrity. For the containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31 -FO01 and 1-G31-F004, the two TS required operable channels ensure that no single failure prevents the operators from being
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 3 of 3 presented with the information necessary to determine the status of the containment penetration flow path. The two required channels is satisfied by requiring one channel of position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for each of these two PCI Vs.
Although the 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel is inoperable, there are alternate means for operators to verify the isolation status of the containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31 -FO01 and 1-G31-F004. First, the 1-G31-F004 PCIV position instrumentation channel is fully operable. Also, the Control Room is equipped with RWCU inlet, RWCU return, RWCU reject, and RWCU differential flow indications. Isolation of the RWCU containment penetration flow path served by 1-G31-FO01 and 1-G31-F004 can be quickly verified by monitoring these flow indications. These flow signals are continually monitored by the leak detection system which would annunciate and alert operators of flow imbalance levels arising from isolation of the containment penetration flow path. Individual RWCU filter flow indication is also available in the Control Room with associated low flow annunciation. Finally, the high energy line break and leak detection systems also monitor reactor building temperatures alerting operators of any significant RWCU system leakage.
Plans and Schedule for Restoringj the Instrumentation to an Operable Status Given that BSEP Unit 1 is in MODE 1 and valve 1-G31 -FO01 and its limit switches are in the Unit 1 drywell, the limit switches cannot be accessed for repairs. These repair activities will be completed during the next Unit 1 refueling outage, currently scheduled to begin on February 27, 2016. These repair activities will restore the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel to an operable status.
S DUKEBrunswick
~P.O. Box 10429 Nuclear Plant ENERGYSouthport, NC 28461 OCT 22 D1h Serial: BSEP 15-0088 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 Docket No. 50-325 Special Report - Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report In accordance with Technical Specification 5.6.6, "'Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report," for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 1, Duke Energy Progress, Inc., is submitting the enclosed Special Report associated with the Unit 1 Reactor Water Clean-Up System Valve Position Indication.
This document contains no regulatory commitments.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Lee Grzeck, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (910) 457-2487.
Sincerely, Anneltte H. Pope Director - Organizational Effectiveness Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2
Enclosure:
Special Report - Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report cc (with enclosure):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II ATTN: Regional Administrator 245 Peachtree Center Aye, NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Michelle P. Catts, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. Andrew Hon (Mail Stop OWEN 8G9A) (Electronic Copy Only) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 1 of 3 Enclosure Special Report -
Technical Specification 5.6.6, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)
Instrumentation Report
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 2 of 3
Background
On September 9, 2015, at 2103 hours0.0243 days <br />0.584 hours <br />0.00348 weeks <br />8.001915e-4 months <br />, with Brunswick Steam Eiectric Plant (BSEP) Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100% power, Unit 1 experienced a loss of electrical power to Motor Control Center 1 CB, resulting in a Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) Group 3 containment isolation. During this isolation, Unit 1 RWCU Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve 1-G31 -FO01 went fully closed as required, but displayed dual "Open-Closed" valve position indication in the Control Room. Full closure of 1-G31-F001 was verified by stroking the valve open and closed and noting an acceptable full stroke time in both the open and closed directions. Subsequent investigation determined the 1-G31-F001 "Open" position indication in the Control Room was operable while the 1-G31-F001 "Closed" position indication in the Control Room was inoperable. Valve 1-G31-F004 is the Unit 1 RWCU Inlet Outboard Isolation Valve in the same containment penetration as 1 -G31 -FO01. During the Group 3 containment isolation, 1-G31 -F004 went fully closed as required and the valve's "Open" and "Closed" position indications in the Control Room were operable.
In MODE 1, BSEP Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.3.1-1, "Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation," Function 8 PCIV Position, requires two channels of Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for an un-isolated containment penetration flow path with two containment isolation valves. For the un-isolated containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31-F001 and 1-G31-F004, this requirement is satisfied by requiring one channel of position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for each of these two PCIVs. With the 1-G31-F001 "Closed" position indication in the Control Room inoperable, the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel is inoperable. The Required Action and Completion Time for Condition A of TS 3.3.3.1, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," requires the channel be restored to an operable status within 30 days. Given that BSEP Unit 1 is in MODE 1 and valve 1-G31 -FO01 and its limit switches are in the Unit 1 drywell, the valve and its limit switches cannot be accessed for repairs. Therefore, the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel was not restored to an operable status within 30 days. With the Required Action and Completion Time of Condition A not met, the Required Action and Completion Time of TS 3.3.3.1, Condition B, requires action be initiated immediately in accordance with TS 5.6.6. TS 5.6.6, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Report,"
requires a report be submitted within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel to an operable status. This Special Report is submitted in accordance with the TS 5.6.6 requirement.
Cause of Inop~erability Initial investigation determined the cause of the inoperable 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel was a failure of a limit switch on the valve.
Preplanned Alternate Monitoring Method The TS Table 3.3.3.1 PAM instrumentation ensures there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess plant status and behavior following an accident. In the case of PCIV position, the important information is the isolation status of the associated containment penetration for verification of containment integrity. For the containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31 -FO01 and 1-G31-F004, the two TS required operable channels ensure that no single failure prevents the operators from being
BSEP 15-0088 Enclosure Page 3 of 3 presented with the information necessary to determine the status of the containment penetration flow path. The two required channels is satisfied by requiring one channel of position instrumentation in the Control Room be operable for each of these two PCI Vs.
Although the 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel is inoperable, there are alternate means for operators to verify the isolation status of the containment penetration flow path served by PCI Vs 1-G31 -FO01 and 1-G31-F004. First, the 1-G31-F004 PCIV position instrumentation channel is fully operable. Also, the Control Room is equipped with RWCU inlet, RWCU return, RWCU reject, and RWCU differential flow indications. Isolation of the RWCU containment penetration flow path served by 1-G31-FO01 and 1-G31-F004 can be quickly verified by monitoring these flow indications. These flow signals are continually monitored by the leak detection system which would annunciate and alert operators of flow imbalance levels arising from isolation of the containment penetration flow path. Individual RWCU filter flow indication is also available in the Control Room with associated low flow annunciation. Finally, the high energy line break and leak detection systems also monitor reactor building temperatures alerting operators of any significant RWCU system leakage.
Plans and Schedule for Restoringj the Instrumentation to an Operable Status Given that BSEP Unit 1 is in MODE 1 and valve 1-G31 -FO01 and its limit switches are in the Unit 1 drywell, the limit switches cannot be accessed for repairs. These repair activities will be completed during the next Unit 1 refueling outage, currently scheduled to begin on February 27, 2016. These repair activities will restore the required 1-G31-F001 PCIV position instrumentation channel to an operable status.