05000397/FIN-2017008-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | Green . The inspectors reviewed a self -revealed, non- cited violation of Technical Specificat ion 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow Procedure SOP- RCIC- INJECTION -QC, RCIC RPV In jection Quick Card, Revision 5. During a complicated reactor scram on December 18, 2016, licensed operators failed to open the RCIC turbine trip valve, RCIC -V-1, prior to initiating RCIC. As a result, RCIC tripped on overspeed, required local resetting, and led to licensed operations personnel injecting with the HPCS system , a nonpreferred injection source . As immediate corrective actions, the licensee implemented operations N ight Order 76 that emphasized to operators the correct valve seq uence for initiating RCIC flow. To address additional training aspects of this issue, the licensee updated the RCIC quick card procedure for clarity and added a training module to the next licensed operator requalification cycle on use of RCIC during transients. The licensee entered the unexpected trip of RCIC into the corrective action program as Action Requests 359064 and 359162 . The failure to follow Procedure SOP -RCIC- INJECTION -QC, RCIC RPV In jection Quick Card, Revision 5, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At -Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; (2) the finding did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non- technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety -significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This finding had a cross -cutting aspect in the area of human performance, training, in that the licensee failed to provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the licensed operator did not understand the sequence of component manipulations for restarting RCIC using the quick card [H.9] |
| Site: | Columbia  |
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| Report | IR 05000397/2017008 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Bradley G Kolcum M Haire R Deese |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2017008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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