05000374/FIN-2016001-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain Appropriate Work Instructions Led to Lost Parts in the Reactor Vessel |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was self-revealed for the licensees failure to verify zero differential pressure across the jet pump plug seals prior to plug removal, an activity affecting quality, in a manner that was appropriate to the circumstances regarding timeliness of the removal. The verification was required by steps 6.13.1 and 6.12 of work orders (WO) 174735903 and 180438305, respectively. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as action requests 2466339 and 2508333. Corrective actions planned and completed include performed additional analysis and testing of jet pump plug tooling, revised procedures/work instructions, and planned upgrades to the jet pump plug tooling to increase the margins associated with the forces required to displace the seal from the plug. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, it had the potential to become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the robust physical characteristics of the plugs were such that, if unrecovered and unmitigated, coolant flow through certain peripheral fuel assembly orifices could have become blocked by the plugs and potentially led to fuel melt. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Under Exhibit 4, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, the inspectors answered No to all of the screening questions. Therefore, this issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work management because the licensee did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety was the overriding priorityas evidenced by the in-field staff verifying zero differential pressure, but then delaying plug removal due to conflicting activities (e.g., shift turnover). As a result, plug removal was later recommenced without re-verifying that conditions had not changed in the intervening period [IMC 0310, H.5]. |
Site: | LaSalle |
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Report | IR 05000374/2016001 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Dickson C Hunt G Roach J Robbins R Ruiz R Zuffa T Bilik T Go |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000374/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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