05000483/FIN-2015004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality on the Reactor Coolant System |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, after identifying boric acid deposits on the flange downstream of valve BBV0400, a reactor coolant system boundary valve, the licensee did not promptly take action to stop the reactor coolant system leakage before it worsened and caused a plant shutdown due to reactor coolant system leakage in excess of technical specification limits. The immediate corrective action was to torque the valve and flange to reduce leakage to within limits. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201505308. The licensees failure to correct the condition adverse to quality (i.e. leakage past valve BBV0400) in a timely manner was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the reactor coolant system equipment and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to correct the reactor coolant system leakage through valve BBV0400 resulted in reactor coolant system leakage worsening and exceeding technical specification limits, and a plant shutdown. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because after a reasonable assessment of degradation, it could not: 1) result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident, or 2) have likely affected other systems used to mitigate a loss of coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work management component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee initially planned to address the reactor coolant leakage six months after the issue was identified, and then moved it out an additional three months, failing to prioritize the work commensurate with its safety significance. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2015004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J O'Donnell M Langelier N Taylor P Hernandez T Hartman |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2015004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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