05000368/FIN-2016002-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Incorporate Vendor Guidance in Work Order |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to incorporate vendor instructions in a work order. Specifically, the licensee exceeded the vendor specified torque values and performed the work with the component in service, contrary to vendor cautions, breaking the glass, wetting the auxiliary feedwater pump, and necessitating the unplanned shutdown of the main feedwater pump. The licensee replaced the ruptured sight glass and repaired and tested the wetted components. The licensee documented the issue in Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2015-04832. The failure to incorporate vendor instructions in a work order is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump and main feedwater pump B being rendered unavailable. The inspectors evaluated the finding with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding involved an actual loss of function of auxiliary feedwater and one train of main feedwater, designated as having high safety significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation and determined that the increase in core damage frequency was 1.3E-7/year (Green). The analyst assumed that all feedwater pumps were available until the time of the leak and that any increase in core damage frequency resulted from the unavailability of the pumps after the leak. The emergency feedwater system remained available to mitigate the increase in core damage frequency of this finding. The inspectors determined this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area of Work Management because the primary cause of the performance deficiency involved the failure to identify and manage risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities (Section 1R12). [H.5] |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000368/2016002 Section 1R12 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Barrett B Tindell M Tobin N O'Keefe |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000368/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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