05000443/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Loss of DC Control Power to Switchyard #2 |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified for failure to follow procedures associated with switchyard maintenance activities on January 24, 2013. Specifically, in preparation for the planned maintenance on switchyard battery (SYB) #3, operators incorrectly performed NextEra procedure ON1048.07, Switchyard Battery Operation, which led to a loss of power on switchyard system (SYS) #2, disabled the SYS#2 breaker automatic closure feature, and increased the risk of a loss of offsite power. Corrective action was subsequently taken to secure the maintenance on SYB#3, and return it and the battery charger to service to supply loads to both Switchyard System #1 (SYS#1) and SYS#2. NextEra entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1841980. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, not properly performing NextEra procedure ON1048.07 resulted in the loss of the SYS#2 breaker automatic closure feature, thereby increasing the risk of an initiating event due to a loss of off-site power. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations (IMC 0609A). The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not cause a reactor trip, and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because NextEra personnel did not utilize human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task, such that work activities were performed safely. Specifically, NextEra personnel did not verify that the switchyard battery charger switch manipulation would result in the appropriate system response. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2013002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Dentel P Mckenna S Rich B Dionne M Jennerich |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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