05000366/LER-2016-004

LER-2016-004, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2
Event date:	11-07-2016
Report date:	01-04-2017
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3662016004R00 - NRC Website

LER 16-004-00 for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Inoperable PCIV

ML17004A231
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/03/2017
From:	Vineyard D R Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-16-2794 LER 16-004-00
Download: ML17004A231 (6)

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150.0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric — Boiling Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System codes appear in the text as (EIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On November 7, 2016 at 2355 EST, with Unit 2 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP), while performing a main control board panel walkdown, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) vacuum breaker motor operated isolation valve 2E41F111 (EIIS Code ISV) had been left in the open position with its breaker turned off. Upon subsequent investigation, it was determined that since the valve provides a primary containment isolation function, it is required for operation in the current plant condition. The 2E41F111 was then declared inoperable and the 2E41F104 redundant penetration motor operated isolation valve was closed and deactivated to meet the required action per Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A.1.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The unacceptable as-found condition of the 2E41 F111 primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) was due to supervision failing to recognize that the tagout preparer did not possess the proper skill set to perform the task. This led to assigning an individual to prepare the tag out who did not have the appropriate knowledge of basic TS. Additionally, invalid assumptions were made by the tag out reviewer concerning the PCIV TS Bases when rendering a PCIV inoperable.

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. Upon review of the tagout, it was determined that the valve had been in a condition prohibited by TS for greater than the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LCO completion time.

Although the 2E41F111 was left in the open position with its breaker turned off, the manual HPCI turbine exhaust valve 2E41F021 was tagged in the closed position per the tagout instructions. This allowed the associated piping to be isolated such that primary containment boundary functions as assumed in the safety analyses were maintained. However, because the valve is Appendix J, Type A tested instead of being Appendix J, Type C tested this is a condition prohibited by TS per the Unit 2 Hatch TS Bases LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A.1 which states that the device used to isolate a penetration must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. Therefore, if the inoperable valve is Appendix J, Type C tested, the device used to isolate the associated penetration flow path must also be Appendix J, Type C tested per current Hatch TS Bases. TS required actions were met once the 2E41F104 isolation valve was closed since this valve is also Appendix J, Type C tested. Based on this information, the event is considered to have very low safety significance.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Expectations were instituted to ensure individuals assigned with preparing tagouts associated with TS equipment are trained on the basics of TS. Enhancement actions were also taken to label all PCIV equipment in the clearance and tagging database as containment related components. In addition, guidance will be provided to determine when a pre-job brief is required to be conducted before developing a tagout.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.ResourceOnrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Other Systems Affected: None.

Failed Components Information:

Master Parts List Number: 2E41F111 Manufacturer: Dresser Industries Model Number: Hancock Type 950 W Motor Operated Gate Valve Type: Isolation Valve Manufacturer Code: D245 EIIS System Code: BJ Reportable to EPIX: Yes Root Cause Code: A EIIS Component Code: ISV Commitment Information: This report does not create any licensing commitments.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

None.