05000413/FIN-2016002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Implement RHR Operating Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately implement a procedure for the operation of the Unit 1 residual heat removal (RHR) system. As a result, the breaker for the 1B RHR pump loop suction valve was left open, which resulted in the 1B train of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) being inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to close the breaker and restore operability of the 1B train ECCS. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2014866. The licensees failure to adequately implement RHR system operating procedure, OP/1A/6200/004, Shutdown and Alignment for Standby Readiness, prior to plant startup was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the breaker for the 1B RHR pump loop suction valve being left open and the1B train of ECCS being inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Section B and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time because 1ND37A (redundant decay heat removal (ND) 1B pump suction from reactor coolant (NC) Loop C) was still be able to provide the required permissive signal to open 1ND136B (ND supply to safety injection (NI) pump 1B). The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect of teamwork in the area of human performance because operations did not communicate and coordinate activities associated with the RHR system to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. (H.4) |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2016002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Hutto C Scott F Ehrhardt |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Catawba) @ 2016Q2
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