05000416/FIN-2017011-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Disposition Adverse Conditions as Required by Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding for the licensees failure to disposition conditions as required by Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revisions 24 through 30. Specifically, the licensee did not identify 72 conditions as either Adverse Category B, C, or D as required by the procedure. As a result, the licensee failed to perform the required cause evaluations and develop corrective actions to address the conditions. The licensee entered the conditions into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2017-10896. The licensee initiated corrective actions to re-categorize the conditions and perform the required evaluations. The failure to disposition conditions as adverse (B, C, or D) as required by Procedure EN-LI-102 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, condition reports associated with deficiencies or potential deficiencies involving safety-related equipment are required to be categorized as adverse and appropriate corrective actions are assigned including causal analyses appropriate to the circumstances per licensee Procedure EN-LI-102. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was related to, but was not itself: (1) a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) a loss of system and/or function; (3) an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees Maintenance Rule program. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, consistent process, because the licensee did not use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Specifically, the licensees failure to consistently disposition identified conditions as adverse led to the failure to fully evaluate the conditions [H.13]. |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000416/2017011 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2018 (2018Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Azua L Micewski W Sifre C Speer M Young T Hipschman |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2017011 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2018Q1
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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