05000528/FIN-2017002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inoperable Containment Isolation Valve Due toNot Operating Valve in Accordance with Station Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.6.3 Condition C for exceeding the allowed outage time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to isolate the flow path of an inoperable containment isolation valve. Specifically, Unit 1 containment isolation valve SG-1134 was inoperable from June 28, 2016, to September 21, 2016, due to improper restoration from planned maintenance. The licensee entered this condition in their corrective action program and performed a Level 2 cause analysis under Condition Report 16-14896. The licensee also undertook immediate actions to restore the valve from the neutral position and remotely stroke the valve per procedure.The inspectors concluded the failure to restore Unit 1 containment isolation valve SG-1134 from maintenance in accordance with station procedures was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor and a finding because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of maintaining functionality of containment under the Barrier Integrity cornerstone which affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers will protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inoperability of this containment isolation valve allowed the potential of a radioactive release during a design basis accident. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, Issue Date: 05/06/04. Section 4.1 determined this to be a Type B finding since the degraded condition did not affect the likelihood of core damage. Table 4.1 shows that containment isolation valves in lines connecting reactor coolant systems to environments with small lines would not contribute to large early release frequency. Since valve SG-1134 is a small (one-inch) valve, this finding screened to Green using the flow chart in Figure 4.1 LERF-based Significance Determination Process. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the documentation component. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide a work package that was complete, thorough, accurate, and current in accordance with station procedure 40OP-09OP01, Operation of Air Operated Valves, when returning SG-1134 to its normal operating condition following maintenance. As a result, the valve handwheel was left out of neutral, thereby preventing remote operation [H.7]. |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2017002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Peabody D Reinert D You B Correll W Sifre E Uribe G Miller |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2017002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Palo Verde)
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