05000443/FIN-2013008-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Primary Component Cooling Water System Unavailable Following a Seismic Event |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that NextEra did not verify the design basis for the primary component cooling water (PCCW) system had been translated into specifications and procedures. Specifically, the team found that NextEra had produced engineering evaluations and maintenance procedures that allowed a limited amount of leakage past the B train PCCW isolation valves. The team noted NextEra used these documents to conclude that a 2.5 gallons per minute (gpm) leak rate identified in April 2011 and a 4 gpm leak identified in October 2012 on B train valves were acceptable. The team reviewed the design and licensing basis of the B train and determined the system did not have a safety related refill capability and, therefore, was required to be leak tight. The team determined that, with leakage past the isolation valves, water would need to be added to the system and concluded that following certain design basis events a safety related refill system would not be available resulting in loss of the PCCW system. Following identification of the issue NextEra entered it into their corrective action program and evaluated the operability of system, concluding the PCCW system was operable based on recent valve-leakage testing results. The team review of the evaluation determined it to be reasonable. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors (seismic event) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event and resulted in a DRE in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 4. Based upon the DRE, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The team determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because NextEra did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, engineering evaluations and maintenance procedures associated with PCCW isolation valves did not align with the design and licensing basis requirements for a leak tight system. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2013008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond K Mangan S Pindale W Sherbin J Schoppy S Kobylarz P Krohn |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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