05000373/LER-2010-001

LER-2010-001, Unauthorized Individual Gained Access to the Protected Area.

Docket Number
Event date:	03-03-2010
Report date:	04-28-2010
3732010001R00 - NRC Website

A. PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric Boiling Water Reactor, 3489 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core Power

CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit(s): 1 Event Date: 3/3/2010 Event Time: 07:47 Reactor Mode(s): 4 Power Level(s): 0% Mode(s) Name: Cold Shutdown

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 3, 2010, at 07:47 an individual approved for protected area access inserted their security badge into the Main Access Facility (MAF) turnstile #5 card reader and received the proper response (green light on card reader and turnstile unlocked) for authorized entry. The individual believed that the proper response for accessing the plant was not received and stepped away from the entry point to obtain help from a Security Officer. Turnstile #5 remained unlocked. The Security Officer called the Security Control Center at 07:49. The Security Officer was informed that the individual had already logged into the protected area at 07:47. Security approved protected area access for the individual at 07:49. The individual entered the protected area through a turnstile manually unlocked by Security.

On March 3, 2010, at approximately 07:47, a second individual that was not authorized for protected area access inserted their security badge into the turnstile #5 card reader. The individual failed to identify that they had not received the proper response for entering the protected area and proceeded through turnstile #5 and entered the protected area. The individual was able to access the protected area through turnstile #5 because the turnstile remained unlocked from the previous individual's attempt to gain access. Once the individual passed through turnstile #5, the turnstile returned to the locked position.

The second individual, now in the protected area, identified that his co-workers could not gain access.

At approximately 07:58, the individual proceeded to the exit turnstiles. The individual inserted his security badge at the exit turnstile card reader and received an error message. Security immediately responded and took control of the individual.

At 08:25 on March 3, 2010, Security contacted the operations Shift Manager and notified him of the issue. At 08:51 CST an ENS one hour notification was completed per 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1). This event affects both units due to the shared protected area.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was that the authorized entrant did not follow the process for entering a vital door or turnstile. The individual did not enter or challenge turnstile #5. A contributing cause was that the second individual did not properly use human performance tools to validate access approval on indication at the security card reader.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS

The safety consequences of this event were minimal. The unauthorized individual displayed no malevolent intent to gain access. The individual has been approved for access at other nuclear facilities and was unaware that their security badge had been cancelled. Access approval forms had been properly completed with no discrepancies identified.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A site wide communication was issued to inform station personnel of the event. The communication included a description of the proper techniques required for security card usage on vital doors and security access turnstiles. The individuals were coached on the proper human performance techniques when using vital doors and security access turnstiles.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURENCES

LaSalle County Station has not previously experienced an unauthorized individual in the protected area.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

Not Applicable