05000382/FIN-2016001-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 6.8.1, states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Appendix A, Section 2.l, requires procedures for refueling and core alterations. Step 6.2.1 of Procedure OP-001-005, Revision 309, RCS Drain and Fill Below RCS Hot Leg Centerline, instructs the licensee to verify, in part, that Containment Purge is aligned for Refueling Ventilation with RAB Normal Ventilation, or adequate provisions or controls are in place to acceptably address radiological concerns. Contrary to the above, on November 18, 2015, the licensee failed to verify that Containment Purge was aligned for Refueling Ventilation with RAB Normal Ventilation or that adequate controls were in place to acceptably address radiological concerns. Specifically, the licensee proceeded with RCS fill without radiation protection monitoring for airborne radioactivity in the vicinity of the TRH hoses as required. The alignment for Refueling Ventilation was not completed because the required valve (CAP-201), which allows alignment between containment purge and refuel ventilation, was inoperable. The licensee indicated that this condition had existed since at least Refueling Outage 18 in 2012. This finding adversely affected the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone because it had the potential to cause a high airborne condition local to the refuel cavity and cause unplanned exposures. The licensees immediate corrective action was to initiate a work order to complete repairs of the inoperable CAP-201 valve. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2015-08474. The significance of the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was: (1) not an ALARA finding, (2) did not result in an overexposure, (3) did not involve substantial potential for an exposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. Licensee-identified findings do not involve cross-cutting aspects. |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2016001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Hagar C Speer F Ramirez J Josey L Carson N Greene |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2016001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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