05000454/FIN-2016002-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that the licensee provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to the above, the licensee identified that they failed since original plant construction to verify the adequacy of the diesel driven AFW pump design. Specifically as discussed in the review of LER 05000454/201600100 in Section 4OA3 of this report, the licensee failed to verify the diesel driven AFW pump could perform its safe shutdown function following a HELB in the turbine building. Since the diesels air intake was located in the Turbine Building, it would be impacted by a HELB. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP and took immediate corrective actions by declaring both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 diesel driven AFW pumps inoperable and then restored operability of the pumps by implementing temporary plant modifications to relocate the diesel air intakes to the auxiliary building where the environment was not susceptible to a HELB. The licensees planned corrective actions include a permanent plant modification to relocate the air intake to a location that was not susceptible to a HELB. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to verify that the diesel driven AFW pump could perform its safe function following a HELB event in the turbine building did not ensure its availability, reliability, and capability to respond to the initiating event. Since the finding did represent an actual loss of function of at least a single Train for greater than its Technical Specification Allowed Outage Time, a Detailed Risk Evaluation was performed which concluded that the estimated change in core damage frequency was approximately 3.4E7/year, which represented a finding of very low safety significance (Green). |
Site: | Byron |
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Report | IR 05000454/2016002 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Hunt C Thompson E Duncan G Edwards J Draper J Mcghee L Smith M Holmberg S Bell |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2016002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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