05000354/FIN-2015007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to establish appropriate acceptance criteria for RHR and core spray pump start times during simulated LOCA/LOP testing. |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because PSEG did not establish appropriate acceptance criteria for the time allowed for starting the residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray pumps during simulated loss-of-coolant accident/loss-of-offsite power (LOCA/LOP) conditions in the 18-month integrated emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance test (ST) for the vital 4KV buses. Specifically, the ST acceptance criteria failed to confirm that the pumps started in accordance with the design basis loading sequence described in the design analyses and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 8.3-1. PSEGs short-term corrective actions included reviewing LOCA/LOP test results and plant historical data to confirm current operability of the RHR and core spray pumps, and initiating corrective action notifications to determine the appropriate ST acceptance criteria and to trend pump start times. The team determined that the failure to specify adequate acceptance limits for the design basis assigned start times for the RHR and core spray pumps during LOCA/LOP conditions in the 18-month integrated EDG ST procedure was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2 Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. The team determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Documentation, in that PSEG failed to maintain accurate test acceptance documentation to aid plant staff in the identification of equipment performance that was outside the acceptable limits of design. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2015007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Brand J Kulp J Schoppy M Yeminy P Krohn S Kobylarz S Makor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2015007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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