At the time of the event, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in MODE 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.
Unit Status:
Event Description: On December 15, 2004, an initial evaluation of the adequacy of the radioactivity detection sensitivities of both Unit's Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radioactivity Monitor (EMF38L) and both Unit's Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitor (EMF39L) concluded these EMFs were operable.0 However, on March 2, 2005, McGuire concluded the sensitivities of these EMFs were inadequate for them to perform their intended function of detecting a one gallon per minute leak from the Reactor Coolant System within one hour.0 In consequence, with regard to the Reactor Coolant System leakage detection function, these monitors were inoperable for periods in excess of Technical Specification requirements. These instances represented a Technical Specification prohibited operation reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 A risk assessment has (a)(2)(i)(B).0 determined this event to be of no significance to the health and safety of the public.
Event Cause: The initial evaluation of EMF38L and EMF39L did not recognize that, even though their sensitivities appeared to comply with original licensing basis requirements, current Reactor Coolant System radioactivity levels precluded EMF38L and EMF39L from satisfying their intended function of detecting a one gallon per minute Reactor Coolant System leak within one hour.
Corrective Action: Additional training will be conducted related to what is to be addressed when evaluating the capability of a structure, system, or component to perform its specified function(s).0 License Amendment Request will be submitted clarifying the capabilities of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation. |
BACKGROUND
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection Instrumentation [IL](EMF):
The purpose of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation is to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small RCS leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the Unit in a safe condition. Redundancy is provided by the use of diverse monitoring methods. Two of these methods are the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Radioactivity Monitor (EMF38L) and the Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitor (EMF39L). Another is the Containment Ventilation Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT) Level Monitor.
The original licensing basis radioactivity detection sensitivities of EMF38L and EMF39L were established based upon guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.45 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection. RG 1.45 indicates that, when analyzing the sensitivity of leak detection systems using particulate or gaseous radioactivity, a realistic RCS radioactivity concentration assumption should be used. With regard to this assumption, RG 1.45 states that the expected values used in the Plant Environmental Report (PER) would be acceptable for use. Based upon the guidance provided in RG 1.45 and the expected radioactivity values provided in the McGuire PER, the original licensing basis radioactivity detection sensitivity of each Unit's EMF39L was established assuming an RCS radioactivity concentration based upon a 0.1 percent failed fuel assumption. Using this same RG 1.45 guidance, the original licensing basis radioactivity detection sensitivity of each Unit's EMF38L was established assuming an RCS radioactivity concentration based upon corrosion product activities shown in Table 11-4 of the McGuire UFSAR.
McGuire Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.15 - RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation:
The EMF38L and EMF39L RCS leakage detection functions are ensured by compliance with the applicable requirements of TS 3.4.15. The TS 3.4.15 LCO states that EMF39L and either the EMF38L or VUCDT level monitor are to be operable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. As per TS 3.4.15, Condition B, if EMF39L is inoperable, either analyze grab samples of the respective Containment's atmosphere once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or perform an RCS water inventory balance once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. As per TS 3.4.15, Condition C, if both EMF38L and the VUCDT Level Monitor are inoperable, either restore EMF38L to operable status within 30 days or restore the VUCDT Level Monitor to operable status within 30 days.
If the required actions and completion times of Condition B or C are not met, TS 3.4.15 Condition D states that the applicable Unit shall be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Note that the TS 3.4.15 BASES states that, when the VUCDT Level Monitor is used as a RCS leakage detection method, manual hourly logging of the VUCDT level is required to satisfy the TS 3.4.15 LCO requirements.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Timeline:
November 19, 2004 > McGuire became aware of industry operating experience where a utility had received an NRC non-cited violation related to the inability of a Containment Atmosphere Gaseous Radioactivity Monitor to perform its design basis function of detecting a one gallon per minute leak from the RCS within one hour. The utility attributed this to RCS radioactivity levels lower than those used to establish the original licensing basis radioactivity detection sensitivity of the monitor.
December 15, 2004 > A McGuire evaluation, performed in response to the above operating experience, concluded that each Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L monitors were operable given that, as per RG 1.45 guidance, their sensitivities were established based upon the expected RCS radioactivity values at the time of original licensing.
Note that McGuire recognized that, due to improvements in fuel performance and corrosion products control, McGuire's RCS has lower radioactivity levels than those used to establish the original EMF38L and EMF39L licensing basis sensitivities. However, McGuire concluded that these EMFs were operable since their sensitivities were established using guidance provided in RG 1.45.
February 12, 2005 > As a result of NRC discussions, McGuire implemented conservative actions to perform an RCS water inventory balance on each Unit once per night shift. Although neither Unit's EMF39L had been declared inoperable, performance of this water inventory balance is a TS 3.4.15 required action for an inoperable EMF39L.
Concurrent with the above RCS leakage calculation, as a conservative measure, each Unit's VUCDT level was being manually logged once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
February 24, 2005 > McGuire implemented conservative actions to increase the frequency of manual logging of each Unit's VUCDT level to once per hour. Although neither Unit's EMF38L had been declared inoperable, manual logging of VUCDT level every hour satisfies the TS 3.4.15 LCO requirements whenever EMF38L is inoperable.
March 2, 2005 > Subsequent to discussions with the NRC, McGuire concluded that both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L were inoperable with respect to their RCS leakage detection function. For reporting purposes, this is the event discovery date.
Due to improvements in fuel performance and corrosion product control, there is significantly less radioactivity in the RCS than assumed in the calculations used to establish the original licensing basis EMF38L and EMF39L sensitivities. Given this, both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L sensitivities were not adequate to allow them to perform their design basis RCS leakage detection function of detecting a one gallon per minute leak from the RCS within one hour. Therefore, even though these sensitivities were established using RG 1.45 guidance, McGuire concluded this condition rendered EMF38L and EMF39L inoperable.
Given the information provided in the above timeline, both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L Monitors should have been declared inoperable with respect to their RCS leakage detection function for the period between December 15, 2004 (completion of initial evaluation) and March 2, 2005. Note that these EMFs were also inoperable prior to completion of the initial evaluation on December 15, 2004. Given that both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L were not declared inoperable as required, the applicable required actions and completion times of TS 3.4.15 were not satisfied. This represented an operation prohibited by TS which is reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
CAUSAL FACTORS
The initial evaluation completed on December 15, 2004, did not recognize that, even though the sensitivities of EMF38L and EMF39L appeared to comply with original licensing basis requirements, current RCS radioactivity levels precluded these EMFs from satisfying their intended function of detecting a one gallon per minute RCS leak within one hour.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Completed:
- On March 2, 2005, both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L were declared inoperable with respect to their RCS leakage detection function.
The applicable TS 3.4.15 required actions are being implemented.
- Temporary alarm setpoints have been established for both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L. These setpoints provide an earlier notification to Operators should a significant RCS leak be experienced.
- A Special Order was issued providing directions for monitoring of other diverse methods of RCS leakage detection.
Planned:
- The sensitivity of both Unit's EMF38L will be established as low as practical based upon actual RCS radioactivity levels. These sensitivities will be periodically reviewed and revised as practical and necessary.
- It may not be possible to adjust the sensitivity of EMF38L such that it would be capable of detecting a one gallon per minute leak from the RCS within one hour under all possible RCS activity levels. In addition, due to its design, it is not possible to adjust the sensitivity of EMF39L such that it would be capable of detecting a one gallon per minute leak from the RCS within one hour. Therefore, McGuire will submit a License Amendment Request to clarify the capabilities of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS leakage detection instrumentation as needed.
- Additional training will be conducted related to what is to be addressed when evaluating the capability of a structure, system, or component to perform its specified function(s).
SAFETY ANALYSIS
EMF38L and EMF39L are not modeled in the McGuire Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Therefore, the significance of this event will be assessed qualitatively.
TS 3.4.15 identifies the following separate RCS leakage detection instrumentation systems:
- Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level Monitor
- EMF38L and VUCDT Level Monitor.
The BASES for TS 3.4.15 states that the primary method of detecting RCS leakage into the containment is measurement of the Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level. The BASES also lists other monitoring methods such as containment air temperature and pressure monitoring.
Given the redundant RCS leakage detection methods and the absence of significant Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS leakage, the risk associated with the event was negligible. Therefore, the event described in this LER was not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A review of the McGuire corrective action database identified a 1994 event related to the inability of both Unit's EMF38L and EMF39L to detect a one gallon per minute leak from the RCS within one hour (reference LER 369/94-02). However, the circumstances, cause, and corrective actions associated with that event are sufficiently different such that the event described in this LER is not considered a recurring event.
Applicable Energy Industry Identification (EIIS) system and component codes are enclosed within brackets. McGuire unique system and component identifiers are contained within parentheses.
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05000328/LER-2005-001 | Unit 2 Reactor Trip Following Closure of Main Feedwater Upon Inadvertent Opening of Control Breakers | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000388/LER-2005-001 | DDegradation of Primary Coolant Pressure Boundary due to Recirculation Pump Discharge Valve Bonnet Vent Connection Weld Flaw | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000423/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000455/LER-2005-001 | Unit 2 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level resulting from a Software Fault on the Turbine Control Power Runback Feature | | 05000370/LER-2005-001 | Automatic Actuation of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps During Outage | | 05000244/LER-2005-001 | Failure of ADFCS Power Supplies Results in Plant Trip | | 05000247/LER-2005-001 | 0Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Exceeding the Allowed Completion Time for One Inoperable Train of ECCS Caused by an Inoperable Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Check Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000529/LER-2005-001 | REACTOR HEAD VENT AXIAL INDICATIONS CAUSED BY DEGRADED ALLOY 600 COMPONENT | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000336/LER-2005-001 | | | 05000266/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000269/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000289/LER-2005-001 | | | 05000293/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000298/LER-2005-001 | Reactor Scram due to Reactor Level Transient and Inadvertent Rendering of High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000331/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000315/LER-2005-001 | Reactor Trip Following Intermediate Range High Flux Signal | | 05000316/LER-2005-001 | Reactor Trip from RCP Bus Undervoltage Signal Complicated by Diesel Generator Output Breaker Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000317/LER-2005-001 | Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Inoperability Due to Handswitch Wiring | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000323/LER-2005-001 | TS 3.4.10 Not Met During Pressurizer Safety Valve Surveillance Testing Due to Random Lift Spread | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000333/LER-2005-001 | Inoperable Offsite Circuit In Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Out of Service Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000352/LER-2005-001 | Loss Of Licensed Material In The Form Of A Radiation Detector Calibration Source | | 05000353/LER-2005-001 | Core Alterations Performed With Source Range Monitor Alarm Horn Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000306/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000361/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000362/LER-2005-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G003 Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Wiring Connection on Emergency Supply Fan | | 05000263/LER-2005-001 | | | 05000456/LER-2005-001 | Potential Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4 Violation Due to Imprecise Original TS and TS Bases Wording | | 05000454/LER-2005-001 | Failed Technical Specification Ventilation Surveillance Requirements During Surveillance Requirement 3.0.3 Delay Period | | 05000282/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000286/LER-2005-001 | Plant in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications due to Error Making Control Room Ventilation System Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000400/LER-2005-001 | Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System Single Failure Vulnerability | | 05000395/LER-2005-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Load Due To A Loss Of Vital Bus | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000382/LER-2005-001 | RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of a Pressurizer Heater Sleeve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000305/LER-2005-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000369/LER-2005-001 | Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000266/LER-2005-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000255/LER-2005-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000361/LER-2005-002 | Missing Taper Pins on CCW Valve Cause Technical Specification Required Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000370/LER-2005-002 | Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Failed Surveillance Testing | | 05000353/LER-2005-002 | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to a Degraded Control Power Fuse Clip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000263/LER-2005-002 | | | 05000454/LER-2005-002 | One of Two Trains of Hydrogen Recombiners Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications Due to Inadequate Procedure | | 05000244/LER-2005-002 | Emergency Diesel Generator Start Resulting From Loss of Off-Site Power Circuit 751 | | 05000362/LER-2005-002 | Emergency Containment Cooling Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000247/LER-2005-002 | DTechnical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Exceeding the Allowed Completion Time for One Inoperable Train of ECCS Caused by Gas Intrusion from a Leaking Check Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000306/LER-2005-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000265/LER-2005-002 | Main Steam Relief Valve Actuator Degradation Due to Failure to Correct Vibration Levels Exceeding Equipment Design Capacities | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000286/LER-2005-002 | • Entergy Nuclear Northeast Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249Entergy Buchanan. NY 10511-0249 Tel 914 734 6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration July 5, 2005 Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket Nos. 50-286 N L-05-078 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject:L Licensee Event Report # 2005-002-00, "Automatic Reactor Trip Due to 32 Steam Generator Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch Caused by Low Feedwater Flow Due to Inadvertent Condensate Polisher Post Filter Bypass Valve Closure." Dear Sir: The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-002-00 is the follow-up written report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP3-2005-02478. There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668. Sincerely, 4F-/t R. Dacimo Vice President Indian Point Energy Center Docket No. 50-286 NL-05-078 Page 2 of 2 Attachment: LER-2005-002-00 CC: Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator — Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Resident Inspector Indian Point Unit 3 Mr. Paul Eddy State of New York Public Service Commission INPO Record Center NRC FORM 3660 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 50 hours.RReported lessons teamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 29555-0001, or by InternetLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) e-mail to Infocoilectsenrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-l0202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the Information collection. 1. FACIUTY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE INDIAN POINT 3 05000-286 10OF06 4. TITLE Automatic Reactor Trip Due to 32 Steam Generator Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch Caused by Low Feedwater Flow Due to Inadvertent Condensate Polisher Post Filter Bypass Valve Closure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000287/LER-2005-002 | Unit 3 trip with ES actuation due to CRD Modification Deficiencies | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000336/LER-2005-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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